Portugal: Theses on the Portuguese Revolution — Adopted by the February 1976 Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International

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THESES ON THE

PORTUGUESE

REVOLUTION

November 25, 1975, opened a new stage in the "revolutionary process" in Portugal. For broad sectors of workers, it is more evident that any new progress of the Portuguese revolution now depends on the capacity of the working class to increase its degree of self-organization and to take a step forward in the extension and centralization of the workers commissions and in the generalization of workers control in order to push through working-class solutions in the economic and polifical realms, independent of the relations among the various factions of the armyThe defeat of the officers of the so-called "military left" and of a part of the vanguard of soldiers, in spite of its demoralizing effects on a layer of workers, cannot be considered a defeat of the toiling masses. An important recomposition is going on in the workers movement. The "revolutionary process" is going through a limited retreat, but the working class has not suffered a setback in a frontal and open battle against the employers and their state. After attaining the highest peak of mobilization during the preceding weeks, the working class has not lost its capacity to resist the attacks of the bourgeois state, nor has it lost its potential of combativity. The factors that have determined the outlines of the Portuguese revolution since December 1974 have not disappeared, even though the dialectical relationships among these Factors have changed; these factors are radically revealing the limits of the semi-sporjaneous and semi-conscious movement of the masses that was dominant during this first phase. Confronted by a profound social and economic crisis, the Portuguese working class remains in position to recover its strength, to reorganize its ranks after an inevitable pause, and to relaunch its attacks against the capitalist system. But the bourgeoisie, with the aid of imperialism, now commands increased political, economic, and repressive means with which to attempt to drive back the revolutionary process and then drown it in blood. 16

Thus, tests of strength are inherent in the dynamic of the present situation. Revolutionary Marxists must prepare both themselves and the toiling masses for these tests of strength. The experience of November 25 must serve as an aid to the working class in concentrating its forces and organizing the preparation for these decisive After December 1974, and more radically since March 1975, the revolutionary rise has increasingly taken on the features characteristic of all revolutions in the imperialist countries. The main outlines of this revolutionary rise were shaped by the combination of four factors whose reciprocal relations and respective weight were modified by November 25, but which will once again exert their effects during the next stage of the Portuguese revolution.

The proliferation of wildcat strikes during the period following April 25, 1974, the purge actions (saneamentos) in response to economic sabotage, and the initiatives of "popular vigilance" (September 1974 and March 1975) reflected the emergence of a broad workers vanguard prepared to act independently of the Stalinist and Social Democratic reformist apparatuses. The ranks of this vanguard were made up of a unification of seasoned cadres of the working class and a new generation of workers who joined the ranks of the proletariat during the yours of decline and crisis of the Salazarist regime. The openly antistrike policy of the Portuguese CP during the first few months after April 25, 1974, and the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the CP's cadres made it easier for this broad vanguard to play an important role in the strategic factories of the Lisbon industrial region and, although less massively, in the Porto region as well. This vanguard was to absorb, at a higher

INTERNATIONAL EXECUTME

FOURTE INTERNATIONAT

RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE level and in a more generalized manner, the gains of the latest phase of workers struggles in capitalist Europe - workers commissions, experiments in workers control, linkup with the soldiers, and so on. This vanguard initiated a process that was to expand and spread with the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975. 2 relatively limited size, is divisions, and is politi- The impact of this workers vanguard - in spite of its cal confusion - must be seen in relation to the objective dynamic of workers struggles determined by the very weakness of Portuguese imperialism, by the deep structural crisis of entire sectors of industry, sharpened by the international copitalist recession. The upsurge of the movement for workers demands, initially centered around demands for wage increases and reductions in hours, led to a sharp attack on the rate of profit of a capitalism whose development had been based on low wages and very long hours and whose production was oriented toward exports. The resulting imbalances, strongly accentuated by deliberate economic sabotage, placed initiatives of factory occupations, workers control, and demands for nationalization on the agenda. With layoffs and unemployment on the rise since the beginning of 1975, the cumulative process of strikesoccupations-workers control went beyond the limits of the largest factories of the Lisbon region and extended to branches in which small and middle-sized companies predominated, the sector of distribution as well as the banks and insurance companies. The conjunction between this effervescence of struggles and the mobilization of March 1975 led to a wave of nationalizations that in furn stimulated the emergence of more advanced demands and bolstered the weight of the workers vanguard. The interaction between the advance of the revolufionary process" and the structural and conjunctural crisis of the Portuguese economy produced a situation in which normal capitalist functioning became impossible, while the dominant features of the market economy were not eliminated. It is here that the overall demands put forward by the advanced wing of the Portuguese proletariat - reconversion of the production of entire branches, socialist planning, generalized workers control - have their roots. In addition, this situation impelled many workers commissions (for example, Setnave, Lisnave, Sacor) to initiate discussions on the nature of the socialist economy, the function of workers control, and the possibility and necessity of a centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power.

