on the
position of Lotta Continua from Chile to Portugal -nature & implications of Chinese international policy by LIVIO MAITAN 16
The problem of the international policy of the Chinese leadership has once again been posed for the workers movement, and for the far left in particular, by the attitudes the Chinese leaders have taken toward the sifuation in Portugal, their statements on Angola, the welcome extended to a delegation of the Chilean government, and the presentation of credentials by Ambassador
Li Lien-pi to the authorities of the Common Market.
The imminence of the visit to Peking by a rather brood delegation of Italian industrialists and concern that this visit may be the occasion for some Chinese statements not at all useful for the workers now engaged in battles over the renegotiation of labor contracts are in all probability additional elements that induced Lotta Continua to directly deal with the question of Chinese international policy during the September meeting of the LC
National Committee.
The position presented in the report published in the
September 18 issue of the daily Lotta Continua was marked on the one hand by the acknowledgment of certain facts of life and by the call for explicit dissociation from some of the Chinese attitudes that are most difficult to swallow and on the other hand by an attempt at interpretation and justification that is reminiscent of the style of certain "friends of the Soviet Union"
during the 1930s and 1940, "friends" who were always able to come up with interpretations suited to satisfying the demands of the least coarse palates. In any case, we agree with Lotta Continua that the broadest discussion about its positions on the analysis of Chinese policy and the definition of a different strategy is necessary; for our part, we consider if useful to take up a series of themes that revolutionary militants should think about critically. Two superpowers: a false theory At the theoretical root of the Chinese positions is the theory that the USSR is an imperialist power, or more precisely, a social-imperialist power. The nonorthodox Maoish especially rely on the label "social imperialist" in order to overcome the difficulties that arise from the incontestable fact that the policy of the USSR entails motives and attitudes that are hard to identify with those of U.S. imperialism. (Lotta Continua, for example, resorts to the "social imperialist" designation when discussing the positions of the U.S. and the USSR on Angola.) Nevertheless, if remains the case that according to the Chinese leaders, there is an analogy, and even an identity, on the essential element: the class nature of the two states. Nothing in substance is changed by the fact that most of the time, particularly in current propaganda, this concept is replaced by the not af all scientific conception of "great powers" or "superpowers, " countries belonging to a "first category, " which is then counterposed to a second and third category, both of which are distinct from the "superpowers. " For the Chinese, the identity lies in the fact that in the final analysis capitalism exists in the USSR, as it does in the United States.
This is not the place to go into this problem in an exhaustive manner. The difficulty lies in understanding the dual, contradictory nature of the ruling caste in the
Soviet Union, This caste has raised Itself above the worker and peasant masses, has practically destroyed
Soviet democracy and imposed its own dictatorship, and, in order to safeguard is own domination and its own privileged position, has worked and still works in general for an international status que, subordinating the interests of the world workers and revolutionary movement to this requirement. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy arose out of and continues to operate within the framework of a society of postrevolutionary transition based on the property relations and relations of production established by the October revolution; for that very reason, the bureaucracy has an interest in safeguarding these relations. Hence is struggle against tendencies toward the restoration of capitalism, above all when these tendencies begin to constitute a real threat and not merely a potential tendency. Hence also the bureaucracy's interest in opposing the exparsion of imperialism and in supporting both social forces and movements in struggle against imperialism and countries in which the revolution or structurally revolutionary processes have brought down the capitalist system. The case of Cuba eloquently illustrates this. The Soviet bureaucracy did nothing to help the revolution win, on various occasions during the period before the revolufion the Cuban Communist party supported Batista, and it joined Fidel Castro's struggle and movement only during a later period. But when a workers state arose in Cuba in which both the Imperialist companies and the companies of the so-called national bourgeoisie had been expropriated, the leadership of the USSR had an Interest in preventing the United States from attacking Cuba in order to restore the old regime. It therefore provided vital economic and military aid, Similar considerations were at work in the case of Vietnam. The leaders of the USSR did not want the Geneva accords to break down; nor did they want the Vietnamese revolutionaries to respond with armed struggle to the new operations of the imperialists and theit puppets. The Soviet leaders did everything poisible to impose compromises, thus rendering the task of the Vietnamese leaders more difficult, especially at crucial moments. (This is also true of the Chinese leaders, at least beginning in 1971) Nevertheless, the USSR stood on the side of Vietnam. in the course of the conflict and furnished Vietnam consistent military aid, even if it was belated in certain respects. And for many years Vietnam was the epicenter of the world class conflict, hence, the positions that were taken had to have been determined not by tactical considerations or by conjunctural or secondary interests, but rather by the class nature of the forces at work. As for the class nature of the socioeconomic structures (which obviously must be the starting point of the analysis), the definition of the USSR as a workers state, that is, a state in which collectivist relations of production exist and not relations of production of the bourgeois-capitalist type (in spite of th
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY generation), is confirmed by a fact of life whose import tance cannot be overestimated. For a year and a half now the whole capitalist world has been racked by the most serious economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. For Marxists, it is out of the question to ascribe the fundamental cause of this crisis to conjunetural or partial factors or to the imbalances that are emphasized by the economists and politicians of the bourgeoisie, Rather, the present crisis must be seen as the result of the very functioning of the system, of its intrinsic contradictions; the breadth and depth of this crisis are linked to the overall crisis of imperialism on a world scale. This recession has not taken hold in China.
