Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Spain: Franco: New Isolation

Inprecor no. 36, 23 October 1975 · pp 9-13 · 2,545 words

Spain France Repression and political prisoners Greece and Cyprus

SPAIN

FRANCO-

NEW

ISOLA

TION

The following interview with a militant of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (LCR/ETA-VI - Revolufionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress) deals with the mass response in Spain and Euzkadi to the murder of five revolutionary militants by the Francoist dictatorship. It is a followup to the interview published in IN-

PRECOR, No.34, September 25, 1975.

INPRECOR. In the context of the final crisis of the

Francoist dictatorship, what is the meaning of the regime's decision to execute the five militants?

LCR/ETA-VI. For several months now a process has been going on that leads Franco to make his decisions under the greater and greater pressure of the "carrion of the regime" (that is, the repressive apparatus - INPRECOR and to base himself exclusively on that fraction of the state apparatus. This has to be seen in relation to the fact that most of big capital is now taking some distance from the regime. We have characterized this tendency as the reduction of the dictatorship to a repressive apparatus.

The murders of the five militants had been demanded by this faction, by the repressive forces. They wanted these murders because they wanted to set an example! It is significant that the dictatorship made this choice against the advice of the "Supreme Council of Military Justice."

In fact, in the case of Otaegui and Garmendia, this council had recommended a new trial, but that didn't happen. Only Franco could have imposed such a decision; the government could not!

Hence, these executions mark off a sort of point of no retur in the process. For one thing, the decision means that tensions will grow between the dictatorship and the leading factions of the bourgeoisie, especially because of the diplomatic isolation of the regime in Europe. To this is added a confrontation with sectors of the army, some of whom are seeking to become the main pillars of a post-Francoist regime. For another thing, the bourgeoisie knew that the executions would be a real provocation against the mass movement and was also aware that they would trigger off mobilizations that would go beyond those of late. August and the beginning of September in both size and militancy. INPRECOR. What was the mass response in Euzkadi (the Basque couritry), and could you explain the differences from the previous general strikes? LCR/ETA-VI. The number of strikers in Euzkadi surpassed all the previous strikes: 310,000 workers were out on September 29 and 300,000 on September 30.

SPAIN In the first place, it is important to note that Navarro province came into this political general strike, despite the syndicalist tradition of this province. During the Burgos trials in 1970 the mobilizations in Navarro had been limited; they amounted to a few street demonstrations. On December 11, 1974, there were some work stoppages. On June 11, 1975, there were street demonstrations and assemblies in the factories. This time, on Sunday, September 28, an assembly was held at Imenaza (Pamplona), a strike was voted, and then a demonstration was organized. On Monday, September 29, fortynine factories in Pamplona (a city of 170,000 inhabitants) were on strike! On Tuesday, September 30, the workers of thirty-three factories went on strike. This extended to the foctories of the region: at Estella in the La Barranca zone, and so on. Likewise, in the province of Alava the mobilization was of unexpected size, in view of the lack of tradition in this area, In the city of Vitoria on September 29 eleven factories went on strike; on Wednesday, October 1, there was a demonstration of 2,000 people. Besides the geographical spread, new sectors joined in the struggle: shopkeepers, the fishermen of Vizcaya (Biscay) and Guipüzco, the small peasants, the school children. In Guipúzcoa, the province where ¡"Txiki" and Olaegui lived, virtually the whole population participated in the mobilization. One example indicates the level of the mobilization: On Sunday, September 28, a folklore exhibition was supposed to take place in Eibar. Some comrades of the LCR/ETA-VI got on the loudspeaker and broadcast a message, in Basque and Spanish, explaining the political situation and the necessity of transforming this "folklore festival" into a combat demonstration against the dictatorship. After this appeal, everybody - that is, about 5,000 people -sang "Euzko gudariak" (a sort of anthem of the Basque resistance) and then went home, as a sign of protest against the execution of the five militants. A third important feature of the mobilization was the massive character of the demonstrations. On Friday, Sepfember 26, in Son Sebastian there were more than 5,000 people demonstrating in the streets; on September 30 there were more than 6, 000, In Erandia (near Bilbao) there were 5,000 demonstrators on September 27; there were 4, 000 in Mondragon on September 28; 2,000 in Algorta (near Bilbao). On September 30 about 5,000 people met in Bilbao, formed up into contingents, and ron through the streets shouting "Forward to the general strike"| Also, there was real progress in the politicization of the masses. In Frandia of the Westinghouse factory there was a general assembly of 500 workers on Monday, September 29. A communiqué denouncing the murder of the five militants was voted. This declaration stressed that the assassinations were a result of the death agony of the dictatorship and called for a general strike around the following objectives: respond to the executions, for self-determination, for the dissolution of the repressive bodies and the military tribunals, for preparation of the mobilization against any new sentences. 10

