BREAKTHROUGH
BANCARIOS CoNSION CRA INTERNA by LIVIO MAITAN The forty-eight-hour general strike in Argentina, which ended on July 8, represented the culminating point of a many-dimensional crisis whose roots extend far into the past. It could become the jumping-off point for a new crisis, the exact development of which is difficult to predict at this time. By the very fact that it was directed against an important decision of the Isabel Perón government, the general strike revealed the overall failure of the operation of political, social, and economic stabilization undertaken by the Argentine bourgeoisie with Peronism's return to power in May 1973. This failure can no longer be concealed by any tricks of propaganda. The Argentine bourgeoisie had hoped to take economic advantage of the increases in the prices of row materials that occurred for a whole period. It had hoped to benefit from the attempts of European and Japanese capitalists to expand their investments. The plan had been to maintain relative "social peace" by relying on a combination of the prestige of Perón, the old charismatic leader, and some modest wage increases to compensate for losses in buying power. The bourgeoisie had further counted on the USSR and the other workers states, Cuba included, to offer increased maneuvering room. Success in this overall project would have endowed the Argentine bourgeoisie with a relatively stable leadership after years of political and social crisis and thus would have permitted bourgeois democracy to function, at
ARGENTINA: NEW WORKERS least partially. (Officially, this was baptised "the process of institutionalization.") The outbreak of the international recession was a severe blow for the Argentine economy. The bourgeoisie's maneuvering room was suddenly reduced, if not wiped out altogether. The turnabout in the situation of the meat market in Europe hit hard at the export of agricultural products, while the increases in production costs of industrial products reduced their competitiveness on the world market. According to official sources, there was an intensified decline (or, in the best of cases, a stagnation) of exports of principal products during the first three months of 1975. There is no indication that this trend will be turned around during the second quarter. At the same time, inflation has intensified. It has taken on dimensions never before seen in the country's history, to use the formula of the most representative Argentine bourgeois dailies. There is no doubt that the major burden of this unfavorable economic evolution of Argentine capitalism has been borne by the workers and the toilers in general. This does not mean that the "social pact" was rigorously respected, as had been hoped for by the bourgeoisie and the Peronist leadership. On various occasions resolute struggles of some sectors and categories of the working class succeeded in winning gains that went beyond
ARGENTINA: the limits set by the accords. Even more important, the myth of the old caudillo suffered severe blows, even before his death. His return to power occurred in a context vastly different from that which prevailed during his rise to power in the 1940s. The concessions to the masses that had formed the basis of his popularity at the end of the second world war could in no way be repeated. Justicialist rhetoric become increasingly insufficient for maintaining Peronism's unity; still less could this rhetoric guarantee the continuity of Peronism's ties to the masses. The first direct and resounding break between Perón and the left wing of his movement occurred during the official May Day demorstration in 1974, when thousands of youth responded to Perón's insults by walking out of the rally. In past months, the strike in Villa Corstitución (see INPRECOR, No. 26, May 22), despite its outcome, which was certainly not successful, had likewise signaled an open clash between the Isabel Perón government and an important section of the workers. Other episodes could also be cited; here we will simply point to two of the most significant ones. At the beginning of June Alfredo Gómez Morales was replaced by Celestino Rodrigo as minister of economics. This was supposed to be a decisive step in pushing through the economic measures the bourgeoisie considered necessary to straighten out an increasingly deteriorating 4 situation. Essentially, these measures involved a new devaluation of the Argentine peso in order to stimulate exports, a considerable increase in the price of public services in order to reduce the budget drastically, and a radical limitation of wage increases under the guise of slowing down inflation (in official circles there was talk of halding wage increases down to 38-45%, while the cost of living was going up at an annual rate of 150%). In other words, it was an attempt to drastically reduce the consumption levels of the mosses, even ot the risk of provoking a deflationary turn so sharp that a serious recession might be triggered. To judge from the comments of political formations and employers organizations up to the eve of the crisis that broke out at the end of June, the bulk of bourgeois forces agreed with the measures of the new economics minister. These measures were also supported by international capital, which was obviously concerned about the gravity of the Argentine situation. (It must be remembered that in spite of the severity of the official repression and the criminal actions of the parallel gangs of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) and in spite of the massacres of militants and intellectuals of the left and the far left, bourgeois "order" had scarcely been restored; the clandestine organizations, especially the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP - Revolu-
BASTA DE iT! tionary Army of the People) and the Montoneros, have not at all reduced the level of their activity.) On June 18, as a sign of support to Celestino Rodrigo's attempts to straighten out the situation of Argentine capitalism, eight multinational automobile companies (representing German, French, Italian, and North American capitol) signed an agreement not to repatriate profits during a two-year period; they also agreed that during the same period they would accept payment for various patent rights and technical assistance in Argentine Central Bank certificates instead of currency. In exchange for this concession, the price of automobiles in Argentina will be exempt from the official system of price-setting. But the project of the government and the new minister quickly ran up against the resistance of those who would have had to bear the burden of the measures. Within a few days after Rodrigo's decisions, a large number of collective contracts of important categories of workers began to expire (metalworkers, construction workers, bank employees, public service employees), Rank-and-file pressure was so strong that in most of these coses the wage claims that were demanded and won were far in excess of the limits set down by the new economic policy; for some categories, the wage increases reached or even exceeded 100%.