This is not because the Chinese economy is more developed than the other economies of the world or because it has attained a greater degree of solidity. (In fact, in comparison with the developed capitalist countries, the opposite is true.) Rather, it is because the revolution has established qualitatively different relations of production, of a collectivist type. But the USSR has not been hit by the storm either. Should we take note of this undeniable fact and seek to understand the structural factors that account for it? Or should we wait for a Bettelheim to think up some new explanation adapted to the new circumstances? During the 1960s, when the polemics over the alleged restoration of capitalism in the USSR were going on, the most commonly used arguments were that the USSR was Integrated into the capitalist world market, that it was constantly increasing its trade with the capitalist countries, that it was having foreign capitalists construct entire industrial enterprises, that it was taking out foreign loans, and so on. At that time we explained that these features were not decisive in defining the social nature of the USSR. Now China is doing exactly the same things - and on a large scale. What do the Maoists think of this, the dogmatic ones or sophisticated ones? Do they perhaps intend to follow the road already traced out by some sects (certain ex-Maoists in the United States, for example), whose consistent applicafion of false premises has led them to conclude that capitalism has now been restored in China? The USSR as "main enemy» practical implications The first analytico-practical implication of the theses of the Chinese leaders is that the world situation should be interpreted much more as the reflection of the conflict between two "superpowers" than as the development of the crisis of the international capitalist system and the clash between opposing social forces. Class distinctions become attenuated and toned down, if not abolished. This emerges more clearly from the Chinese practical positions than from the analysis itself. It becomes especially clear to the extent that the Chinese leaders no longer place a sign of absolute identity between the USSR and the United States. In both cases, 18 according to the Chinese leaders, we are dealing with Imperialist "superpowers"; but the USSR is explicitly denounced as the more aggressive and dangerous of the two: "While one of the two superpowers is continuing its forward push, the other is marshalling its forces and marking time" (Pékin Information, No. 32, 1975, p.8). "In this fight to the death, the Soviet Union is exhibiting an offensive spirit, while the United States is rather on the defensive" (same source, p.9). "The country that preaches peace and security most vociferously is the country that flagrantly militarily threatens the peoples of the world and especially the peoples of Europe" (statement of Teng Hsiao-ping in Paris, Le Monde, May 15, 1975). From which it follows that the USSR is currently the "main enemy, " to use the Maoist terminology. Peking's attitudes toward Europe, the Common Market, NATO, and the Helsinki conference flow from that premise. "China, " said Teng Hsigo-ping, "firmly supports the unity of West Europe." "Since the formation of the European Economic Community, "said Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade Li Kiang when relations were established between the EEC and China, "the tendencies toward unity on the part of the West European countries have been accentuating. They have held firm in face of pressure and intervention from outside and have ceaselessly worked to safeguard their sovereignty and independence. This is a positive factor in the development of the international situation. " (Pékin Information, No. 20, 1975) Shortly thereafter, the Chinese news agency Hsinhua commented favorably on the victory of the "yes"-vote in the British referendum on the Common Market and denounced Soviet hostility to the EEC: "The European Community was created for the very purpose of opposing superpower domination and expansion and to safeguard the political rights and economic interests of its member states." (Hsinhua, June 18, 1975, English-language edition.) Thus, for the Chinese leaders the EEC is not an expression of the tendency toward the concentration of capital, nor is it an association of imperialists (the European
* remain imperial istl); rather, it is a sort of instrument for the legitimate defense of states whose class nature has simply been swept aside. An analogous reasoning is applied to NATO, the possible weakening of which the Chinese leaders openly regret (Pékin Information, No. 33, 1975), going to far as to suggest that the strengthening of European unity should not necessarily imply the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. (See the discussions between Teng Hsiao-ping and French President Giscard d'Estaing.) The Helsinki conference offered an especially interesting test, beyond its intrinsic importance. In fact, never has if emerged so clearly that the Chinese critique of Soviet policy is not based on the fact that the Soviet leaders have made a compromise with American imperialism. (We leave aside Lotta Continua's fantastic assertion that in certain respects "Chinese policy appears to be motivated by the determination to fight against a 'historic compromise' on a world scale. ") On the con-
