DEBATE WELL UNDER CONTROL by ANTOINE PUECH
François Mitterrand 02022992299 That is a new feature of the political situation after the presidential election (of May 1974).... All the more so in that the Socialist party has not clearly rejected Giscard's solicitations. " (G. Marchais in l'Humanité, the organ of the CP, March 11, 1975.) That is what the leaders of the PCF are hammering on, and they are going as far as to refer to the history of the French Social Democracy, to the role of Léon Blum in the Popular Front of 1936. The PCF leaders are explaining that there has been a difference "in character" between the PCF and the SP ever since the split in the SP at the 1921 congress in Tours, when a minority of the Socialists refused to join the Communist International. The alleged difference is that the PCF is a "revolutionary party" defending the interests of the working people and the SP is a "reformist party." The PCF retaliated for the "turn" of the SP by refusing to organize common meetings with the SP in the major cities of France! For several days now, the polemic has eased up, but it has not disappeared. After a meeting of the Committee of Liaison of the Left, the PCF, the SP, and the Left Radicals decided to engage in a unifed
campaign to defend jobs and protest the high cost of living and to conduct the campaign on the basis of the proposals contained in the Common Program, which has been signed by all three parties. A series of united meetings in the big cities has even been planned. But even so, the PCF has not complete ly suspended its polemic. Paul Laurent, a member of the Political Bureau of the PCF, hailed the plan for the common campaign and portrayed it as a consequence of the policy of his party; but at the same time he expressed regret about the limits of the agreement, declaring: "We would have wished for even greater clarity on the problem of nationalizations and their extension. " When Giscard d'Estaing paid a visit to Marseille, whose mayor is Gaston Deferre, one of the principal leaders of the SP, the PCF made some criticisms, reproaching Deferre for having received Giscard d'Estaing and for having prepared the visit secretly so as to head off any "popular response. " In an article in the March 4 l'Humanité Roland Leroy, another member of the PCF Political Bureau, hailed the united action that had been "rediscovered" by the left parties, but neverthe less reaffirmed the Communists' intention to make whatever criticisms of the SP they felt were necessary in any event. A "left turn" by the PCF? Some people have quickly analyzed this "hardening" of the PCF as a sort of "class reflex" against the Social Democracy and have simply reproached the PCF for not going far enough. For example, the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU - United Socialist party, a centrist formation) observed that in the present crisis situation "the choice is between a policy of "egalitarian' austerity of the Delors or Rocard type(1) and a resolutely anticapitalist policy not restricted to just a few nationalizations. " Then it continued by explaining: "While rejecting the first solution, the PCF has not opted for the second. But as long as it has not chosen its strategy, it will continue to make its peace with the Social Democracy. " (Tribune Socialiste, the weekly of the PSU, No. 636.) As if the PCF had not long ago clearly chosen a reformist strategy concretized in the Common Program ! As if it had some possibility of putting forward another policy! The reasons for the hardening of the PCF must be sought neither in some "class reflex" nor in the alleged evolution of the international situation foward a new period of "cold war" between the United States and the USSR and a consequent new "left course " by the various Stalinist parties. If there is a reflex on the part of the PCF, it is a reflex of self-preservation. The PCF began to open fire on the SP just after the legislative by-elections of the end of 1974, which confirmed that the SP was gaining ground on the PCF on the electoral field. This was a supplementary confirmation of a tendency that the PCF leaders had already noted in the legislative elections of 1973 and the presidential elections of 1974. During those elections, in some regions the PCF suffered losses of about 5 percent, while the SP made gains of about the same magnitude. Marchais then observed that "for the first time, the unity that has been realized profited the SP more than it profited us. While these particular warning signals were the most visible ones, they were not the only ones. On the eve of the presidential elections the Communist Youth had 6,000 fewer membership-card holders than it hod had a year before. In the big factories there is a stagnation or even decline in the number of members and supporters of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT - General Confederafion of Labor, the CP-led union federation) and a strengthening of the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT - French Democratic Confederation of Labor). (See table.) While the leaders of the PCF may have expected that their policy of unity would result in a certain strengthening of the SP, they had not counted on such a leap forward by the Social Democracy. The development of the SP is part of the same process that is reflected in the development of the CFDT and, on another level, of the revolutionary groups: a process of recomposition of forces within the workers movement that has been going on since 1968 and is tending to place in question the PCF's hegemony over the organized workers movement. (2) The PCF could accept an electoral growth of the SP, but its aim was for the SP to become the party of the "new middle classes, " for the SP to eat into the electorate that normally votes for the center parties. The aim was not for the SP to eat into the PCF's electoral support and link up with the CFDT to challenge the PCF's hegemony in the workers movement. For one of the strong points and special features of the PCF as a Stalinist party is precisely its ties with the working class. To maintain these ties is virtually a matter of survival for the PCF. By "hardening" its position it hopes to shift the relationship of forces in its favor in anticipation of the next elections (legislative elections are set for 1978). In addition, the polemic opened by the PCF, the "scrapping" that is going on in the Union de la Gauche, and, finally, the PCF's relative loss of political credibility all serve as excuses for the PCF to postpone the anticipated date of its entry into the government and to wait for the next elections. Indeed, if the unity between the PCF and