The rapid succession of political events, cabinet crises, and more or less violent clashes among the fundamental political forces and social classes propelled the mass movement onto the political scene and assured its growing politicization, even though the effects of forty-eight years of rule by a corporatist regime and the lack of any experiences in national mobilization were not rapidly dissipated. The sharpness of the economic and social crisis and the very nature of the successive political difficulties (debate over the Intersindical), the República affair, the various MFA documents, the role of the organs of "popular power" when the SP and PPD left the government, etc.) resulted in the process of politicization beginning to become rooted in the organs that the workers themselves created in the course of their struggle: workers commissions, moradores (tenants) commissions, peasant leagues, During the demonstrations of August 20 and November 16, 1975, this phenomenon came to the fore with undeniable clarity; its repercussions within the CP in large part account for the maneuvering of the CP leadership. This phenomenon constitutes one of the elements that could facilitate the transformation of these instruments into effective structures of dual power. Under the impact of these forces, the pace of development of workers struggles was very rapid. Now, for the

PORTUGAL First time in four decades, the working class was able to come forward as a class and constitute an independent workers movement. The dialectic that developed among the structure of the working class, its history, and the sudden effervescence of struggles - occurring in a context in which the old regime's apparatus of social control was crumbling without being replaced -was expressed in a very deep uneven development of class consciousness, a combined process of construction of traditional organs of the workers movement (unions and parties) and of instruments of the workers themselves (workers commissions, moradores commissions), a fluidity of political influences among the toiling masses. An erroneous comprehension of these dominant features of the revolutionary upsurge leads to two errors. The First consists of overlooking the decisive importance of this workers vanguard (strongly rooted in the strategic factories), the modification in the relationship of forces between the Stalinist and Social Democratic reformist apparatuses and this workers vanguard and the consequent possibilities of initiatives, and the growing and increasingly decisive role of the organs of proletarian democracy. The second consists of big underestimation of the still broadly majority influence of the reformist apparatuses within the working class, of the necessity of winning the majority of the working class, of the importance of a correct united-front policy toward the reformist organizations, of the necessity of a systematic political battle around these themes within the broad vanguard itself and the far left, and of the capacity for maneuver and cooptation still commanded by the reFormist parties, a capacity that is increased by the political confusion of this vanguard and the weakness of the revolutionary Marxist organization.

