repression now coming down on the GCl, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico.
terior has held a favored position in this field. The inertia of the enormous political bureaucracy and the decisive weight exerted by the control of the masses through the PRI and the other official organizations that are coordinated by the Secretariat of the Interior gives the holder of the post of secretary of the interior a decisive advantage over the other members of the cabinet.
But with the growing number of conflicts and contradictions building up on the political and economic scene, the political apparatus of the government-PRI has been increasingly shaken ever since 1968, the year of the great crisis. Echeverrfa responded to these tensions with his "democratic opening, " partially neutralizing these tensions with more or less timid reform measures. Thus, under this government, even though all the possible successors declared their fidelity to Echeverriaism, the secretary of the interior was always considered as most closely linked to the repressive sector and as the main advocate of a stronger style of rule.
In addition, in the middle 1970s the Echeverrfa regime finds itself confronted by increasingly serious economic problems: growing trade deficit, colossal debts to the agencies of imperialism, structural unemployment organically linked to the very heart of the economy, and a rising cost of living that is impoverishing vast sectors of the "middle classes. " With Echeverría, for the first time in this country a technocratically worked out plan was set in motion to coordinate the existing financial, administrative, and political chaos of the federal govemment. For the first time, the technocratic layer had direct responsibility for the political orienfation of the gigantic bureaucratic apparatus of the Mexican government. Today it is more than ever necessary for the bourgeoisie to take technocratic measures, above and beyond the traditional repressive measures, to resolve (partially, of course) the grave national problems. The designation of López Portillo is a response to this situation. Although secretary of finance for only three years, he has proven capable of surrounding himself with and receiving the advice of one of the most clever sectors of the technocracy. In this way he participated in raising the prestige of the "triangle of government efficiency": the secretariats of Finance, the Presidency, and National Patrimony. Moreover, last but not least, his relations with the financial agencies and the nafional and international banks made López Portillo a logical candidate, even though he is somewhat different from past Mexican presidents. But in order to impose his choice on the official world, Echeverria had to make a maneuver that underlines the profoundly antidemocratic character of the regime. Moya Palencia had been counting on the inertial force of previous choices to act in his own favor. But on September 22, before any program had been adopted and even though Echeverrfa himself had declared the day before that in Mexico "it is the majority that decides the presidential succession, " the propaganda apparatus of the presidency came out with the word: "Lopez Portillo is the one." As soon as the presidential choice was known, people began jumping on the bandwagon. But it was later clear that this presidential selection had been made without even consulting the closest government functionaries, those formally assigned to "choose" the candidate: to begin with, of course, the leaders of the PRI itself and the presumed successor, Moya Palencia. The abdication of the whole PRI leadership, its replacement by various cabinet ministers, the changes made in the cabinet, and the servile behavior of the popular "leaders" all demonstrate in a clear and grotesque fashion that even those who occupy the highest government posts have absolutely nothing to say in designating the presidential candidate. The September 24 demonstration of the CNOP, which, it had previously appeared, would serve as Moya Palencia's tribune from which to launch his candidacy, instead served to ratify the candidacy of López Portillo.
Fissures in the regime But this capacity for maneuver on the part of the regime cannot conceal the regime's pronounced ossification, its lack of real Flexibility. Reyes Heroles, outgoing president of the party, was coopted to the government; Muñoz Ledo, secretary of labor and social security, was named president of the PRI; Gómez Villanueva, secretary of the agrarian reform, was made secretary general of the PRI. The trade-union leaders stay in place; the structure remains, The top functionaries have simply been shuffled. These changes, although they do not herald any substantial modification of the apparatus, nevertheless testify to growing fissures, friction, and internal conflicts. Thus, while the PRI no longer mobilizes the masses (and as an instrument of mass mobilization it is completely dead), it is obvious that Muñoz Ledo and Gómez Villanueva could not breathe new life into the PRI even if they wanted to, despite the enormous means at their disposal. Further, the group that has now crystallized around Moya is not simply one more group. If represents the old layer of professional politicians, the top oligarchy of the Mexican "revolutionary family"; it represents a center of power that has only partially been supplanted by the new techocracy. This technocracy is even less linked to the masses than are the professional politicians. When it becomes necessary to resort to the old populist demagogy, it will be necessary to call upon the old politicians, masters at mouthing off. The PRI has shown that it is a structure totally dependent on the president, especially as concerns the question of presidential succession. Naturally, the PRi has its cliques, nuclei of power, and "caudillos" who can choose and impose their candidates for posts like deputy or senator; but the big important and substantial decisions remain in the hands of the president. The PRI has in no way attenuated the despotic and authoritarian presidentialism that dominates the Mexican regime. Revolutionary perspectives In 1975 the next president of Mexico was designated by a flick of the little finger of the sole and great elector. But 1975 has also seen the clear emergence of a new vanguard on a national scale. This vanguard is predominantly student in composition, but it contains a growing number of workers, it is the living evidence of the discredit and erosion of the Mexican Bonapartist apparatus. If represents the layers of the population that are moving ever farther from government policy and are seeking an independent alternative. On March 14 at the University of Mexico a part of this vanguard directly disavowed Echeverría. All signs are that his successor's fate will be no better. The twilight of Mexican Bonapartism has set in irreversibly. Lopez Portillo will not stave off its night.
CONFRONTATION
Prime Minister Raook In less than a year the Malayan government has taken a series of meosures that amount to a new hardening of the police regime of Tun Abdel Razak: the arrest of personalities and militants for violation of the winternal security act"; direct takeover of the universities; legal establishment of the principle of collective responsibility; institutionalization of informing; creation of a special "antiterrorist" court exempt from "normal" juridical rules; systematic police operations. The utilization of this new repressive arsenal is one of the essential elements of Razak's planned response to the gradual changes in the internal social and political atmosphere and the deep alterations in the regional relationship of forces caused by the victory of the Indochinese revolution. The Malayan economy has not suffered an overall crisis during the past two years. Nevertheless, some of the most important sectors have been hard hit, even though Melaysia has escaped the generalized recession. The country was not affected by the increases in the price of oil. Its relatively modest oil production (90, 000 barrels a day) is generally sufficient to cover domestic needs. While the world market price of rubber has temporarily dropped (after a strong increase in 1973), the price of coconut oil has held up. In spite of this, the social crisis has sharply intensified The average per capita yearly income is one of the highest in Southeast Asia: US$400. But this figure conceals pronounced social disparities. The 1974-75 report of the Ministry of Finance officially admitted that 40 percent of the population live below the poverty threshold, which is a monthly family income of 140 Malaysian dollars (about USS70), or 25 Malaysian dollars per capita (US$12.50).(1) These social disparities have been aggravated. The first to suffer from this have been the 500,000 small-scale rubber planters, who raise 50 percent of total rubber production. In reality, the great majority of these people live well below the poverty threshold, as 10