PRISONS
Among the popular masses, the idea of the liquidation of the Francoist dictatorship has always been identifie above all with the moment that the gates of the Francoist prisons are finally flung open and the borders, sealed for so many years, are opened for the thousands of exiled fighters. This feeling is stronger than ever today. The disappearance of the person identified more than any sother with the essentially repressive charocter of the regime is generating enormous mass sensitivity to the siogan demanding the immediate release of all political prisoners. The fight to win this demand is at the very center of the present struggle to liquidate the dictatorship. The dictatorship is not unaware: of the emotional outpouring that would sweep the country with the release of the as well known as those condemned in the Burges trials, thousands of political prisoners, among them comrodes the revolutionary militants, the workers leaders like Zalbide, Sabino, Sarasketa, Mojika Arregui, Fernandez Inguanzo, Camacho, or with the public appearance of exiles like La Pasionaria, Carrillo, and others. The dictatorship knows that this could touch off an uncontrollable dynamic. That is why it wants to grant only a limited amnesty, in an attempt to endow the inheritor of power with an aura of liberalism while at the same time trying to avoid being caught in the sort of situations that would arise if, for example, the returning politIcal exiles were met af the train stations by tens of thousands of people. How could it then be maintained that the opposition is an insignificant minority; how could the failure to legalize the political parties, or at least certain political parties, be justified? But any attampt to paralyze the combativity of the movement through partial concessions like the limited amnesty is condemned to failure. This amnesty means that the comrades under the heaviest sentences (and in the first place those who are accused of having responded fo Francoist terrorism arms in hand) remain Imprisoned or in exile. This measure con only be called a new trick, a new challenge to the masses will to struggle, It only proves that "Juan Carlosism" is nothing but an extension of the corpse of Franco and of his regime of terror. The mass movement must place no confidence in the promises of sectors that have decided to play the card of a hypothetical Juan Carlosite reformism. So long as the essential part of the Francoist state apparatus remains intact, any liberty will have to be won in struggle; it will in no case result from shadowy diplomatic pressure, That is why we must not at all wait for such measures: we must begin right now to press for the broadest possible mobilization to win these liberties and, in the first place, for an immediate and total amnesty. Rallies in front of the prison gates; vigils by relatives and friends of the prisoners and exiles: permanent aaitation in the neighborhoods, factories, and schools; central demonstrations in each city; massive collections
(Drawing by a Spanish political prisoner) of signatures - those are the sorts of initiatives that are needed now. More than ever, the political situation requires that we reject any wait-and-see attitude and any sectarianism. The unity in action of the various existing bodies against repression and the coordination of all workers organizafions to drive these tasks forward - that is what is needed On the basis of these tasks and these orientations, it is necessary to prepare a centralized day of struggle throughout the country for immediate amnesty for all political prisoners and for the return of all exiles.
November 25, like April 25, September 28, and March 11, marks a new stage in the Portuguese "revolutionary process" that opened eighteen months ago. After the victory of the construction workers (see INPRECOR, No.38, November 20), more than 100,000 people demonstrated on November 16. In spite of the efforts of the Communist party to avoid frontal attacks on the sixth government as such, the most commonly chanted slogans were directed squarely against Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo. In addition, the bakers threatened to use the same methods as the construction workers if the Ministry of Labor persisted in opposing their demands. They "gave" the government six days to come up with "a positive response on the question of our working hours and wage guarantees,.. . (otherwise) we will use new forms of struggle that will openly expose the fake socialist policy of this government, which is actually against the workers. In the army the "revolt" of the Tancos paratroopers occupies a position of prime importance. After blowing up the Radio Renascença broadcasting tower, the Tancos paratrooper regiment itself exploded. The paratroopers elected a new commander and "placed themselves at the service of the revolution" with all the confused haste characteristic of a completely new radicalization. The government then went "on strike, " on the grounds that the "armed forces can no longer assure the government the authority necessary to govern. " On November 25, the government entered its sixth day of 'strike." In this context a polarization developed around the nomination of Vasco Lourenço (a member of the Council of the Revolution and one of the leaders of the "group of nine" of Melo Antunes) to the post of commander of the Lisbon Military Region (RML). In effect, this nomination meant that Otelo de Carvalho, who has been strongly supported by the CP in recent weeks, was to be deprived of command of the military region of the capital. Within the army, or at least within many units of the RML, a polarization then took place around this nomination and the consequent removal of Carvalho. For example, the EPAM (Practical School of Military Administration), which occupied the television station on November 25, adopted the following motion in a general assembly: "We consider that the removal of General Saraiva de Carvalho must be viewed as a real purge of the left, if it goes through, it would open the door to a chain of purges of commanders of many progressive and revolutionary units, purges aimed at the establishment of a military discipline that, while repressing the organization of the soldiers, would allow the soldiers to be used against the workers struggles. The soldiers of the EPAM, united in general assembly on November 18, 1975, decide: "1. To reject the attempted purge of General Otelo, declaring that we are opposed to this reactionary maneuver; "2. To maintain ourselves on a state of alert in defense of the revolution; 6
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