REFORMISTS
STRANGLE
STRIKE WAVE
It is exactly this task that the militants of La Nouvelle Défense at Glaverbel and especially the worker militants of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs have been carrying out for several years. As André Henry pointed out in an inter-
"balance sheet of the strike": "The LRT had developed a broad propaganda campaign in favor of elected view on the strike committees and occupations. It appeared to the workers as the organization that was fighting for these forms of struggle and for workers democracy. All the action of the LRT, unlike that of the other organizations, tended to strengthen active union democracy against the bureaucracy. ... Organizations like AMADA and Unité Rouge have not understood the political impact that an elected strike committee can have first of all by creating dual power within a factory; nor have they understood that the practice of workers control can impose a new relationship of forces on the employers by DENMARK Between May 8 and May 20 an important section of the Danish working class responded to the bourgeois parties' continued attacks on the workers by going on strike and demonstrating. The immediate issue that triggered the strikes was the introduction of new indirect taxes on consumer goods and plans for extensive cutbacks in spending for education and social security. The strikes and demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of workers point to the deepening social crisis and the weakening of the effectiveness of parliamentary rule as a bourgeois instrument for attacking the workers. The outbreak of the strikes also represents part of an international tendency in the developed capitalist countries toward a structural crisis of capitalism forcing the bourgeoisie to move to increasingly tough attacks on the working class: inflationary assaults on real wages, incomes policy, unemployment, antistrike legislation, and so on. The strikes marked the end of the special Danish "Social Democratic way of life" and the beginning of Denmark's entry into the European tendency toward the workers taking direct action to defend themselves through local strikes, factory occupations, political general strikes, etc. Parliamentary rule
The Social Democratic party is traditionally a government party in Denmark. In the beginning of the 1970s, because of the still-limited activity of the Danish working class, the
Social Democratic party tried to continue as the leading administrator of the capitalist system in spite of the narrowing economic margin for maneuver. The Social Democratic party the workers taking charge of protecting the machinery, reducing the work pace, starting up off-standard production, and so on. " (La Gauche, organ of the LRT, June 14.) The primary objective of the LRT was to contribute the maximum to the success of the strike. Our political concern was to make the vanguard layers grasp the links between the forms of struggle, the maturation of the movement, and the line advanced by the LRT through its militants that were engaged in the struggle. And we contributed in various ways: meetings on the eve of the strike, May 1 demonstration with the Multiplane workers, putting out the bulletin Glaverbel Rouge and factory bulletins in other regions, giving a lot of coverage to the strike in our press, including interviews with the main delegates from Glaverbel-Gilly and Roux, as well as Multiplane, among others. **
. by MOGENS PEDERSEN was an important force in pushing Denmark into the Common Market in 1972, and it followed up this success by initiating attacks on the living standard of the working class. The party's strategic plan for improving the position of Danish capitalism was -- and remains -- so-called Economic Democracy. The essential content of this plan is to solve the resource problems of the employers (financial needs, need for cheap labor force, etc., especially for the big export industries) through direct subsidies from central funds, the trade-union leadership being granted a certain influence on the distrubution of these funds. The funds themselves are to be created through virtual forced savings for the working class, which was to be compensated by a degree of "co-ownership" and "co-management. " But the Social Democratic Economic Democracy plan did not receive a very warm response from the workers, who began demanding less abstract concessions in the form of hard cash. Nor was it well received by the employers. The generally growing discontent among the voters, including the working class, found its first sharp expression in/ the parliamentary elections of December 4, 1973. These elections resulted in a shift to the right on the parliamentary level, one of the reasons being that sections of the workers discontented with Social Democratic management of capitalism and the swollen Social Democratic state apparatus as well as with rising prices and taxes voted for the Progress party led by
Glistrup (a populist-type party based on demagogic promises of putting an end to "bureaucracy and income taxes").