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FRANCE the SP had been strengthened after the presidential elections, if the parties of the left had appeared more united than ever, and if they had been increasing their political weight, how then could it be explained to the workers that it is necessary to wait until 1978 before getting rid of the Giscard regime? How could the refusal of the reformists to engage in a test of strength with the regime during the strike of the postal workers and public service employees this past autumn be explained? How could the absence of a centralized response to the massive rise of unemployment be justified, when workers combativity clearly exists? The PCF's polemic denouncing the SP as being responsible for the situation has some demoralizing effects within the working class and thus serves as a diversion from all these problems and as a justification for waiting for the next electoral dates that have been set by the bourgeoisie. A right turn by the SP? Because of the needs of the moment, the PCF analyzed the congress of the Socialist party that took place in Pau in February 1975 as a "right turn." Actually, things are not that simple. The big event of the congress was that the "left opposition" of the SP, the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Socialistes (CERES - Center of Socialist Research and Study), was removed from the central leadership positions of the party. Let us note that the CERES is a very pale left opposition, a left reformist current that "fights" within the SP in the name of the Common Program and of unity in action with the PCF; it is not at all a centrist current balancing between reform and revolution. Rather than reflecting a turn to the right, the eviction of the CERES from the leadership represents a tactical maneuver by Mitterrand within the SP. The significant gains that the CERES was making (it had 25 percent of the votes at the congress) forced Mitterrand to react. He had a choice: Either he could keep the CERES in the leadership of the party, which would have had the advantage of reducing the "left" maneuvering room of the CERES, but would have led the SP into a polemic with the PCF (among other things) with a heterogeneous leadership and also would have amounted to Mitterrand's sanctioning the gains of the CERES and its plans for gradually nibbling away at the party apparatus. Or else, he could have issued a warning to the CERES by excluding it from the leadership, at the risk of seeing it fall into opposition and thus intensify its "leftist" aura. Aware of the limits of the leftist evolution of the CERES and under pressure from his base, 16
Mitterrand opted for the second solution. Between two evils, you have to choose the lesser one! But all this was absolutely not accompanied by the significant development of rightist currents within the SP questioning the alliance with the PCF, currents on which Mitterrand would have drawn support. (3) Furthermore, the SP reaffirmed its determination to "accept its governmental responsibilities" even if the PCF maintained its refusal to enter the government under a Giscard presidency: "The Constitution of 1958, " Mitterrand declared, "grants the prime minister, the head of the government, the right to refuse to step down if he preserves the majority in parliament." Let us note that although today the PCF refuses to envision a leftist government under a Giscard presidency, before the legislative elections of 1973 Marchais had made it known that the PCF would not challenge Pompidou's election by universal suffrage if Pompidou would reciprocate by drawing the conclusions of a possible victory by the left in the legislative elections. In other words, the PCF was prepared to govern along with Pompidou. Mitterrand's statement must not be understood as the expression of a will to break the alliance with the PCF in order to make a turn toward some party of the present presidential majority; rather, it must be understood as an assertion of the SP's independence of the PCF, as an expression of the will to show that if they were in power, the Socialists, while they would maintain the alliance with the PCF, would also not refrain from seeking allies in the center to act as a counterbalance to the PCF. A breakup of the Union de la Gauche? The breakup of the Union de la Gauche is far from the most likely variant. The PC's reactions of self-preservation have accentuated the party's contradictions rather than expanding its maneuvering room. Of course, "dumping on the Sp" can get a response from a small fringe of old PCF militants, but it also throws into disarray the whole new electoral base and membership that the PCF has recruited on the basis of its "new policy of overture, " Its policy of unity with the SP. The fact is that both politically and in terms of day-to-day action, the leadership of the PCF has no real alternative to the alliance with the SP and the strategy of the Union de la Gauche. The only action the PCF took to assert its cleavage from the
