japan the political crisis of the bourgeois regime INPRECOR. Could you explain the meaning of the cabinet change that took place at the end of last year? 5AKAI. Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka resigned on November 26 last year. About ten days later Takeo Miki was chosen as prime minister by the Liberal Democratic party (LDP), of which he was chairman at the time. Miki formed his goverment on December 9. This government change hos a very important significance in the present Japanese situation. Tanaka represented the will to continue the expansionist. policy that had previously guided the development of Japonese copitalism. To do this he had worked out a plan for recasting the economic structure of Japan through such projects as the many ultra-highspeed railway lines (See Quatrième Internationale, No 14, April 15-May 15. 1974.) But the Miki government is abandoning this exponsionist policy This change can also be felt in the political arena. When Tanaka was elected he was very popular among the population which had been taken in by mystification. He led one of the most important factions of the LDP. Miki, on the other hand, does not represent a traditionally dominant current in the Japanese bourgeois party. He was the spokesman for a fraction that was a small minority. That the LDP had to name Miki prime minister is symptomatic of the disintegration of the relations that had been maintained between the LDP and the government on the one hand and the Japanese masses on the other. The Tanaka cabinet will have been the last of the 14
Miki traditional bourgeois governments. The move to the Miki government represents a deep break with the traditional mode of bourgeois political rule in Japan, a break that reflects the evolution of the general situation of Japanese capitalism and the intensification of the crisis of the Liberal Democratic party, the only bourgeois government party in Japan. INPRECOR. Can you give details on the causes and nature of this break? SAKAI. The Japanese bourgeoisie is now confronted with three essential problems:
*The change that has occurred in the general situation in East Asia;
*The changes that have gone on in the Japanese economy;
*A beginning of the deep transformation of the political structure in Japan. As far as the economic situation is concerned, Japan has left the period of very rapid growth that characterized the preceding decade. It has entered a perio of slow growth, and the whole economic situation is dominated by this qualitative decline in the growth rate. In 1974, for the first time since 1945, Japan was effectively gripped by recession. According to the latest figures, the gross national product fell by 1.8 percent in real terms. 1 don't mean to say that we are heading into a period of decline, but it is certain that growth will be slow. As far as the regional situation is concerned, the previous equilibrium has been broken. This equilib-
rium had rested especially on the military and political presence of American imperialism in East Asia (Southeast Asia and the Far East). Militarily, Japanese imperialism is very weak. Its intervention in the region is combined with that of the U.S.A.; Tokyo's presence is essentially economic and financial. The crisis of U.S. domination in East Asia -illustrated by the reorientation of American diplomacy in regard to the People's Republic of China and the progress of the Indochinese revolution - is contributing to knocking both Japanese imperialism and the dictatorial regimes in the region off balance. This is aggravated by the economic crisis itself, which explains, for example, the difficulties that have emerged in the relations between Tokyo and Seoul, although these relations remain close. It is the combination of the changes that have occurred in the economic and international situations that is provoking c beginning of a fundamental change in Japanese political structure. Since the Korean war, Japanese governments have always been governments of one party, the LDP, which is the only bourgeois government party. It was around this party and this form of government that the Japanese political system established a certain stability from the middle of the 1950s to the 1968-70 period. That is one of the essential characteristics of Japanese bourgeois democracy. This structure has now entered into crisis, into political crisis. To such an extent that one can say that the Miki government will be the last of the one-party governments. Today, even in leading circles, debates are going on about a future "coalition government. " In fact, there are already discussions about what coalition government will be needed: with the Democratic Socialist party (DSP, a rightwing split from the Social Democracy), with the petty-bourgeois Buddhist Komei party, or with a section of the Socialist party. INPRECOR. One of the examples you gave of the changes that have occurred in the regional situation is the difficulties that have emerged between Tokyo and Seoul. Could you explain more precisely the interaction between the development of the situafions in South Korea and Japan? SAKAI. The current situation in Korea has important implications for Japan. In fact, in view of the mutual relations linking the two countries, the situation in each one cannot be analyzed separately. The South Korean regime of Park Chung Hee is based on two key international features: U.S. military and political domination in the region and the economic intervention of Japanese imperialism. In effect, it is only the regional presence of U.S. imperialisin that allows Park to carry out a severe and massive repression and to muzzle any popular expression of the desire of the masses to reunify Korea. The Park regime was an element in the imperia list system aimed at isolating the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Likewise, it was one of the countries that sent troops to South Vietnam; these troops gained a reputation for extreme ferocity in the policy of terror. Finally, the Park Chung Hee regime was established in direct and close relation with Tokyo. Relations between the two countries were formally normalized in 1965, and after 1968 the export of Japanese capital reached such scope that it transformed the South Korean economy into an economy directly dependent on Japanese imperialism. Militarily and politically, the Park regime depends on the United States; economically, it depends on Japan. The turn imposed on Washington by the success of the Indochinese revolution involved the recognition of the People's Republic of China. The Japanese did the same and, along with the United States, sought "three-sided peaceful coexistence among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Obviously, this new orientation dealt a sharp blow to the South Korean regime. It had to try to readjust its policy just at a time when the Korean masses, perceiving the weakness of U.S. imperialism (that is, the weakness of the international backer of the regime), began to move. During 1972, 1973, and 1974 the youth, above all the students and intellectuals, waged an important campaign against the regime and for the reunification of the country. (See INPRECOR, No. 11, October 11, 1974) Park was compelled to engage simultaneously in a policy of internal repression and international reorientation. In fact, his representative was compelled to publish a joint communiqué with the representative of the Democratic People's Republic on the very question of the reunification that was being demanded by the forbidden demonstrations in the South. The repression carried out by the secret police (the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, KCIA) was intensified with the kidnapping in Japan itself of Kim Dae Jung, a candidate in the presidential elections of 1973, and his forced transfer to South Korea. Likewise, two Japanese, a journalist and a feacher, were arrested in Seoul and accused of supporting the opposition to the regime. Finally, on August 15, 1974, an unsuccessful attack on the dictator Park
15
Japan was carried out by Mun Se Kwang, a Korean who had frequently lived in Japan. The government then organized anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul. Since the mass movement was developing, the requirements of political repression imposed a deterioration in the relations between the two governments in question, a deterioration that neither government wants. At the same time, after the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, Korean residents in Japan began to mobilize in support of the movement of opposition to the Seoul regime. (There are about 1 million Koreans in Japan, the result of an immigration that often leads to permanent residency - INPRECOR.) Finally, this mobilization of the Korean immigrant community in Japan was in turn directly influenced by the development of moss movements in Japan itself. So you can see how the very fact of the interpenetration of the Korean and Japanese regimes and communities results in the movement of opposition to the Park dictatorship becoming one of the permanent factors contributing to shaping the political face of Japan. This is a new and very important feature in the situation, even if it is still only embryonic. Under these conditions, the Japanese government could not continue to support Seoul too openly. And Park Chung Hee was in urgent need of economic support from the Japanese bourgeoisie. He therefore adopted a more flexible policy, releasing the two Japanese who had been arrested and, at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, freeing some of the political prisoners, among them the poet Kim Chi Ha. This, it must be stressed, was done under the direct pressure of the mass movement. In this context, Tokyo and Seoul were able to reduce their tactical contradictions and overtly redevelop Japanese political and economic support for Park Chung Hee. "miki, on the oth Nevertheless, the situation remains very critical for the South Korean regime. Kim Chi Ha, the stu- not represent a dent leaders, and the other political prisoners who have been released are waging an active campaign dominant curre against Park and are vigorously denouncing the tortures they were subjected to in prison by the KCIA. japanese bourg The potential for mobilizing opposition to the regime is enormous; in fact, it even affects the soldiers. Park has sought to maneuver. Nevertheless, it is possible that there will be important political and social explosions of the South Korean masses during the coming year. If that happens, the impact in Japan will be very great. It would be a hard blow for the Japanese bourgeoisie. This is an example of how the neocolonial policy adopted by Japanese capitalism during the past decade is today being challenged by the new rise of struggles in Southeast Asia and the Far East. 16
