Sahara:
Beyond the «Green March» by PACO ROBS The world was not much interested in western Sahara until the beginning of the 1960s, when fabulous mineral riches were discovered in its territory, including the world's largest deposit of phosphates, in the region of Bu Craa, These deposits, which extend over an area of 250 square kilometers (the essential part of which can be exploited in open air), present the twofold advantage of an extremely profitable mineral and a rapid access to the Arlantic Ocean, which is only a few hundred kilometers from the deposits. Exploitation began only in 1972 with the creation of a company called Fos-Bu-Craa in which the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, the Banque Rothschild, and Krupp invested; this company provided highly technical extraction equipment. If employs 2, 500 wage earners, of whom only 1,000 work in the mines. Only a minority of these workers come from the Saharan population; the others come from the Canary Islands or Spain. Exploitation of the phosphate deposits on a large scale would enable western Sahara to profit from a virtually complete monopoly on the world phosphate market, pushing aside Morocco, which is now the leading producer. It is thus easily understandable why the imperialist powers would be in no hurry to foster the accession to independence of a country that could then make them pay a high price for the decades of brutal colonialism and deliberately maintained poverty. The mishaps the imperialist powers have experienced in the realm of oil in recent years serve as a lesson. Thus, neither U.S. imperialism, which has the greatest interest, nor West German and French imperialism, hide their desire to Morocco annex this territory. But the phosphate mines are not the only natural resource of western Sahara. Along the coast there are extremely rich fishing zones, which Spanish colonialism has sold off and abandoned to the pillage of the fishing fleets of several countries. Exploration has also revealed the existence of important oil deposis, deliberately undervalued up to now by the big oil companies in charge of prospecting, But the companies' haste to reach exploitation accords with the Spanish regime during the most recent period says a lot about the real richness of these deposits, hitherto regarded as strategic reserves. Finally, in addition to deposits of iron and uranium, the subsoil of western Sahara contains a virtual underground lake, an immense sheet of fresh water that would enable Rio de Oro (the southern portion of western Sahara) to be transformed into a giant garden in the midst of the desert. There is no need to look any further in seeking the reason for Mauritania's interest in this region. But apart from its economic importance, western Sahara is an especially important political and military target in view of the profound change in the balance of forces in Africa caused by the accession to independence of the former Portuguese colonies. U.S. imperialism is anxious to strengthen its presence in this region by fostering the annexation of this region by Morocco and, secondarily, by Mauritania. The formation of an independent Sahara in which a decisive role would be played by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara (PFLS) supported by Algeria is especially dimly regarded by imperialism, since such a development could endanger the U.S. military bases on the Canary Islands. Since the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal, the bases in the Azores have no longer represented a very reliable piece in NATO's military apparatus. The development of the MPAIAC (Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago) and the fraternal ties it has established with the PFLS confirm that such concerns are well founded.
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WESTERN SAHARA A sizeable stake, western Sahara has been the object of complex negotiations and dangerous initiatives of which the "green march" is only the latest. For a year now, Spanish colonialism, forced to fight while retreating, has been committed to a policy of pseudo-decolonization, a policy all of the aspects of which Madrid has been unable to control. The Spanish regime has sought to safeguard the essential part of its economic and military interests in the region while at the same time opening up negotiations on several fronts. The first objective was to postpone the date of decolonization by unleashing a brutal repression against the first actions of the PFLS and by opening fire on demonstrators in el-Ayoun, the capital, in June 1970. There were dozens of deaths and hundreds of wounded; besides that, there have been many cases of torture. But the repression did not succeed in halting the development of the PFLS, which held its founding conference in August 1973. The fall of the Caetano dictatorship and the aggravation of the crisis of the Francoist dictatorship forced a change in Spanish policy. On August 22, 1974, Madrid announced its intention to organize a referendum to determine the status of the territory. Concurrently, it Fostered the creation of the PUNS (Party of Saharan National Union), a legal party composed of Saharan notables won over to collaboration with the Spanish regime. The PUNS was supposed to assure a neocolonial link