A COMRADE OF THE
INTERVIEW WITH LCR/ETA-VI Question. Could you explain the meaning of the recent decree-law "against terrorism" and the political context in which it was issued? Answer. The most immediate reason for the passing of This decree-law lies in the extraordinary political general strike movement of June 11 in Euzkadi, the general strike against the state of exception that was imposed there. The regime, whose fundamental basis is repression, applied the most brutal repressive measures it could muster, and after two months they saw the result: 100,000 strikers against the state of exception during the month of June. This strike marked the failure of the state of exception. So the dictatorship looked for other measures. These repressive measures indicated that the Francoist dictatorship was abandoning what some people had called on "evolution" toward an "opening, " a political "recomposition." More and more, the regime's policy boils down to the utilization of the repressive apparatus. Nonetheless, the internal contradictions are multiplying, and today they even affect the army. For instance, opposition to the Francoist dictatorship has been publicly expressed among the officer corps. This opposition is called the Military Democratic Union. It is difficult to say how large this group is numerically (probably it's a few hundred officers), but it has a certain audience and is composed of prestigious officers. These officers have taken political positions that fail within the bourgeois framework, to be sure, but this nevertheless reveals the contradictions that exist within the ormy. To these contradictions within the military hierarchy has been added the development of rank-and-file organization among the soldiers, especially in Euzkadi. The emergence of the first soldiers committees is very important. If you consider that the military war council is expected to hand down about a dozen death penalties during the coming month, you can see how important it is for the dictatorship to make the army come forward as the protector of its power and as the guarantor of the action of the repressive forces. The regime is worried about the contradictions that are beginning to undermine it. In the midst of the state of exception, General Coloma, the army chief of staff, visited the Euzkadi barracks and affirmed: "We stand behind you." He was trying to boost the rather low morale of his troops. 4
In addition to this situation in the army, you have to add the fact that a sector of the bureaucracy brought up by Francoism has taken an open position in favor of a process of institutionalization; obviously, they want this to take place within the framework of o strong state - but outside the dictatorial framework, which doesn't allow the political forces of the bourgeoisie to function at all. In this context, the dictatorship is seeking to use the actions of the FRAP and the ETA-V (the politico-military faction) as a pretext to launch a desperate offensive against the mass movement. This offensive is accompanied by a press campaign against "terrorism, the brutality and violence of which have not at all achieved the success the regime had hoped for, and that itself is an expression of the process of decomposifion of the dictatorship. There are many instances of resistance to the most repressive aspects of the decrees. There is an ultrarigid censorship which is throwing the news system back to the situation of the 1940s; the response has been large-scale nighttime listening to the CP radio that broadcasts from Paris. The censorship has also led to the widespread practice of circulating information in the form of photocopied articles from Le Monde, and so on. A photocopied editorial from Le Figaro is considered a leaflet violating the articles, decrees, and laws against terrorism. It is impossible for lawyers to defend people accused of breaking these laws, and the lawyers themselves can be accused of collaboration with terrorism at any time. Finally, this decree-law obviously has a well defined function in repressing revolutionary militants and serves as a pretext for the harshest penalties. These repressive measures are being used on a mass scale. The right of habeus corpus has been suspended and the legal limit for detention without trial has been extended from three to ten days. And ten days of torture is a very long time. Political prisoners can no longer communicate with their lawyers. Since August 28, lawyers for prisoners in the Basauri prison have been unable to communicate with the prisoners; they no longer receive the special permits needed to visit the prisoners. You can see the violence of these decrees being applied at all levels. One example: a 12year-old child was arrested by the Guardia Civil because he had telephoned a newspaper in Saragossa saying he was going to plant a bomb. He was accused of
treats, that would soresponda h victory. This expresses the impasse and crisis of the Francoist dictatorship!
