Angolan conflict has obscured perception of the struggles between the MPLA and the FNLA-UNITA coalition, at least in the international press. But this is just the opposite of what ought to happen, for each group is now busy arguing, justifying, and negotiating its position. The masks are falling off. Hence, there is every opportunity to examine and nail down the analysis of factors as important as the nature of the Americon interests, African diplomacy, the reasons for the Soviet intervention, the projects of the MPLA, and so on. A new Vietnam? The frankest American argumentation, apart from Kissinger's, was presented by Daniel Moynihan, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who asserted on January 12 that "the Angolan conflict is a practically inevitable consequence of the détente. ... You must see détente as a situation in which tensions will increase, or you've missed the point altogether. The United States has taken a severe setback in Southeast Asia and has gone into what I've called a failure of nerve. If in fact we are in a condition where we won't stand up to the ideological attacks, then we're not well advised to have détente. " (Newsweek, January 19) For some time now Moynihan has been known for his forthright statements. And that was another one. Thes, it is under the heading of not suffering a "failure of nerve" that the United States has been sending arms and money to the FNLA since 1962 and voting against most of the UN resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism. It appears that Nixon decided to ease off this support around 1969, probably under the joint effects of Portuguese and South African requesh. Nevertheless, the ma"MPLA: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola -Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. FNLA: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola -National Front for the Liberation of Angola. UNITA: União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. 16 terial support shot up again after the overthrow of the Salazorist regime in Portugal on April 25, 1974. In January 1975 a meeting of the White House high-level intelligence coordinating body decided to send $300,000 to Holden. (New York Times, December 19, 1975.) In mid-July of the same year the CIA was authorized to send 510 million in matériel to the FNLA and UNITA. Since then, support has remained at a high level. During the debate that broke out in Congress in December some Senators complained essentially about the secrecy surrounding U.S. activities in Angola. But it was not only this formal aspect of things that was involved in the conflicts in Congress. Senator Hubert Humphrey, who called for a halt to the U.S. commitment without demanding reciprocity from the USSR, subtly formulated his view of the conflict. *If the Soviet Union persists (in aiding the MPLA), " he said, "it will find itself isolated. This has happened before in Africa. Angolan nafionalism will probably turn out to be a more powerful force (in Africa) than Soviet communism. Even if the USSR wins some immediate tactical advantage, it will probably be of short duration. " For Humphrey, then, the American intervention will only radicalize the struggle, while the present nationalist line of the MPLA constitutes a lost line of deferse against anticapitalist struggles. The Soviets responded to Humphrey through the TASS press agency, which on January 12 asked the United States to apply the policy of peaceful coexistence with a more "consistent spirit. " And the Moscow newspaper "United States: Economy, Politics, Ideology," estimated that "in general, Soviet-American relations are still tending to improve" in spite of existing "complex problems" and all the "unresolved questions. * In this regard, the Soviet newspaper called for rounding out the polit-
ANGOLA: THE CERNATIONAL STAKES by C. GABRIEL ical détente with a military détente and stressed that *the question of the normalization of Soviet-American economic relations remains a current one." American imperialist interests in Africa are not homogeneous. Some representatives of U.S. imperialism view their policy within the overall framework of the continent and reconcile themselves to the most diverse forms of political power here and there. For them, the United States has to preserve a certain image throughout the continent, reconciling the exigencies of their investments in South Africa with the needs of their investments in the independent states. American investors in GuineaConakry, for example, are not prepared to support the FLA and UNITA unconditionally. On the other hand, other imperialist factions bose their attitude on unconditional support to the southern bloc and the regime in Zaire. Even so, the American commitment in Angola is not the result of a deliberate and premeditated choice. Everything indicates that the Alvor accords represented a highly acceptable solution for the United States. But subsequent events tore these accords to pieces. The confrontation between the MPLA and the FNLA, had it resulted in a defeat for Holden's troops, would have left a clear field for the political and economic projects of the MPLA, with the immediate prospect of nationalizations. Thus, South Africa could not accept the American government's allowing the establishment in Angola of a regime whose first act would be to set up a state economic sector af the expense of some investors. This would have been a direct threat to South African investments in the Cunene River valley and in the Cassinga mines, for example. Apart from the question of investments, an Angola controlled by the MPLA would be a serious obstacle to the South African perspective of a Balkanization of Namibia into autonomous Bantustans and would have aided the forces struggling for immediate and total independence of the country. The expansionist South African state, taking advantage of a large degree of independence of imperialist capital, decided on a direct intervention in Angola. While this blocked the advance of the MPLA, it forced the hand of the American government, pushing Washington into unconditional alignment behind the FNLA and UNITA. Roberto Holden described this situation perfectly when he launched an appeal to the West to "save Africa from communism." "I ask the West to save itself. I am astonished to have to cry this in the desert." "Without considering the United States as the policeman of the world, I believe that it is the guardian of world liberty." And he hailed the intervention of the South Africans, who "came to fight the fire when the house of their neighbor was burning. Perhaps they do not do this out of love for their neighbor, but simply to prevent their own house from catching fire later on. The western nations should draw the conclusions. " (Newsweek, December 22, 1975.) Thus, during the conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a diplomatic trial ballon was launched around the theme of a possible withdrawal of the South African troops, the suggestion being that South Africa would be satisfied by an agreement among the three organizations. Washington put pressure on Pretoria to try to get the South Africans to make a deal with the OAU in exchange for a return of the coalition government. Such a possibility still seems to be far off, since the MPLA has reiterated its rejection of a new coalition and since there has been some conflict between the FNLA and UNITA. In Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) there have been murderous clashes between UNITA troops and FLA troops commanded by Chipenda. Incapable of infusing their troops with even a minimum of national consciousness, the general staffs of the FLA and UNITA have been reduced to cutting down their differences to the scale of tribal conflicts, of grudges and confrontations among fighting froops. American diplomacy thus remains relatively paralyzed. Since the return of a coalition is a premature perspective, the Democratic opposition is insisting that in any case the American commitment is unjustified and that the stakes involved are in no way comparable to those in Vietnam. Washington was content to make sure that the majority of the OAU conference would not vote to recognize the People's Republic of Angola proclaimed by the MPLA. African diplomacy put to the test The essential function of the Organization of African Unity is to preserve a consensus among all the African bourgeois leaderships in face of the twists and turns of continental political life and also in face of revolution-
17
ary struggles. The clause of the OAU charter stipulating noninterference in the internal affairs of each member state is the supreme hypocrisy of these leaderships, who know very well how extensively their interests are linked and how much their economies interpenetrate. The fetishization of petty-bourgeois pan-Africanist themes traditionally serves as an ideology for the big shows otherwise known as OAU assemblies. In the Angolan conflict, for the first time, the old routine of unanimous motions lost it effectiveness. Zaire is directly and publicly infervening in the conflict. The South African army has also intervened, forcing each African regime to take a stand on its "sensitivity" to the racist regime in Pretoria.
The governments most susceptible to following the lead of Soviet diplomacy, those that are committed to a line similar to that of the MPLA (Guinea-Bissau, for example); those for whom an FLA victory would represent a direct threat because of internal opposition (the Congo), very quickly recognized the People's Republic of Angola. Others, clever tacticians, became convinced that it was unrealistic to support the FNLA-UNITA bloc. Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, and Burundi may be listed among these. Thus, a total of twenty-two countries recognized the People's Republic. The draft resolution was presented by Nigeria; it was worded so as to represent a consensus among this group. The document proposed recognition of the People's Republic but also expressed its confidence in this government to "continue to bring about an atmosphere of reconciliation of all Angolans willing to work to strengthen national unity. " The opposing camp was scarcely any more homogeneous. Along with the group of "hardliners" like Zaire and the Cameroons, there were UNITA backers who are for a new coalition government (Senegal), and the most hesitant, who were content simply to call for unity. Twentytwo on each side! The abstention of Uganda preserved this delicate equilibrium. They all condemned South Africa and then referred the whole affair to the regular bodies of the OAU. The direct protagonists in the conflict all considered this OAU conference as a partial defeat. Several weeks before, the MPLA had believed that it would win recognition. Zaire had hoped for a decision that would change the situation inasmuch as the present dynamic has reFlected Tiself in o succession of defeats for the FNLA on the northern front, ever since the fall of Ambriz. But the conference decided nothing and the FNLA continues to retreat. The function of the CAU hod never been so bodly bungled. Will those elsewhere on the continent who still have illusions in African diplomacy understand the lessons? The Soviet intervention The reasons for the massive Soviet aid to the anti-imperialist fighters basically go back to a desire to break down the unconditional American support for the South African 18 intervention. The USSR decided to spectacularly bolster its aid shipments and diplomatic activities after the South African intervention and the U.S. aid to the FNLA had threatened the diplomatic balance in black Africa. Zombia is increasingly close to the South African policy, which in itself represents a significant shift in the region. An FNLA victory, which would strengthen the centrepital forces among the Bakongo ethnic group, would give a second wind to the opposition of Bakongo notables to the Ngouabi regime in the Congo. But this regime represents a not unimportant element in the Soviet posifion in central Africa. The attempts at official dialogue between black Africa and the South African racists are becoming increasingly credible because of the concrete advantages Pretoria is dangling before the neocolonial regimes. Finally, an FNLA victory would permit the constitution of a Zaire-Angola axis whose anticommunist weight would be quite formidable for the future of Soviet policy throughout Africa. For the Soviet bureaucracy. the aim is to preserve is diplomatic clientel, among which must be placed the Congo, Somalia, Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, and now Guinea-Bissau, Nevertheless, it is out of the question to equate the Soviet intervention with the American intervention. Whatever the diplomatic reasons for the Soviet military aid to the MPLA, we must consider this aid positive and reject the bypocritical attitude of those who call for "noninterference by the great powers. " The consequences of this aid on the political course of the MPLA remain to be measured. In any case, the MPLA needed no Soviet pressure to oppose any overly impetuous development of the mass movement. Apart from that, the consequences will probably be as follows: a) a greater credibility for the MPLA's state capitalist projects, which will be backed up by Soviet economic support; b) a development of Stalinist currents within the MPLA, without this necessarily giving rise to o Stalinist faction with a political program of its own to counterpose to the rest of the MPLA leadership. The conjunction of these two elements has already produced an astonishing mixture in the Luanda press: nafionalist declarations, declarations on "the Paris Commune by Marx, " and statements on "Marxism-Leninism. " And the Cuban intervention? Is it purely a matter of the Cubans in Angola serving as cannon fodder for Soviet policy? We do not think so. The Cubars have a tradifional presence within the ranks of the liberation movements, especially the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, Moreover, it seems that Cuba strongly fears a Brazilian penetration of this part of Africa. Further, and this is an extremely important factor, the Cuban leadership, speaking through Vice-Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, has affirmed that it would continue to extend military aid to the MPLA regardless of the decision of the OAU: "We will not take heed of any appeal by the OAU." This breaks clearly with the OAU diplomatic game, which is at the center of the Soviet motives.
Finally, what about China? It seems that the Chinese instructors have left the ranks of the FLA. Nevertheless, Chinese policy has preserved its tone. Let us recall that the two regimes in the region toward which Peking has been directing its charm and whose presidents have been invited to China during the past few years are Zaire and the Cameroons. These two countries were in the leadership of the anti-MPLA camp during the OAU conference, and everything suggests that Chinese diplomacy will maintain its links with these regimes. Hence, Maoist policy in Angola will preserve its cautious attitude toward and even complicity with the UNITA-FLA camp. The Angolan far left The petty-bourgeois nationalist character of the MPLA leadership stands in direct opposition to an anticapitalist development of the mass movement and real forms of self-organization. The events of the past several months confirm this analysis. While the MPLA had waged the national liberation struggle essentially in the rural areas, after April 25, 1974, the urban milieu nurtured anticapitalist currents that emerged from the student youth, over whom the MPLA had no direct control. Thus, groups emerged like the Amilcar Cabral Committees (CAC), which were linked to the Portuguese UDP (União Democrática Popular - Popular Democratic Union, Maoist), as well as some forces upholding a revolutionary Marxist orientation, such as the distributors of the newspaper Revolução Socialisto. The CAC, which held a generally majority position within this far left, were able to play a decisive role in pressuring the MPLA for a whole period, particularly on the question of the neighborhood committees and their coordination and on the question of the self-defense militias. The militants of the CAC penetrated rather for into the ranks of the MPLA, taking on positions in military training and posts of responsibility. The MPLA leadership made a de facto accommodation with these currents so as not to frontally oppose a sector of the masses that was developing a spontaneous movement during the year
1975.