The interaction between the dynamic of workers struggles and the crisis of the army - a product of the army's function of dominating political and social life, which accorded it its role in April 25, and the weakness of the structures of political domination commanded by the bourgeoisie - facilitated the penetration into the ranks of the soldiers of the process of self-organization that was being consolidated within the working class. The two attempted coups (September 1974 and March 1975) introduced an initial element of breakup of the hierarchical relations between soldiers and officers. Military discipline began to be challenged. In the eyes of the soldiers, acceptance or rejection of an order was justified according to the political options of the commanders. Little by little, political debate came to coexist with the system of military authority. The splits in the hierarchy and the confrontations that occurred within the MFA under the effects of social polarization stimulated centrifugal tendencies. In the Lisbon military region, the integration bodies set up by the MFA beginning in October 1974, especially the Assemblies of Unit Delegates, were able to fulfill their functions 18 only partially, because of the radicalization of the rank-and-file soldiers. Thus, for the soldiers, the way was open for the search for their own channels of expression both for their material demands and for the determination of their political options in face of the choices mode by the hierarchy. After September 1975, the independent movement of soldiers became a new and decisive element in the deep crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus. The relative disintegration and paralysis of the army in turn allowed the mass movement to take many initiafives without clashing with any formidable and effective repressive apparatus. The available space for the proliferation of extremely advanced experiences (factory occupations, land occupations, initial experiments in the creation of self-defense organs, utilization of the radio by the organization of wounded war veterans (ADFA), siege of the Ministry of Labor by the metalworkers, encirclement of So Bento by the construction workers) was broadened by this decomposition of the instruments of repression. But, concurrently, there was a consequent illusion about the degree of paralysis of this army and about the capacities of military initiative still commanded by the hierarchy. Consequently, the objective elements that would have compelled maximum development of self-defense were weakened. Finally, this crisis favored the grip of the orientation of the reformists and centrists who falsely locate the center of gravity of the "revolutionary process" in the army itself, thus sacrificing the independence and autonomy of the movement of the toiling masses. IL. the revolutionary upsurge that was expressed in the In July-August 1975, in face of the deepening of strengthening of the workers commissions, the moradores commissions, etc., in the deep shaking of an army that was being transformed into a political battle ground, and in the acute crisis of bourgeois political leadership, the bourgeois camp devoted itself essentially to the restoration of a coherent instrument of political authority and of a repressive apparatus with some degree of effectiveness. The growing polarization of social forces brought the crisis of the MFA to a head. Under the hammer blows of the workers, the MFA could no longer fully carry out its Bonapartist function; its unity was openly broken, and it was therefore incapable of initiating a policy of repression. Then, the majority of the officers of the

MEA got together and launched an offensive leading to a recomposition of forces within the military hierarchy in order to permit the creation of a repressive striking force and in order to stabilize the institutions of the bourgeois state.

The ruling class did not command a state apparatus and polifical structures capable of breaking the revolutionary upsurge; simultaneously, however, the level of selforganization and mass consciousness was still by far insufficient for a qualitative leap in the "revolutionary process. " Hence, the primary objective of the bourgeoisie became an offensive to reconstitute the bourgeois order through the legal and parliamentary road. The campaign launched by the Soares leadership of the SP fit in perfectly with this project of reasserting the authority of the Constituent Assembly and the institutions of the bourgeois state against the workers commissions, moradores commissions, etc., all of which, as the SP itself put it, constituted a "parallel power" to the bourgeois state apparatus. On the field of struggle against "anarcho-populism," the PPD dogged the steps of the SP, as did the "group of nine." The division of the working class, provoked by the SP leadership and fed by the orientation and methods of the Stalinist leadership of the CP, impeded a new leap forward of the revolution. It facilitated the open reemergence of the right and the far right, without any determined response by the working class. The attacks on the headquarters of the CP, the Intersindical, and the far left, combined with the organization of terrorist initiatives by the far right, showed what the dynamic of this inversion of the "revolutionary process, " an inversion initiated by the leadership of the SP, would have led to if it had continued and succeeded. At first, the great maneuvers of Costa Gomes, Soares, and the group of nine seemed to be making gains. A process of recomposition of forces was going on in the bourgeois camp. Militarily, the appeals for discipline were getting a favorable response within a hierarchy that was regaining its self-confidence and was seeking to bolster its positions from the bases it commanded in the North. The petty bourgeoisie, more particularly the smallholding peasantry of the North, offered a social fulcrum for the defenders of "order" against "anarchy." Indeed, this peasantry, which hod been promised wondrous miracles by the MFA "dynamization" campaigns, was hard hit by the economic crisis and by the government's inability to respond to their most immediate problems (prices of fertilizers, seed prices, credits, purchase prices of products in comparison to sales prices, etc.). In addition, the overlapping links between the smallholding peasantry and the working class in the North created favorable ground for expanding the audience for the themes being developed by the SP leadership among politically backward layers of workers integrated into branches of industry in profound crisis. This was one of the most negative features of the serious political division of the proletariat, for the uneven development of class consciousness took the form of a division between the various regions of the country.

