PRETORIA'S DIPIOMATK TURN by JOHN BLAIR It is now quite clear that the events fouched off in southern Africa by the repercussions of the fall of the Salazarist dictatorship and in particular by the September 7 Lusaka agreement, which traced out the steps towards independence for Mozambique by June 25, 1975, have profoundly affected the approach of the government of South Africa to the souther African region. First, on the question of Mozambique: For more than ten years Pretoria had been the closest ally of Portuguese colonialism, exchanging military missions and equipment and collaborating in intelligence activities in the attempt to suppress the Frelimo liberation fighters. But immediately after the Lusaka agreement, promises of "continued collaboration and cooperation" with the new government flowed from the mouths of South African spokesmen. Three key economic considerations have determined their attifude: 1. Fifty percent of South Africa's trade is conducted through the port of Lourenco-Marques, which is the nearest outlet for South Africa's industrial heartland, the Transvaal area around Johannesburg. Any disruption of this transportation link would have disastrous effects on the already overstrained rail system and ports. 2. The gold mines of South Africa are now almost totally dependent on imported labor from surrounding countries. For the mine managements, Imported labor is superior because the workers come for limiled periods of time - a maximum of welve months - and do not bring families. That prevents the formation of a real proletariat so that the threat of unionization, strike action, and so on, is considerably reduced. Furthermore, the imported labor is
Vorster recruited from wide areas in the surrounding territories, and the mine owners undoubtedly benefit from the exploitation of ethnic and language differences among various groups in the work force -even though such factors can occasionally overflow into clashes that disrupt production, like those that are currently affecting the Western Deep Level Mine of the Anglo-American Corporation. The key result is that mine wages are depressed way below the average for blacks in South Africa. This makes it possible to work seams equivalent in mineral content to those that were closed down as unprofitable in the United States thirty years ago. Of this imported contract labor some 100,000 people a year (approximately 25 percent of the work force) come from Mozambique. Moreover, since Hostings Kamazu Banda, president of Malawi (the source of another 28 percent of the imported labor), is now threatening to clamp down on recruitment, it is vital for the South African mining industry that the Mozambique quota be maintained, if not increased, in the future. 3. In Mozambique the Cabora Bassa dam project on the Zambezi River in Tete province is nearing completion of its first stage. The massive hydroelectric station is linked by overhead cables with the Transvaal, to which the overwhelming majority of power produced is supposed to be exported. The dam's construction by a South African-led consortium has been an essential brick in Pretoria's strategy to minimize its dependence on foreign-controlled energy. These three factors explain the attitudes taken by the South African government, the acid test of which came when white racists in Lourenço-Marques staged their protest against the Lusaka agreement.
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SOUTH AFRICA There were bloody clashes in the streets of the city, and the obligatory "horror stories" appeared in the South African press. But in a speech to Parliament, Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller enunciated the following principles: No South African mercenaries would be allowed into Mozambique under any circumstances; South Africa would not interfere in the situation and would offer cooperation with the Mozambique authorities; South Africa held "no brief for colonialism in any shape or form" and was strongly opposed to neocolonialism; it strongly belleved in self-determination for its own and Africa's blacks and would not "take fright and run away from it" in Mozambique; lastly, the Republic possessed "an understanding and appreciation of black nationalism." Clearly, this jumble of hypocrisy and statement of intent was aimed at the Frelimo leadership and the people of Mozambique; in addition, as we shall see, it was directed to the leadership of certain other black African states. The same factors help to explain why Minister of the Interior Connie Mulder has twice warned white "refugees" from Mozambique that they must follow proper immigration procedures in entering South Africa. He also stated that in any case most of them were not wanted in South Africa, with the exception of a few hundred skilled workers. Clearly then, safeguarding their economic interests has been paramount in determining the recent altitudes of the South African rulers toward developments in Mozambique. The success or failure of these maneuvers cannot be determined with certainty; but the indications are ominous. Frelimo Prime Minister Joaquim Chissane has several times affirmed his government's desire for collaboration with all neighboring territories, and there have been unconfirmed press reports that secret clauses in the Lusaka pact guarantee the continuation of the Cabora Bassa agreement. With regard to Rhodesia, the change in the South Ipt African line has headed in the opposite direction. Of course, the Vorster government has never been a fervent supporter of lan Smith's positions. Unlike Mozambique, Rhodesia has no economic importance for South Africa. In fact, since Rhodesia's "unilateral declaration of independence, * it has actually been an economic strain, because South Africa has hod to compensate for some of the shortages arising from economic sanctions. Rhodesia has also put a heavy burden on the South African transport system, because many of its imports and exports (chrome, for example have had to pass through South Africa in order to appear as South African on shipping documentation. Should the new Mozambique government carry out a policy of full economic sanctions by cutting the crucial rail link with the port of Beira, which carries 80 percent of Rhodesia's trade, the 34
