the january workers strikes schematically, the possible variants would be reduced to two. The government of historic compromise could tum out to be not very different from those of the first phase of the center-lett; that is, it could refuse to introduce sufficiently important reforms to channel and normalize the situation. In that case, the projects of the PCI would remain mere pieces of paper and the party's links to the masses would be placed in danger. On the other hand, if the government of historic compromise took the road of significant reforms, such as striking at the interests of at least some sectors of the ruling class and even of some conservative strata of the middle classes, even then there would be no guarantee of a restabilization. A dynamic of the 1971-73 Chilean type could be set in motion, with on the one hand a tendency for the masses to go beyond the government and on the other hand a tendency for the ruling class — or sectors of it - to create ever greater tensions and to move toward sabotage. In the long run, "conciliation" would not be possible, and the PCI could find itself confronting an explosive situation in which it would be faced with choosing sides - exactly the situation the historic compromise is designed to avoid. In such crucial moments tacticians, no matter how clever, would not be of much use; the strength, effectiveness, a revolutionary marxist INTRODUCTION On April 13 Abdel Aziz Hegazi, president of the Egyptian Council of Ministers, presented his resignation to President Anwar el-Sadat. Three days later, Sadat appointed the fifth Egyptian government since the death of Nasser. Hegazi was absent from it, being replaced as president of the Council of Ministers by Mamdouh Salem, a career policeman who had been vice-prime-minister and minister of the interior under the Hegazi government. The ministerial shake-up was Sadut's response to the intensifying economic crisis and to the rise of the workers movement. The reawakening of the Egyptian workers movement, largest and most decisive in the and general prestige of the organization are not at all sufficient, and the murky ideological schemas would thus be rendered completely useless. Finally, let us consider a different possibility, one that we believe still remains the least probable: that the Italian bourgeoisie succeeds in the short or relatively short term in restabilizing the situation (even if only partially), achieves a new ascending phase of the economy without great upheavals, and succeeds in presenting a less discredited political leadership capable of offering a minimum of operating effectiveness. In that case also, the present strategy of the historic compromise would enter a crisis. In fact, there would no longer be any possibility of realizing the historic compromise in pracfice; on the contrary, it would be relegated to the indefinite future. Then Berlinguer - or someone else - would be compelled to work out some other alternative seasoned with some new ideological justification. Conjuncturally, the fourteenth congress represented a success for Berlinguer and the leading group closest to him. But, as we have sought to demonstrate, it does not at all follow that the strategy of the historic compromise faces a very bright future. EGYPT interview with Arab world, had shaken the regime rwice since the beginning of the year: early in January, when there was a wave of strikes and demonstrations throughout Cairo and Lower Egypt, and in March, when strikes broke out in the factories of Mahalla el-Kubra. The demand for the removal of Hegazi, leading exponent of Sadat's "economic opening" and his turn to U.S. imperialism, had been prominent in the workers demonstrations. By removing Hegazi, Sacat sought to give the appearance of granting a concession to the workers. But Salem will certainly continue the economic policies of the Hegazi government - most likely with
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EGYPT the addition of a stronger dose of repression. In face of the deterioration of the economy and the reawakening of the workers movement, Sadat has no available response except repression. In the Western press, the January demonstrations were widely presented as spontaneous, apolitical riots. The interview we are reproducing below clearly shows that the reality was otherwise. In fact, the Egyptian workers ore increasingly tending to turn to methods of struggle that have been used by the workers in the leading imperialist countries of West Europe. And this tendency shows every sign QUESTION. Can you describe the conditions surrounding the January events? ANSWER. Certainly. First of all, it is important to stress that the January demonstrations were not a spontaneous explosion caused by the crisis in urban transport, as has been presented outside. Just the opposite. The demonstration on January 1 was an organized action that capped a working-class upsurge that had been going on for several months. Last autumn there was a series of strikes - the most powerful ones were in September - that succeeded in forcing the government to pay the workers one month's wages out of their accumulated compulsory savings. But the workers were demanding full payment of the entire backlog of their savings and, in addition, a wage increase to partially compensate for the monstrous price increases. The workers movement continued to fight for these demands, and our comrade textile workers in Helwan printed leaflets about these demands and distributed them to other layers of workers. In fact, these leaflets reached Shubra, el-Mahalla, and Alexandria, as well as other centers of working-class concentration. Naturally, this stimulated the repressive apparatus; three workers of the el-Sharq factory in Almbaba were arrested and tortured to get information out of them. But the workers upsurge was still on the rise. In December the workers of Shubra organized assemblies inside the factory to demand an increase in wages and the payment of their savings. * Then they organized workers councils, which moved into the building of the textile workers union and continued to operate on an almost daily basis for ten days. The regime got very frightened, and Saleh Gharib, the minister of labor, personally intervened to order the workers expelled from the building and then to shut the building down to prevent further meetings from taking place here. As a protest against these maneuvers, which had been supported by the trade-union bureaucracy, the workers of Helwan demanded that their