trary, the USSR is denounced because, according to the Chinese leaders, behind the mask of détente and pacifist statements, the USSR is carrying out an aggressive policy against Europe, preparing for war. (See, for instance, Hsinhua, August 13, 1975, English-language edition. It is not astonishing that in order to marshall support for such a thesis the Chinese news agency does not hesitate to ufilize reports from conservative newspapers throughout Europe, from the Neuer ZUrcher Zeitung to De Telearaaf, to The Guardian. Nor is if astonishing that on several occasions Peking should grant audiences (including affectionate handshakes from the great helmsman himself) to a tool of reaction like FranzJosef Strauss. After all, he can obviously be counted on to denounce the Moscow "superpower" and all its nefarious maneuvers without showing any signs of weakness. Such are the logical practical implications of the theory of social imperialism and the "main enemy." There is no point knocking oneself out in a search for justification. Lotta Continua claims that China used the invitations to people like Strauss in order to "make provocations and exert pressure. " In any case, the pressure (on Social Democratic, center-left, or center governments) was exerted from a right-wing standpoint, while the "provocation, " if such if was, was directed not against the European or American imperialists but rather, af least in the case of Strauss, against the working class and revolutionaries of West Germany, who saw Peking grant full honors to a man they correctly consider one of their most dangerous enemies. To the extent that it exerts real political influence (and we have seen to what extent that is, the theory of the USSR as the "main enemy" leads to giving priority to one of the two "superimperialisms, *to concentrating the attack against Moscow, and to labeling some of the most conservative representatives of the European bourgeoisie as defenders of national independence. If may be said in passing that this latter attitude also originates from the radically false conceptions about the anti-imperialist" role of the so-called national bourgeoisie, conceptions that have had and still have even more serious implications in the colonial and semicolonial countries. The Chinese leaders and the struggle in West Europe Concentration on the theme of the struggle between the two superpowers leads to reducing the emphasis on the structural contradictions (both social and political) that are now making themselves felt in an especially acute manner in West Europe. Of course, from time to time Chinese publications carry analyses (summary ones for the most part) on the economic crisis and unemployment, as well as news about strikes in various countries. But the emphasis is placed on the struggle between the two superpowers, in Portugal, for example.
Nothing is changed by the fact that frequent quotations appear in the Chinese press taken from obscure newspapers put out by equally obscure "national" Maoist groups, for the aim is always to bolster Peking's own theses with the loyal testimony of devoted followers.
But there is another aspect to the problem. For about fifteen years now the Chinese leaders have been making an enormous propaganda effort, distributing weekly and daily bulletins in many languages. Possibly the most widely distributed bulletin is Pékin Information (the English-language edition is called Peking Review), whose aim is to popularize the Chinese positions on all theoretical and political problems, on China itself and on other countries as well, So, during the current year (up through No.37, September 15) there has been just one article on Spain; it dealt with a series of strikes and made no mention of the general political situation in the country. In the cose of another key country, Italy, there have been a total of three reports, only one of which can really be considered as such (on the strike of February 23); the others consisted of the announcement of a visit to Peking by a delegation from the Organizzazione dei Comunisti/marxisti-leninisti d'Italia (Organization of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy, led by Osvaldo Pesce) and a reprint of an arficle published in Nuova Unità under the title, USSR, Main Danger to Peace in Europe. " Neither Pekin Information nor the English-language edition of the daily Hsinhua bulletin (the largest of all the editions) published a single line on the elections of June 15 (the elections that resulted in large gains for the CP, which came close to overturning the Christian Democracy's position as the country's largest political party and actually became the largest party in nearly every major Italian city). Apparently Peking considers it more important to do some advertising for Osvaldo Pesce's little sect than to analyze the fact that the Italian Communist party polled more than 11 million votes! Since March, Portugal has undoubtedly been the main epicenter of workers and revolutionary struggles in Europe. In China they seem not to have noticed. Neither does the Chinese press speak of the various Portuguese workers organizations, with the exception of the pathetic Portuguese Communist party/ Marxist-Leninist; instead the floor is given to a newspaper produced by Swiss Maoists, called Octobre, from which we learn that "the most important danger facing Portugal is the offensive of Soviet social imperialism. " (Hsinhua, August 18). This when the moderate counteroffensive was at its height, when reactionaries and fascists were attacking the headquarters of the Communist party! Little more than ten innocuous lines were published about the Portuguese events of March 11; there was a short piece on the April 1975 elections, which did not mention the CP or the far left. As for the events of May I, about which the entire international press commented in one way or another, there was also not a word. The London-based Hsinhua bulletin, however, did find space for a report of the demonstration organized by the Communist party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist).
