the permanent
PORTUGAL by C. Michaloux LISBON - The general situation in Portugal today is dominated by two major features: First, the revolutionary upsurge that has been accelerating and deepening since September 1974 has not run up against a bourgeois state apparatus capable of containing or crushing it during the current phase. On the other hand, neither has it attained a scale of self-organization (that is, a situation in which organs of workers power are more or less generalized), a level of consciousness, or a working-class revolutionary leadership that would make possible the conquest of power by the proletariat in alliance with the poor peasants and revolutionary soldiers as an immediate outcome of the revolutionary process. The result is a more or less permanent political and social tension, a feeling of crisis that permeates all the politicized sectors of society, and a succession of dramatic events: ministerial crises, theatrical political coups, and violent clashes between political forces and the major social classes, each of which is trying to modify the relationship of forces before a decision can be imposed in one direction or the other. In the bourgeois camp, the major goal being pursued is to reestablish both a coherent, effective instrument of political authority and the initial elements of a functioning repressive apparatus. After the successive crises that have shaken it, especially the crises of March and
CriSis
July 1975, the original Movimento das Forças Armadas
(MFA - Armed Forces Movement) can no longer adequately play that role. Its authority has been sapped within both the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Its unity is broken. This means that it is unable to initiate a policy of systematic repression of the forms of mass self-organization that are most advanced and, from the bourgeois standpoint, most dangerous: occupations of factories and companies; experiences of workers control;
land and housing occupations; experiments in the creation of organs of workers self-defense; forms of democratic self-organization among the soldiers.
Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie has opted in an initial phase for the reconstruction of the bourgeois order through parliamentary legal channels, as was done in Germany in December 1918-January 1919 and in republican Spain during the period August 1936-April
1937. Such is the sense of the offensive of Mario Soares, who puts forward the Constituent Assembly in counterposition not to a nonexistent "military dictatorship, "
but instead (and explicitly) to "anarchy" and the "absence of government authority, "which would lead to
"communist dictatorship" if it continued. The whole Portuguese and international bourgeoisie is supporting this maneuver. The support of the international bourgeoisie is particularly pronounced. The im-
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PORTUGAL perialist bourgeoisie of Europe is suspending the financial aid that had been promised to collapsing Portuguese capitalism. This suspension will remain in effect until governmental authority is reestablished, firm guarantees are provided that parliamentary democracy (that is, bourgeois democracy) will be consolidated, and the reestablishment of bourgeois order in the factories is assured. These appeals are receiving a growing response within the MFA, not to mention the sections of the officer corps not affiliated to the MFA. Especially in the northern part of the country, the garrisons are controlled by officers who lean politically toward bourgeois solutions, including drastic ones. The air force as a whole is controlled by similar forces. The big obstacle to a rightwing military pronunciamento is the division of the officer corps and the rejection of discipline by a growing layer of soldiers and sailors that could be provoked by such a move so long as the rise of the mass movement continues. That would lead to a crisis in which the bourgeois state apparatus would be even more weakened and powerless than it is today. In the camp of the proletariat, the radicalized and forward moving workers of the big factories of Porto, Lisbon, and elsewhere are continuing their pressure and initiatives toward independent mass self-organization and self-defense. They are extending their attempts to politicize and link up with growing sectors of soldiers and sailors. But these workers are still a minority today; they remain politically confused and are often prone to leave themselves open to the maneuvers of the enemy. The Socialist party has utilized the República incident to unleash an offensive aimed at the reestablishment of bourgeois order and authority in both the factories and the state, under the cover of the Constituent Assembly. The political confusion of a part of the workers vanguard and the sectarianism and Stalinist ideological tradition of the Communist party have powerfully aided the SP in its offensive. But the internal logic of Soares's maneuver is beginning to accentuate the contradiction within the SP between the clearly counterrevolutionary political program of the leadership and the elementary class consciousness of a good part of the Social Democratic rank and file, who favor workers control, workers commissions, and even the continuing and deepening of the