union with20 of continuing and deepening as the Egyptian work- 6 ers again take up their role as the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in the Arab world. The interview was taken in Cairo at the beginning of February with one of the comrades of the Mustafa Khamis Revolutionary Communist Group, a recently formed revolutionary Marxist organization in Egypt. (See INPRECOR, No. 14-15, December 12, 1974.) It appeared in the March-April issue of el-Munadil, journal of the Revolutionary Communist Group in Lebanon, sympathizers of the Fourth International. draw from the general union. When news of this demand reached the minister of labor, he ordered an investigation of five of the prominent trade unionists in the Misr-Helwan textile factory. But he did not dare arrest these workers, because the workers immediately threatened to burn down the factory if any repressive measures were taken. The workers of Helwan went even further; in a secret decision they voted to strike for their demands. All the most important industrial concentrations of workers in Helwan - the steel, foundry, chemical, and coke workers - solidarized with this decision. The date of the strike was set for January 1. On that day the workers gathered in front of the Bab el-Loq railway station in Cairo (departure point for the Cairo-Helwan train) and then marched through the streets of Cairo chanting slogans about their living conditions. The slogans were directed not only against the government, but against the regime as a whole. This demonstration of several thousand quickly ran up against the police. An intense battle ensued, the police using clubs and tear gos, the workers using stones. The demonstrators scattered in several directions and began to smash up some bourgeois shops, a few police cars, and a couple of buses. There were scores of arrests. The next day the Shubra workers went on strike; the workers of the Shubra branch of the Misr-Helwan factory in particular met with further repression. A wave of anger and indignation swept the workers movement. On the third day (January 3) the Misr silk workers decided to go on strike in solidarity with the Helwan workers. But the security forces surrounded the factory with more than 200 police vehicles, refusing to let any demonstrators leave the factory and trying to ensure that production would be continued. Despite this, the workers refused to work for five hours, until finally, under the pressure of threats, they returned to work. Arrests began that night, the workers being taken from their homes.
QUESTION. Was there any parallel movement in the universities? ANSWER. Most certainly. In fact, there were mobilizations during December at the University of Cairo. Posters opposing the regime appeared on the walls; they concentrated on the rising cost of living and the regime's rapprochement with American imperialism. In the middle of December the security police arrested nine students, kidnapping them right off the street. This led to a call for a student meeting, which demanded the release of the imprisoned students and an end to their torture by the police. The meeting also demanded the dissolution of the "university police, "which had been reestablished after the student mobilizations in 1972. (This police force had been abolished in 1968) The meeting also demanded certification of 100 students of the Arts College who had failed by one mark, whereas Sadat's daughter had passed the previous year despite the fact that her yearly average had been five marks too low. These events were percolating in the university when the January 1 demonstrations took place. On January 2 the students announced that they were going on strike. The strike lasted five days, until the police surrounded the university. But since then there have been continual meetings, discussions, conferences, and loudspeaker announcements demanding democratic rights and the release of those arrested. QUESTION. Con you give us an idea of the extent of the arrests? ANSWER. The wave of arrests has been very wide - hitting more than 250 people so far. This does not include people who have escaped and are being sought by the police. The detainees come from a wide variety of social mi lieus and leftist political currents. Among them, for example, are Rashad elJabali, Sayid Fayid, and Muhammed Raslan, all trade unionists. Then there are Muhammed el-Shadhli, Fikri el-Kholi, Muhammed Mustafa, Muhammed el-
Manshawi, and Najati Abdel Hamid, all workers.
Hamdi el-Hinawi, Muhammed Fahmi, Muhammed Khalid, Sidai el-Qasir, Abdel Qasir, and Ibrahim Fathi are clerks. Abdel Muhsin Shasha, Salah Issa, Zaki Murad, Adil Kamel, and Abdullah el-Zaghbi are lawyers. Saad el-Saai is a teacher and Mukhtar el-Sayid is a doctor, Adliyah Michail, Ahmed elShadhli, and Sayid Ashmawi are students. These are just a few of the people who have been arrested.
News of torture of prisoners is continuing to come in, and many have had to be taken to the hospital.
Those arrested face three main charges: sabotage, establishing organizations whose intent is to overthrow the regime, and making contact with foreign countries (implying the Soviet Union and East European countries). • QUESTION. What are the perspectives in your opinion? ANSWER. One thing is certain. The January events marked the beginning of a long road that will be filled with similar happenings and even more violent ones. This is the road of revolutionary uprising that will overthrow bourgeois rule and establish the rule of the workers and poor peasants. In the short run, movements demanding the release of the prisoners are on the rise in the working class and among the students. There is a tendency toward the coordination of the struggles, which must be strengthened. We are extremely optimistic about the future of revolutionary struggle in Egypt. What is required of revolutionaries in all Arab countries and throughout the international revolutionary movement is that they raise their voices in solidarity with the victims of Sadat's repressive regime. There is no need for me to stress the importance of Arab and international solidarity in embarrassing the regime and preventing it from continuing its indiscriminate and vicious repression. This question has special importance for our Arab comrades, who in the course of organizing solidarity with the struggle of the workers and students of Egypt can point the way forward to the real future of revolutionary struggles in the Arab world.
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WORKING