TUC pressure, particularly on the already hard-pressed South African rail network, would become intolerable. Although South African involvement in the war against the ZANU guerrillas in Rhodesia has perhaps provided Vorster's police and military with some valuable training, Vorster certainly realizes that the present renewed upsurge in the fighting there is a signal that in the long run this war would be a bottomless pit for South African men, military resources, and money. Finally, not the least consideration in Pretoria's calculations is that there have been clear indications that the issue of Rhodesia is the biggest current obstacle to the "normalization" of relations with the black-ruled states to the north. So far there has been no decision to end support to Smith, although that has been advocated in the press. The October 18 Johannesburg Star, for instance, declared: "Black rule in Mozambique makes the Rhodesian 'white buffer' less important to us strategically. Economically she is largely a burden. And politically we have plenty of our own crosses to bear without the embarrassing bit of surplus baggage to the north. At the United Nations we have been having our roughest ride yet: and on top of that Britain, which generally leaves us alone there, has criticised South Africa in unusually specific terms as the chief breaker of economic sanctions against Rhodesia. ... We suggest Mr. Vorster use his position of unique influence with Mr. Smith to Force the pace of constructive change there. He must spell out that the fantasy of indefinite white supremacy has a very limited tenure indeed." Not quite so explicit, but clearly thinking the samero way, was Vorster himself in a speech to Parliament on October 23 in which he claimed he did not want to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. But he believed that "with goodwill an honourable solution could be found to that country's constitutional dispute. " The heavy hint implied in this statement was no doubt well calculated to be acted upon in Salisbury. The third area in which South African policy has undergone a subtle change of emphasis in the past period is Namibia. This ex-German colony of South West Africa, handed over to South African administration under League of Nations mandate in 1919, has been a constant source of contention between South Africa and a majority of states at the United Nations, which inherited ultimate responsibility for the country. The territory, which has effectively been integrated into the apartheid state, has consistently seen the most developed opposition to the regime, chiefly through the medium of SWAPO (South West African People's Organization). In 1973 SWAPO was able to organize an effective
...the gold mines are dependent on imported labor boycott of the polls organized to set up a Bantustantype puppet government, while workers actions resisting the migrant labor system have been recurrently militant, particularly in Ovamboland. Vorster's change of line on Namibia consists of his recent statements that the people of that "province" should be given an opportunity to decide their own future. Of course, this could be interpreted solely as a move in the diplomatic game around South African membership in the UN, which was maintained only through the joint Security Council veto by France, Britain, and the United States. But it is likely to have somewhat deeper significance. Namibia is adjacent to Angola, which, despite the current maneuvers of the Portuguese regime and the disarray of the nationalist movements, threatens to achieve its independence in the not too distant future. Ovamboland itself stroddles the NamibiaAngola border, and the continual two-way movement of population poses a threat to the stability of racist rule in Namibia. Vorster is obviously thinking of the possibility of ridding himself of this potentially troublesome and continually embarrassing possession in order to be able to strengthen his grip on the heartland of South Africa. Here again the white racists are dealing with an area that is particularly crucial to them economically, especially in the matter of labor supply. Their aim is to try to produce a solution that would bow to the notion of formal independence but keep the area tied to Pretoria in reality. Today, such a maneuver would certainly founder on the strength of SWAPO. In reply to Vorster's statement obout the need for the future of Namibia to be decided by the people of the area SWAPO pointed out that the wide support they already enjoyed was evidence enough of the desire for total independence. They pledged to continue the armed struggle until all South African forces are completely withdrawn. But if all these subtle changes in policy toward these three areas