2. "SOCIALIST MANAGERS» would be to represent the workers before the management. In reality, the response of the Gierek team, in violation of Gierek's own statement to the striking workers in Szczecin and in violation of the proposals made during the 1971-72 debate, was to increase the dependence of the unions and the workers coun cils on the bureaucracy. As regards the forms of workers organization that were created spontaneously during the strikes of December 1970-January 1971, the Gierek group's response was unambiguous: The bureaucracy moved to the total and merciless liquidation of these forms of organization. Within the unions Gierek took advantage of the demands for the removal of the most discredited leaders to appoint his own devoted collaborators to leading posts. As for the tasks of the trade unions, the September 1971 meeting of the Central Committee of the CP was clear: "The fundamental task of the trade unions must be to carry out consistent action to improve working conditions. ... At the same time, the unions must cooperate in increasing the productivity of labor and in strengthening social discipline." The new labor code worked out in 1973 points in the same direction. It devotes hardly any attention
"In industry the chiefs, like the subordinates, are in agreement with the system, which implies that orders are to be carried out, and they find it perfectly natural that a head director has an office with leather-lined doors and a luxurious armchair, while a department head has a simple office with an ordinary armchair, a foreman has only a chair behind a partition, and a worker has a simple stool. " - A.K. Wroblewski, "The Inclined Plane, " Polityka, January 5, 1974. What are the «workers councils" for? A rigid hierarchy in industry and the rule of "personal management, "which means that all important decisions are made by the head director and on his personal responsibility alone, is nothing new in the countries of the East in general or in Poland in particular. The law, it is true, also allows for the possibility to the unions' role in pressing for the demands of the workers and stresses their tasks in areas like inspection of labor, security, hygiene, housing assignments, etc. On the other hand, various points in the code insist on the "social discipline" and "labor discipline" that are required in order to increase productivity. The bureaucracy's repressive arsenal against the workers was enriched by the June 23, 1973, law on "the principles of the formation and division of factory funds." This law provides for reductions of bonuses (up to and including their total elimination) in cases of intractions of the work rules or of any "unjustified absences. " In addition, Article 7 of this same law classifies participation in an arbitrary work stoppage as an infraction equivalent to theft or drunkenness. When it is remembered who it is that decides whether or not a work stoppage is "arbitrary, " it becomes apparent that this law is nothing but an unequivocal antistrike law. These measures fit squarely into the "new" economic and social strategy proclaimed by the Polish leaders after 1970. The aim is to increase the productivity of labor and to impose labor discipline in order to effect economic growth, which itself has been made a condition for the improvement of the living standards of the workers. of an intervention by the "workers councils of the enterprise" in the management of the workplaces. The "workers councils" were born after the 1956 events and were conceived at the time as bodies of workers self-management. But the emergence of slogans of the type "all power to the workers councils" (raised particularly in circles close to Po Prostu, the weekly of the left intellectuals) was one of the major reasons for which the bureaucracy moved in 1957 to put the brakes on the thaw and radicalization that had begun in 1956. Given the logic of Gomulka's post-1957 policy, the role of the workers councils has become purely formal. As far back as 1958 they were integrated into the "conferences of workers autonomy, " which locked the council of each enterprise into a structure dominated by the trade-union committee and the local party unit. One of the demands of the workers revolts in the Baltic port cities in late 1970 and 1971 was that democratic elections to the workers councils be
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POLAND held and that the power granted the councils by law be recognized. The response of the bureaucrats (this time, the Gierek team) was clear: Once the strike was over, many of the militant workers were thrown out of the shipyards and dispersed throughout Poland, in order to avert any rebuilding, éven embryonic, of the structures of workers self-management. (On this point, see "Gierek vs. the Workers, " INPRECOR, No. 10, October 17, 1974.) The debate on the role of the workers councils opened by the weekly Polityka in 1973 revealed that the councils were generally limited to rubberstamping decisions made by the management. The very great majority of the members of the council are administrators and supervisory personnel. This situation is "justified" by the role of the council (purely formal, obviously) in the acceptance of the economic plan by the enterprise. In the very