that would preserve the essential interests of the Spanish state. The census taken by the colonial administration in preparation for the referendum rated the population at 75,000, which is very small for a territory practically half the size of France. The leaders of the PFLS advance a much higher figure, on the order of 250, 000-300, 000. If is true that the overwhelming majority of the Saharan population is composed of tribal nomads who are quite unconcerned with the artificial lines dividing the region into areas of Spanish, Algerian, Moroccan, and Mauritanian administration. An essential part of this nomadic population escaped notice in the census especially because they often are forced to seek refuge in neighboring territories, driven away by the poverty and underdevelopment to which Spanish colonialism has condemned the territory. (1) This population would certainly be prepared to settle down in a free and independent western Sahara, as is shown by the massive support they have extended to the PFLS, even forcing Mauritania to tolerate PFLS activity in its territory. The Spanish maneuvers came to grief with the spectacular defeat of the PUNS, which despite its ability to act legally proved incapable of checking the development of mass support for the PFLS, as indicated by the demonstrations that greeted the visit of the United Notions mission to the country in the spring of 1975. Moreover, the secretary general of the PUNS, who felt which way the wind was blowing and knew that Spain was losing ground, preferred to go over bag and baggage (and with the organization's treasury) to Morocco and declared allegiance to the Moroccan regime. The PFLS then put itself forward os the undeniable representative of the Saharan people and of their will to form an in12
ILES. -CANARIES MAROC CLARINETE пропід - SAGUTA Cap:Bojudo: Bou Crim NAMRA COCEAN,
CATLANTIQUE Bir-Moghtein
SAHARA -Villa-Cisneros (Dakhola) OCCIDENTAL
H A MAURITANIE dependent state. Both the Morehob (Movement of Blue Men) and the FLU (Front of Liberation and Unity), directly armed and supported by the Moroccan regime, defend the thesis of attachment to Moroccan territory but do not command any serious influence among the Saharan population. With the quick defeat of the PUNS, Spain was compelled to readjust its policy during 1975. Particularly in the most recent period, the international isolation of the Francoist regime, its grave internal crisis, and the Moroccan offensive have forced the Spanish regime both to commit itself to vacating the territory and to opp negotiations on several fronts. Spain has had to renounce preservation of some of its privileges, notably the maintenance of a sizeable military contingent in western Sahara, which comes to about 55, 000 soldiers and 4, 500 members of an armed police. The decisive role played by the troops stationed in Morocco during the fascist uprising of July 1936 is too well known to disguise the regime's interest in maintaining reliable armed forces overseas prepared to intervene again as a counterrevolutionary driving lance in the Iberian peninsula. But the objective being sought in the present negotiations, with Morocco and Mauritania on the one hand and with Algeria and the PFLS on the other, is limited to the maintenance of a military presence in el-Ayoun, which would serve as a support to the air base in the Canary Islands, where some 35,000 troops are stationed. But it has been economic more than military factors that have turned Francoist policy around several times, occasionally at intervals of several days. The lightning trip of Francoist minister Solis to Morocco about two weeks ago led to the announcement of an imminent Spanish-Moroccan agreement, while the de facto recognition of the PFLS as the only real representative of the Saharan people several weeks ago heralded a rapid evacwation of the territory by the Spanish army and administration and the establishment of an independent state. But scarcely several days later, the trip of acting chief of state Juan Carlos to el-Ayoun turned things around once more and hardened Spain's position against Mo-
rocco, under the energetic pressure of Algeria, a pressure that was in any case more economic than military. In point of fact, on the one hand Spain was seeking to reach an agreement with Morocco to maintain a significant participation in the exploitation of the Bu Craa phosphate deposits, a participation that preliminary accords indicate may be as high as 60 percent. On the other hand, however, the resolve of Algiers seems to have weighed heavily on the Spanish government, for Algeria is far and away Spain's leading trading partner in Africa. According to the Spanish Trade Ministry, of 36,590 million pesetas worth of exports to Africa in 1974, nearly 10,000 million worth were purchased by Algeria. Likewise, Spain imported more than 20,000 million worth from Algeria (nearly exclusively oil), out of a total of 70, 680 million pesetas worth of imports from the African continent. The economic agreements that have been reached with Algeria are even more important than those with the United States, and Morocco lags far behind that. The determination of the Algerian government is also explained by the political and economic interests at stake. Algeria is aiming mainly at enlarging