revolutionary process. The CP has manifestly lost the political initiative. The violent anticommunist offensive of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democracy has shaken the CP and initially driven it somewhat to the left. But the logic of its strategic orientation, the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, and its "frontist" tradition are impelling it to increasingly regard the "progressive" wing of the MFA as its only valuable ally and even as the only instrument through which it can carry out its political designs. A realignment of the political currents within the MFA thus threatens to push the CP to the right once again. In conditions like these, the road revolutionary Marxists must follow is clear. They must intensify their campaign for the creation, extension, coordination, and generalization of democratic bodies of self-organization of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and tenants. They must conclude agreements for immediate unity in action with all the political forces prepared to engage in such a campaign. They must simultaneously put themselves forward as the political force in the Portuguese workers movement that most favors unity, waging a campaign for the workers united front, a campaign that condemns both the reactionary anticommunism of the Social Democratic and Maoist leaders and the criminal Stalinism of the CP leaders. The unity of the entire proletariat and of all the Portuguese toiling masses requires that pluralism of parties be the rule within the structures of workers councils that will direct the socialist revolution in Portugal; the independence of political parties and their right to an independent press and to access to the means of massive distribution must be strictly guaranteed; the election (not the appointment) of delegates in general assemblies must be assured, and these delegates inust be recallable by the voters. The struggle for the class independence of the proletariat in a situation like the one that exists in Portugal today cannot at all be reduced to propaganda calling upon the leaders of the SP and the CP to break with the bourgeois ministers. It implies a struggle for a break with the bourgeoisie throughout all the structures of the collapsing stale. The government of the workers organizations must be based only on the organs of self-representation of the masses, the centralization of which in a People's Assembly must be vigorously propagated and actively prepared. The permanent crisis of the provisional government The protracted political crisis of the country is now being reflected in a virtual governmental vacuum. For more than a week there has been no government in Portugal. And everything suggests that the fifth provisional government, which will succeed the one that has just collapsed so miserably, will also be very fragile. The crisis is there for all to see. Mario Soares and the rest of the leadership of the Socialist party flatter themselves in thinking that it was their departure from the government on July !l that triggered the crisis. It would be more appropriate to say that their resignation, drily received like a divorce decree by the July 12 meeting of the Council of the Revolution, only illuminated the factors that had long since been undermining the regime. The government had gotten everybody's back up with its hesitations, compromises, and powerlessness. The bourgeoisie, exasperated at seeing the MFA give in each time under the hammer blows of workers combativity, withdrew the support it had previously extended the government through the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático - Popular Democratic party) and the SP in order to control the situation somewhat. The workers had
PRUENTO Viv tenants expected the government, which they regarded as their own, to take energetic measures to halt the economic crisis of which they are the victims; when that did not happen, their attitude shifted from confidence to distrust, and even to outright hostility. The coalition government died unlamented by those who attended its death agony. Up to the time of the government's demise, everything
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MFA in these conditions the generalization of democratiç bodies o sell-organization of the workers, peas ants, soldiers, and seemed to be going in the direction desired by the leadership of the Communist party. After all, didn't the latest MFA assembly adopt a "guiding document" that came very close to the conceptions upheld by the CP:
the gradual transformation of the bourgeois state apparatus through careful injections of "popular participation" channeled and controlled by the MFA (the "prestigious liberator" of April 25, 1974)? And didn't the report of Vasco Gonçalves, adopted in the MFA assembly (by a weak majority, but a majority nonetheless),