terrorism. Another example, at another level: In Pamplona in the Super-Ser factory an employer who is supposed to be a "progressive" threatened during a meeting of workers. that anyone who spoke in an assembly or mobilized would be denounced to the police as having violated the decree-laws. But it should be stressed that there has been direct or concealed resistance to these decrees at all levels. This appears in a distorted way in the front-page articles published in the press. Obviously, the most important thing that has to be pointed out is that even though the repressive arsena! is being utilized ot full capacity, a protracted general strike is developing in the Basque country to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui. That is the best expression of the dictatorship's inability to roll back the mass movement. Q What is the relationship between the general strikes in Euzkadi on August 28 and 29 and the beginning of September and the preceding strikes of December 1974 and June 1975? A. We have to point out that these three strike movements - December, June, and August/September -developed in Euzkadi, but their influence was felt throughout the Spanish state, in an expanding way among the political and workers vanguard. They expressed the fact that Euzkodi is the key link in the Spanish situation as a whole. We have to take account of the Uneven development of the struggle. That is the point of departure, and the important thing is to grasp this fact of life in order to transform the uneven aspect into a combined aspect. In a certain sense, you can say that the strikes in Euzkodi have a decisive importance nationally, but are still limited geographically. But the geographic limitation must not make us fall into a position that would stress only the unevenness of these developments; on the contrary, we have to understand the potential of what is now going on and the crucial role the struggles in Euzkadi can have on a national scale. Len's make a comparison of the three strike movements. On December 11, the thing that was decisive about the political general strike (which is a rarity in the European workers movement) was that it demonstrated that it was actually possible to hold a general strike.
Better yet, it was possible even against the will and actions of the reformists of the Spanish Communist party, for the strike was convoked by the workers commissions. December 11 demolished the CP argument that a general strike is an adventure, that conditions for a general strike do not yet exist, that you have to wait until the Junta Democitica is built before engaging in such a movement. (The Junta Democrática, Democratic Council, is the bloc of bourgeois and workers parties established last year under the aegis of the CP - INPRECOR.) December marked the break with this type of argument. June 11 represented mass defiance of the state of exception. It was the proof that it was possible to respond throughout the whole Spanish state, even against the toughest measures of the dictatorship. The meaning of August 28 can be summed up in three points: First, it was a protracted political general strike, the first in the postwar history of the Spanish workers movement. It didn't happen by accident. It was the result of long preparation. Ever since June 12 the vanguard had been working in the neighborhoods and factories to prepare this strike to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui. The second characteristic is that it was initiated by a very broad political front of revolutionary and reformist organizations. The third characteristic is that it developed in a general situation in which the dictatorship was using all its repressive force without managing to break the movement; that is, the strike occurs on the threshold of the fall of the dictatorship. 2. What are the main features that shaped the strike movement? A. First of all, I should point out that If there was an unevenness in the development of the struggles on a national scale, there was also an unevenness among the provinces of Euzkodi. The highest level of struggle was reached in Vizcaya (Biscay) and Guipúzcoa. The first characteristic was the very large number of strikers. There were about 150,000 on August 28 and 29, about 60, 000-100, 000 on September 1 and 2 and again on September 11 and 12. The second characteristic, and the most important one at bottom, is the or-
SPAIN ganization of the movement and the confidence of the masses in the vanguard. This relationship of confidence between the political vanguard and the mass movement is most developed in Guipúzcoa. That is where the prestige of the revolutionary organizations is greatest, as was already demonstrated in December and June. The vanguard had played a decisive role in the development of these strikes and the relationship of forces in this region between the vanguard and the troditional parties shifted in favor of the vanguard. This relationship of confidence between the political vanguard and the mass movement was reflected in the fact that the call for the general strike issued by the general strike committee of Euzkadi was broadly followed. The general strike committee called for the strike September 3 and raised the slogan for the September 11 and 12 strikes, asking