referendum and the
political crisis italy the divorce On May 12 the Italian electorate will be asked for the first time since the adoption of the present constitution to participate in a referendum. The issue at stake is the divorce low, which has already been in force for several years and which reactionary groups are now demanding be repealed. The division among political forces on this issue is along the following lines: The Christian Democrats and the MS! (the neo-fascist Italian Socialist Movement) are for repeal; the PCI (Italian Communist party), the PSI (Italian Socialist party), the PSDI (right wing Italian Social Democratic party). the PRI (Italian Republican party), and the PLI (Italian Liberal party) are against repeal. Thus the present coalition government is divided on the issue. But the division also extends into the parties. Certain parties risk being challenged if not by their members then at least by some of the sections of the electorate that traditionally support them. The referendum has been delayed twice (because of the elections of spring 1972 and through subtle interpretations of the low). In practice the delay has been due to the fact that the governmental porties hesitated to enter into a test that divides them, the outcome of which is uncertain. The Catholic Church itself, while struggling fiercely against divorce, appears irresolute: it has always maintained the pseudo-juridical fiction according to which more than 90% of Italians are Catholics and it fears the loss of prestige if the majority, or a very substantial minority, of these "Catholics" vote for divarce against the advice of St. Peter's. As for the Communist party, it has always openly proclaimed that it was scared of vacillations among it electoral supporters (and perhaps even among its members!), but also and above all because the confrontation of the referendum represents an obstacle for the CP's orientation toward collaboration with the Christian Democrats for the perspective of the "historic compromise" propounded by Berlinguer. This is why Berlinguer and his friends sought an agreement right up to the last minute (trying to get Parliament to adopt a new divorce law). It was not due to the CP that all these attempts A POLITICAL BATTLE THAT GOES BEYOND DIVORCE The present electoral struggle -- it is necessary to say immediately -- goes far beyond the importance of the question 8 of divorce itself. It is naturally important not to underestimate the importance for Italy of an elementary democratic acquisition like divorce -- even in such a restricted and partial form as the one that was introduced in Italy. It is also important not to ignore the demoralizing repercussions that would occur if, after the great mass mobilizations of the last six years, such an acquisition could be quashed by o conservative and reactionary initiative. But the real stakes are still more important. May 12 will be a major clash between political forces and the verdict of the electors will not simply affect divorce but will determine in an important way the solution to the political crisis that the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in overcoming. Here it is necessary to deal briefly with the context given to the referendum by the events of the last few years. Because of the opportunism of the traditional workers parties, and because of the absence of a revolutionary organization able to intervene as a real political alternative, the Italion bourgeoisie succeeded in surmounting the crucial period of 1969-70 when a prerevolutionary crisis unfolded in the country. Nevertheless it was incapable of imposing a "normalization" and a retum to the relative stability of 1968. The situation remained extremely unstable and rent with conflich; the working class did not retreat; the student movement, despite its cyclical oscillations, maintained its potential; and large layers of the petty-bourgeoisie remained involved in the wave of radicalization (in certain cases - it is not a new phenomenon -- certain petty-bourgeois layers began to mobilize after the workers radicalization had reached its high point). Finally, the bourgeoisie did not succeed in resolving its crisis of leadership. It is this last aspect that is tied most closely to the present electoral struggle. The upsurge of workers struggle in 1968-69 precipitated the crisis of the so-called "center-lefi" formula of government that had been adopted at the beginning of the 1960. Neverthe less, this formula survived because no alternative appeared on the left and, on the other, because in the rela-
tion of forces created by the mobilization of the mosses, a right wing alternative oppeared extremely dangerous. All attempts to create a reactionary wave through the so-called "strategy of tension" failed lamentably, and certain initiatives of fascist origin -- for example the attack that led to a massacre in a Milan bank on December 12, 1969 -- had rebounded against the reactionaries and against those who had sought to exploit these events. A PROLONGED CRISIS OF BOURGEOIS LEADERSHIP Certain sections of the bourgeoisie -- who are not easy to characterize from a social and economic angle but who are politically identified with a certain wing of the Christian Democrats -- started to move toward a right wing shift in the spring 1971. This move corresponded in the first place to the need of the employers to "restore order in the house" (in other words to restore their damaged authority and to reestablish a satisfactory rate of profit). It also corresponded to a fear that a prolongation of the unstable situation would help, including on the electoral plane, the neofascists to make substantial progress. (Local elections had indicated that this was not necessarily an unfounded fear.) The mounting economic crisis, which placed the workers movement on the defensive and raised the spectre of layoffs and unemployment, also favored this tum, at least partially. The scheduled election of the president, who in Italy is elected by the two chambers of Parliament together, offered an opportunity to realize this project and to create new