It was not out of the goodness of its heart that the trade-union bureaucracy supported the demands put forward by the rank and file. In fact, in many sectors the bureaucracy began by slowing down or opposing mobilizotions, putting forward proposals more in line with the government's projects, and trying to prevent the outbreak of strikes. But the bureaucracy was confronted with an explosion of workers combativity of such scope that any head-on attack on the movement for these demands would have resulted in a generalized loss of control over the working class, That certainly confirms the Fact that the Villa Constitución strike represented a turn in the objective sitution in Argentina, a turn that combined the final episode of a long series of defensive battles by vonguard sections of the working class with the beginning of a generalized mobilization of the working class as a whole. Thus, in the provinces, especially Córdoba and Sante Fe, coordinating bodies of activists and of the factorylevel workers commissions, which had been gradually set up after the regime ousted the elected combative worker leaderships, began to act as real alternative leoderships, organizing strikes and demonstrations during the period June 10-24 and countering the bureaucratic and police provocations and repression, which were still being carried out throughout that period.
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Demonstrators in Buenos Aires burn Lopez Rega in effigyIt is significant that just after the announcement of the Rodrigo measures sectors like the teachers mobilized for their demands in a manner just as unanimous as that of the traditionally most combative elements, like the autoworkers, metalworkers, and printing and graphic arts workers. Thus, a strike proposal for teaching instructors that was opposed by the UDA, the union bureaucracy that is "recognized" in this field, was approved by a majority of 65% in the city of Buenos Aires, 95% in the province of Buenos Aires, and between 95% and 98% in the interior of the country. The government was thus confronted with a dramatic choice: either approve the collective contracts that had been forced on the employers and the trade-union bureaucracy by enormous rank-and-file pressure, which would have meant scuttling the Rodrigo project before if was even launched, or else refuse to ratify the agreements and thus risk a test of strength with the whole working class and the trade-union bureaucracy, that is, an open "breach" in the Peronist movement. The trade-union bureaucracy, having exhausted all possibilities of maneuver and compromise, clearly announced its determination to defend the gains of the contracts. On June 26 it proclaimed an initial "official" work stoppage and called for a workers demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo for the following day. The bureaucracy did this because it was constrained and forced to do so by the many wildcat strikes and other spontaneous demonstrations of workers combativity that had already broken out. It did so with much hesitation, which was shown by the foct that when the June 27 demonstration lasted beyond the scheduled time and began to take a more and more radical turn, the leaders of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo - General Confederation of Labor) took to the public address system to call on the demonstrators to disperse, an action that did not produce impressive results, (In all, the demonstration lasted for nearly ten hours; more than 100,000 workers participated.) On June 28 the government announced its choice in a radio and television address by Perón herself. All the labor contracts that had been arrived at by the parity commissions were annulled. A rigid 50% limit was set on wage increases effective June 1, additional raises of 15% being permissible on October 1, 1975, and January 1, 1976. Isabel did not hesitate to criticize the workers, accusing them of not respecting the promises she claimed they had made to her late husband, promises to "work harder to produce more. " She also accused them of "Facilitating on easy victory for mercenaries, enemies of the fatherland. " But in addition to this reactionary rhetoric, she confessed the failure of the Peronist policy that has been followed during the two years since the electoral victory of the Justicialist front: "The Argentine nation is now facing what I would call the zero hour of our decision to obtain definitive freedom on all fronts. . ... Production is going down. Speculation seems to be spreading beyond all limits. Enormous sums have been spent on activities that are useless to the goals of the nation, " She was even compelled to odd explicitly: "The only possible solution for reestablishing an equilibrium and recoratructing the nation is to maintain a just and healthy austerity, to avoid superfluous expenses, and to increase production to the maximum, as though we were in a war economy." The announcement of the government's decision immediately provoked a furious reaction from the working class. The CT announced that it would meet on June 30 at 10:00 a.m. to decide what to do. But even before the bureaucrats could get together, four provinces -
Córdoba, Mendoza, Chubut, and Santa Fe — were completely paralyzed by spontaneous general strikes, This time the wave of radicalization hit the city of greater
Buenos Aires too; throughout the capital factories were shut down by general assemblies held in the work places.
Many de legafions marched from their factories toward the central headquarters of the CT to put pressure on the trode-union leadership. The government concentrated vast security forces around the Casa Rosada (the presidential palace) and access to the Plaza de Mayo was forbidden.