the workers to go back to work between September 3 and September 11. The workers responded very clearly, returned to work on September 4 because the strike committee told them to. And when they returned to work on September 4, they knew that they would go into struggle again on September 11. The third characteristic, just as important, was the development of forms of self-organization. For instance, the general strike was called by a strike committee that took the form of a united front of workers organizations. This time, it was not the workers commissions that played such an important role, but the united front. Next, we have to stress that wherever there were divisions (because of the existence of workers commissions influenced by various organizations), there was a tendency to overcome this division on the zonal or factory scale through the construction of adequate coordinating bodies. At Naval, for example, the big factory in Bilbao (a city of 500, 000) - where there are CP workers commissions os well as workers commissions influenced by the far left and by the UGT (Union General de Trabajadores - General Union of Workers) and where in addition there is a division between temporary and permanent workers - a united committee to develop the movement was formed in order to overcome these divisions. In Valle del Urola this unity was established in the form of interfactory committees. In the Renterfa zone (about 100, 000 inhabitants, the city itself has 30, 000) the unification took place through the establishment of assemblies of "luchadores" (worker militants), In Guipúzcoa there were many "mountain" committees the name derives from the fact that the meetings were held on the hillsides). In Guipúzcoa there is something of a tradition of struggle against the dictatorship, which took the form of political "excursions. " These "mountain" ossemblies emerged as organs to direct the strike, and the strike committee acted as a sort of executive. In Vizcaya, where the vanguard is weaker and the CP and the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español
- Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy) are relatively stronger, zonal strike committees emerged to unify the movement. We should stress the absence of rank-and-file assemblies in the factories in Guipüzcoo. This explains the secondary role of the workers commissions in this strike, despite the fact that the level of mobilization in this region was extremely high; there were no assemblies in the factories, and the organization of the struggle took place through other channels. In Navarra, on the other hand, there were more movements at the factory level even though the overall level of struggle wos lower; this was an expression of the more syndicalist-type education that has been conducted in this region by the centrist ORT (Organización Revolucionario de los Trabajadores -Revolutionary Workers Organization). In spite of all the differences, however, it is important to note that there was a general tendency to try to develop unifying instruments associating the maximum number of workers in order to raise the struggle to a very high level. Finally, we should stress the politicization and the extreme combativity. That was expressed in many different ways. I will show you how this was shown in relation to self-defense. At the Babcok factory in Vizcaya (4,500 workers), the workers met in an assembly, and when they tried to leave they noticed that the plant was being watched by the special police. They then took the benches in the locker rooms, armed themselves with gasoline cans and various other instruments, and left the factory, shouting "Charge!" The cops had to disperse and could arrest only a few workers who were of the rear of the contingent. At Lequeitio in Vizcaya province 1, 500 people in a town of 6,000 demonstrated in front of the barracks of the Guardia Civil, who hid inside and pointed their guns at the demonstrators, but remained behind the windows. That is an indication of the level of combativity of the masses. In Algorta in Vizcaya there were five or six demonstrations of more than 1,000 people. The antirepression committee includes 300 people on a permanent basis. Actions were undertaken and prisoners were released after having been seized by the BPS (the Political Social Brigade, one of the divisions of the political police). Finally, and this is essential for the future, the Renterfa strike committee set up a permanent self-defense committee that will prepare demonstrations, assure their defense, and so on, Q. Could you explain the reasons for the uneven development and the problems that this can pose? A. On the scale of the whole territory of the Spanish state, the uneven development must be understood on the one hand on the basis of the historical differences in the training of the working class, the differences in the tradition, and so on, and, on the other hand, on the basis of the forty years of Francoist dictatorship. Hence, uneven development, which was already a characteristic of the period of the rise of the Spanish revolution, continues to be a characteristic today. The essential problem in breaking through this uneven development is to initiate mass solidarity with Euzkadi. The forms of solidarity can be different.