Guns being distributed from the arsenal of the workers" militia in Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War After this assembly a new demonstration was organized, and the workers of Ruíz de Velasco, Franco-Espagnola (chemicals), and other factories joined in. The need to strengthen self-organization was one of the central themes of this mobilization. Once again, I want to stress the fact that the working class and the populor strata did not feel these executions as a defeat for the mass movement. The mobilizations against the regime's bloody repression are more and more becoming identified with the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. Finally, there was a step forward on the level of selforganization. We have stressed the importance of the united-front organs (see INPRECOR, No.34), which played a decisive role in the previous general strikes.

But we also pointed out the weaknesses of these organs in really centralizing the struggle, in reflecting the development of mass consciousness, and in actually representing the mass movement.

In fact, while in Guipúzco and Navarro the mobilization was launched by the two "strike committees, Euzkadi General Strike Committee did not meet until * the Tuesday, September 30. Hence, it was the "zonal strike committees" and the "vanguard committees" that took the initiative for an immediate response on September 27 and 28. Thus, for broad sectors of the mass movement, the question of self-organization was posed with new acuteness. In Vergora a decisive and exemplary step was taken in this area. In twenty-one factories "strike committes" were elected either in general assemblies or during meetings of vanguard workers; ordinated among themselves and issued the call for the these committees coSeptember 30 strike. INPRECOR. Did solidarity take a new step forward on the scale of the whole territory of the Spanish state? LCR/ETA-VI. There was progress, but still crying insufficiency. In Barcelona, apart from the demonstrations, which drew about 3,000 people, there were partial strikes at SEAT, Pegaso (the civil governor "sentenced" this factory to pay a fine because it had 'permitted" an ossembly of workers to be held), and Enosa, Also, the workers of about fifteen factories went on strike in the industrial zone around Barcelona. In Madrid there were work stoppages at Standard and in the banking sector, some solidarity demonstrations were organized. The solidarity movement also spread to Galicia, where there were many work stoppages and some demonstrations. But the Communist party did not take any initiative that could have developed the solidarity movement and pushed it across a new threshold. The CP clearly proved that it rejects any central confrontation and above all is afraid of being outflanked. Basically, it acts as a brake. INPRECOR. The press attached great Importance to the pro-Franco mobilization of October 1 in the Plazo de Oriente in Madrid. Some people went so far as to speak of a recomposition of the social base of the regime. What was the real meaning of this mobilization? LCR/ETA-VI. First of all, you have to keep things in proportion. This demonstration drew 200, 000 people. All you have to do is compare that to the 310, 000 workers on strike in Euzkadi and the social importance of the Franco demonstration falls into place. Second, you have to remember the extraordinary propoganda campaign waged by the regime. The population was bombarded with hours and hours of chauvinist television propaganda on all themes For instance, Italy was attacked for "frying to steal tourists from Spain." Third, the factories, banks, and insurance companies were shut down to guarantee the "success" of the demonstration. In many of the banks, three or four fascists would fry to intimidate the employees into going to the demonstration. Buses were used to drive people to the demonstration from small villages dozens of miles from Madrid. Every person who came by car was given a "bonus" of 500 pesetas. Tickets to football games and movies were given out free.