QUESTION The workers councils are necessary because: 1. They have an influence on the social problems of the workers. 2. They defend the workers. 3. They are concerned with production. 4. They help the management. (From Polityka, September 29, 1973.) The task of controlling the management of the enterprises was not even mentioned, despite the fact that, according to the law, that should be the principal role of the councils. It is interesting to note especially that the majority of supervisors who answered the questions (contrary to the majority of workers) saw aiding the management in various forms as the main task of the workers councils. Some articles (For example, W. Piotr, Zycie Gospodarcze, October 7, 1971; T. Kurczynski, U. Wajciechowa, Zycie Gospodarcze, November 14, 1973) pushed this idea even further and proposed that the workers councils look after labor discipline and even organize the layoff of "harmful workers, all in close collaboration with the management. (An article in a coming issue of INPRECOR will deal with "workers democracy" in Poland.) Under these conditions, the management, and especially the head director, has virtually absolute power within "his" enterprise. Very frequently the 20 rare cases in which the councils came out against the views of the management, there was frequently repression, direct or indirect, against the "rebels." In order to correct the transformation of the "workers councils" into simple committees of specialists, J. Maziarski, the author of an inquiry on the role of the councils (Polityka, September 29, 1973) proposed to eliminate the councils formal control over the economic plan. On the other hand, he proposed that the councils be devoted to the defense of the workers. (This is theoretically the task of the trade unions in Poland, but they have never fulfilled this task since the overthrow of the old regime.) An inquiry made among the workers and supervisory personnel clearly revealed the different perceptions of the tasks of the councils among the two groups:
ANSWER workers supervisors 24.6% 9.2% 50.0% 16.1% 13.6% 27.6% 2.7% 12.6% workers organizations (the unions, the workers coun cils) play a role in increasing the pressure on the workers. (It must not be forgotten that these organizations, like the managements, are administered by bureaucrats of the party.) In the very rare cases of conflict between the management and the organizations that are supposed to represent the workers, the effectiveness of the councils or the unions does not go beyond the limits of defending the individual worker, at best. Thus freed from useless constraints, "one-person management" can fully flower in Poland. Strength of a «socialist manager The caste of managers is asserting itself more and more as a real force in Poland. It must be stressed that we are not dealing here with "technocrats, that is, with the totality of engineers and middle cadres of the enterprises, but exclusively with a very narrow layer of top managers who are, moreover, closely linked and even partly assimilated
to the upper layers of the political bureaucracy. The low-level engineer, even if he may sometimes entertain illusions about his role and opportunities, is in fact more and more being pushed into the position of a foreman. The strength and the autonomy of the layer of managers are on the rise. Already in 1968, when Trybuna Ludu, the official organ of the Polish United Workers party (the CP), published an article criticizing the "technocratic" tendencies represented by the popular weekly Polityka (which did, in fact, frequently present the positions of the technocrats), a delegation of managers went to complain before the Central Committee of the party. The very existtence of this delegation was significant. Obviously, there is in Poland no official organization of managers, and the managers have no right whatsoever to send delegations. The Polish managers not only proved that they were capable of organizing themselves rapidly to defend their group interest, they also made a very effective intervention. The author of the article in question, Mysiek, was obliged to make a public self-criticism. That was the first manifestation of the strength of the managers; they proved themselves the only pressure group that was to be allowed to confront the regime in 1968. Gierek's coming to power in 1970 further strengthened the position of these "captains of socialist industry. " Gierek himself came to his position as first secretary of the CP with the reputation of being the man who had been able to "live with the technocrats " in Silesia, the most industrialized region of Poland, where Gierek had been regional party secretary before 1970. He has an engineer's diploma, and his son is a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and a professor in the Academy of Mines. The "reforms, " or more exactly the changes in management, introduced by Gierek consisted mainly of bolstering the power of the managers (apart from a few concessions on wages, which were in any case made only to the workers of the big industrial enterprises, of whom the government was afraid. The administrative changes in the management of enterprises, the regroupment of enterprises by branches into great industrial combines endowed with a greater degree of autonomy (known as WOGs) - all these changes granted more freedom of decision to the managers of the enterprises. According to the new "rules of the game, " the managers themselves can determine how to invest part of the profits of "their" factory. They can more easily decide what sort of products will be manufactured. A decision taken in 1973 introduced "price elasticity" - a system that permils some market pressure on prices (until then, prices had been fixed centrally by price commissions). Under the new system, the managers can lower the price of a new product below the price fixed by the central price commission in order to stimulate sales of the new products. (It must not be forgotten that the aim of the introduction of new products is to "replace" old products "of inferior quality" but of lower cost. Even the "diminished" price of the new product is significantly higher than the price of the old product, which disappears from the market. This system permits prices to be raised without violating the official price freeze.) According to the declaration of a high Polish funcfionary, the elasticity of prices is supposed to "permit the development of competition, encourage the development of modern marketing as adapted to our socialist system, and lend support to all the forces of marketing that are now being created in industry, commerce, and services. " (Interview with E. Szymanski, director of the domestic commerce division before the Planning Commission, Zycie Warszawy, July 