At the moment when the bourgeois counteroffensive seemed to be achieving an initial success with the resignation of the fifth government and the establishment of the Pinheiro de Azevedo government, a new upsurge developed in the proletarian camp, an upsurge which combined the affirmation of the broad workers vanguard on the political scene, the development of the autonomous movement of soldiers independent of any reference to the MFA and even against the MFA, and the initiation of a wave of demands by entire sectors of the working class (metals, construction, textiles, agricultural workers). In this context, the crisis of the Fifth government of Vasco Gonçalves, which advocated a program combining reforms and austerity measures, must not be analyzed solely as a function of the offensive of the bourgeoisie toward the restoration of the authority of the institutions of the bourgeois state, but also in relation to the instinctive push of significant sectors of the mass movement toward workers democracy, toward the strengthening of the workers commissions and moradores commissions, and of soldiers toward soldiers commissions. The conjunction of these various movements illuminated the fundamental relationship of social forces that had previously been obscured by the division within the workers movement, the sudden shakeups in the government, and the realignment of forces in the military hierarchy. The period that opened in August 1975 was thus characterized by the highest level of confluence of the factors molding the dynamic of the Portuguese revolution: a) The autonomous movement of soldiers broke out in the North, stimulated by the initiatives of the SUV, a united vanguard grouping struggling for the emergence of soldiers commissions and their linkup with the workers and moradores commissions. The SUV conjuncturally played a unifying role within the working class to some extent and facilitated a new upsurge of mobilizations. In Lisbon in September it also functioned as a mediating force between the workers vanguard and broader ranks of the class. But most important, it disintegrated the keystone of the project of all those represented by Pinheiro de Azevedo: an army capable of making sure that the decisions of the government of "order and discipline" would be carried out. It even defeated the attempt to reconstitute a military striking force: the AMI (Military Intervention Group). b) The instinctive push of the masses toward the creation of organs of proletarian democracy was strengthened. Coordinating bodies of workers commissions at branch levels arose in some cases. Regionally, the first steps were taken toward the formation of inter-commissions of moradores and Popular Assemblies. Of course, because of the lack of existence of a revolutionary party, the lack of tradition of the workers movement, and the social and political heterogeneity of the working class, this movement was very uneven. The degree of representativeness of the moradores commissions and the tasks they assumed were uneven (this was even true of the workers commissions).

PORTUGAL The divisions within the workers movement were reproduced within these bodies and often led to a multiplication of moradores commissions in the neighborhoods, thus transforming these commissions into simple appendages of political organizations, integrating them into sectarian maneuvers and thus placing a question mark over their capacity to become centralized and carry out genuine initiatives of "social control." The development of the moradores commissions reached its limits rather rapidly. After drawing their spirit from housing occupations, the moradores commissions proved incapable of providing solutions to other social problems: transport, health, supplies, structural crisis of housing. A qualitatively higher level of centralization would have been necessary to begin to resolve such questions. Here, the semi-spontaneous mass movement was exhousted. Only a policy of the broadest unity in action could have enabled the first steps toward centralization to be taken, the sectarianism of the centrist and reformist organizations made this impossible. But in the more specific realm of the workers commissions, the basic trend was toward a growing homogenization, toward an increase in the degree to which they represented the workers, and an expansion of their functions. In fact, the workers commissions were much more able to provide partial solutions, even at the branch level, and the framework in which they developed limited the effects of political division and mode their initial centralization easier (CUF, textiles, etc.). d) The upturn of the movement for workers demands was intermeshed with these two processes. First, the conjunction between the level of self-organization and the depth of the economic crisis strengthened the strategic position of the workers commissions in the process of working out and concretizing the demands for reconversion and socialist planning and the initiatives of workers control. Second, more radical demands were raised and more radical forms of action were taken by the more backward sections of the working class. Finally, for the first time, the movement for demands clashed frontally with the government and assimilated this new dimension. The paralysis of the sixth government in face of these mobilizations indicated the depth of the crisis in the army and the consequent impossibility of using the army for a direct attack on the mass movement. The "capture" of São Bento Palace and the "strike" of the Pinheiro government symbolized the depth of the crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus and the political leadership of the bourgeoisie. The dominant features of the general situation were then as follows: The disintegration of the state apparatus attained a very high level under the blows dealt by the autonomous movement of soldiers, which was "infecting" even troops considered "reliable. • The revolutiongry upsurge was not meeting any repressive force capable of containing it. But at the same time, this upsurge did not give rise to sufficiently generalized and, above all, centralized bodies of workers power. The specific char20 acter of the period lay in this desynchronization, the extreme form of which could only be transitory. This Tack of generalization and centralization of the organs of the toiling masses themselves sharpened the difficulties in overcoming the uneven development of consciousness and forms of organization of the working class, in merging the various components of the working class with the backbone of the revolution represented by the workers of the industrial belt around Lisbon and the ogricultural proletariat of the Alentejo, and in responding to the political divisions of the toiling masses. Inasmuch as the unity in action exhibited on September 28, 1974, and March 11, 1975, was not able to be institutionalized in effective organs of proletarian democracy, this division created favorable ground for reaction to make use of the petty bourgeoisie - which had taken a wait-and-see attitude on March 11, 1975 - and allowed reaction to consolidate a real social base as a bridgehead of counterrevolution in some regions. 7 After March 1975 the SP openly revealed its counterrevolutionary function, as soon as the question,

Which class shall rule? was clearly posed. The form and import of the SP counteroffensive were determined by the very characteristics of the revolutionary upsurge: the level attained by the spontaneous anticapitalist actions of the masses; the unquestionable manifestation of the embryonic organs of workers power; the weakness of the bourgeois state apparatus, incapable of breaking the mass movement; the fragility of the bourgeoisie's instruments of political rule. Under the cover of respect for and defense of the "popular will, *the SP threw itself into deliberate support of the institutions and authority of the bourgeois state against the forms of self-organization and direct expression of the workers in the factories, in the agricultural ener thes, he til forward as the trance. the counterrevolution; it aimed at guaranteeing the difficult transition from the fall of the corporatist state to the establishment of a bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Trotsky characterized an analogous process this way: "As for the German revolution of 1918, It was not at all the democratic completion of a bourgeois revolution, but a proletarian revolution decapitated by the Social Democracy; more exactly, it was a bourgeois counterrevolution which, after its victory over the proTetariat, was compelled to conserve fallacious democratic appearances. In the tradition of the German Social Democracy in 1919, the Soares leadership made itself the agent of what could be called the "democratic counterrevolution": the defense and consolidation of a bourgeois state through the elimination of the orgons of the workers themselves while nevertheless maintaining the possibilities of action and freedom of expression for the reformist parties of the workers movement. A parliamentary framework would then assure the SP, which