SPAIN Besides all that, you have to keep in mind that Madrid is a strong concentration for functionaries who represent the parasites of the regime. Remembering all this allows you to get a better appreciation of this "big demonstrafion to support the regime." In fact, what clearly appeared to more than one observer on October 1 was the isolation of the regime. This demonstration of self-defense of the dictatorship even created disarray among Important sectors of the bourgeoisie, which, aware of the deep crisis of the regime, did not look kindly at the 40,000 fascists who headed the march making the fascist salute. The bourgeoisie is afraid of the repercussions for the future. The process of decay of the regime is also expressed by the emergence of new fascist gangs that are becoming more and more active. They draw their strength from the BPS (Political-Social Brigade, one of the branches of the political police), the Civil Guard, and so on. Kidnappings of revolutionary militants and members of workers commissions and threats against newspapers (Diario de Barcelona has received bomb threats demanding that it take measures against certain journalists) are on the rise. This "counterrevolutionary resistance" can become a real danger to militants, If expresses the decay of the regime and the failure of the "legal" means of repression. Although these gangs support the dictatorship that fuels them, they are nevertheless not under direct government control. Broad sections of the bourgeoisie are afraid of these developments, because they know that they can have effects on the future that will not be happy ones for the bourgeoisie. INPRECOR. Could you explain the attitude of big capital in this crisis? LCR/ETA-VI. First of all, it is obvious that the reacfion of the European bourgeoisie must not be understood as a simple reaction to the big mobilizations that developed in all countries. It's a conscious policy that refleets the desires of sections of Spanish capitalists who lack powerful means of expression, The Spanish government has undoubtedly felt the double pressure of the European bourgeoisie and decisive sectors of Spanish capital, but it is incapable of satisfying the demands of these capitalists, economically or politically. For a dominant faction of big capital, the measures taken by the European bourgeoisie mean only one thing: Get rid of Franco and Francoism in order to avoid his overthrow! The malaise and fear of the bourgeoisie can be measured concretely. The stock market continues to decline in spite of official support. The lowest point yet reached by stock quotations this year is 91.85. On October 3 the index was 93.55 and on October 10 it was 92.5. In recent months, according to an economic weekly, the flight of capital out of the province of Vizcaya alone amounted to $300 million. For big capital, or at least for the most important sectors of big capital, it is 12 more and more obvious that the dictatorship corresponds to no objective at all. It is incapable of controlling the mass movement; the measures of repression only accentuate struggles; the government can't come up with any responses on the economic level. The dictatorship no longer serves as a political apparatus of domination. The maintenance of the dictatorship increasingly undermines the chances for any alternative solution. Big capital's attention is now directed toward the army, where internal tensions must not be seen solely as evidence of a crisis in the army, but also as the expression of a process of "recomposition" aimed at providing a basis for an alternative political solution. Important sectors of the army are opposed to the policy of the dictatorship. But the resistance of the Francoist apparatus itself makes this type of solution increasingly risky.

spani-he infantrymen no pear INPRECOR. Can you indicate the short-term perspecfives after these mobilizations? LCR/ETA-VI, First, the mass movement has to prepore for new mobilizations ogainst the frials being prepared by the dictatorship. Second, you have to be aware that all the partial struggles - struggles around the now labor contracts, strug gles around the health service and education, struggles in the neighborhoods - are going to run up ogainst the "antiterrorist low, " Because of this, a dynamic of confrontation with the dictatorship is going to develop. With the mobilizations in Euzkadi and the present objective situation as a starting point, the revolutionary general strike is of burning importance. Against the ravages of the fascist gangs, it is crucially necessary to setup "vigilance committees. " This theme must be part of the campaign we are waging around selforganization.

international

Since our last issue, we have received further reports of actions in solidarity with the Basque and Spanish militants executed by the Francoist dictatorship: IN LUXEMBOURG, more than 1,000 people responded to a call from the Luxembourg Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners in Spain and came to a demonstration against the murder of the five militants. The Social Democratic party participated in the united front, along with our comrades of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League), but the Communist party did not. At the end of the demonstration, 250 militants occupied the Luxembourg Cathedral to attract greater public attention to the crimes of the Francoist regime. IN GREECE, there was a protest demonstration of 4, 0005,000 on September 28 in Athens. It was called by the Communist party (exterior faction), the far left particisolidarity pated. The next day between 15,000 and 20,000 people assembled at the University of Athens in response to a united call issued by the CP youth (both interior and exterior), the youth of the PASOK (the party led by Papandreou), and the youth of Karamanlis's party. The meeting turned into a demonstration of nearly 30, 000. In Salonica there was a more modest demonstration, called by a united front of the CP youth, the PASOK youth, the EDA youth, and the youth of the Internationalist Communist party (Fourth

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