alliances. The election of Leone to the presidency at the end of 1971 on the basis of a right wing bloc was the first concretizatior of this turn. Soon afterwards the center-left government was replaced by a government of the center-right directed by Andreotti. It was based on collaboration with the liberals, who in Italy are a right wing party, and which played the card of calling elections. The clections allowed the Christian Democrats to consolidate their position but they did not stabilize the situation -- even on the Parliamentary plane. For this reason the second Andreotti government, formed after the elections, continually Found itself in an unstable and difficult situation; the bourgeoisie's crisis of leadership was not really overcome. Neverthe less the bourgeoisie decided to support the center-right in the hope that Andreatti would succeed in recreating a certain cohesion and efficiency in the state apparatus and would succeed in making progress on the road to "normalization" in the factories and in the schools and colleges. The battle around the renewal of the wage agreements in the most important industrial sectors, in the First place the metal workers, became a major new confrontation in which the government and the employers -- helped by an economic situation that pressed heavily on the workers -- hoped to consolidate their new formula and to wear down the combativity of the This six-month battle was even longer than that of 1969. The demands of the unions were in general moderate and the stubborn resistance of the employers could only be explained by political motives. But the employers' operation -exactly from the political angle -- suffered a defeat. The temporizing tactics of the employers not only did not break the combativity of the workers but, on the contrary, provoked mobilizations of enormous dimensions (e.g. the demonstration of 250,000 metalworkers in Rome in February 1973)
and, in the decisive weeks of the struggle, led to great explosions such as the occupation of Fiat-Mirafiori and other factories in Turin. Andreotti's operation reached its end of the congress of the Christian Democrats and wos liquidated in favor of a new attempt at a center-left coalition (the formation in July 1973 of the Rumor government with the participation of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the Republicans). WHAT 'HISTORIC COMPROMISE'? The new center-left coalition had two foctors working in its favor: the re-expansion of the economy and the conciliatory attitude of the trade unions and the Communist party. The trade unions were ready to accept a truce and to negotiate with the goverment on its economic policy. The PCI, which considered the fall of Andreotti as a victory, declared that its opposition would be of a "different Type"; in other words it did not want to create serious difficulties for the government. The theory of the "historic compromise," including Communists, Socialists and Catholics in a bloc, relaunched with fanfares after the coup d'efat in Chile, sketched out a perspective of a long-term "apposition of a different type." However, the economic expansion was accompanied by on accelerated rate of inflation that rapidly eroded the workers' incomes and operated as an uncontrolled redistributor of income. The oil crisis exacerbated the difficulties and nullified all the government's measures. In this situation the unions, always under strong pressure from the rank and file, could no longer maintain the truce; they opened up a new stage of struggles, axised on factories or sectors of industry, which culminated in, among other things, the limited national strike of February 27 this year. The government was again torn by internal contradictions and was paralyzed. The government resigned and wes replaced by another Rumor government in which the Republicans did not participate, although they supported it from outside, and which included representatives of the left of the PSI and the right of the Christion Democrats, including Andreotti, who had not participated in the previous government. The change was very small, although it was o slight shift to the right. In any case, it is necessary to stress again that the new Rumor government is o very provisional solution, which can be called into question at any moment and could be swept away by the result of the referendum of May 12. This succession of crises, accompanied by a succession of scandals implicating politicians, famous industrialists and managers, judges, civil servants, university professors and notable doctors has produced, in the context of the socioeconomic situation we have already outlined, a profound wearing down of the bourgeois-democratic regime installed after the second world war. Consciousness of the extreme gravity of the situation, and of the paralyzing crisis that the ruling class now finds itself in, has been general for some time: It is only necessary to read the best known daily newspapers -- notably Corriere della Sera of Milan and 11 Messaggero of Rome -- to see this. In principle the bourgeoisie has two ways out. Faced with the erosion of the parliamentary regime and with the necessity of reorganizing the economy, it can decide to bring the crisis to a head and install an authoritarion regime. On the other hand, faced with a mobilization of the masses that is still very strong, it can move towards a diametrically opposed solution and attempt to conclude an alliance with the
9