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY The predominant theme in the short reports that do appear about Portugal is constant denunciation of the dangers of penetration by Soviet "social-imperialism, " in regard to which the Chinese press agencies do not hesitate to use the same arguments as those used by reactionary Western rags, including the generic accusation taken from police vocabulary that the Soviet Union is "Fishing in troubled waters." (Hsinhua, June 16.) At the present time, we do not have sufficient information to judge to what extent the USSR has sought to increase its own influence, either directly or through the medium of the Portuguese CP, which has up to now received unreserved official ideological and propagandistic support. The most probable hypothesis is that the Soviet leaders were taken by surprise by April 25 and particularly by the succeeding events and that while waiting for the situation to become clearer, they fell back on the traditional policy of aiding and strengthening a Communist party that in any case had already given repeated proof of its rigorous orthodoxy. At the same time, they sought to make use of Cunhal's greater "orthodoxy" in polemics against parties like the Italian and Spanish CPs, which are considered "too independent" of Moscow. Up to now at least, it does not appear that the USSR has intervened in Portuguese internal developments in any other way; the USSR has not had any consistent influence, In any cose, if it furns out that the Soviet Union is able to take advantage of the weakening of the imperialist camp and of NATO that has been caused by the Portuguese crisis, we see no reason why the working class and revolutionaries should have any regrets, as the Peking leaders seem to have, even if they do not say so explicitly. On the other hand, it is a fact that American imperialism, and European imperialism perhaps even more so on the political level, have been and still are maneuvering desperately in Portugal, intervening with threats, blackmail, pressure, and actions of various other types (including terrorist acts) with the fundamental aim of blocking and stifling the revolutionary struggle. To keep quiet about this and to direct the attack against the USSR means concretely to favor reaction and to deal a blow against the Portuguese revolution. The Maoists in Portugal, taking advantage of the bureaucratic and opportunistic degeneration of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Portuguese CP, have succeeded in doing what Maoists have not done in other European countries which have been racked by prerevolutionary and revolutionary crises: create rather substantial organizations that are in position not simply to reproduce Chinese documents or variations on Chinese documents, but also to put a given orientation into proctice. Hence, an analysis of the policy of certain Portuguese organizations constitutes an important test. The organizations that have applied the theory of the two superimperialisms with the most orthodox adherence to the Chinese leaders themselves have wound up supporting Soares's demonstrations, blocking with the Porfuguese Socialist party in many trade unions, and dubbing as revolutionary the reactionary mobilizations in 20 the North, sometimes going so far as to participate in atlacks on CP headquarters. Aberrations of people who are only "Maoists" (between quotation marks) or "so-called" Maoists? No, they are Maoists consistently applying the theory with which many others have toyed without having the courage to think the theory through scientifically and still! less to draw all the practical conclusions. If the USSR is an imperialist power, if it is the main enemy, and if the Portuguese CP is nothing but an agent of the USSR, and if the strategic axis of the strug
TIVA EXISNO-LENISMO! SPERRATR gle during the current phase is the fight for national independence against the two superpowers, then it is logical to flirt with and reach agreements with the SP, which is the agent of the "secondary enemy" and perhaps even an expression of the national bourgeoisie which is inclined to fight for independence against social imperialism. It then becomes perfectly legitimate to do all the things that some of the Portuguese Maoist organizations have done, and the problem cannot be swept under the rug by claiming that these groups are crozy or by resorting to scathing epithets. If they want to draw all the consequences of the theory that they continue to defend and if they want to be consistent with the general theoretical and analytical premises of this theory, then the comrades of Lotta Continua, like all those who accept the theses of the Chinese Communist party, will have to place the Italian Communist party and the Christian Democracy on the same footing, since both are allegedly bourgeois parties linked to an Imperial ist superpower; or, applying the logic of the "main enemy" thesis, they would have to concentrate their fire against the CP, thus favoring the Christian Democracy, at least objectively. We know very well that the militants of Lotta Continua would decisively reject such an orientation. But in that case, why not reflect on the substance of a conception and analysis that has such aberrant practical implications? Why not seek to theoretically examine the scientific consistency of certain concepts in relation to problems whose solution is fundamental in working out the organization's
