SITUATION IN ASIA
OF THE The defeat of American imperialism in Indochina is provoking inevitable reactions among the ruling classes of the states of the Far East and Southeast Asia, especially those that are tied to U.5. imperialism. All the various reactions have one feature in common: the belief that a period is coming to an end and that it is consequently appropriate to consider the new political and economic features of the period now opening. Not all the ruling classes of the region are drawing the same conclusions about how to maintain their privileged status. The problem that is common to them all is that they must create as quickly as possible the conditions necessary for their security in the wake of what they correctly consider to be the abandonment of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese ruling classes by U.S. imperia lism. Some regimes, such as the dictatorships of South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, see their immediate future in continuing to strengthen their economic, political, and military alliance with U.S. imperialism. They are thus eliminating their own margin for maneuver, however narrow it may be. Other regimes - in Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia - are drawing different, quite opposite conclusions. All agree that the failure of the Nixon doctrine marks the end of a period and that American imperialism no longer represents a guarantee of power and security, but instead an obstacle to the political and economic changes that have now become necessary. They consider it appropriate to acknowledge that the leaders of the People's Republic of China are partners worthy of genuine trust who must be dealt with at all levels. The Malayan leaders have demonstrated their confidence in their immediate future. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has stated: "I do not believe 10
EVOLUTION by G. VERGEAT in the domino theory, " adding, "The fate of the states of Southeast Asia is to be held in the vise of competition between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, China having the advantage of historic ties with the region. " As for the Thai foreign minister, in response to questions asked by the American magazine Newsweek, he stated: "Our foreign policy on this subject (the U.S. troops and bases in Thailand) is very clear. The American troops and their logistical support will leave Thailand within twelve months. We are now negotiating the organization of the withdrawal, which must take the situation in the region into consideration. As soon as peace is established in the region - in other words, a cease-fire in Cambodia - the troops will depart. " To a question about relations with Hanoi, this gentleman, Chatichai Choonhavan, replied, "It is difficult to guess the intentions of a country that possesses half the armed forces in the Indochina area. As a neighboring country of Indochina and Thailand, North Vietnam has for years infiltrated agents into Thailand, engaging in constant efforts to recruit Thais to the goal of subversion in Thailand. I invite you to draw your own conclusions about Hanoi's intentions in the region. " To a question about relations with China, he replied: "We have already normalized our relations with China and I hope that diplomatic relations will be established after my trip to Peking in several weeks. Naturally, this would be followed by the immediate end of our relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). But the Peking leaders have never asked that we cut off our commercial relations with Taiwan, relations which we hope to continue, as have other countries that have recognized Peking. We have had good relations with China for 2,000 years. China and Thailand are not like the others. We can take whatever path we choose. " Finally, to a question about what factors would guarantee peace in Southeast Asia, he answered: "They are four in number: independence and internal strength; re-
gional cooperation; coexistence without regard to political ideologies; and, fourth, before the establishment of a zone of freedom and neutrality can be realized, attempts must be made to promote the policy of taking equal distance from the superpowers.
These statements of position define very preof certain Asian states hope to adopt. They would not take the chance of making such statements publicly unless they had already received favorable echoes through diplomatic channels, especially from China. For many years the Peking leaders have aided this political evolution. This is expressed by: a) the fact that they do not oppose the U.S. military presence in the region; on the contrary, they consider that this presence directly counters that of the USSR, which itself threatens China; b) the disarray into which Peking has thrown its supporters in the region, whether armed or not; these supporters have been politically fragmented and divided, since they no longer represent the major pawn that Peking previously needed in order to penetrate the region, the most striking instance of this today being the case of the Malayan Maoists; c) finally, Peking needs currency to buy industrial equipment and technological facilities that Moscow has refused to provide. Prices for this equipment have been affected by the generalized inflation. Consequently, Peking is undertaking a twofold operation, on the one hand offering its own textile and industrial products at prices below those of all competitors (reductions of more than 20 percent) thus permitting China to drain off currency and on the other hand offering the bourgeoisies of Asia the possibility of making purchases at reduced prices outside the world imperialist market, which offers material little adapted to regional conditions. Bosserted or operative in practice, but neverther
This ensemble of new features - not yet fully less already clearly defined - has brought about political contradictions that are now emerging in the workers, anti-imperialist camp in the region. Hanoi's and Peking's conceptions of how to defend their respective interests appear clearly at variance if not actually counterposed. Peking no longer conceives of the defense of Ching as linked to extending the struggle against imperialism in Indochina in alliance with the struggles in the region. For example, Peking accepts the maintenance of U.S. troops in Thailand, while Hanoi demands their departure. For his part, the Thai prime minister is simultaneously organizing the departure of the Americans, extending a hand to the Chinese, condemning Hanoi, and proposing that the region become neutral, taking equal distance from Moscow and Washington. The aim of such an operation is quite clear: to maintain the regime in power, reach an agreement with Peking, and limit or even isolate Hanoi by appealing to Sihanouk. Sihanouk's April 15 statement, made in Peking, echoed what the Thai prime minister had proposed for the region: "The regime established in Phnom Penh after the victory of the Khmer Rouge will be nonaligned, democratic, progressive, and noncommunist. " His oral declaration to French radio asserted that "after victory, there will be a totally communist government and administration. Thus, either I become a puppet of the Khmer Rouge, or I remain independent, and then there will be trouble. " This makes one point quite clear: Sihanouk intends to make use of the social base he still commands in the countryside (the necessarily nationa list character of the present struggle has allowed him to conserve real influence among the masses and among many elements of his former state apparatus who went over to the resistance); he also intends to make use of international support from both the West and the East (which he already has in part from Peking) to counterpose himself to the Khmer Rouge and secondarily to the Vietnamese. It is too early to draw any conclusions, but the problem is posed. The concept of regional neutrality is a key element for Sihanouk, Bangkok, and Peking, and could inhibit Hanoi both in its work toward the unification of Vietnam and in its regional relations. In return, it imposes a very heavy and clear responsibility on Hanoi: to agree to establish strengthened political ties, and perhaps even military ties, with the revolutionary forces in the region that have traditionally been linked to China. The internal reconstruction of Vietnam may still block this process, but Hanoi knows what isolation could mean. In this sense, one problem still remains unresolved: The upsurge of mass mobilizations throughout the region, already clearly manifested in the assaults of the students against the ruling classes of each of the countries, lacks real political leadership. The combativity of the masses against imperialism - in its combined American-Japanese expression - is an element that has actively been brought into play by the Indochinese victories; but Peking no longer offers any political leadership, and still less does Moscow. The consequent leadership vacuum poses a considerable problem for the Vietnamese leadership. It is thus on this terrain that Hanoi will demonstrate whether or not it has the will to continue the struggle that it has led so admirably in Indochina. On this field, conflict with Peking is inevitable if Hanoi sets its course positively.=
11