PORTUGAL constitute a line "that is binding on the whole MFA" and "fully satisfies the Portuguese Communist party"? Under a rubric entitled "the transformation of the state apparatus and the link between the MFA and the people, " the prime minister reported: "It is important to stress the two most important preconditions for the actual realization of the socialist process. The first consists of transforming the state apparatus, which means that its rule must become a consistent instrument for the realization of the interests of the workers. The second consists of creating organs of people's power independent of the parties and supported by direct democracy, which can exert a dynamization and control over the state appaIt is claimed that Vasco Gonçalves has been a member of the Portuguese Communist party since 1965; in any case, that is his place. And the CP has carved out a good position for itself within the MFA. The government is dead, long live the government! Vasco Gonçalves has been confirmed in his post as prime minister and has settled down to form the fifth provisional government. Everyone is parading through his Sâo Benito residence. On July 17 Vasco Lourenço, spokesman for the Council of the Revolution, announced the end of the coalition government, as the PPD's conditions for remaining in the government team were officially rejected by the MFA. On July 18 the members of the ex-MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista - Left Socialist Movement) - that is, former members of the MES who joined the MFA after March 11 - resigned from the government. João Cravinho and Jorge Sampaio handed the prime . minister a document in which they affirmed: "The revolution lacks a power center. The MFA is now primarily responsible for the revolutionary process. Without a mobilizing program that the masses can understand, political power loses its internal coherence and leaves an open field for the most sterile party struggles. " The present orientation is toward the formation of a military government with which members of the CP, the exMES, and even the MES and the FSP (Frente Socialista Popular - Popular Socialist Front) would be associated "as individuals. " The CP supports this project, for it is quite confident in the relationship of forces it has established in the MFA and expects that such a government would adopt its positions by a majority. The 15,000 people who gathered in front of the SP's Lisbon headquarters on the night of July 15 will not be able to block the realization of this plan. Not, at least, in the opinion of Alvaro Cunhal and Vasco Gonçalves. The SP campaign "The SP has lost a battle but not the war, " Mario Soares declared the day after the Socialist ministers and state secretaries resigned. Within just a few days, the SP
6 leadership mapped out a real campaign plan. The troops for this campaign were assembled by the SP leadership's disguising its position against the emerging organs of workers power with some lyrical braggadocio about "socialism in freedom. " These troops were recruited at top speed and by all available means; the SP leadership lined up every Tom, Dick, and Harry with hysteria against "communist totalitarianism" and "social fascism." Next, the generals had to be rallied and broken from their fetishism about the unity of the MFA. On Friday, July 18, Minister of Foreign Affairs Melo Antunes took a plane to Rome. At the airport he confided to whoever wanted to listen that it would probably be his last official trip. He anticipated that the new government would carry on without him, the ardent defender of the ideas of the SP within the Council of the Revolution. Upon his arrival in Rome he held a press conference during which he declared that any political solution to the current crisis had to be sought in a government including the SP and the PPD. With beautiful synchronization, on the night of July 18 itself the SP struck a real blow by assembling 70,000 people in the Antas stadium in Porto. The next day, more than 100, 000 people gathered in the Alameda Afonso Henriques to listen to speeches by the central leaders of the SP, who, under the tender gaze of representatives of the major European Socialist parties, attacked the Communist party with unprecedented violence, calling it a "social-reactionary and murderous" organization that "wants to transform Portugal into an immense concentration camp"; also denounced were "the captains, a bit too quickly promoted to generals, who support its (the CP's) totalitarian schemes. " Soares demanded a "government of national union in which the SP, representative of the Portuguese people, must have its rightful place. " He also demanded the resignation of Vasco Goncalves and his replacement by "a really independent prime minister" who "respects the popular will as expressed by universal suffrage." In Porto, as in Lisbon, Soares washed his hands in advance of any consequences his reactionary and anticom-. munist diatribes might have on the overcharged crowd. During the night, roving bands set fire to propaganda stands of the CP and the MDP (Movimento Democrático Popular - Popular Democratic Movement, close to the CP) that had been set up in Humberto Delgado Square in Porto; later they tried to assault the studios of RadioClub Portugal, which were protected by the army. In Lisbon the few army trucks and jeeps that were parked around the SP meeting soon drove away; militants of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI - Internationalist Communist League, the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), who had come to distribute a leaflet to the demonstrators, owe it to the protection of foreign journalists that they were not lynched by an enraged mob shouting "Commies go back to Moscow!"