own position within the framework and dynamic of the struggle of the international workers movement? Holden Roberto and Pinochet Chinese policy is no less deleterious with regard to the colonial and neocolonial countries, which represent the major center of interest for the Peking leaders, There has been no lack of striking examples, especially since the tum marked by Nixon's visit to Peking. It is sufficient to recall Peking's support to the Pakistani military dictatorship, which was practicing a sort of genocide in Banglodesh; the expressions of friendship for Nimeiry just when he was executing Sudanese trode unionists and Communists; worse yet, the support and applause to the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government when it was massacring a revolutionary movement of young peasants, students, and intellectuals, throwing about 20,000 militants and suspected militants into concentration camps without trial (this support being expressed in a scandalous letter from Chou En-lai published in the Colombo daily press and never denied by the Chinese leaders). But with the above-mentioned visit to Peking by a delegation sent by the butcher Pinochet (on the second anniversary of the September 11,1973, military coup), the Peking leaders have recorded yet another black page; they do not even stop at maintaining good relations with the most bloody dictatorship in the history of Latin America, which sets them off not only from the Soviet leaders, but even from various bourgeois governments that are concerned about not discrediting themselves in the eyes of public opinion in their own countries. The Chinese position on Angola is no less eloquent. In principle, a workers state or workers party may desire the unity of various movements fighting for independence against imperialism; in a given context, such a party or state can refuse to set down preferences in granting political and material support. But, in the first place, China has not at all maintained an attitude of neutrality among the Angolan organizations; for a long time Peking has been giving military aid to the FNLA, even when the FINLA openly revealed its neocolonial orientation. Second, the claim that the civil war was provoked by the USSR - a claim that has been repeatedly asserted in official Chinese organs (see Pékin Informafion, Nos. 31 and 36 in 1975, for example) - is false and transparently mystifying. The logic of the Angolan class struggle has been concealed and falsified by the Chinese leaders. Once independence has been won (even if this is still a few months away), the struggle will have to grow over from the anti-imperialist field to the field of conflict between the indigenous classes. We have no intention of attributing labels to the MPLA that the organization seems not to claim for itself, but it is impossible to avoid noting that the MPLA is expressing more advanced positions and is feeling pressure from the masses, who do not want to be robbed of the fruits of their victory over colonialism by the indigenous ruling strata or by neocolonialist operations and have begun to organize on a democratic rank-and-file basis, especially in Luanda; the FNLA, on the other hand, unites behind it the "national " owning strata (or candidates for that role) and enjoys the support of Mobutu, not to mention the favors of the United States, The truth is that in the Indian subcontinent, in the Sudan, in Angola, and in Chile, Chinese policy, far from being characterized by episodic deviations or incomprehensible contradictions, falls within an overal! logic, a logic whose effects in other parts of the world we have already enumerated. Concealing or maximally toning down qualitative distinctions based on the class criterion and substituting criteria based on real or potential conflicts of interest and consequent divergences between the two "superpowers, * the Chinese leaders indiscriminately seek convergences, agreements, and alliances with the so-called national bourgeoisie and their governments, even conservative or reactionary ones. The claim that the USSR is the main enemy does the rest: against the USSR anything is legitimate, from friendly relations with the shah of Iran to applause for the repression in Sri Lanka to cordial visits from the Chilean reactionaries. It could perhaps be thought, rather ingenuously, that at least in Latin America it is the United States that deserves the qualification "main enemy." Such is not the case, however, as is demonstrated by the example of Chile. The Allende government, while it was not a pawn of "social imperialism, "certainly maintained beiter relations with the Soviet Union than with the United States, Precisely for this reason, Peking did not join in the international campaign to denounce the coup; on the contrary, the Peking leoders hurried to use the maneuvering room opened up by the coup in order to take advantage of the weakening of the positions of the "main enemy." Is there a single revolutionary, a single militant of the Chilean workers movement, prepared to accept or justify such a calculation and such a policy? Drawing the general conclusions At this point it is possible to draw some conclusions. The theories and interpretations of the Chinese leaders, intrinsically erroneous, have harmful practical implications, which may be synthesized as follows: *by concentrating the fire on the USSR in International politics, these theories cover up the responsibility of American imperialism and this objectively facilitate the actions of U.S. Imperialism; *China's orientation toward conflicts in West Europe and the political-diplomatic choices that flow from that orientation favor the bourgeoisie of the countries of the Common Market as well as those outside the Common Market, the initiatives of these governments and their politicians, including reactionary ones, are often presented in a favorable light;