italy whole traditional workers movement, including the PCI, in the hope of bringing about rationalizing reforms. In other words it could, in essence, accept the "historic compromise" and renew the traditions of the bloc of parties of the working class and of the bourgeoisie that existed between 1944 and 1947. The tragedy for the Italian bourgeoisie today lies precisely in the fact that it cannot bring off either of these operations. It is true that, especially since the coup in Chile, rumors of a military coup have been circulating, strange movements have occurred in the barracks*, the neo-fascists have intensified their activity, and the police have engaged in provocations. But despite all this the arguments against a coup d'elat are enormous: The relation of forces and the mobilization of masses continually argues against the bourgeoisie undertaking an initiative that would carry such dangers. As for the project of the "historic compromise, " if continues to run into objective, and even more subjective, difficulties that cannot be overcome in the short term. If is for this reason that the center-left has been able continually to rise from the ashes and stagger from one crisis to another without a coherent orientation and without the possibility of putting into practice even the modest programs that it periodically puts forward. There has been much talk in recent weeks of a Bonapartist project led by Fanfani, the present secretary of the Christian Democrats. One of his speeches, in particular, has provoked alarmist comments in the press, from Lotta Continua (an extreme left newspaper) to Corriere della Sera (the main bourgeois newspaper). But we do not believe that such an operation -- whose precise contours are difficult to fix at present - could really be worked out and put through successfully. Among other things bonapartism needs a Bonaparte, and Fanfani does not meet the requirements of such a role. In the final analysis, by his function as secretary of the majority party and by having been the head of the government Fanfani is too much associated with the regime for him to become simultancously its gravedigger and the inheritor of RECONSTRUCTING A RIGHT-WING ALTERNATIVE Nevertheless while a real Bonapartist operation is still a thing of the future, this does not prevent certain important sections of the ruling class and of various political tendencies with some real weight seeking to prepare in the short term a more profound and less improvised right turn than that of the two Andreatti goverments. They have decided to exploit the referendum on May 12 taward this end. In effect the struggle for the abrogation of divorce is aimed at constructing a bloc of conservative and reactionary forces with a very large mass base and thus to demonstrate that beyond the present distribution of seats in Parliament a rightwing alternative exists. The victory of the anti-divorce front would severely damage the Socialists, the other partics in the coalition favorable to divorce, the left wing of the Christian Democrats, and the PC and the workers movement in general (the liberals could console themselves about the abrogation of the divorce law by the fact that they would rapidly enter into the bossom of the government). Simultaneously the room for maneuver by the fascists, who are to some extent the cutting edge of the anti-divorce coalition, would be greatly increased.
Certainly the conservatives' task is not easy: the bourgeoisie remains divided, certain Catholic organizations hesitate, the church itself is for from unanimous. This is why the batHe is simultaneously a struggle within the ruling class and an attack on the workers movement and its allies. The PCI, for its part, is deeply engaged in the struggle. Its leaders have understood what is at stake and know that their basic strategy is being subjected to a severe fest. In face of the new Rumor government and in the face of the rejection of all compromise on the question of divorce by Fanfani and the leadership of the Christion Democrats, the PCI has made a turn: "opposition of a different type" has been replaced by "intransigent opposition." This helps them to solidify their ranks and causes difficultics for the far left. As we have said, vacillations are possible on the question of divorce among the militants of the party; This has left the PCI leaders with no choice but to politicize the struggle and present it as a test of strength between "democratic progress" and reaction. The radicalization of their opposition to the goyemment also flows from this need. Nevertheless, the thorough opportunism of the bureaucracy continues to show itself even in the orientation of the electoral campaign. The perspective of the "historic compromise" has not been abandoned and the campaign for the defense of divorce is carried out with timid and fundamentally conservative arguments: Divorce is presented as a solution for pathological cases and therefore as an instrument for the defense of happy families. All the rotten products of Stalinism are trotted out again. The revolutionary Marxists base their campaign on the political significance of the present confrontation, while at the same time seizing the opportunity to explain their views on the family, bourgeois ideology, sexual repression, the liberafion of women, etc. They conceive their struggle as completely independent of that of the other currents that support divorce. Here they diffarentiate themselves from the other organizations of the revolutionary left - from Lotta Continua to Avanguardia Operia -- which have not hesitated to participate in common demonstrations with bourgeois parfies that support divorce, the liberals included. "Turn the battle on the referendum into a general political confrontation" -- this was the conclusion of the pamphlet distributed by the Italian section of the Fourth International. "NO to the reactionary attempt of the Christian Democrats to coalesce the dissatisfied petty-bourgeoisie, the bigots, and the fascists into an anti-working-class front. If the abrogation of the divorce law is approved, the bourgcoisie will go forward in its attack to impose austerity, ' order, "discipline. We say clearly: VOTE NO! "NO to all those who defend the bourgeois concept of the Family, an instrument for the transmission of the ideology of the ruling class! For an anti-capitalist outcome to the struggle of the workers and students; no concessions to the historic compromise; no renunciation of the struggle for the defense of wages and employment. To help prepare the workers counteroffersive vote NOI"
- LIVIO MAITAN * It is necessary to be on guard against the exaggerations that sometimes appear in the press on this question (e. g. there never was a night during which "Rome was occupied by the army"). L