was strong electorally, a role as an intermediary between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Whatever the chances of success for such an operation, which historically has always been followed by a rapid advance of reaction, this was nonetheless the basic project of Soares, Rego, Zenha. For this reason, Portuguese capital and European imperialism unanimously supported the counteratlack launched by the SP leadership. It is true that during June and July 1975 some sectors of workers participated in the demonstrations of the SP for motives that cannot be assimilated to the actual and coherent project of the SP leadership. In the minds of these workers, an anticapitalist will was combined with a reaction against the bureaucratic and antidemocratic methods of the CP in the frade unions and municipal governments, which the Social Democratic leadership was able to make use of. Thus, from this angle, these demonstrations had a contradictory character expressing both the profoundly uneven development of class consciousness and the consequences of the CP's orientation and sectarianism. The Soares offensive took on broad scope just at the time when the effects of social polarization on the MFA revealed the MEA's inability to play a pivot role in constructing a state apparatus after April 25. The ossembly of the MFA in June 1975 reflected the social and political confrontations that were racking society and the army, confrontations that had repercussions on the MFA. The assembly's adoption of the document on "popular power" - a "popular power" that was to be integrated into the institutions of the bourgeois state apparatus and was not intended to replace that apparatus — expressed the MFA's inability to effectively counter a mass movement that it even seemed to sanction. This campaign against "anarcho-populism" logically led led the SP to support the interventions of the sixth govemment, from the occupation of the radio and television stations to the destruction of the Radio Renascença broadcasting tower to the purge of radicalized officers. Moreover, the SP frontally opposed the movement for workers demands which, beginning in September 1975, drew sectors of the working class into action on a national scale (metals, construction). The conjunction between the dynamic unleashed by the mobilizations of the SP and the divisions within the working class created favorable conditions for a strong reemergence of the bourgeois parties. By making use of some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, the CDS and particularly the PPD made significant appearances on the political scene and presented themselves as the most consistent defenders of the capitalist order. In the North, this was reflected in the key role played by these parties in the assemblies for "order and discipline. " Beginning in November 1975, these mobilizations of reaction moved from the political field to the organization of a massive battle against the agrarian reform (First concentration of small, middle-sized, and large landowners of Rio Maior), in which the for right assumed an increasingly active role.

On the eve of November 25 the SP began to find itself in a state of disequilibrium under the pressure of the growing polarization between the two fundamental social classes. On the one hand, in the North the PPD and the CDS were seizing the initiative and transforming the mobilizations in support of the sixth government into demonstrations of reaction, while the SP was increasingly less capable of mobilizing its working-class base to support Pinheiro de Azevedo. On the other hand, in the industrial and agricultural South, where the SP faced massive mobilizations, its links with the working class, the agricultural workers, and the smallholding peasants became increasingly tense. There were many reasons why the potential in OctoberNovember 1975 for a break between the policy of the Soares leadership and the rank-and-file organized or influenced by the SP was still not concretized in an open crisis, in the emergence of opposition tendencies of rather precise outlines, or in significant splits. First, the sectarian policy of the CP, which reached Its peak when "barricades" were built against the SP demonstration in July, reunited the Social Democratic rank and file around the leadership. Second, the CP's bureaucratic grip on the Intersindical, its manipulation of the press and the other mass media, and its crude monopolization of municipal governments lent credibility to the democratic proclamations of the SP leadership. In addition, the ultraleft course followed by most of the organizations of the so-called revolutionary left was an impediment to chipping away SP workers who were critical of the leadership's policy and hostile to the bureaucratic methods of the CP. Finally, the very history of the SP, its lack of trodition as an organized party in the working class, and the low political level of its membership limited the expression of the party's internal contradictions in the form of an alternative orientation and favored the anticommunist maneuvers of the leadership. 8 The overall reformist project of the CP consists of getting into the bourgeois state apparatus so as to subject it to a process of "democratization, " which objectively implies the survival of that apparatus. Whatever the tactical turns, the overall project of the CP remains the establishment of "advanced democracy." The MFA is only an element that can be used to try to concretize this project, even if it acquired a major importance for a whole period. Within this perspective, the mass movement is thus deprived of all autonomy and must serve solely to prop up this plan. The decisive role of the MFA in the overthrow of the corporatist state and the nature of the crisis of the institutions of the old regime provoked by April 25 determine the concrete forms of the CP strategy and shed light on its tactic of penetrating the institutions of the bourgeois state. The main points of this tactic are the attempt. to monopolize the municipal administrations and the mass media, the control of the trade-union structure inherited from the previous period (law on trade-