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY *the same tendencies are at work in the colonial and neocolonial countries, especially in critical situations in which precise class distinctions are an urgent necessity. To affirm as Lotta Continua does that "the Chinese choices move on a level different and distinct from the level on which the commitment of the revolutionary forces in the class struggle in each country moves" is a pitiful euphemism, a timorous attempt at justifying the Peking policy. The Chinese positions and the actions of those who are inspired by these positions are in contradiction with the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the working class. Even apart from theoretical proof, Portugal, Chile, Angola, Sri Lanka, etc. demonstrate this incontestably. Another meaningful element by which to judge the policy of the Chinese leaders is provided by the relations these leaders maintain with the workers movement, and parficularly with the for left, in other countries. According to Lotta Continua, China "makes provocative use of European Marxist-Leninist parties which exist only when reports about their visits to Peking are printed in the Chinese press. " But against whom are these "provocations" directed? Certainly not against the imperialists; they simply take no notice of such operations, for they are meaningless as far as the imperialists are concerned. Against the "social imperialists" perhaps? But the Soviet leaders have everything to gain From such buffoonery, which objectively increases their own prestige and above all the prestige of the Communist parties under their influence. In actual fact, the "provocation" affects the militants and groups who have interpreted the so-called cultural revolution favorably, who consider China as a "necessary international reference point, " who have gained some credit in the countries in which they are working, and who then find out that the Peking leaders prefer grotesque personalities and groups lacking any real substance. But is all this simply a matter of buffoonery and nonprofitable utilization of the resources of the Chinese state? No. There is also a logic in it. It is the logic 22 of those who want to establish relations of unconditional subordination, who demand the most rigid orthodoxy and automatic acceptance of all tums, whether strategic or tactical. In other words, what the Chinese leaders are establishing are eminently bureaucratic relations. Pages and pages of the Chinese press are given over to the reports of the activities of groups that do not exist, to quotations from newspapers that merely re-echo what has already been heard from Peking; nothing at all is said about the struggles of revolutionaries or communist parties in countries like Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy. All this expresses in the most paradoxical manner the criterion that lies at the root of the behavior of the Chinese bureaucracy, the same criterion that lay at the root of the behavior of the Soviet bureaucracy during the Stalin period and lies at the root of this behavior to this day: Subordination of the needs of the struggle of the workers of the world to the needs of the bureaucracy itself. We repeat: Only those who want to deceive others or themselves can claim that what is involved here is a matter of individual incidents or episodic deviations. A whole series of events and attitudes taken at crucial moments indicates that what is involved is an overall line. Precisely those who have applauded and supported the Chinese leaders in the hope that they would act as a revolutionary leadership offering new perspectives to the international workers movement should now feel the urgent need to do some basic thinking about the real nature of this leadership. Rely on your own forces
The conclusions that Lotta Continua draws from its empirical remarks about Chinese policy are pessimistic, objectively at least: "The problem today - for the European revolutionary left and, more directly, for the
Mediterranean revolutionary left - is to really count on our own forces and to be able to construct, both
practically and theoretically, the response to the concrete challenge contained in the positions of the Chinese comrades: Is it possible to make the revolution in this region, to free it from the tutelage of American imperialism, without falling under the control of social imperialism?" The choice of relying only on one's own forces entails (whether this is desired or not) renunciation of the international dimension of the struggle, a renunciation for which a price is inevitably paid. The example of the Chilean MIR is instructive here. This organization was marked by a similar conception during the years of the Unidad Popular government, the MIR did not go beyond a general internationalism, a general reference to Cuba, and did not take a precise position on the crucial problems of the international workers movement. Thus, in practice the militants of the MIR undervalued and maximally attenuated concrete comprehension of the fact that the struggle in Chile was an indivisible part of a world conflict in which tendencies and forces were at work that would inevitably affect the situation in Chile Itself in one way or another. (This would have been even more true if the Chilean experience had continued or if a workers state had been established.) Among these forces were primarily American imperialism and the Latin American "national" bourgeoisie, but the Soviet bureaucracy was also involved, as was the Chinese bureaucracy itself (although less so), not to mention the contradictory influence exerted by the Cuban leadership. In the present phase more than ever, a revolutionary struggle cannot be victorious if it lacks on international dimension. This is particularly the case not so much for an ill-defined "Mediterranean area, "as for West Europe itself, which has now achieved a significant degree of economic, social, and political interdependence. A victorious