Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

France: The PCF and the Crisis of Capitalism

· Inprecor no. 42, 22 January 1976 · pp 27-31 · 3,198 words

France Middle East

crisis of capitalism. Nevertheless, beginning with the years after 1965, it appeared so clearly that the twenty years of relative prosperity that had been enjoyed by the developed copitalist countries were going to be followed by exacerbated and lasting difficulties and contradictions that the

БУБ PCF had to begin speaking of the crisis of state monopoly capitalism. 4. From the moment that the crisis is defined as a crisis of capitalism, one could expect that the solution envisaged for ending the crisis would be to raise the perspecfive of the destruction of the capitalist system and the bourgeois state. Not at all! In fact, after making the affirmation -purely verbal, as we shall see — of the link between the crisis and the capitalist system itself, the PCF effects two "slides" that will fake it a long way:

- As far os ending the crisis is concerned, the PCF is content to propose not the destruction of the capitalist system and the bourgeois state, but instead the elimination of the major monopolies (through nationalization) and a change in the government;

- Or, in the absence of any immediate electoral target dates, the PCF is content to try to influence the policy of the existing government in order to begin to end the crisis! In this article, we will concentrate on analyzing these two "slides. Nationalize the monopolies and change the government 1. The analysis presented by the PCF consists of explaining that the crisis is jointly due:

- To the policy of the monopolies, which is isolated from the overall functioning of the capitalist system and is viewed as o simple and removable wart marring the face of the capitalist system rather than as an inevitable product of the development of the system. he service overhe monopies but which, ben placed in y, which has been placed i ent goverment (a "left" government), even with the same state ("democratized" but not destroyed as a bourgeois state), could be placed in the service of the workers. If should be noted that this manner of separating the monopolies from the functioning of the capitalist system as a whole is at the heart of many of the "counter-truths" served up by the PCF. This is the case, for example, with its refusal to consider the social character of copiralist exploitation, which leads if to speak of "indirect monopolist exploitation" in regard to the exploitation of workers by the owners of small and middle-sized enterprises. The aim of this is to mask this exploitation and present these owners essentially as "victims" of monopoly plunder, just like the workers. To what lengths they go in justifying the alliance with the "antimonopolist layers"! If the crisis is jointly due to the monopolies as such and to the government, then to end the crisis it is sufficient:

- To nationalize the major monopolies (this is the well-known "minimum threshold");

- To change the government and "democratize" the state. This is the model of "advanced democracy, " or whi would result from the application of the Common Program of the left (the program of the bloc of the PCF and the Socialist party); it would, according to the PCF, establish a society in transition to socialism. 28

This society would be characterized by:

- A state that would not yet be a workers state but would no longer be a capitalist state; in short, a halfway house between the two;

- The end of the rule of capital. In fact, the public sector would be a socialist sector immune to the laws of capitalist valorization; in addition, this public sec -for would envelop and even dominate the private sector, which would consequently no longer be subjected solely to "the logic of profit" but also to the "logic of needs." In any event, it is the "logic of needs" that would be dominant in society as a whole. And that is precisely why the crisis would end. 2. Unfortunately, the truth is otherwise. "Advanced democracy, "or even the complete application of the Common Progrom, would leave the essential levers of political and economic command in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

1) The bourgeois state would be maintained. In fact, revolutionary Marxists know:

- that the state is not neutral, that the bourgeois state apparatus is organically linked to the bourgeoisie, that it represents the "concentrated and organized 10cial violence of a class" (Marx), and that the bourgeois state cannot be placed in the service of the working class;

- that there can be no state whose class character is ill-defined. The transition to socialism begins only after the destrucfion of the bourgeois state and the establishment of a workers state. It is here - and not in a so-called gradual transformation of the bourgeois state into a workers state - that the transition really takes place. So long as the bourgeois state is not destroyed, the bourgeoisie conserves its power.

2) The reign of capital would also be maintained. First of all, as far as the public sector is concerned, let us note two important points:

- Given the maintenance of the bourgeois state and the existence of a very large private sector, including a monopoly sector, there is no reason to believe that the public sector would be a socialist sector. Only the destruction of the bourgeois state, the establishment of a workers state, and the initiation of central planning within that context would create the conditions for the destruction of capital. In the framework of "advanced democracy, " the public sector would remain subject to the law of value and the workers of the nationalized enterprises would remain subject fo capitalist exploitation. In short, in the context of the maintenance of the capitalist state, nationalizations would not at all eliminate capitalist relations of production. Under these conditions, to extol the "efficiency" of the nationalized enterprises would purely and simply amount to hailing the development of public capital, that is, the exploitation of the workers. It is true that the PCF is accustomed to doing this, even n the context of present society (whose capitalist na ure the PCF cannot deny), for the Communist party hails the merits of efficiency and productivity of Renault (which "runs faster than Citröen"), of the state electrical company, of the nationalized railroads, etc.; that is, it hails the accumulation of capital, which is

itself the bearer of relations of exploitation!!

- So long as the bourgeoisie conserves its levers of command: - Either the bourgeoisie can oppose the extension of nationalizations, or, if it is compelled to accept them under the pressure of struggles, it still has means by which to roll them back (denationalizations) as long as these struggles do not destroy the bourgeois state and thus fall into an ebb sooner or later. The example of Portugal, where some 60% of industry has been nationalized that is, much more than is envisaged under "advanced democracy"), shows that so long as the bourgeoisie conserves its power and so long as the bourgeois state has not been destroyed and replaced by a workers state, a march to the rear remains possible, Isn't this asserted by the Portuguese CP itself? - or else the bourgeoisie accepts the nationalizations, but still has ways to use them to promote its own class interests. This is the way the nationalizations were used to reconstruct capitalism in France in 1945-47 (even though in a certain sense the nationalizations were products of workers struggles). This utilization consists bath of taking a series of measures favoring accumulation by monopolies and of developing the valorization of public capital itself. Further, as far as the private sector is concerned, two additional remarks may be made:

La) The application of the Common Program, even its total application, would leave a private sector that would still represent 86% of production, 87% of the working population, and 55% of investments. Within the private sector itself, many important monopolies would continue to exist: Michelin, Hachette, Shell France, Peugeot, etc. In short, neither the capitalist economy nor big capital itself would disappear. In this regard, one may note many turns made by the PCF, turns that must surely make the party's rank-and-file militants a bit seasick. In the program of the PCF, for example, twenty-five nationalizations are called for. Then, in the Common Program, the "minimum threshold" in the industrial sector was reduced to nine nationalizations and four cases of state "participation"; an ambiguous formulation envisages a possible extension of nationalizations beyond this "minimum threshold." Later, during the presidential election campaign, François Mitterrand, the candidate of the united left, explained that there was no question of going beyond the nine nationalizations (which were even reduced to eight under the pretext that in the meantime one group had been taken over by a German group) and four cases of "participation," He also declared that even these nine (or eight) nationalizations would not be enacted immediately, in any case not before they were approved by parliament. But parliament had a majority opposed to the nationalizations; hence, new elections might be necessary, and it was not certain that even then there would be a parliament favorable to nationalizations. In other words, a lot of water could run under the bridge before the nine nationalizations were enacted. At the time, the PCF stood for all this with a straight face and even approved it. In addition, during the weeks following the elections, the PCF tried to find theoretical pseudojustifications to explain that the criteria that had been used in Timiting the nationalizations to nine were serious and scientific. The degree of interpenetration of capital was notably mentioned! Then came the polemic with the Socialist party. This time the PCF upped the ante on its demands for nationalizations. Where the PCF previously had explained that the minimum threshold was not a "door ajar, " it now claimed that it was not a "fixed catalogue. " Where it had previously explained that the limitation of nine nationalizations was the result of "scientific" criteria, it now explained that in fact it was the fruit of a compromise with the SP, which advocates class collaboration! We await the next tum!

Mb) The existence of the bourgeois state, of a public sector still subject to the lows of capitalist valorization, and of a large private sector (monopolist in part) renders absurd the idea that the "logic of needs" would be dominant and would even hold sway in the private sector itself. The nationalizations of banks (in any case reduced to two by Mitterrand during the election campaign) would change nothing here: The bourgeoisie would still have means of using the banks to support its own interests. 3. It follows from our remarks that "advanced democracy" (or the application of the Common Program), would not be able to solve the crisis, which is precisely a crisis of capitalism, so long as the existence of the bourgeois state and the reign of capital are maintained. Unless one believes that there can be capitalism without crisis. In any case, that would be the logical consequence of the PC's erroneous "theory" of overaccumulation-devalorization, a theory that leads to the idea that the Common Program, by permitting the extension of nationalizations, would permit the increase of what the PCF (falsely) calls the devalorization of public capital and would thereby provide a lasting cure for overaccumulation. The idea that the Common Program is a program for the transition to socialism cannot be accepted any more than the vision of a capitalism without crisis can be accepted. To claim to attack the "logic of profit" and to arrive at socialism while leaving the capitalist system and the bourgeois state intact is, let us say as a first approximation, contradictory. The contradiction can be resolved in one of two ways:

- Either through a violent and unprepared confrontation with the bourgeoisie, if the Stalinist and Social

Democratic leaderships do not succeed in stifling the workers struggles and their advance;

- Or else through a successful preventive capitulation on the part of these leaders, who would then get the workers to accept the elimination of their demands in whole or in part, It was this policy that came through in a striking manner during the presidential election campaign: The PCF explained that with a left government it would be necessary to be able to moderate demands (for example, to accept a minimum wage of 1,200 francs a month - about USS300 - even though just before the death of Pompidou, Georges Seguy and Edmund Maire (leaders of the CGT and CFDT, the two largest trade-union federations) had told the workers that it

was impossible to live decently on less than 1,500 francs a month) and that it would also be necessary to emphosize the increase in production and productivity (and therefore of exploitation). The electoral defeat and the absence of new immediate electoral target dates allowed the PCF to raise its tone on demands somewhat. But, under the pretext that political conditions were not yet ripe for the application of the Common Program (which means that getting rid of the Giscard-Chiroe government could not be placed on the agenda before the elections of 1978), the perspectives for ending the crisis had to be changed. Whereas previously it had been a question of changing the government, now it would only be a question of putting some pressure on Giscard and Chirac to make them adopt a different policy. A new "slide" and an important one. For it was to give rise to the illusion that if is possible to begin to end the crisis even with the present government. Influence the policy of the present government In examining the proposals for beginning to end the crisis made by the PCF in September 1974 (speech of Georges Marchais in Albertville) or in August 1975 (press conference of Marchais), two remarks must be made.

1) As we have seen, it is asserted that the crisis is due to the capitalist system, but the illusion is propagated that Giscard and Chirac could begin to end the crisis provided "effective " solutions were forced on them. 3 Well, what are these solutions? In reality, the proposals advanced by the PCF are a mixture of objectives of struggle around questions of buying power and employment and proposals, illusory in part, for a different management of the capitalist system. For example, the PCF proposes to develop a certain number of branches of production (in the public and private sectors) and asks the government to take measures in this direction. What does this amount to if not a policy that is content to demand a different allocation of capital instead of setting the perspective of the elimination of capital? Thus, the PCF constantly insists on the fact that wage increases allegedly not only correspond to the interests of the workers (which is obvious), but also would permit the beginning of the end of the crisis, thanks to a priming of the economy (the capitalist economy, in case the PCF has forgotten through consumption. In regard to this reasoning, one may say:

La) That it is scandalous, because to hail the possible establishment of better conditions for the development of the accumulation of capital, to hail for example, the increases in productivity that followed the wage increases won in May 1968 (as the PCF did), is to hail the development of the exploitation of the workers!

Mb) That it is false. In fact, wage increases mean an attack on profit. Hence, they can be beneficial for 30 the functioning of the capitalist system only if o certain number of preconditions are fulfilled. Notably, the bourgeoisie must be able to take back with one hand (through speedup, price increases, tax increases, etc.) what it has given away with the other hand. Indeed, that is what happened after May 1968, when previously unutilized production capacities were set to work again. Obviously, it is an absolute necessity to fight for wage increases. But it is a profound error to suggest that economic activity can emerge from the crisis through wage Increases (and that unemployment will thus decline). Moreover, isn't the PCF caught in a sharp contradiction when it affirms that the crisis is a crisis of overaccumulation - that is, that it is due to the fall of the rate of profit - but also claims that what is needed to end the crisis is an increase in wages, which amounts to an attack on profit?

Gc) That the PCF has never really believed in its own reasoning. Its insistence on declaring that if does not want to attack the great "economic equilibriums" (that is, in the final analysis, profits); its moderate declarations on wages during the presidential campaign: its refusal to advance the perspective of a generalization of struggles even when the situation permitted such a generalization (during the postal strikes of autumn 1974, for example); its manner of making the opening of negotiations an objective in itself - all this shows that the PCF is not unaware that the crisis of capitalism cannot be ended through simple wage increases extracted from the bourgeoisie. It is true that the PCF always adds that in order to consolidate wage increases and assure their "beneficial" effects on the development of economic activity if would be necessary to win some nationalizations from Giscard (banks, Citröen, steel, etc.). This amounts to a new illusion, which consists of suggesting that even without changing the government it would be possible to impose a new "logic of development, " as the PCF

2) In fact, what clearly appears in the proposals of the PCF is an attitude of total capitulation. In reproaching the SP for proposing a government program when, according to the PCF, such a proposal is not on the agenda and in attacking the SP for not pressing for the demands of the workers and not waging struggles to win these demands, the PCF is simultaneously:

- seeking to spread illusions about its own will to do everything possible to foster the development of struggles, a will that is belied notably by the PCP's systematic refusal to unify and centralize struggles;

- openly exposing its determination not to challenge the existence of the Giscard-Chirac regime. Its polemic with the SP and its verbal "leftism" are only feeble facades for a policy that is no less class collaborationist than the SP's, for its refusal to work for the unity and independence of the working class, and for its refusal to pose right now the problem of bringing down the Giscard-Chirac regime through the development of struggles. November 1975

DECLARATION OF THREE

ANTI-ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS

When the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism, the Zionist authorities in Israel and their spokesmen in the imperialist world protested. They hurried to utilize their old mystifying weapon, which consists of identifying anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism. It is an old maneuver aimed at keeping the Jews in Israel united around the leadership of Zionist adventurers, united in support of the worst crimes against the Arab people of Palestine. Doing this requires maintaining the besiegedghetto atmosphere in

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