Obviously, Barcelona constitutes the key point if this solidarity is to have an impact in mobilizing the heavy battalions of the working class. The CP has an especially great responsibility for the limited development of mass solidarity. But, without being too self-congratulatory, we must say that with the exception of the LCR/ETA-VI nearly all the organizations of the so-called revolutionary left have failed to develop solidarity work to the level that is required by the political conjuncture. The problem of uneven development is tragic on two levels: In Euzkadi the mass movement may quickly begin to feel isolated and could then start to hesitate. At another level, that of the political vanguard, a feeling of powerlessness could arise in face of the inability to develop solidarity. Finally, this problem of uneven development has to be considered in relation to the conjuncturally difficult general situation. In a number of regions the very high rate of unemployment is strengthening the impact of the repression by the employers. The workers are afraid of losing their jobs. The decree-law increases the risks of solidarity action. And finally, the lack of information, which has not been counterbalanced by a systematic effort on the part of the revolutionary organizations, diminishes awareness of the level of struggle that has been attained in the Basque country and of the great defeat that this struggle already represents for the dictatorship. Nevertheless, we have to stress that there has been progress in solidarity over the past several months, and even between August 28 and September 11-12. For instance, in various cities there have been vanguard demonstrations of between 100 and 1,000 people. Propaganda and agitation is going on, despite the weaknesses. Today, in addition to solidarity with Garmendia and Oregui, we need solidarity with the FRAP militants the dictatorship wants to murder, hoping that there will be a weaker response than there was during the trial of Garmendia and Otoegul. It is essential that we take up solidarity with these comrades, regardless of the political criticisms we may make of the initiatives taken by the FRAP. This movement against the death penalties will be combined with the movements around the renewing of labor contracts, which is going to start in October and end in January. The situation is thus extremely favorable to making a breakthrough in the movement throughout the territory of the Spanish state. To end with, I would like to add that the level attained by the movement in Euzkadi must be understood on the basis of the long period of preparation that was systematically carried on beginning last June. There has been no similar preparation in the rest of the Spanish state, and you have to take this into account in judging the situation. Q. Could you trace out what has been the policy of the Spanish CP? A. First of all, I want to insist on the fact that the CP, because of its position and influence, could have played a key role in the development of solidarity.
BERTAD Carrillo: Second, there is a difference between the CP's general position and its practice during the latest mobilizations in Euzkadi. The CP is weaker in these provinces; it doesn't control the movement; the relationship of forces with the far left is different, and because of all this, the CP's tactical adaptation is understandable. The CP signed the September 11-12 general strike appeal and it pushed for the mobilization. On August 28 and 29, on the other hand, it tried to slow the movement down by systematically supporting the most rightwing positions in the Euzkadi general strike committee. But the most important thing is that in spite of its big statements on the radio elsewhere, within the Sponish state the CP did nothing to develop solidarity. It did nothing to centralize the movement on the scale of the whole state; the only thing the CP tried to do was to grab hold of the tiger in the Basque country so as to be in a good position in case the movement really took off. Also, the CP took positions that can only be called scandalous; these positions were directed more to the bourgeois right than to the workers movement. For instance, the CP declared that terrorism cannot be combatted with the methods of the dictatorship, which means implicitly that there are better ways to fight terrorism, or, for instance, statements like "We are all responsible for what is going on in the country." Beyond these considerations, perhaps the most important point is that neither the Junta Democrática nor the Convergencia Democrática (a similar body established under the aegis of the Social Democracy - INPRECOR) played any role in Euzkodi. The level of the