Torn between pressure from the rank and file and pressure from the government, the CGT leadership still sought to gain time and decided to postpone its decision until Wednesday July 2. But the spread of wildcat strikes was so extensive that in order to try to keep its "troops"
under control the trade-union bureaucracy, after the failure of the attempts at conciliation with the govern-
ment, was forced to call a forty-eight-hour general strike for July 7 and 8. The government's decision to annul the collective contracts provoked not only the massive reaction of the working class, but also a deep political crisis. Nearly all political formations and even various employers associations disassociated themselves from the government.* The Peronist movement itself was deeply divided, the differences even extending into its parliamentary group. If is here that another important aspect of the change in the objective situation signaled by the Villa Constitución strike made itself felt, Not only sectors of the workers vanguard, but also substantial sectors of the working masses as a whole openly took aim at López Rega, Isabel Perón's "grey eminence" and Peronisms's ideologue and strong man. At the June 27 demonstration the trade-union bureaucracy had tried to get the tens of thousands of assembled workers to sing the Peronist hymn - in vain. The demonstrators were not prepared to follow this odvice. But the demand for the removal of López Rega become more and more generalized in their chants and slogans. And when the CGT was compelled to call for the July 7-8 general strike, the demand for López Rega's removal was included among the official goals of the movement. Obviously, this was an event of great importance. López Rega has been the real instigator of the increasingly reactionary course of the Peronist regime after the brief interlude of Cámpora's presidency in 1974, It was López Rega who began using the many leaders and torturers of the repression under the Ongania regime, unleashing a repression on a grand scale against the Peronist youth, the revolutionary organizations, and the cadres and leaders of the class-struggle tendencies in the trade unions. A ferocious anticommunist whose ideology is semifascist, an open admirer of Mussolini and Franco, a purger of universities and intellectual circles, López Rega is the real organizer of the "unofficial" terror of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance. In association with secfions of the trade-union bureaucracy, he tried to sysrematically break the class-struggle trade-union leaderships that had emerged in various sectors during the preceding period of the workers radicalization. For all these reasons, he is considered the embodiment of the antiworker and counterrevolutionary repression in the countryThis judgment, at first put forward systematically only by the revolutionary organizations and other opposition * Among the rare political forces that came out in favor of Isabel Peron's decisions were the Maoists of the PCR (Revolutionary Communist party), who asserted that "in a situation of national crisis" it was correct "for the united Peronist people to confront the Russo-Yankee conspiracy, on the road to the definitive liberation of the people and the fotherland."
forces, has now been taken up by broad sections of the working class itself. While it is premature to see this as evidence of a decisive break of the Argentine working class with the bourgeois ideology of Peronist Justicialism, it is undoubtedly a step that brings closer the Argentine proletariat's winning of political class independence. As of this writing it seems that the government has copitulated to the general strike on the question of wage increases; Isabel Perón has refused to abandon López Rego, but she appears to be prepared to sacrifice Rodrigo and other unpopular ministers. The government formally resigned; a cabinet shake-up of greater or lesser scope has become inevitable. The military officers, who refrained from openly intervening in the crisis, but seem to have brought pressure in the direction of a "reconciliation" with the trade-union bureaucracy, could well return to top position. An attempt to relaunch "left Peronism" could possibly be made, utilizing such personalities as Cámpora, for example, Isabel could try to get out of the situation by recomposing the various elements that represent Peronism in power. But whatever happens, there is no doubt that the crisis of Peronism has reached a new stage. Never have its relations with the working class as a whole (and not simply with certain sections of the working class) been as tense as they are today, The trade-union bureaucrats understand very well how dangerous the current developments are both for the future of their own positions and for the future of Argentine bourgeois society as a whole, That is why they are ceaselessy reaffirming their fidelity to Peronism and are seeking to save the reign of Isabel Perón, even while they tried to recover their control of the masses by the proclaiming the general strike. In such a context, revolutionaries must stand in the front lines of the great ongoing battles, making their contribution to the broadest possible mass mobilization, for it is only such a mobilization that could lead either to Isabel Perón's total capitulation or to her removal. The decision to annul the collective labor contracts must be purely and simply rescinded. Wage increases that fully compensate for the effects of inflation and preserve the buying power of the workers must be won and guaranteed by a sliding scale that responds to any new price increases. At the same time, revolutionaries must insist on the necessity of preparing to respond to any reactionary atlack, whatever its character, and of organizing workers self-defense on the broadest possible scale against official and unofficial repression. It is intolerable for worker militants to fall under the blows of the AAA and other antiworker gangs. The release of the political prisoners must be won. The organization of self-defense must become an irreplaceable guarantee for the victorious outcome of the new phase of moss workers struggles that has now opened in Argentina. July 9, 1975
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