11, 1974.) In practice, the manager frequently has the right to lay off workers. Up to now, this right has not been legalized. But the new labor code, which was adopted recently after workers opposition had held up its implementation for two years, allows the manager to penalize workers for drunkeness on the job... and for unjustified work stoppages! This latter clause has been used as justification for the layoff of Edward Batuga, the leader of the workers revolts in the shipyards of Szczecin. One of the not negligible advantages won by the managers after Gierek's reforms was a considerable increase in their bonuses, proportional to the increase in the profits of the enterprise. The special bonuses, distributed to the workers of the enterprise who have obtained good economic results, are calculated according to two criteria: "odded production, " which reflects the increase in the production of the factory, and direct profit. These bonuses are shared among the workers according to "their role in the creation of the surplus. " Needless to say, the role of the manager in the creation of these profits is considered predominant. For example, in the Warta and Przyjaźn cement factories, where the new bonus system was introduced beginning in 1971, the surplus of profits was divided among the workers according to a system of points fixed on the basis of the alleged individual contribution of each person: The manager gets 40 points; a female janitor gets 1 point. The new system of management was not introduced without problems and friction. Articles appeared
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POLAND in the press (for example, "A Test for Managers, W. Grochala, Polityka, September 16, 1972) that complained about the lack of initiative of some managers in spite of the new opportunities open to them. Other managers complained about the "anachronism" of certain central bodies and about the too extensive intervention in their affairs from above, despite the new directives. But apart from the small problems of this transitional period, most of the managers did not complain very much about the new increase in their power. "How to be loved" It is not an easy task to be a good "socialist" manager. To assist managers in distress, Życie Gospodarcze (the major Polish economics weekly) published a long series of articles in 1972 on "the art of being a manager. " The material the articles were based on consisted of research studies on the art of management conducted in the West (notably in the United States) and on parallel studies conducted in the USSR and Poland. Based on his study of the Western documents, the author of the articles, W. Kozuch, proposed a series of "classical" recipes: the introduction of an efficient management secretariat, qualified managerial aides; strict filtering of visitors and telephone calls to the manager, etc. He also added a few proposals adapted to the "30cialist" countries: assignment of managers to fulfill the function of liaison with the party apparatus; maximum limitation of their social functions; limitations on meetings with organizations of personnel (councils, trade unions, etc.). In short, the orticles propose that the (socialist) manager not be concerned with anything but being a good manager, as is the rule in all the advanced industrialized countries. In reading this series of articles, as well as other similar ones, the clear impression comes across that it is believed in Poland that economic problems will be miraculously resolved if factory management of the American type can be achieved; and further, that with a little effort and a few administrative reforms this can in fact be achieved. The small differences berween the economic systems prevailing in the two countries are scarcely mentioned. In an article entitled "How to Be Loved" two managers explained the practice of the art of management (Życie Ekonomiczne, July 2, 1972.) The principle is quite simple: To be loved one must consult one's subordinates from time to time. It is useless to consult them too often, for "the workers will be very happy and will consider that they are participating in the management if the manager asks their 22 advice before each important decision relative to problems of labor organization and personnel. " But there must be no mistake, the advice is purely consultative, aimed at improving the personnel's feelings about the manager, for "it is an absolute rule that the decision must be made by the director alone, and it is he alone who is responsible for this decision. " The sacrosanct principle of "personal leadership" is not infringed upon. It's better to be loved, but you don't Fool around with responsibilities within the factory. The inclined plane The economic changes made after 1970 contributed to doubling between 1970 and 1972 the number of salaries in excess of 5,000 zloty a month (the percentage of salaries reaching that level rising from 2.2% to 4.1% of the total during that period). But that is not an extremely high salary. The minimum wage at the time was in the neighborhood of 1,000 złoty, but the official statistics do not explain who is getting the salaries of "more than 5, 000 złoty. " Another index of inequality is the gap between the lowest and highest salaries: In 1972 this figure was on the order of 1:7 between the lowest 2% and the highest 2% of salaries. And for the highest 0.2%? It must not be forgotten that the official salary is only a fraction of the real income of high functionaries. To the base salary must be added the many bonuses and the various material advantages, like fully-serviced apartments, travel abroad, and so on. Popular sentiment has it that the difference between the maximum and minimum salaries is greater. Some 85% of the participants in an inquiry on wages conducted by Polityka (May 29, 1971) believed that the gap between wages was higher. Polityka tried to explain this popular "error" as a lack of informafion on high salaries. According to them, people imagine that a factory director earns more than 100,000 złoly a month. In this inquiry 43% called for a maximum salary of 8, 000 złoty; 10.8% believed that the maximum salary should not exceed 4,000 złoty (less than twice the average salary at the time), and only 7.8% (the great majority of whom had a higher education) agreed that the maximum salary should exceed 15,000 złoty. The captains of "socialist" industry have no serious problem making ends meet. Their basic salaries, which are already not especially low, are boosted greatly (especially since the introduction of reforms) by bonuses and various material benefits. Moreover, since Gierek's introduction of the "new model of socialist consumption, " they have succeeded in "legalizing" their right to material privileges. The new model of consumption, which was intro-