The elections resulted in the formation of a government led by the Left party, a bourgeois-liberal party of peasant origin
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DENMARK having only 22 members in parliament. (Eleven parties are represented in the 179-member parliament.) At the same time, economic problems were worsening. Real wages are being undermined by violent price increases on the order of 15-20 percent a year, the "normal" inflation rate being intensified by the "oil crisis." The government began to maneuver. In February it introduced forced savings for the workers and direct subsidies for the employers, the Social Democratic party collaborating in the project. It is now preparing further reductions in the periodic wage regulation (an already insufficient "automatic" adjustment of wages linked to price rises). Unemployment is increasing in the construction industry. The next element in the bourgeois attack was to be increased duties on certain consumer goods and cutbacks in government spending. The parties in parliament were conducting round-the-clock negotiations aimed at establishing a majority to carry out these plans. But even before it became clear that the government proposals were going to be implemented, sections of the working class spontaneously went on strike and began to demonstrate, rejecting the parliamentary spectacle. It is worth noting that the strike movement started in factories dominated by the Social Democracy. The shipyards in Lindø and Odense, where the trade unions are controlled by the Social Democratic party, were the scene of the first actions on May 9. The massive strike wave broke on May 13 -- still before there had been any clarification in parliament. It was not only the traditional conflict centers like the Copenhagen shipyards and breweries that were hit by strikes. The movement spread to include groups that have generally not participated in direct action: thousands of white-collar workers, civil servants, etc. The strikes also were extended geographically, the actions nearly reaching the level of general strikes in some provincial cities. In Copenhagen, where hundreds of thousands were on strike, the movement reached high points with the demonstrations in front of the parliament building on May 13(60,000-80, 000 participants) and on May 16.
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Militancy-- and parliamentary illusions The extensive mobilization escaped the control of the Social Democratic party and the Landsorganisationen (LO -- the central trade-union federation). The pressure forced the Social Democrats to decline to take part in the governmental agreement, which resulted in the establishment of a rightwing majority in parliament. The workers mobilization demonstrated the beginning of disintegration of confidence in the bourgeois parliamentary system and an increase in the understanding of the necessity of independent struggle to achieve results. The fundamental distrust of the working class in the government was demonstrated. The political strikes raised the question, In whose interest shall the government rule, the bourgeoisie's or the proletariat's? The strike actions clearly showed the workers' determination not to pay for the crisis of capitalism. But the mobilization did not answer the question of how that desire is to be secured in reality. The strikes and demonstrations rejected in practice the usual form of class collaboration in which the Social Democratic party cooperates with the bourgeois parties in trying to administer the capitalist state. But at the same time, decades of passivity and reformist domination of the working class made themselves felt in various ways: the organizational weakness of the strike in individual factories, the lack of organized political discussion, the dominating role of slogans giving the struggle a parliamentary orientation, like Glistrup out of parliament! New elections! Resignation of the prime minister! and, occasionally, Knud to power! (Knud Jespersen is the chairman of the DKP, the Danish Communist party.) This indicated possibilities for the DKP to direct the struggle into parliamentary channels or to stop the struggle entirely. These possibilities were fully utilized. Specific events and various statements illustrated the function of the parliamentary orientation. Apart from the parliamentary activity of the Social Democratic party itself, Thomas Nielsen, the chairman of LO and a Social Democrat, claimed that the
strikes were only the reflection of "Communist hysteria. " Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF -- Socialist Peoples party, a leftwing Social Democratic party) called for a political general strike. But the SF has no trade-union apparatus for organizing a general strike, and for this reason (among others) the SF concentrated its activity in the parliamentary field. In pracfice, not all the SF's trade-union leaders supported the call for a general strike -- Holger Foss, chairman of the Copenhagen trade-union branch of the brewery workers being an The determining factor in the strike leadership was therefore the DKP and the Formandsinitiativet (Initiative of Chairmen, a CP-dominated confederation of some twenty chairmen of Copenhagen trade-union branches). The strikes had generally broken out spontaneously, but because no alternative leadership was developed through the struggle, only the DKP and the Formandsinitiativet remained as centralizing factors. This "leading" function began with the mass demonstration in Copenhagen on May 13. Speeches were made by Knud Jespersen and by a DKP trade-union chairman, as well as by some SF members. The government was condemned, the Social Democratic party was called upon not to make any agreements with the government, and new elections were called for; but there was no suggestion as to how the workers should continue the On May 16, after a parliamentary agreement had been reached, a new demonstration was held in front of the parliament building. Sentiment among the workers for a general strike was mounting. But still no general strategy was presented by the "leaders. " None of the speakers at the rally -- most of whom were members of the DKP-- had anything to say about how to develop the struggle, and they said nothing at all about a general strike. Jan Andersen, a leader of the DKP and chairman of the rally, decided that too many resolutions from factories had been received to read them aloud. He thus avoided mentioning the important words: general strike. That afternoon a meeting was arranged by the Formandsinitiativet gathering the Copenhagenti|liIdsmand (shop stewards). If this meeting had called for a general strike, it would have been a reality. The strike movement would have received renewed strength and more workers would havelbeen drawn into the movement, not only in Copenhagen but throughout the coun But the DKP wanted no general strike. So the meeting followed the usual scenario. Jørgen Jensen, chairman of a local Copenhagen branch of the Metalworkers Federation and a leading member of the DKP, opened the meeting by speaking about the unjust taxes bill proposed by the government, explaining that the workers would demand compensation from the employers. The struggle was to be continued in the individual factories around the demand for a raise of 2 kroner an hour (about US$O.45). After being interrupted several times by shouts for a general strike, Jensen declared that the "sitvation" was not ripe for such a move and that it was necessary to wait for new elections. Many shop stewards spoke, 'saying that their fellow workers were awaiting initiatives for a general strike. Even the leading shop steward at the Burmeister and Wain motor factory, who is a member of the DKP, had to read a resolution from the B and W workers calling for a general strike. The brewery workers, the dockers, the dustmen, and others also raised the call for a general strike. Jensen closed the meeting "summing up" the discussion by repeating what he had said in his opening speech: The workers must demand raises of 2 kroner an hour. In spite of vigorous protest, that was the last word. Although strikes continued for some days thereafter, a demobilization began. The government had survived the crisis.
