Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Bolivia: Collapse of the "Unity of the Armed Forces"

Inprecor no. 4, 18 July 1974 · pp 9-10 · 1,707 words

Armed forces and soldiers Latin America Peasants and land reform National liberation

COLLAPSE OF THE

ARMED FORCES*

BOLIVIA UNITYOFTH The Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer Suarez used to be in the habit of giving speeches about the "unity of the armed forces as a bulwark of power. " Today, this image of a united armed forces, so extensively propagated both inside and outside the country, has been demolished by the abortive coup that Banzer's officers and comrades in arms organized against him. The military plot laid bare the processes of differentiation and decomposition that are now ripening within the Bolivian officer corps. It is true that in the past Banzer has been faced with conflicts in the army, but these have generally originated from the top hierarchy, where every now and then some general or other gets it into his head that he has abilfties at least os developed as those of Banzer and decides that he has the duty to assume the responsibilities of president of the republic in place of the dictator. Such was the case, successively, with General Iriarte Roque Terán and Colonels Selich Zenteno Anaya, A. de Zamora, and others. One after another, they were all cold-bloodedly eliminated. The successive crises touched off by these high dignitaries had scarcely any effect on the officer corps as a whole, nor did they involve them. The officer corps maintained its unity, which was founded on the extraordinary privileges the officers have enjoyed since the Banzer regime came to power in the coup d'etat of August 21, 1971. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR - - Revolutionary Armed Forces), the group formed by officers under the command of Major Rubén Sanchez, which opposed the fascist coup and rallied to the popular resistance, had not been able to extend its influence within the officer corps. In the past, when we spoke of fissures appearing in this pillar of the military dictatorship, we were referring to those situations. The abortive coup of June 5,1974 But now, the attempted coup has revealed that these fissures have deepened and, under the pressure of the general situation in Bolivia, have been transformed into a real crisis. They are seriously undermining the main instrument of power that Banzer commands. This time, it was not a matter of a few ambitious and isolated generals. The attempted coup involved several entire units of the army as well as dozens of officers, among which twenty-five of the most prominent were punished and thrown out of the armed forces. There are new elements in this crisis. The putschists spoke for a tendency within the army that is trying to take its distance from the dictatorship and wants to win some sympathy among the popular masses. In addition, the many messages and proclamations that came to light after the failure of the coup indicate that the officers are involved in a sharp struggle among political tendencies. For the time being, five conflicting currents can be distinguished.

1. The top military command, headed by Banzer, which exercises real power and governs the country. It is responsible for the whole policy of the regime. Its most vigorous civilian mouthpieces are the FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana -- Bolivian Socialist Phalange, a far-right organization supported mainly by the large landed proprietors) and the bureaucratic remains of the now fragmented MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario -- Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) . 2. The FAR of Major Sanchez, which has won "citizenship rights" in the army thanks to its persistent propaganda and the action of its clandestine teams in the barracks. According to their own documents, the FAR is made up of commandants, officers, subofficers, sergeants, corporals, and soldiers who regard themselves as the heirs to the struggles of the Indians of Tupacamaru and Katori against the Spanish colonizers, the heirs of the guerrillas who fought for independence against the Spanish crown, the heirs of Belzu, the president and caudillo of the last century, and of progressive military men like Busch and Villaroel. The FAR affirms that its goal is national liberation. It declares itself antifascist and anti-imperialist. It condemns Yankee imperialism as the number-one enemy of the Bolivian people. It defines the revolutionary aims it is fighting for as "changes in the structures that will radically and definitively modify the framework of dependence and neocolonialism. " It calls upon its brothers-in-arms in the army to struggle "together ants, the university students, the liberal professors, and all with the miners, the factory workers, the teachers, the peasimpoverished and exploited sectors of the country with the aim of winning national liberation through common ac''on." The FAR was part of the FRA (Frente Revolucionaria Antiimperialista -- Revolutionary Anti-imperialist Front) and continues to call for such a front as the "political instrument having the strategic objective of building socialism. " The FAR's head-on opposition to the Banzer dictatorship has won it some sympathy among low-ranking officers. 3. The group whose existence was brought to light by the abortive coup d'etat of June 5, 1974. Its leaders were Lieutenant Colonels Lopez, Calvi, Sanchez, and Uzqueda, and Majors Gary, Prado, and Sergio Osinaza. Since the failure lieutenants, and six corporals have been removed from their of the coup, four colonels, two majors, two captains, six posts. A manifesto signed by four of these officers who are now in exile in Brazil defines this putschist group as a "movement of generals" that "corresponds to the revolutionary thought of the university students and the trade-union struggle that is trying to realize the gains and well-being of the workers. " They oppose the totalitarian system of Banzer, which they declare to be a repressive regime contrary to the interests of the people and a defender only of the interests of the privileged classes. They condemn the massacre of peasants in Cochabamba. They claim to be in favor of university autonomy, of the right of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana,

