VOLKS!.. "VW's losses in 1974 were unique in the industry of the western world. Losses for 1975 will be on the same order. A liquidity crisis is looming. V's dependence on exports is a deadly danger. An equivalent reduction in capacity of all VW and Audi/NSU factories is not possible. The Audi/SU factory in Neckarsulm is especially threatened with total shutdown." (Stern, No. 10, 1975.) That is how T. Schmücker, new VW chief and rationalization expert, described (in a "strictly confidential" report) the economic situation of what was once the showpiece of the West German "economic miracle. " The April 14 decision of the VW board of directors did not call for the outright shutdown of any of the factories belonging to the concern; but the reorganization plan that was decided on does call for the largest mass layoffs in Germany since the end of the second world war. If the management of the firm succeeds in getting its way against the workers, the following layoffs will be ordered during coming weeks and months: VW Wolfsburg 5,900 (out of 48, 000 workers); VW Hannover 3, 900 (out of 20, 000); VW Kassel 2,300 (out of 15, 000); VW Salzgitter 3,000 (out of 8, 200); Audi Ingolstadt 1,700 (out of 10, 000); Audi Neckarsulm 4,700 (out of 10,000); and VW Brusse Is 1,350
SEN: .. in Teverses * WERNER NIELSBER
(out of 3,000). The several hundred jobs in the
Heilbronn and Neuenstein factories will be eliminated completely.
A monument wobbles
With these measures the company management is trying to improve the deteriorated position of the firm, which is no longer a secret. This is to be done at the expense of the workers, who already last year suffered considerable losses of income due to twelve periods of short-time work. And this is not to mention the sharpened competition for jobs, which makes it possible to threaten the workers with unemployment.
The West German auto industry remains deeply in crisis. In spite of a recent small increase in monthly production, the production figures for the entire automobile industry for the first quarter of 1975 were
25.8% less than for the first quarter of 1974. Exports are down 43%. (Handelsblatt, April 23, 1975.)
VW sales have been the hardest hit by this crisis.
In 1966-67 VW tried to meet the rising and sharpening competition in the automobile industry by expanding its production for export. The approximately
17
WEST GERMANY 125,000 VW workers in West Germany produce about 70% for export, while the average in the auto industry as a whole is 60%. The energy crisis, rising inflation, conjunctural economic difficulties, and the emergence of a "saturated market" for the automobile industry have engendered a notable decline in sales by all auto companies since 1973. In West Germany VW sales declined from 670, 000 in 1970 to 516,000 in 1974. Export sales in the other European countries declined from 352, 000 in 1972 to 282,000 in 1974, and sales in the United States declined from 570, 000 in 1971 to 282, 000 in 1974. Growing competition on the domestic market, which has rendered "unattractive" the model around which VW has based itself for decades, has also led to a decline in sales in West Germany itself. In 1961 VW's share of the West German auto market was 43.9%; in 1971 it fell to about 29.1%; in 1972 to 26%; and in 1975 it should be about 28.3%. The collapse of the international monetary system and restrictions on imports and other protective measures taken by countries to which VW exports autos further sharpened the sales crisis. In some cases (Ireland for example), changes in the exchange rates have even led to a suspension of all export. Only in Latin America (where in Mexico and Brazil VW has conquered first place in passenger cars) may sales still increase. All in all, experts estimate that the VW concern lost approximately DM850 million last year. Of that total, D550 million was lost by VW itself and DM300 million by its subsidiaries abroad. (See Der Spiegel, No.16, 1975.) Factories ran at about 40% capacity during the year. The crisis of what used to be a model company ("A Volkswagen always runs forward, " said former VW chief Nordhoff), its rapid plunge from first to seventh position among West German companies, came as worse than unwelcome for the SPD-FDP coalition government. (SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - Social Democratic party of Germany. FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei - Free Democratic party, the bourgeois liberal party.) The ruling parties wanted to achieve a small reduction in unemployment (to reduce it to less than 1 million) before the state elections in Schleswig-Holstein and Nordrhe in-Westfalen. The slogan of the SPD during the Nordrein-Westfalen elections was "Vote for an upturn. "But the mass layoffs at VW put a damper on any optimism about stabilizing the economic situation and upset the SPD's calculations. And understandably so, for no other West German company can determine the economic future of whole regions the way VW can. In Lower Saxony alone (where VW production is concentrated) VW accounts for one-sixth of all industrial employment. About 30% of all industrial investment in the state stems from VW. Such well known German firms as the 18