*Through parliament The tactics followed by the DKP in the strike movement were a logical consequence of the DKP's "antimonopoly strategy." The "antimonopoly strategy" aims not at workers power but at "advanced democracy, "which is to be achieved through parliament. The DKP's intent is to win a parliamentary majority through an alliance with the Social Democratic party (and perhaps with the SF as well), based on a minimum common program calling for the extension of "democracy. " To achieve this "labor" majority the DKP finds it necessary to put pressure on the Social Democrats to abandon their policy of directly administering the capitalist system. Part of this pressure is to be brought to bear by winning leading positions in the trade-union hierarchy, an activity in which the DKP has made some progress. Another means of bringing pressure on the Social Democracy is sending an endless stream of delegations from students, factories, trade unions, and so on to the Social Democratic parliamentary group. That elections and parliamentary activity constitute the sole perspective for the DKP is amply demonstrated in the interview Jørgen Jensen gave to the May 27 issue of the bourgeois newspaper Børsen. Answering a question as to whether striking and demonstrating is unjustified when a majority in parliament supports the government, Jensen said, "If by a majority you mean what people would vote for, then we do not have a majority today. There is no doubt about that. We know it quite well. That's why we trade-union leaders were not willing to support a general strike. " If there is a bourgeois majority in parliament, the working class should not organize a general strike to defend its interests! For the DKP, the only possible path to improvements for the working class is through parliament. Demobilization -- but not demoralization The first upsurge of the struggle was derailed. The mobilization was stopped. But no real demoralization has set in. This is important, for more effective demonstrations will be necessary in the period ahead. A certain instability will persist in parliament. The main problem will be legislation concerning housing (a preliminary agreement, encompassing the Social Democratic party, has been reached) and taxes (financial cutbacks, raising the tax on consumption to 20 percent). It is uncertain whether the government will be able to establish a firm majority on these questions. The government is using the "threat" of new elections to force its proposals through. It is not unlikely that there will be new elections in the autumn, before the end of the contract negotiations between the employers and the LO. This does not mean that the new elections will produce a "labor majority" of the Social Democratic party, the DKP, and the SF. Since there is no alternative for workers who are dissatisfied with the Social Democracy, the DKP will probably increase its number of seats. But the working class parties will probably fall short of 50 percent. And the Social Democratic party is continuing its orientation toward collaborating with the bourgeois center parties in a war against the DKP in the trade-union movement. But regardless of the parliamentary developments, the working class will face vital problems that will give rise to new confrontations: 1. The wage question. In spite of the general discontent of the working class with the derailing of the May mobiliza-
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•DEMARK tions into "ordinary" wage struggles, there will be more fights on the wage front, partly for wage demands to compensate for the effects of the bourgeois agreements on living standards, partly because central negotiations for new contracts will be intensified in the autumn. 2. Unemployment. In the construction industry the unemployment rate may be as high as 20 or 30 percent. Other sectors will most likely be hit by increases in unemployment too. 3. Arbejdsretten (the Industrial Relations Court). The bosses have threatened that 40,000-70, 000 workers will be fined for "illegally" going on strike between May 9 and May 20. If they try to make good on that theat, the workers will surely respond with another massive strike wave. The general strike will be on the agenda again. But whatever the exact course of developments, it is necessary to sum up the lessons of the May strikes and examine the alternative line that was put forward during the strikes by the revolutionary Marxists. Line of the RSF The development of the strikes showed two main weaknesses. First, the lack of effective rank-and-file organization in the individual factories during the strikes. Major discussions among workers were held only in a few cases. No committees were elected to coordinate the actions. No alternative to the disorganization and bureaucratic leadership was created. Second, parlamentary illusions were a contributing factor in preventing the emergence of a centralized line for struggle. Furthermore, the lack of rank-and-file organizing helped the maneuver around the demand for 2 kroner an hour and impeded the development of widespread political discontent and a clear understanding of the perspectives of the The Revolutionære Socialisters Forbund (RSF -- Revolutionary Socialist League, Danish