SPAIN mass movement exposed the inadequacy of these types of instruments and the CP had to opt for the road of united-front participation in the strike committees. It was in Barcelona that the CP's responsibility was greatest. It did nothing. This connot go on without raising problems within the CP. There are already some signs. In Guipúzcoo there was a small split. A tendency developed a position critical of the rightist line adopted by the CP leadership, especially in Barcelona. This tendency occused the leadership of the CP of howing entered into a "social pact" and not a "political pact with the bourgeoisie in the Junta Democrdtica. Whatever the confusion of these criticians, this sort of tension is a first symptom. It is hard to see how the CP will be able to remain inaclive very long in the present situation. It is certainly going to try io channel the movement faward objectives Sof struggle that are linked to the renewal of labor contracts and that involve the trade unions; but it would be False to analyze that in a one-sided way. This type of mobilization can combine with the sort of struggle that is now developing and may lead to a major crisis, whatever Carrillo's intentions may be. Q. Could you quickly trace out the main perspectives today? A. First of all, you have to keep in mind three essenfial facts about the current polifical situation. First, the promulgation of the antiterrorism law and the sentences handed down against Garmendia and Otaegui and against the militants of the FRAP indicate the extreme state of crisis of Francoism. Second, this crisis is now finding expression within the army (where there is also an ongoing battle in the shadows over control of the decisive repressive instrument of the Guardia Civil) and within sectors that have up to now been tied very closely to the regime. Third, the very rapid fall of the stock market (which necessitated an accord between the banks and the government), like the accusations of "cowardice and lack of patriotism" the minister of industry has made against some capitalists, reflects the growing tension in the relations between the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship. Big capital is beginning to understand that the maintenance of the dictatorship is creating a situation that is rapidly becoming explosive and is generating an impressive increase of activity and consciousness among the mosses and a depreciation of the fundamental instruments of domination, especially the army. Once again I must stress the decisive, fundamental role of the mass movement. We have to insist on the fact that the call for the September 11-12 general strike was issued by all the political workers organizations and that it was not blocked by any wait-and-see 8 attitude which would have made the calling of the general strike dependent on the result of the legal appeal. This call and the response it received indicated a hitherto unattained offensive capacity in Euzkodi. The mass movement has taken the form of a protracted strike - with a complex and uneven development both in Euzkadi and in the Spanish state as a whole - and this shows that the overthrow of the dictatorship is on the agenda, if the movement that has developed in Euzkadi can combine with a movement throughout the territory of the Spanish state. If all this is placed within the fromework of the current crisis of the regime, this combination that would place the overthrow of the regime on the agenda does not require that the level of Struggle has to be uniform throughout the state before the regime is brought down. The overthrow of the regime could take place on the basis of a generalized mobilization, but one whose unevenness remained great, the advanced point being Euzkadi, In addition, it must be understood that with this protracted general strike the theme of the revolutionary general strike is more important than ever, in spite of the lack of homogeneity of the movement on the scale of the whole Spanish state. If the regime corries out the death sentences in coming days, the level of the mass response could rise another notch. If the dictatorship retreats, that would represent an enormous victory. This expresses the whole imposse and crisis of the Francoist dictatorship. We are not merely going through a repetition of the Burgos mobilizations. (In 1970 mass mobilizations forced the dictatorship to withdraw its death sentences pronounced against militants by the Burgos War Council - INPRECOR.) Revolutionary Marxists must prepare to deal decisive blows against the dictatorship. We must center our efforts on making the mass movement take a leap forward by stimulating all forms of self-organizotion and by putting the emphasis on the tasks of selfdefense, setfing the highest objectives. Moreover, all efforts must be made to stimulate the solidarity movement throughout the state by making it go beyond the Limits of the restricted mobilization of a vanguard. This is the perspective within which we have addressed our "open letter" to all the organizations of the workers movement. (For the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in Spain, see also "The Death Agony of Francoism, " declaration of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, INPRECOR, No.29, June 19, 1975 -INPRECOR.) In face of this situation, the importance of international solidarity has to be stressed again and again. In 1970, at the time of the first Burgos trials, the international workers and revolutionary movement was able to save the lives of Izko and his comrades. The mobilizations that have to be developed today to save
Garmendia and Otaegui and the comrodes of the FRAP who have been condemned to death will prepare the way for the even broader mobilizations that will have to be developed in solidarity with the Spanish revolution in the not so far future.