Peine-Salzgitter steel works, Conti-Gummi, Phonix, Varta, Bosch, AEG, Siemens, Blaupunkt, and A. Teves are economically dependent on VW, to which they furnish supplies. The overall estimate is that between 30% and 50% of Lower Saxony's economy is dependent on VW. (See Die Welt, May 31, 1974) Factories in southern Germany are even more dependent on VW production. In Neckarsu Im and its environs about two-thirds of the employed population is dependent on VW. In more localized urban areas, every second metalworker and every fourth industrial worker works for Audi/NSU, which belongs to the WW concern. (Die Welt, July 12, 1974.) The reorganization plan The original reorganization plan called for the total shutdown of the Neckarsulm factory with its approximately 10, 000 workers. Reports of this possibility began appearing in the newspapers months ago. In spite of massive efforts by the workers to get the management to make its plan public, the personnel were left in the dark for months. But the massive mobilization of the workers of the threatened factory and of the population in the surrounding area forced the management to back down. (At the beginning of March more than 20,000 people demonstrated, and 90,000 signatures were collected within a few days on a petition against the plans to shut the factory down.) At the beginning of April the reorganization plan that has now been decided on by the WW board of directors became known through an "indiscretion." The first response of the combative section of the VW workers was to organize two token strikes and demonstrations in Neckarsulm and one token strike in Salzgitter. In the meantime, a plan to construct a V factory in the United States had fallen through (the idea was to avoid import restrictions and reduce production costs), so the management. had to move to centralizing production through mass layoffs. The Audi/NSU production facilities, acquired in 1969, did their part in this, for the Audi models produced there permitted VW to expand its models (Golf, Passat, Polo) by making only superficial changes in the basic stock. Beyond that, the reorganization plan is supposed to achieve a concentration of the individual VW factories and also to make it possible to introduce new investment for rationalization. For example, there are plans to install a fully electronically operated conveyor belt for body frames in the VW factory in Hannover. The influence of T. Schmucker, presently w chairman, is quite clear in all these plans. Previously, he had applied the same recipes during the crisis at Rheinstahl, the West German steel
giant: Intimidation of the workers through threats of layoffs; mass layoffs; rationalization investment; selling of unprofitable subsidiaries (which is already being discussed openly); and mergers, or at least close collaboration, with economically sound firms. The workers attacked... Up to now the VW workers, with the exception of those of Neckarsulm and Salzgitter, have not responded with any notable resistance to the measures the employers are trying to push through. And this is not surprising. In spite of the high level of trade-union organization, the rank-and-file trade-union bodies at VW are playthings in the hands of professional factory councils that have held their positions for many years. With a few exceptions (some of the workers in Kassel), the VW workers do not have any experience in trade-union struggles. The long period of economic upswing created conditions under which the employers were able to integrate the workers and buy off the unions. (Up to now, W has been in the forefront both in Lower Saxony and in West Germany as a whole on questions of wages and social benefits; in 1975 the wages of VW workers are on the average about 13,1% higher than those of metalworkers.) Periods of short-fime work and permanent layoffs have further eroded combativity over the past year. (Between December 31, 1973, and December 31, 1974, the number of workers employed of VW dropped by 19,000. In the first three months of 1975, it was reduced by 5,000 In order to avoid becoming unemployed, general foremen agreed to be demoted to foremen, and foremen and skilled workers agreed to be demoted to assembly-line workers. In addition to avoiding a total confrontation with the combative workers in Neckarsulm, the reorganization plan that has now been decided on by the management has the advantage of further sharpening the lack of solidarity among the workers. A correspondent of the liberal daily Frankfurter Rundschau remarked in this connection: "A cleverly devised strategy, which makes it possible to order mass layoffs without provoking big reactions from the employees, is having its effect. Feelings of fear, insecurity, and gallows humor are predominant among the workers." (Frankfurter Rundschau, April 26, 1975.) But not yet beaten The situation in Neckarsulm is different. The work force in that city has taken part in two labor conflicts in the recent past (the metalworkers strike in 1971 and the fight for better working conditions in
Baden-Wurttemberg in 1973). Discussions are held and decisions are made in the rank-and-file trade: union bodies. The two token strikes of the past several weeks have given the workers a feeling of their own strength. They want "no longer to be powerless objecis, " as one commentator put it. Salzgitter is seething as well. The actions and combativity of the workers in Neckarsulm led the local metalworkers union into conflict with the class conciliationist line of the national trade-union leadership. More extensive measures of struggle, such as protest blockades of the highways, factory occupations, and guarding of the factory premises to prevent secret transport, are being discussed not only by individuals, but also by a large section of the trade-union activists. But between the workers' will to struggle and the actual initiation of the struggle stands the trade-union bureaucracy: the local bureaucracy, which has so for regarded measures of struggle as "exercises in duty" that had to be taken in order to remain on top of the struggle so as to channel it, and the bureaucracy on all other