revolution in a European country like Spain, France, or Italy would immediately find itself facing drastic economic choices, given the impossibility of an autarkic retreat into a new "socialism in one country." The economic dynamic no less than the political dynamic would pose the alternative: extension of the revolution or its suffocation and defeat. And it will be very difficult to unravel this knot in a positive manner if this perspective is not clear from the outset, if the European and international workers movement is not able to prepare itself in odvance for such a choice. And there is more. Only political myopia or an attachment to a schema whose falsity or extremely equivocal character we have already pointed out could translate this dilemma into the formula: "either in the U.S. orbit or in the Soviet orbit. " Just the opposite, it must be clearly stated that a qualitative structural transformafion of the economy of Spain, France, or Italy would make it possible and realistic to envisage projects not only of collaboration but also of genuine economic integration with East Europe and with the USSR itself (obviously, this does not rule out relations with China). Those who remember the difficulty the Kremlin had in imposing its hegemony over countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland and who remember Stalin's lack of success in his attempts to subjugate a small country like Yugoslavia will understand that it would not be so easy for "social imperialism" to force countries like France or Italy into relations of subordination. Let us leave such hypotheses to the propaganda and senile fantosies of the reactionaries. For us the opposite is more likely; that is, a revolution and the beginning of socialist construction in a country with a high economic and cultural level and a solidly organized and politically mature workers movement would have very great repercussions in East Europe and the USSR itself. This could be a decisive factor in unblocking the situation of paralysis that has dragged on for years but has always contained enormous contradictions that can blow up at any time (the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland again in 1970 have proven this. Instead of "counting on our own forces" in order to go through experiences that are cut off from the tendencies operating in other parts of the world, we have to count on our own forces, the forces of others, and the dialec-
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY tical interdependence of both factors within an overal! perspective in which the connections are indissoluble and will tend to become increasingly close. We do not want to bring up yet another problem, but we cannot resist mentioning an additional point: Is it not perhaps realistic to think that a revolution in a European country would have an impact on the American working class itself, thus creating an additional obstacle to imperialist action? "Sterile polarization"? "To develop the initiative and debate on this crucial point (that is, revolutionary perspectives in Europe -INPRECOR) is an especially important task for the revolutionary left in Italy - which is most solidly linked to reality and to the lessons of the class struggle - in relation to a European revolutionary left within which a sterile polarization between a 'Marxist-Leninist' current and a "Trotskyist' current is tending to crystallize." Thus Lotta Continua. In fact, it is quite important to pursue the debate on ail points that are raised in the Lotta Continua document. Other points could be added to those already mentioned. There is scarcely any need to recall all the burning problems that have been raised by the Portuguese experience: the overall problem of the motor forces of the socialist revolution and its instruments, the means by which to take power. It is a fact that for a whole crucial period (although slightly less so now) the Italian far left re-echoed the illusions prevalent among the Portuguese left about the role of "guarantor" of the revolutionary process allegedly being played by the MFA (Armed Forces Movement); these "guarantors" were particularly some of the MA's most outspoken representatives, who gave very "advanced" interviews that in turn received very enthusiastic responses. This was not a matter of a simple error in analysis, but a radical error in conceptions. What was envisaged was granting the title of motor force of the revolution and guiding instrument of the revolutionary struggle to a force other than the proletariat, a force that could not be a revolutionary party, Experience has quickly demonstrated (unfortunately at the price of a serious halt in the revolution) that although the varieties of a revolutionary process can be unpredictable and the modes and pace of the construction of a leadership can vary to the utmost, the task of revolutionaries is always to grasp the substantial elements of the process that lie behind conjunctural forms and misleading appearances; Further, "peculiar" roads, exceptions, shortcuts, and "originality" are not possible either with respect to the function of leading motor force, which can be fulfilled only by the working class, or with respect to the necessity for organizing the working class itself into a revolufionary party of the Leninist type. Not to understand this would mean not to have reflected sufficiently on the Chilean tragedy or on the Portuguese events, the outcome of which remains open. 24