Despite its "socialist" pretensions, the campaign organized by the leadership of the SP against the CP has
opened the floodgates for a broad reactionary offensive. Between Thursday, July 17, and Saturday, July 19, local headquarters of the revolutionary organizations, the CP, and the Intersindical (the trade-union federation) were attacked in Alcavem, Sacavem, Leiria, Batalha, Porto de Mos, Aveiro, Rio Maior, Lorinha, and Cadaval. The news spread (confirmed by revolutionary soldiers with access to the army's radio transmission service) that 200 mercenaries recruited in England had just arrived in Spain to join the estimated 5, 000 armed men of the ELP (Portuguese Liberation Army, a fascist military organization) massed on the Spanish side of the border. On Friday and Saturday, July 18 and 19, the soldiers and officers in the barracks were placed on alert, while the revolutionary militants of the MES, the LUAR (Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária - League of Revolutionary Union and Action), the FSP, and the LCI kept in close contact with the CP, the trade unions, the workers commissions, and the tenants commissions in order to deal with any eventuality. At no time did the SP leadership take a clear position on the disturbing wave that was developing, especially in the north, where whole villages fell under the control of reactionary forces. In fact, the SP leadership took advantage of this sudden tension, to which it had contributed in no small measure, to make apparent its ever more indispensible role within the state as the "guardian of order. " But this subtle blackmail could well end up turning against the SP itself by touching off a massive reactionary aggression against the workers movement, of which the Socialist workers are still an integral part. The SP leadership has been playing with fire during this agitated week. By inciting its militants and sympathizers to a white heat against "communist dictatorship" it has allowed fascist gangs to penetrate its meetings and demonstrations, gangs that came to "kill the reds" in preparation for soon being able to kill the workers, whatever their party or organization. These past few days have given a frightful foretaste of what the fury of the fascists would be if they managed to regain control in Portugal thanks to a persistent division of the workers movement. Everything must be done to make sure that this never happens. The CP's adventurism The leadership of the Communist party bears a large share of the responsibility for the division in the workers movement that has erupted these past days and that could tragically threaten the future of the Portuguese working class. The leaders of the CP have tried to transform a necessary mobilization against reaction into a maneuver aimed • at isolating the SP. They have sought to take advantage of the very lively and widespread sentiment among the workers about the necessity of barring the path of an increasingly arrogant fascism to cynically push the Socialist party - and not only its leadership - to link its own fate to that of the right, that is, to that of the PPD, the CDS (Centro Democrático Social - Social Democratic Center), and all the reactionary grouplets. The leadership of the CP hoped in this way to provoke the MFA to enter the game on the side of the CP and thus to ensure a prolonged political marginalization of the SP. For some days now the leadership of the CP has been engaged, with no success at all, in a policy of denouncing "social fascism, " a policy parallel to the one the SP has been following toward the CP. On the night of Friday, July 18, communiqués released by the CP and the Intersindical called for the erection of barricades to prevent an imaginary "march on Lisbon, " which in reality was the meeting of the SP. If a march on Lisbon had really been in preparation, the first thing to do would have been to launch an offensive toward the SP - its militants and its leadership - demanding that it join in the organization of workers selfdefense aimed at blocking the path of the march. To do that would have required first assuring the militants of the SP that their right as a workers party to hold meetings and demonstrations would be recognized. That would have forced the SP leadership to make its position clear, and its possible or probable lack of response to such appeals would have at least helped a large number of Socialist militants who are already beginning to assert themselves to get a clear idea of the real orientation of their leadership and to join with the Communist and revolutionary workers in the organization of a common response to reaction. But the adventurist and sectarian folly of the CP on the contrary contributed to helping the SP leadership harden up its rank and file by invoking the threat of the CP. The reflex of party patriotism, obviously intermixed with reactionary and anticommunist prejudices, was thus able to come fully into play to assure the success of the SP meetings, which were presented by the Social Democratic leadership as "a great victory against the attempt at Stalinist repression. " In any case, only about 2,000 people participated in the Lisbon "barricades, " which were quickly taken over by COPCON. By the end of the night, the leadership of the CP itself was compelled to order the barricades abandoned because of the hostility with which its initiative had been greeted by broad sectors of the working class not inclined to serve as foot-soldiers for the CP's maneuvers aimed at preparing for the formation of the next government. After trying in vain to gain control of the demonstration of workers and tenants commissions that had been called in Porto for Friday, July 18 (which followed up the Lisbon demonstration of Wednesday, July 16), the CP tried to cover itself by convoking a united meeting with the MES, the LUAR, the FSP, and the LCI - but these organizations refused to attend. What is the explanation of what could appear to have been a crude adventurist error by the Communist party? The dominant factor is the CP leadership's desire to
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PORTUGAL guarantee its preponderance within the MFA at any price. The CP prefers the unity of an MFA in which it holds a preponderant influence to the unity in struggle of the working class, which, the CP leaders are now beginning to feel, could very quickly threaten their present control over the organized workers movement. The radicalization of the Portuguese workers is beginning to have an effect on the CP, which is losing ground to the revolutionaries in some unions, workers commissions, and tenants commissions. In the teachers union, for instance, the CP leadership was displaced by an MES list of independent far-left militants. In the woodworkers union in the Porto region (which includes several thousand workers), the LCI has won preponderant positions over the CP. In the CTT (the postal system), the insurance companies, and the banks of Lisbon, far-left lists have obtained percentages that sometimes border on majorities. No longer satisfied simply to sit astride the combativity of the workers and people, the CP leadership wanted to give it a big "leftist" crack of the whip that would get rid of the SP, at least until the MFA could finish the job. The sole result of this typically bureaucratic adventure has been to isolate the CP in the workers movement between the SP on the right and the revolutionaries on the left. It is now indispensible to work - and fast - to reforge workers unity where it can be most effectively asserted: in the workers commissions, the tenants commissions, and the popular assemblies. Nevertheless, behind these great maneuvers orchestrated by the leaderships of the SP and the CP, the real target of which is the MFA, two demonstrations put the stamp of the future on these days of governmental crisis. The first took place in Lisbon on July 16. Called by the workers and tenants commissions of the capital, it assembled about 10,000 demonstrators, who marched under the slogans "Against reaction, against capital: proletarian unity!" "Workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, united we will win!" and "Workers control, people's power!" For the first time since April 25, hundreds of soldiers marched in the contingents of the demonstration. The soldiers of RALIS (the light artillery regiment of Lisbon) participated - complete with their tanks and armored machine-gun carriers onto which hundreds of demonstrators carrying red flags quickly jumped. The soldiers of the RIOQ (the operational intervention regiment of Queluz), units of the military police, and other regiments of the city also turned out, raising their fists and singing the Internationale. In Porto there were even more demonstrators - and in the midst of the crisis, a few hours before the SP meeting of July 18. This time, the Intersindical endorsed the demonstration. This was done, of course, partly in an attempt to coopt the demonstration to the advantage of the orientation of the CP (which failed completely), but also because the leadership of the CP understood the potential danger if it held itself aloof from these initial street assemblies of the independent bodies of
8 the working class, which went beyond the limits of the neighborhood or factory to put forward the outlines of an alternative policy in the crisis. The presence of many soldiers in these demonstrations represents much more than the participation of the most radicalized regiments of the Portuguese army. It is also a sign of the growing penetration of the movement by the independent organization of the working class in the barracks, especially important in a context of tension propitious for an attack by reaction. There were examples of this all week long. On Saturday night, July 19, in the SICA 1 (the tank regiment of Porto) the soldiers got together in a plenary assembly to discuss the situation. Because of the reactionary and anticommunist machinations of the commandant, they decided to remove him from his post and elect someone else. Similar assemblies were held in the Lisbon area, among the RALIS and at the EPAME barracks. On each occasion, the discussions attested both to the high level of radicalization among the soldiers and to the reactionary polarization of certain officers, members of the MFA of course. The crisis, which reached its zenith on Saturday night, July 19, revealed deep fissures in the army, especially among officers. Although it has now receded temporarily, the tension of these past days has etched out a lesson that has been well learned by the revolutionary soldiers and officers: The decisive weight needed to crush reaction, which raised its head on July 18 and 19, will be found outside the military encampments and in the defense of the gains of the workers through independent workers organs of anticapitalist struggle. The assemblies of representative units of the soldier rank and file must ally with the workers commissions, the tenants commissions, and the people's assemblies if they are to prevent a part of the military hierarchy from doing their worst. Another provisional government: for how long? Whatever mixture is finally selected in forming the fifth provisional government, that government will not be viable. If the pressure from the SP succeeds in convincing the Council of the Revolution to name a new coalition government, it is probable that such a government will be a short-lived one. A government with a prime minister like Vasco Gonçalves flanked by a vice prime minister close to the SP (Vasco Lourenço perhaps), in which a large number of SP ministers are also involved (as individuals, in order to save face), would quickly be torn apart by the first important decision. And the important decisions that have to be made in Portugal today are legion! Things would just be put off for a few weeks, or even a few days, at the rate things move today. In any case, the SP has shown its true colors; its participation in the government would be predicated on putting an end to "anarchy" (that is, the nationalizations,