levels, which hos come to terms with mass layoffs. Even Steinkühler, the factory leader of the metalworkers union in Boden-Wurttemberg, who is considered a "leftist, " does not see the "possibility of preventing the reduction of the work force through layoffs by resorting to measures of struggle." (Honde Isblatt, April 8, 1975.) Eugen Loderer, chairman of the metalworkers union (and vice chairman of the VW board of directors) has beaten the drums for the solution the employers are now trying to put through, He was the first to publicly call for "distributing the burden on as many shoulders as possible" instead of closing down the factory outright. The trade-union leaders on the WW board of directors have taken the same attitude. They do not come out against all layoffs; they simply propose a plan that would lay off only 20,000 workers instead of 25, 000. The trade-union bureaucracy happily stated in a press release that they had "made it clear with their compromise proposal in the board of directors that they are prepared to accept responsibility at VW." This example clarifies the effects of all class collaborationist models granting the workers' organizations influence in the policy of the employers under capitalism. The case of VW is a clear indication not only of the end of the West German economic miracle, but also of the bankruptcy of the "partic¡pation" advocated by the trade-union bureaucracy. "Participation" cannot block layoffs, and neither can any other form of class collaboration, Instead, it means taking responsibility before the working class for layoffs.
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WEST GERMANY Resistance to the plan for layoffs is beginning to develop in Neckarsulm. In order for it to be successful, it must prevail against the solid front of the managers of the firm, the trade-union bureaucracy, and the SPD government. The SPD-FDP government has so far denied any direct aid to the workers. Economic Minister Friedrichs, for example, declared: "I want no British Leyland here, " Chancellor Schmidt has deliberately hailed the "new conception" of how to administer the concern. The coming 25,000 layoffs are being saluted as "certain to improve the health of the enterprise. " By promising a DM108 million program to develop new jobs in the regions that are to be affected by the layoffs, the government is trying to make the workers wonder whether it is even worthwhile to defend their jobs today - despite the fact that experts estimate that it would take two to three years before the effects of such plans would be felt. And in any case, such plans are not so good for the workers. The real beneficiaries will be the capitalists in the areas concerned; their investment needs will be reduced by about 20% due to state subsidies (in addition to the 7% subsidy provided by the "conjunctural program, " which went into effect at the beginning of this year). The struggle by the workers of Neckarsulm against the reorganization plan stands at a turning point. Either the workers will prevail against the pacification maneuvers of the trade-union bureaucracy and thus will issue a call to struggle to the workers of other regions who are still intimidated today, or else the "concerted action" of the company management, the union bureaucracy, and the government will again be imposed. The conditions for such a struggle by the workers are better than ever today. 20
What next? The West German working class is beginning to shake off its insecurity, which crippled the combativity of the working class when it was confronted with massive unemployment in the autumn and winter. Some 40,000 young workers demonstrated in Dortmund, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart against the rise of unemployment among the youth and against the reduction of apprenticeships for working-class youth. In a small town in Westfalen, 150 cement workers have been occupying their factory for seven weeks now to prevent a shutdown. Recently held elections to the factory councils have resulted in shifts in favor of leftist or combative candidates in most of the big factories. (According to law, secret-ballot elections are held every three years to choose the representatives of the workers and employees.) If the workers of Neckarsulm succeed in taking steps forward in the direction of self-organization of the struggle; if assemblies on the department and factory level are held at regular short-term intervals; and if these assemblies become places in which coming actions are discussed and decided upon, then the position of the bureaucracy, which remains strong today, will begin to crumble. A recently established support committee has set itself the task of organizing active solidarity in other factories. But the struggle has to get an impulse forward. The slogan "No layoffs! " has to be concretized. Against the slogan "Spread the burden over many shoulders! " which has been raised by the trade-union bureaucracy, we must fight for the slogan "Spread the available work among all workers with no reduction in pay!" April 26, 1975
economy in 1971 by ETTORE SALVINI The publication in the Soviet Union of the economic results obtained in 1974 and of the plan for 1975 (released, as usual, between December and the end of January) passed virtually unnoticed this year. Brezhnev's political and physical health, which seemed especially fragile and threatened precisely during that period, provided the main focus of attention for Kremlinologists, and consequently for world and Soviet public opinion as well. Given the generalized crisis of the world capitalist economy, bourgeois observers had no interest in highlighting the fact that the