The debate, we repeat, is necessary. It must be real, nonexclusive, and on time. There is no use at all in falling back on exorcistic formulas like the "sterile polarization" that supposedly afflicts the European revolutionary left. If there is a phobia about initials and labels, let's leave them aside and discuss the real problems and the conceptions that correspond to these problems, conceptions that lie at the roots of the political and organizational differences. The "Marxist-Leninist" (or rather, Maoist) positions are a reality that will not be easily eradicated, both because these positions have historical precedents that tend to be revitalized under certain conditions (dogmatism, sectarianism, adventurism, efc.) and because, even more important, these positions are fueled directly or indirectly by the force represented by the leadership of the Chinese state with all the prestige it commands. The Trotskyist positions are another reality which no one can deny and which Lotta Continua, like others, must learn to analyze and judge on the basis of their intrinsic importance, for what they actually say, without misleading tactical considerations and without weighing the words of various speakers according to the influence that those speakers currently command. There is scarcely any need to add that the positions of the Communist parties, which continue to represent an international current in the workers movement, cannot be dismissed off-handedly, but must be refuted theoretically and strategically and their practical implications must be denounced. Lotta Continua seems to suggest an initiative for the Italian revolutionary left that could counter the tendency toward "sterile polarization, " As far as we are concerned, there is no doubt that the Italian far left has the strength to make its voice heard or that it has undergone experiences that militants in other countries, probably adherents of all tendencies, have not sufficiently reflected upon. This experience can aid in the deeper and more concrete understanding of a whole series of problems, but not necessarily by providing "new" or peculiar solutions. Lotta Continua's assertion, however, seems to contain a note of particularism, if not of na-
tional messianism, which, regardless of the intentions of the comrades who subscribe to this view, is linked to a tradition that can be considered only portially positive. At various times the Italian workers movement has had features that distinguished it from the workers movement of other countries in West Europe. During the first two decades of this century, the Italian Socialist party held a special place in the Second International, as did its successor with respect to European Social Democracy after the fall of fascism. The Italian Communist party can also lay claim, not without foundation, to its own "national" physiognomy, which distinguishes it from other Communist parties. Even the phenomenon of the PSIUP during the 1960s (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria - Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity) Probably had no real equivalent in any other country. During the first world war these peculiarities acted in such a way as to save the Italian workers movement from a capitulation as shameful as that which took hold among the great majority of the workers movement in many other countries; they also prevented Italian Social Democracy from joining with the rest of European Social Democracy in reactionary operations during the time of the so-called cold war, Similarly, the peculiarities of the Italian Communist party permitted both the reduction of the impact and duration of the most classical Stalinist damages and the overcoming at a certain point of the most debilitating forms of pressure from the Soviet bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the other side of these tendencies has been the development and consolidation of intermediary, eclectic, and centrist positions of various types, at various levels, and at various times. This has facilitated equivocation, ambiguity, and illusions (think of the Italian Socialist party, which joined the Third International Immediately after the first world war and voted in a-congress for the dictatorship of the proletariat), has retarded the necessary clarification and development of the consciousness of vanguard militants, and has therefore represented an obstacle to the building of a Leninist revolutionary party. The very process of critical rethinking initiated by the Italian CP beginning in 1956 (in its own way and in advance of all the other Communist parties of the capitalist coun tries) was laden with negative consequences that continue to assert their weight today, twenty years later. With the concurrent adoption of an increasingly "constitutionalist" and "gradualist" line, this has fueled a strong current that criticizes Stalinism from the right, a current that now holds a large majority among the cadres of the party. At the same time, exactly because of the accentuated regression, exactly because of this tendency toward Social Democratization, many of those who refused to accept a reformist perspective have been driven toward orthodox Stalinism, neo-Stalinism, and Maoism. The Italian far left must therefore ask itself whether its own peculiar features actually make it superior to the rest of the European far left simply because they result from experiences that unfolded during the most protracted social and political crisis of all capitalist Europe. These peculiar features must be examined critically in the light of the past history of the Italian workers movement; and the ambiguities and contradictions of these features must be grasped. The Italian far left must develop a more internationalist outlook, which also means taking account of all the international tendencies and defining its position on the great problems of the workers movement throughout the world. This is an ineluctable theoretical necessity and a concrete political exigency. September 20, 1975
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