MEMBERS OF THE CGT IN THE METAL INDUSTRY IN THE PARIS AREA Department Workers Paris 158,993 Seine et Marne 35,967 Yve lines 105,186 Essonne 38,816 Hauts de Seine 239,277 Seine St Denis 105,577 Val de Marne 54,440 Val d'Oise 33,640 TOTAL T71,896 SP - the refusal to organize common meetings -is so ridiculous as to reveal this foct. Neither the Communist Youth's preparing for their national assembly by taking a few actions like occupying some offices of the National Employment Agency nor the CGT's hardening its tone a bit before its congress can offer political perspectives to the PCF membership. On the contrary, without a basic change in the international situation, without a new cold war that could justify in the eyes of the workers an isolation of the PCF and an absence of any political prospects, a breakup of the Union de la Gauche would put the PCF in an embarrassing position in face of the rise of the workers that characterizes the current period. The PCF could not get away with taking a stint in the opposition and hardening its tone while not offering political perspectives for this combativity of the working class. In response to l'Humanité Mitterrand cried at the last congress of the SP: "We would like to break the Union de la Gauche and renew an alliance with the center? We would have to be complete fools! At least grant us the concession of admitting that we are not so stupid. " It is true that while Mitterrand has an interest in asserting the position of the SP in relation to the PCF, in making clear the place he will demand in a Union de la Gauche government, he has no reason to saw off the branch he is sitting on. What makes the SP a credible alternative to the present regime (credible even as a solution for the bourgeoisie) is exactly its ties with the workers movement, its alliance with the PCF - an alliance, yes, but also an assertion of the SP's position in the relationship of forces and even Mitterrand's own maneuvering room within the alliance. This is all the more true in that although the SP has grown since May 1968, it has done so within the frame-
CGT Members CGT Members
1973 1974
8,373 5.2% 6,234 3.9%
4,010 11.1% 3,596 9.9%
6,551 6.2% 5,607 5.3%
4,171 10.7% 3,641 9.3% 26,623 11.1% 22,260 9.4% 16,172 15.3% 13,862 13.1%
8,001 14.6% 7,090 13.0%
3,899 15.1% 2,787 8.2% 77,800 10% 65,437 8.4% work of an alliance with the PCF. A breakup of this alliance and Mitterrand's entry into the government in alliance with the center parties would strongly threaten to trigger off splits within the SP (in view of the size of the "leftist" currents). In exchange for a tactical operation with no great future, Mitterrand would find himself without a party and with no political or electoral credibility; he would be led into being not the head of government, but simply one component of a presidential majority. In the present situation, that would be a form of suicide. In short, the polemic between the SP and the PCF is not the expression of an inevitable rupture between two different strategies. It is simply the reflection of the "different reactions" of the two reformist workers parties functioning within the same reformist strategy, for which they have no political alternative. Obviously, these "different reactions" are related to the difference in character of these two parties: As a Stalinist party, the PCF simply cannot tolerate seeing its hegemony over the working class challenged. That is what explains its reactions of self-preservation, although the PCF has neverthe less been unable to draw any substantial profit from these reactions. The relative tendency toward the PC's loss of hegemony is not a conjunctural phenomenon. It is the product of an evolution of the relationship of forces that emerged out of 1968, an evolution that is beginning to go beyond the scale of molecular processes and is crystallizing politically in the PF's suffering losses on its right and on its left. That is why the most likely hypothesis is that this polemic and these tensions will continue up to the time of the next electoral campaigns, although of course there will be ups and downs in their intensity. At the same time, the alliance between the PCF and the SP will be maintained in the framework of the Union de la Gauche.
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after the October days in Thailand:
A new National Assembly was elected in Thailand last January 26, the country's first since the Assembly elected in in 1969 was dissolved by the November 17, 1971 coup. No party or "natural" coalition of parties holds a majority in this assembly. On February 6 a man of the old regime of the military dictatorship was elected president of the assembly: Prosit Kancha Nawat, the ex-minister of trade, a rich merchant and confirmed right-wing politician. On February 13 the same assembly named Seni Pramoj as prime minister. Considered a "leftist" by Thai standards (which are inapposite, as we shall see), he leads the Democratic party, a traditional by PIERRE ROUSSET opponent of the military regime. The government was formed on February 21. It includes eighteen ministers of the Democratic party, nine who belong to no party, and three ministers from the Social Agrarian party, whose president, Sawet Piumpongsarn, has become vice prime minister and minister of finance. The Social Agrarian party is one of the formations directly arising from the very regime that the Democratic party had opposed. This rather curious government remains a minority in the assembly, controlling only 91 seats out of 269. What these chaotic elections reflect is the ambiguity of the situation born of the October days of T973. At that time, in five days of demonstrations - which turned into riots when the police opened fire - the Thai students forced the military triumvirate (Generals Praphas and Thanom and Colonel Narong) to flee the country. It was, in fact, a virtual popular uprising involving 300, 000 people, an event unprecedented in the country's history. (1) But it is a long way from the flight of the dictators to the overthrow of the regime. In spite of the establishment of a civilian government, the structures of the country remain unchanged. The "student insurrection" of