INPRECOR. Let's go back to the government political crisis in Japan. You mentioned the ways in which leading circles were posing the question of a coalition government. But the same pressure must also be weighing on the opposition formations, and especially the workers organizations. What is the situation here? SAKAI. First of all, we must recall the structure of the Japanese workers movement. There are two large national trade-union federations. The Domei, rightwing, is based essentially on the big companies in the private sector; the Sohyo, left reformist, is mainly implanted in the public sector (railroads, posts, telegraphs, and telephones, teaching, and so on). The Democratic Socialist party is linked to the Domei. The Sohyo apparatus is largely controlled by the Socialist party. On the other hand, the SP does not really have a party apparatus of its own. As for the Japanese Communist party, it represents a rather significant minority in the Sohyo. Moreover, it takes advantage of a large national apparatus to wage its electoral and parliamentary campaigns. The Democratic Socialist party is a very small minority in parliament (holding about ten seats) and is very weak politically. The Socialist party has about a hundred members of parliament, which is ten times as many as the Japanese Communist party. As far as the workers movement is concerned, it is the Socialist party that has the greatest parliamentary influence. But the SP is divided by deep tendency struggles. Two main currents are emerging within the SP and its youth organization on the question of the composition of a future coalition government. The first r hand, does is the Kyokai (Socialist Society) faction. Of Kautskyist persuasion, it is dominant in the trade-union apparatus, especially in the post office and the railraditionally roads. This trade-union bureaucracy is under direct pressure from the rank-and-file workers in the public ut in the sector. The bureaucrats struggle against the CP in the unions, but at the same time they are prepared rois party» to accept united fronts with the CP. The Kyokai faction is sensitive to Moscow's conception of "Marxism-Leninism." Against the Kyokai faction a bloc has been formed that amounts to the embryo of a possible center-left tendency in the SP. The two leaders of this bloc are Kozo Sasaki and Saburo Eda. Eda represents an openly right wing within the party. Sasaki, on the other hand, is one of the leaders of the left tendency in the SP, a tendency that was formed against Eda; he is pro-Chinese. But now they are making a bloc to oppose a coalition with the CP and are seeking to obtain a center-left government. It should be noted
17
JAPAN that Peking had supported the Tanaka government (which caused some Japanese Maoists to refuse to advance slogans calling for the government's overthrow) and today would like to see a center-left coalition of the LDP, the Komei (Buddhist), and the SP, with the CP excluded. The Eda-Sasaki bloc is very weak in the trade-union movement in the public sector. It is now seeking to develop its influence among the bureaucracy of the trade-union movement in the private sector (that is, among the right wing of the trade-union apparatus). As for the line of the Communist party, it has a classical popular-front orientation. It calls for the formation of a national democratic coalition government. This is the way the CP is reacting to its exclusion by the SP, the Eda-Sasaki bloc, and the Komei. The present proposal of the CP is for a CPSP-Komei-DSP government. But it would accept a place for a bourgeois party in its so-called socialist coalition government. That is the general line of the CP. This orientation must be understood in the framework of a particularly right-wing overall I.ne. The Japanese CP has drawn the lessons of the Chilean coup in the following way: The army was provoked by the "radicalization" of the Socialist party. Consequently, the CP is more and more committed to defending the civil order of bourgeois democracy. This problematic dominates the whole of its policy. Here are a few examples: *In the trade unions the activity of the Japanese CP is Further right than that of the SP bureaucracy in the Sohyo. The bureaucracy is prepared to organize some economic struggles, while the CP is very hesitant on this point. During the spring 1974 strikes, the Socialist bureaucracy was speaking of a general strike. At the same time, the CP was breaking the strike of the teachers. In doing this the CP explained that the teachers are not workers like the others, that they are responsible before the masses, and that they have to take account of the children, the parents, and the communities, and therefore cannot go on strike like that. You couldn't imagine a more conservative line! It was new for the Japanese CP. *Another example: The CP is now waging a very vehement campaign against the Buraku Liberation League. (The Burakus are a lar that was artificially excluded from the caste system when it was createn in precapitalist Japan. They live together in the same villages and are confined to jobs that are considered "impure" by Buddhism, such as work in tanneries. In spite of the dissolution of the castes and the fact that no ethnic or religious difference separates them from other Japanese, the Burakus remain a minority that suffers discrimination, oppression, and superexploitation - INPRECOR.) 18
The Buraku movement has created its own radical and combative wing: the Buraku Liberation League. It has carried out many actions during the past ten or fifteen years, essentially in the municipalities and local areas, the "communities, " as they are called in Japan. They have won important concessions in many municipalities. Recently, the movement took on a militant character. For two or three years the CP has been constantly denouncing the movement. On several occasions the CP has divided the League and has formed blocs against it with traditional bourgeois currents in Japon. Today it explains that the League was formed by a gang of adventurers, that it is a violent group and that it is placing in quesfion the gains that the League had previously won in the municipalities. This provoked the temporary breakup of the CP-SP municipal coalition in Tokyo, which backs up the present governor of the capital, Ryokichi Minobe. This coalition has been ruling in Tokyo for eight years. Its breakup meant the almost certain victory of the conservatives in the next elections. It took the intervention of French SP leader François Mitterrand, who passed through Japan three weeks ago, to pick up the pieces. But he didn't resolve the basis of the problem. Finally, in its government program the CP accepts the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces, behind which the bourgeoisie is recomposing its army, disbanded after its defeat in the second world war. At bottom, in face of the economic and social crisis and the consequent financial difficulties of the municipalities, the CP is asking the masses to accept a rationalization of the capitalist economy so as not to place in danger the "national unity" of the population. The CP has drawn the most rightist possible lessons from Chile. The Communist party represents a serious obstacle to the deepening of the class struggle in Japan. INPRECOR. How does the coming campaign of struggle for wage increases look for this spring? SAKAI. In 1974 inflation was the key question for the Japanese working class. During last year's spring labor offensive we saw a de facto general strike of several million workers (see INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974). Today the question of the economic recession has been added to that of inflation. Unemployment is becoming massive. According to official figures themselves, it is reaching 1 million and going even higher (in March the figure will reach 1,270,000), that is, about 2 percent of the work force. And these figures conceal a very high level of underemployment. Trade-union sources put
the number of unemployed at 2 million and the number of partially unemployed at between 2 and 4 million. Layoffs and reductions of the workweek are above all affecting women, workers of the medium-sized factories, and temporary workers in the big companies (in which many workers benefit from the principle of "employment for life"). Overtime has been eliminated, and that deals a sharp blow to wages that have already been eroded by inflation. The bourgeoisie is waging a very hard campaign against the coming mobilizations in defense of wages. And the CP is vehemently blocking the development of economic struggles. The traditional trade-union leaderships offer no solution to this problem. In the working class, the general tendency is toward an increase in combativity. But there is no alternative national leadership independent of the SP, CP, or DSP. The bourgeoisie is exerting pressure to make the trade-union apparatus accept the conditions to make the capitalist economy profitable, and the CP has already folded. The Sahyo is now preparing a special congress to discuss the spring struggles. There is little chance that the bureaucracy will be completely united. We have to help in the development of uncompromising struggles against the bankruptcy of the traditional bureaucratized leaderships and against the popular-front line of the CP. An independent tendency has to be launched. We can predict that the trade-union right wing will increasingly run into difficulties, even in the backward sector, the private sector. We must thus prepare an intervention in this sector as well. It is delicate to try to predict what will happen during the next spring campaign. But what must be noted is that the campaign will mark the opening of a new period of workers struggles dominated by the new national and international economic situation. It is in this context that we must understand the rightist evolution of the traditional leaderships and the importance that devolves on the struggle against the CP's orientation and for the establishment of an independent class-struggle tendency during the next two or three years. The political differentiation within the working class is going to accelerate. In fact, we are probably entering into a period of regroupment and recomposition of the workers movement. We must intervene in this in an active, political, and internationalist way, not only with a view to forming a national class-struggle tendency, but also to closely linking the fight of the Japanese workers to the struggle being waged against Japanese imperialism in the entire region.