have immediate importance for certain very clearly identifiable political and economic interests of the South African government, their total effect is designed to have repercussions not only in those neighboring territories, but also throughouf Africa to the north. One aspect of the changes is the possibility that they are an attempt to consolidate the white racist stronghold on a smaller and more easily defensible basis in the heartland of the South African state itself. But the other aspect, of at least equal importance, is the acknowledged attempt to "normalize" relations with block Africa, which has been expressed by Vorster himself on numerous occasions. In his keynote speech October 23 he stressed that South Africa wanted to work with other nations on the continent through technical and monetary assistance. Of course, the reality behind this statement is that as the leaders of the most economically developed power on the continent, the South African rulers see themselves as the potential dean of a subimperialism extending far to the north. Steps in this direction have already been taken, particularly through the close relationships built up with Malawi and the Ivory Coast. But Vorster is after much bigger fish, and on October 26 it looked as if he had indeed caught the biggest one of all. In a speech on that day Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda had this to say about Vorster's October 23 speech: "He declared his faith in the future and
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SOUTH AFRICA expressed his optimism about future developments in southern Africa. This is the voice of reason for which the world has waited for many years. " Setting out his conditions for a détente, Kaunda said: "Rhodesia and Namibia, after the end of the war in Mozambique, are the major obstacles to peace and cooperation between the people of South Africa and the people of the rest of Africa. Unless these obstacles are removed, the basic causes of conflict will remain." Throughout the speech Kaunda gave the impression that if the racist government were to withdraw from Namibia and Rhodesia, then the way would lie open for its cooperation with Zambia. Careful observers of Kaunda's politics were not surprised by this development. On October 19, for example, the following statements had appeared in a center-page feature in the government-owned Daily Mail: "In hard economic terms any improvement in relations between South Africa and black Africa would • be enormously beneficial to both sides. ... The closure of the border between Zambia and Rhodesia has cost South Africa millions of kwacha (the Zambian unit of currency, approximately equal to US$1.40) worth in exports and other business. And it has cost Zambia millions of kwacha because of the costly re-routing operation the border closure has entailed. . . . And countries such as Zambia which now import a large range of goods from Europe would be able to make considerable savings in exchange by taking South African goods. . .. Zambia would also be able to buy South African mining equipment at an appreciably lower cost and its Southern Province, now something of a backwater, would once again become an important crossroads of trade. The article also admiringly quoted statements describing South African Foreign Minister Muller as "no ruffian, and in the South African context probably a liberal. It is also of course noteworthy that until Smith's 36 precipitate closure of the border in January 1973 Zambia had carried on very extensive trace with South Africa; until this year, half of its copper mines remained under the management of Oppenheimer's Anglo-American Corporation, which still holds 49 percent of the shares in Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines. Indeed, whatever its verbal pledges of solidarity with the forces hostile to apartheid, the Kaunda government has always sought to maximize profits through as liberal an attitude as possible toward economic relationships. Right now it is eagerly taking advantage of the possibilities opened by Vorster's remarks to reopen these lucrative links. But above and beyond such considerations, the desire of the leaders of neocolonial black Africa to normalize relations with South Africa and consequently defuse the opposition movements has a more deep-rooted and crucial motivation. The eruption of the revolution of the black masses of South Africa against the apartheid system will be entirely different in character and effect from any other liberation struggle that has taken place on the continent. In this most industrially developed country all the key imperialist states are fast increasing their stake in the profits to be derived from the cheap labor force guaranteed by the racist laws. The revolution that will ultimately rise up against this system cannot fail to pose from its earliest stages the socialist tasks of totally destroying that imperialist penetration. And the effects of such a development would not stop at the borders of South Africa, but would send ripples throughout the continent, shaking the foundations even of regimes as seemingly solidly entrenched as that of Kaunda. If Vorster's present moves are being welcomed as opening the way to a "new order in southern africa" it is because the governments of neocolonial Africa ultimately have as much interest in preserving "stability" as Vorster does. D November 5
revolution:
GUINEA-BISSAU the
Three comrades of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (