Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Portugal: Statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

· Inprecor no. 33, 11 September 1975 · pp 15-16 · 1,557 words

Portugal Fourth International Armed forces and soldiers

OF THE

UNITED SECRETARIAT

OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

4. The creation of a front including the revolutionary political parties and other organizations, the revolutionary militants, the MFA, and the autonomous organs of popular power referred to in the guiding document of the MFA-people alliance constitute an outlet for the revolutionary process. The prerevolutionary situation that opened in Portugal with the beginning of 1975 has gone through an exacerbation marked by the government crisis, but above all by the mossive emergence of the autonomous movement of the masses, as revealed by the August 20 demonstration, the impact of which has begun to make itself felt on the reformist organizations, 1. The division of the MFA, triggered by the rise of the class struggle, makes it impossible to stabilize the army, which has been profoundly undermined by the crisis of the hierarchical system and by the political debates and divisions (especially around the Copcon document and the "document of the nine"). In the short run, this breakdown of the army, which is occurring in a context of generalized social crisis, makes it impossible to launch a reactionary coup d'etat without running the risk of civil war. In face of the MFA's incapacity to stabilize its Bonapartist function, the bourgeoisie has moved to counterattack on several fronts: *internationally, through blackmail threats of economic strangulation on the part of the European imperialist powens (whether with or without Social Democratic governments) and through the financial and military pressure exerted by American imperialism on Portugal and the Portuguese dependencies (the Azores, Madeira, Timor, and Angola). *nationally, through the de facto junction of the terrorist attacks, the anticommunist mobilizations exploiting the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie of the North, and the civilian and miliary political offensive combining the orientation of the SP leadership with the great maneuvers of Melo Antunes and sections of the military hierarchy. 2. The August 20 demonstration, which drew 50,000 people, more than a thousand of whom were soldiers,

5. The undersigned have decided to form a provisional secretariat for the purpose of working out actions that permit a common offensive against reaction and for the advance of the revolutionary process. The undersigned declare that this platform is open to all organizations, revolutionary militants, and organs of popular power that wish to adhere to it. STATEMENT revealed the maturation of the combativity and the elevation of the level of consciousness of important sections of the working class, especially in the workers bastions of Lisbon and the southern region. The radical character of the demands advanced by these sectors - for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, workers control, and the reconversion of production - objectively place on the agenda the necessity of a centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers (workers commissions, popular assemblies, "moradores" commissions) in order to respond to the need for socialist planning of the economy. Nevertheless, the present geographical limitation and uneven development and functioning of these organs must be stressed. 3. The situation is thus characterized by an increased polarization between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, although this does not imply that there will be an immediate qualitative modification of the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes. With the accentuation of the economic crisis, which will provoke an intensification of workers struggles that will run up against the government's inability to meet the workers demands, the possibility of the current prerevolutionary situation being transformed into a real revolutionary crisis emerges. For this, it is important that all initiatives be taken so that the autonomous organs of the workers are developed, coordinated, and centralized, thus permitting a real response to the demands of the toiling mosses and to the division of the working class that has been accentuated by the leaderships of the SP and the CP. Toward this end, it is necessary that the autonomous organs take charge of the defense and generalization of workers control, the expropriation of the capitalists, the arming

PORTUGAL of the proletariat, and the enactment of measures to establish a monopoly of foreign trade, to deepen the agrarian reform, and to institute planning. In face of the attempts of the "group of nine" to reestablish discipline in the army, to put an end to the beginning of the emergence of workers militias, and to stabilize the MFA os on instrument of the hierarchy, it becomes all the more imperative to forge links between the revolutionary soldiers and officers and the workers commissions, moradores commissions, etc., and to generalize the election of officers by assemblies of soldiers. Likewise, it is necessary to advance adequate measures (selective price support, moratoria on debts, credit, direct liaison between consumers and small-scale producers, etc.) in order to neutralize reaction's utilizofion of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the minifundistas of the North among others. Finally, the centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers in order to carry out these tasks will take the form of the convocation of a National People's Assembly composed of delegates of the workers commissions, the moradores commissions, the assemblies of military units, and the popular assemblies. 4. The essential obstacle to the realization of this strategic objective lies in the policy of division followed by the leaderships of the SP and the CP. The policy of the Social Democratic leadership, which manifestly aims at halting the revolutionary process, is beginning to meet the first signs of resistance from the SP's rank and file workers, in spite of the sectarianism and bureaucratic methods utilized agoinst the SP by the CP leadership. Concurrently, the zigzags of the Stalinist leadership of the CP have provoked disorientation among the CP rank and file at a time when a workers vanguard is forcefully emerging onto the political scene. Thus, it is not only necessary but also possible to carry out an audacious policy of workers united front directed at both the SP and the CP in order to consolidate o response by the working class as a whole to capitalist reacfion, to defend the gains of the workers, and to spur on the development of the revolutionary process. The autonomous organs of the toiling mosses are the bodies that are best suited to realize this united front, for in their present form they already group together Socialist workers, Communist workers, revolutionary workers, and workers who belong to no political party. 5. The unitary accord of August 25 testifies to the shift in the relationship of forces between the workers vanguard and the reformist apparatuses. In the present conjuncture, it was politically correct to seek a united front accord with the CP. But the accord of August 25 did not respond to the actual requirements of the situation. 16 a) The accord in effect sanctioned the CP's policy of supporting the government and maintaining the unity of the MFA, precisely at the moment that the MFA was being ripped apart by the pressure of antagonistic closs forces. b) The accord mentioned no concrete objective that would permit the unification of the working class and the actual stimulation of workers self-defense and selforganization. c) Because of this absence, and because of the lack of proposals to the SP (a party that currently groups together nearly half of the proletariat), the accord sanctioned the present division of the workers movement and did not contribute to surmounting this major obstocle to the development of the revolutionary process. d) Furthermore, the "unitary accord" envisaged the formation of a "front" in which the MFA is included on the same footing as the autonomous organs, parties, and revlutionary organizations of the workers movement. This not only appeared as a stamp of approval on the CP's project of creating a "democratic and socialist popular front, " but also fell within the framework of the perspective of integrating the autonomous organs, in opposition to their real independence of the institutions of the bourgeois state. e) Thus, the accord could easily serve the objective of the CP (as it did during the August 28 demonstration), which is to utilize the weight of the workers vanguard to negotiate compromises on the level of the state apparatus, the government, the army, and the MFA under the best possible conditions. Now, the relationship of farces permifted revolutionaries to seize this opportunity to lead the CP to take a position on the implementation of the essential tasks necessary for the progress of the revolution. Here again, the lack of concrete objectives and the concessions made to the CP's political orientation prevented the lessons of the policy of the CP leadership and of the rupture of the "front" from being clearly drawn before the masses. 6. In the workers and people's counteroffensive based on the real dynamic of the mass movement, the Trotskyist militants of the LCI will stand in the front ranks of all initiatives fostering the extension, generalization, and centralization of the autonomous organs of the workers and the self-defense of the workers. It is through the capacity of revolutionary Marxists to fulfill these tasks that the revolutionary party, indispensible for the victory of the Portuguese socialist revolution, will be able to develop. The Fourth International and all its sections and sympathizing organizations will support the comrades of the LCI by all the means of their disposal and will press for all mobilizations of solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of the Portuguese workers. September 2, 1975

← Portugal: Text of the August 25 Accord · Bangladesh: The Coup: Its Roots and Consequences →

Something wrong on this page?