INPRECOR. To conclude, could you tell us something about the work of the Japanese section of the Fourth International? SAKAI. In a short space it is impossible to describe all of our activities, which are very numerous today And I have been out of Japan during the most recent actions we have waged. But I can give you an idea of the main themes of our intervention. I gave some examples of our activity in the factories and an analysis of our electoral campaign in the last interview (see INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974); so here I will mention some other areas. We have just held a conference unifying the three revolutionary youth organizations that had existed previously (students, high-schoolers, and young workers). That was the founding conference of the Communist Youth League. (See "News of the Workess Movement" in this issue of INPRECOR for an account of the conference.) We are also preparing the formation of a new socialist organization for women. Both the men and women militants of our movement are carrying on constant and growing work with women workers and with housewives in the popular neighborhoods, in the localities, and in the unions in order to unify the ir struggles in the same class front. We have developed important work in solidarity with the movement against the Park dictatorship in South Korea. And we have begun work in solidarity with the battles being waged by the peoples of Southeast Asia against the neocolonial regimes. (See INPRECOR, No. 8, September 19, 1974.) We are participating especially in the Information Center on Asian Political Prisoners, while also continuing our own anti-imperialist work in East Asia. Likewise, we are concretely manifesting our solidarity with the Buraku movement, especially around the trial of Kazuo Ishikawa, a young Buraku victimized by discriminatory "justice" and sentenced first to death, later to life imprisonment. On October 31, 1974, tens of thousands of people massed in front of the court in which the trial was going on. For its part, the Japanese CP held its own meeting, a very small one, and refused to join in the big demonstration because of the role played in it by the Buraku Liberation League. We are also continuing our activity in solidarity with the peasants of Sanrizuka in their decade-long struggle against the construction of the new international airport in Tokyo. (See INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974.) On October 10, 1974, some 5,000 people responded to the call of the Sanrizuka Peasant Union and met near the airport. We brought around 900 militants, the largest contingent of any organization. This assembly was a success; its function was to prepare
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JAPAN the coming confrontations that will take place if the government tries to tear down the tower that the peasants have built on the runway to prevent the airport from being used. Some of our militants were arrested during the demonstration that followed the assembly. We now have excellent fraternal relations with the Sanrizuka Peasants Union.
We are also involved in antimilitarist activity, particularly around the trial of two soldiers who, along with three others, were discharged from the army for denouncing the U.S. and Japanese military occupation of Okinawa (in the Ryukyu Islands, where the Americans have built an immense base). The decision to discharge the soldiers is being appealed so that they can continue to work in the barracks. This campaign is not limited to antimilitarist propaganda;
it also affects sections of the trade unions and mobilizes workers. In a general sense, our situation is objectively favorable today. At the end of the 1960s there were nearly a dozen far-left groups. But during the years
FOUNDING
OF THE
JAPAN
COMMUNIST
YOUTH
LEAGUE The founding conference of the Japan Communist Youth League was held in Tokyo January 31-February 1. Previously, there had been three youth organizations under the leadership of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL), Japanese secfion of the Fourth International: the International Labor Committee, the Internationalist Communist Students League, and the Front of Internationalist High-Schoolers. For the past several years, the Japanese Trotskyists had been-trying to form a single, unified communist youth organization of young workers, students, and high-schoolers. The