9

the national trade-union federation, now banned) to function legally, and of the overthrow of Banzer and the return of constitutional liberties. 4. Concurrently with the manifesto of the defeated putschists, there appeared publicly a programmatic document of a "central general staff of the nationalist armed forces" signed by 1,500 commandants, officers, subofficers, and cadets. They accuse Banzer of having transformed himself into an entrepreneur working with the "middle mines" (the privately owned mines, as opposed to the nationalized "big" mines -- INPRECOR and a sector of the private employers. They affirm that Banzer has placed the officers in the service of imperialism under the pretext of waging an antiguerrilla, antisubversive, and conterrevolutionary war. They call for the creation of a Second Republic based on a mobilization of the masses, a struggle for national sovereignty, and the establishment of a progressive regime embodying "socialist, humanist, and Christian faith. " They demand amnesty for political prisoners, the reconstruction of the three branches of the state, economic development toward social ends, and depoliticization of the armed forces. 5. Finally, another group of military men has appeared. This group has published a document condemning Brazil and Yankee imperialism. Why the division in the army? It is important to explain what is behind this disintegration of the "unity of the Bolivian armed forces, "which the dictatorship had so often proclaimed to be "founded on granite. " A whole series of factors have been exerting pressure on the officers. The first thing that must be mentioned is the crisis of the civilian components of the government, the MNR and the FSB, which have exhausted themselves in violent struggles over control of the state apparatus and finances, thus giving rise to gigantic corruption. Next, there is the failure of the government's proposals and projects allegedly designed to bring about economic development and solve the country's chronic economic crisis, which has generated exacerbated inflation, unemployment, and poverty, despite the advantageous conditions created for Bolivian capitalism by the increase in the world market prices of raw materials. This whole economic morass has provoked growing resistance from the masses. 10

In addition, account must be taker af the geopolitical international pressures on Bolivia and the open intervention of the Brazilian dictatorship and Brazilian capital in the economy, political life, and even decisions of the army in Bolivia. All these factors have affected the sensibilities of many officers. But the main thing that has been shaking the young officers has been the tenacious resistance of the masses, who, since the peasant rebellion of January 1974 (see INPRECOR No. O) have demonstrated that they can rise up against their exploiters and oppressors. The officers had accepted Banzer's plans because they believed that these plans would produce economic and social stabilization. But as they are now seeing that this stabilization is an illusion and that the country is becoming more and more unstable, they are beginning to vacillate. They see that their future is in danger, that the Banzer government is falling apart, and that it no longer has much of a future. They have no desire to go down with this government, and they are therefore beginning to take their distance from it. In lens than three years, the military has seen the failure of the banzer regime and all its schemes. They have seen the country sold to the rich, with 10 million hectares ceded to imperialist oil companies. They have witnessed the denationalization of the mining companies, the ceding of land to French, Japanese, and North American companies. They have seen Brazil's peaceful invasion of the regions of Santa Cruz and beni. But all this has failed to produce any "economic mirucle. " On the contrary, the result has been inflation and food shortages. They have seen their military commanders wage the bloodiest repression against the Bolivian masses and seen them participate in plundering, corrupting, and sacking the resources of the nation. Furthermore, they have felt the struggle of the masses, the miners who will not compromise, the radicalization of the peasants who broke through the farce of the "military-peasant pact, " the new rebellion that has arisen among the university students. In short, they have felt the new revolutionary rise of the masses. This reality is affecting not only the armed forces; it has also been noted by imperialism, which is keeping watch over the situation and taking note of the decomposition of its puppet regime.

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