its political influence through the formation of an independent Western Sahara under the aegis of the PFLS, at isolating Morocco and Mauritania, and at preventing the strengthening of the military and political presence of U.S. imperialism in this region. But Algeria is also seeking an access to the Atlantic Ocean, which would permit rapid transit for the oil and natural gos that lie in the part of the Sahara that is under Algerian control. The cost of constructing pipelines to the Mediterranean would be exorbitant, and negotiations with Morocco to gain permission to pipe gas and oil across Moroccan territory, which would permit more rapid access to the Atlantic, fell through very quickly. As for Morocco, it plays just as important if not even more important a role. The consequences of King Hassan's decision to withdraw the 300,000 participants in the "green march" cannot be evaluated yet. But even though this decision seems to herald the possibility of an agreement with Spain, it appears to represent a political defeat for Hossan, an adventure that turned out badly. In fact, the green march was conceived and organized not as a simple means of putting pressure on the Spanish government, but as a real invasion that was intended to permit the immediate annexation of the territory by Morocco. An important part of these 300, 000 marchers had been recruited from certain layers of the active population that Hassan wanted to see installed in western Sahara as new colons, Likewise, technicians specializing in the exploitation of phosphates had been mobilized to provide replacements for the Spanish administration in Bu Crao. In addition, the criminal adventure of Hassan Il was aimed at precise internal political objectives: to strangle the opposition to the regime, an opposition that plunged into this crusade (with the CP in the lead), reconstituting a degree of national unity not hoped for by such a tottering regime; to firm up the regime's popular base; and, finally, to offer an easy "war" for the Moroccan army, which is still not very reliable for the regime. On the internal level, Hassan's operation, largely inspired and supported by the United States, which was anxious to exploit the internal difficulties of the Francoist regime, turned into a fiasco and could well result in the elimination of the crown. This retreat is especially delicate in that what remains posed is not only the question of western Sahara, in regard to which the Moroccan claims are absolutely illegitimate, (2) but also the problem of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are integral parts of Moroccan territory and should be immediately handed back. Thus, only the immediate proclamation of a SpanishMoroccan accord on Morocco's annexation of western Sahara could safeguard Hassan's position. But for such an accord to become a reality, it would be necessary for Morocco to invade the territory, which would run up against determined resistance from the majority of the Saharan population, which backs the PFLS, which is in turn supported by Algeria, which has the most powerful army of the countries concerned, In the event of such an accord, Spain would hurry to evacuate the territory as quickly as possible, for Madrid has no desire to get its army embroiled in a difficult conflict in which its interests would not be directly at stake and whose consequences could prove to be quite serious. The future of western Sahara rests essentially with the PFLS. This organization, whose political contours are difficult to discover, seems to enjoy mass support among the Saharan population, whose social structures remain precapitalist. The weak proletariat that has emerged in the mines and the urban subproletariat, which suffers from tragic unemployment, exert too weak a social weight today. The leadership of the PFLS is in the hands of the small Saharan intellectual elite trained in Spanish and Moroccan universities. It appears to be under big pressure from the Algerian leadership, with which it broadly identifies. Under such condifions, it is difficult to envisage the PFLS being able to lead the national liberation struggle of western Sahara through to the total national and social liberation of the Saharan people and the constitution of a socialist state. But it can at least resolutely commit itself to the road of the rapid proclamation of an independent state, In this struggle against the military threats of Morocco, against the possibility of an intervention by the Spanish army or a direct intervention by the United States, it must receive the resolute support of revolutionary militants and of our comrades in Spain in the first place. That is how things are understood by the militants of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in the the territory of the Spanish state), some of whom are now on military service in western Sahara and are fraternizing with the PFLS. FOOTNOTES: 1. In all, western Sahara has 2 secondary schools and 350 hospital rooms, half of which are reserved for Spanish colons. 2. Morocco appeals to links that existed before the colonization between Saharan tribes and the sultan of Morocco, to whom the tribes swore an allegiance that was purely symbolic in any case.
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CONSTRUCTION WORKERS