duced by the central committee of the Polish United Workers party (in June 1974) in the educational program for party members, attempts to explain and justify privileges in durable consumer goods (especially private cars and houses) in a socialist society. A campaign was waged to explain that ownership of the consumer goods in question is not a sign of petty-bourgeois attitudes but, on the contrary, represents proof of the achievements of the happy villaand-automobile proprietor in the building of socialism. According to the definition frequently repeated in this context, socialism means "to each according to his work", the fact that someone is allowed to have a beautiful house only proves that he has worked very well. The initial project of the Gierek government when it launched the "new model of consumption" was probably to mobilize a section of the workers and low-ranking supervisors with the prospect of acquiring durable consumer goods at the cost of long years of privation and saving and in this way to induce them to forget the daily problems that begin with the lack of meat and end with the analysis of the political situation. For the moment, this tactic has failed. Very serious problems in the construction industry have prevented the construction of a significant number of individual houses. The increase in the price of oil (the price of gas in Poland today is higher than anywhere else in Europe) has placed the use of automobiles out of the reach of workers. There remains the role of the "model of consumption" as a plausible explanation for the origin of individually owned automobiles and houses among those who already possess them, "those who have contributed the most to the development of socialism."
Szczecin, 1970. Workers burn the Communist party headquarters. For the rest, it is not only a question of durable consumer goods. There are also the cash "bonuses" (not only for those who work for export), "bonuses" that today permit the purchase of almost everything, even goods that are practically unavailable on the domestic Polish market. There are, for example, annual vacations in the West, for as everyone knows, it is only in the West that you can really relax. The theoreticians of management in Poland like to speak of the "streamlined structure of enterprises. The directors find this structure insufficiently streamlined. In the article "The Inclined Plane" (quoted at the beginning of this article), the author explains that "the factory is like the army; first of all you obey orders, afterwards, you can talk about it." A dream for managers. The "socialist managers" in Poland today enjoy virtually absolute power in their own domain. Given the absence of any independent workers organization and the attempts at conciliating, buying off, and integrating the managers by the Gierek government, which is in search of objective allies against the working class, their position seems very stable. But unlike their Western colleagues, their power does not rest on solid economic bases. Their position, which derives from the political power of the bureaucrats, is intimately linked to the bureaucracy and suffers from all its weaknesses. The "egalitarian" tendencies of the masses have not disappeared, despite the propaganda campaigns of the regime criticizing these tendencies; in fact, they remain threatening. The plane in Poland is indeed inclined, but it lacks any solid support. It threatens to collapse at the first strong wind.
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We are publishing below the editorial that appeared in the first issue of Marxismo Revolucionário, a new journal published by sympathizers of the Fourth International in Brazil.
It deals with the elections that took place in that country last November and with the situation of the working class and the workers vanguard. I. 1• Place in Brazil last November 15 represented a For the popular masses, the elections that took breach in the panorama of reaction and antipopular terror characteristic of the past several years. Despite the fact that the elections were nothing but a crude farce based on puppet bipartisanism, and despite the fact that the dictatorship tried to hold them within very narrow limils, the masses took advantage of the opportunity to express their discontent about the absence of democratic rights, the low wages, the high cost of living, inflation, unemployment, and the precarious character of public and social services. The behavior of the masses was not marked by the apathy of the previous years. This change in the behavior of the workers and popular masses was symptomatic of the change that was beginning to occur in their state of mind. This was observable even before the elections, beginning with the radicalization that had become apparent among certain social sectors. In fact, the situation in the working class during 1974 was characterized by the rebirth of an atmosphere of struggle that reached rather significant proportions in some sectors. In the ABC region and in So Paulo (that is, the backbone of the Brazilian working class) there have been a number of strikes, and there have been wage negotiations in some of the major factories of the country (Volkswagen, Ford, Chrysler, Aços, 24