section of the Fourth International) put forward an alternative line to the reformist-bureaucratic orientation. The RF's line corresponded both to the objective needs of the working class and to the subjective consciousness of the more advanced layers of the working class, a line corresponding to the need for a continued struggle on a clearer political basis after the period of demobilization following the strikes. The RSF explained that limited "pressure" on the Social Democratic party has at best only a short-term effect on its parlamentary alliance with the right-wing parties and that only the total force of the working class backed up by a general strike would be able to break the governmental agreement and bring down the government. The main theme of our propaganda and agitation after the spontaneous outbreak of protest strikes was the organization of a political general strike. At the same time, we explained that it would have to be an effective, democratically organized general strike built up through rank-and-file organizing committees in the individual factories. It would have to be organized through the holding of meetings in the factories with the active participation of all the workers in the discussions and decisions. At the meetings, action committees to organize the struggle according to the decisions of the general assemblies would be elected and contacts would be made among the various factories to extend and coordinate the struggle. That would be the condition for securing sufficient unity and striking power in the struggle. 28
Such an effectively organized general strike would have been able to sweep away the bourgeois agreement and government. This would have signified the refusal of the working class as a whole to submit to the bourgeoisie's attack or to assume any responsibility for the profit-making schemes of the capitalists. It would have signified the gathering of the organized power of the working class and would have thereby improved conditions for breaking down parlamentary illusions. A victorious general strike would have decisively shifted the relationship of forces in favor of the working class and -- in contrast to two or three days of broad but uorganized strikes -- would have put the working class in a qualitatively better position for the confrontations to come. A third element of the RSF propaganda and agitation has been to stress that the struggle should not be seen solely as a fight against a particular bourgeois agreement, but should be followed up in all the factories by struggles for demands around wages and working conditions and against layoffs. We have explained that the struggle must be seen as part of the building of the organized strength of the working class in order to reject any form of incomes policy and all attacks from the employers and the government. After the initial demobilization, a series of tasks confront the workers and the revolutionary Marxists. Local struggles must be prepared. Effective rank-and-file organizing bodies must be set up in these struggles, inc luding elected action committees in the conflicts over single isses. The struggle to defend real wages must be made more effective in this way. While it is true that the demand for a 2 kroner per hour increase was put forward as a way of diverting the struggle, we must also fight on the level of wages. Larger wage demands must be raised. But other demands must be raised as well. The piece-work system, which is a means of dividing the workers in the plants and speeding up the work pace, must be opposed. Increased wages must not be accompanied
Therefore, we say: general wage increases for all workers combined with the fight for organized workers control over the wage systems and the present organization of the work place in order to effectively be able to reject all divisive wage systems, speedups, and dangerous or unsanitary working conditions. Through democratic rank-and-file organizing we must be able to take up the struggle for control of the account books and prices in order to attack the "right" of the employers to control production and in order to prepare the struggle for a sliding scale of wages to compensate fully for the inflation that is undermining real wages. Through organizing for such a struggle we will be able to prepare the negotiations for new contracts in the autumn and during the first months of 1975, to reject all incomes policies and to fight against a weakening of the threshold agreement on the initiative of the Dyrtidskommissionen (High Price Commission, a body organized to "prepare" negotiations for new contracts). Confronted with the threat of rising unemployment, we must build solidarity between workers who are immediately threatened by layoffs and those who are not. In this way we will be able to create the conditions for a struggle against the falling rate of emp loyment based on the main demands: No layoffs, No overtime work, Reduction of the work pace, Reduced workweek for all workers with no reduction in pay. (This last demand has been taken up by the building workers inside the Danish Union of Unskilled and Semiskilled WorkAgainst the threats to presecute workers in the Industrial Relations Court we must struggle to develop solidarity among
THE