When the civil war began to take a different course and it became necessary to prepare for a genuine protracted war, it became that much easier for the MPLA leadership to control the neighborhood committees and isolate the for left. The first objective was to break the weight of the CAC in the neighborhood committees. For example, Nito Alves declared that after "the FNLA and
UNITA, the struggle will have to be waged against the ultraleftists. " The radio broadcast speeches against "partisans of Trotsky and Bakunin" and the Macist newspaper
Poder Popular was banned. Isolated and weakened, the far left was open to a death blow. In October the neighborhood committee of São Paulo was occupied by the
FAPLA (the military forces of the MPLA) and nine committee members were arrested, along with eleven militants of other neighborhood committees. A wave of intimidation spread. In November these militants were released; some were deported to Portugal. The CAC were very much weakened and the MPLA leadership was easily able to bring the structures of "popular power" under control. Clearly, attempting to lend these forms of self-organization an anticapitalist content provided an opportunity to wage a battle against the MPLA leadership. This batthe was lost by the far left during a conjuncture of the war for which these currents offered only insufficient responses. The CAC developed opportunist and entrist conceptions in regard to the leadership of the MPLA, while others made mistakes in the abstract character of their propaganda. This far left, which generally emerged from the Portuguese far left, was politically and organizationally insufficient. It was Maoist in its majority and hence suffered the effects of the miserable Chinese policy in Angola. Faced with the mass movement, these Maoist currents broke empirically with the tradifional "popular national democratic revolution, "but without presenting any clear alternative strategy. They were up against the prestige of a leadership that had come out of the armed struggle and they overestimated their real base among the masses, The fact that the repression against them did not bring the MPLA into conflict with the masses is proof of the mass movement's increasing reliance on the MPLA. Nevertheless, this must in no way diminish our solidarity with these militants, especially those who oriented their work toward a socialist transformation of the Angolan revolution. Some of these militants, such as Salvador Catão and José Ingumba, members of the Revolução Socialista group killed in Nova Lisboa, died fighting the FNLA and UNITA, giving sterling proof of their anti-imperialist courage. The political battle of these militants is still not over. The December 20 issue of the MPLA newspaper Vitória & Certa had a headline reading "The Struggle Against the Rightists and Ultraleftists"
and the editorial was devoted to the struggle against ultraleftism. This shows that the "normalization" of Luanda is not at all settled.
A fight must be waged around the themes of freedom of expression and the right of organization for all anti-imperialists. The broadest democracy must be demanded for those who are fighting reaction. The MPLA representatives who are traveling around the world and speaking at support meetings organized by the international far left must be confronted with questions about the repression. If the South African aid to the FNLA and UNITA must serve as a lesson to the "neutralists" who see the current struggle purely as a fight among counterposed petty-bourgeois leaderships, the repression against the far left must serve as a lesson to the most varied centrist groups who have so far refused to make the slightest criticism of the MPLA.
January 13, 1976
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The last American GI was driven out of Vietnam by the Forces of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) on April 30, 1975. Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City. Just six months later, this city was the scene of the "consultative political conference" that was to decide on the final steps toward reunification of the country. Twenty years after the date set in the Geneva accords of 1954, elections will be held to choose a single national assembly. Liberation and revolution The holding of the consultative conference, November 15-21, 1975, also provided an occasion to confirm some of the essential features of the Vietnamese revolution. The main report was delivered by Truong Chinh, a member of the Political Bureau of the Workers party of Vietnam (the Communist party) and chief of the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The report was dominated by two themes: the necessity to achieve reunification rapidly and the commitment of the entire country to the socialist road. Truong Chinh delivered a genuinely programmatic speech that solemnly took up the leitmotiv of the statements of the leaders of the Workers party: the link between national