PORTUGAL union unity), and, above all, the winning of influence in the MFA, essentially in its leadership bodies: the MFA assembly and the Council of the Revolution. Hence, the CP was to systematically put the emphasis on the unity of the MFA, which is presented as the motive force and guarantor of the process of "democratization" of the state apparatus and the channeler of the mast movement. The class independence of the workers movement is sacrificed and the relationship of forces within the military becomes the determining factor in all initiatives to mobilize the workers, In the context of the deepening of a preevolutionary situation, the oscillations in the application of this orientation must inevitably be numerous; the ways in which these oscillations are carried out will be determined by various factors. The crisis of the MFA, symbolized by the Tancos assembly and the emergence of the autonomous soldiers movement, forced the CP to hastily revise the formulation of its orientation. It sought to utilize the soldiers movement to push for a realignment of forces within the MF A and to aim at a recomposition of the MFA. At the same time, the rise of the mass movement and its growing degree of self-organization, combined with the parfial challenging of the CP's control of the Intersindical, forced the CP to readjust its tactics and hook up with this radicalization. The CP created the provisional secretariat of the workers commissions of the Lisbon industrial belt, which was intended to enable the CP to contain the push toward strengthening of the autonomous bodies and direct it toward the objective of reshuffling the civilian and military bodies of power. In this perspective, the workers commissions are intended to be, in reality, comanagement councils in nationalized industry; the moradores commissions are supposed fo be bodies that complement the bourgeois state appargtus on the local level, in the sense in which they were "legalized" by the MFA document of June 1975.

These tactical adaptations are not simply the product of a policy of maneuver, but are also expressions of pressure from the CP ranks themselves for the development of democratic forms of direct representation and initiatives of workers control. This pressure can be reflected all the more easily within the CP since there are very few party cadres capable of defending the fundamental orientation of the leadership and of politically training the young militant rank and file, which has many links with the workers vanguard and the militants of the far left and is undergoing many experiences of struggle.

In addition, the absence of a long practice of class collaboration in the framework of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, the lack of legalist traditions among the party ranks, and the consequences of the struggle against the corporatist dictatorship result in a certain adaptation on the part of the CP cadres to the spirit of the toiling masses, which has given rise to more than one illusion among the centrist currents about the real nature of the

CP's strategic orientation.

The development of the class struggle during this period was to undermine the project of the CP, the beginning of the crisis of the CP - af the and of August and during September - was the product of the dynamic of class confrontation. On the one hand, the CP's links with the Soviet bureaucracy, its structural independence of the bourgeoisie, and its relations with the working class do not make the CP, unlike the SP, a viable instrument for initiating a counteroffensive to assert the authority of the bourgeois state. On the other hand, the CP's program of "democratization of the state apparatus, " its opposition to the independence of the mass movement, and its hostility to workers democracy place it in contradiction to the activity and aspirations of the advanced wing of the mass movement. The possibilities for the exacerbation of the contradictions within the CP, of the CP being bypassed, and even of partial breakups could not be realized in practice because of the ultraleftism and triumphalism of the centrist current and because of the sectarianism of the Maoist current. Hence, the CP was able to take advantage of its capacities of intervention and its organizational strength to maximally limit its loss of control over sectors of the working class.

The influence of the far left - linked to its quantitative importance, the place it occupies in some key sectors of industry, and the ability of the workers vanguard to take initiatives — increased significantly during this period. The rapid pace of the rodicalization of layers of young workers, the atmosphere of permanent political debate, amplified by the mass media, the willingness to engage in political discussion among significant sectors of the masses, the emergence of the autonomous movement of soldiers, and the space created by the disintegration of the repressive apparatus all created propifious conditions for an expansion of the audience of the organizations of the "revolutionary left." Nevertheless, this influence found no direct correspondence in the capacity of these organizations to educate and organize those layers of workers prepared to join in the mobilizations they were stimulating.

The coincidence of the crisis of the CP, still reeling under the shocks of the breakup of the MFA, and the emergence of a brood workers vanguard onto the political scene gave the far left (the organizations of the

FUR and the UDP) an opportunity to independently stimulate demonstrations of some breadth (July-August-September 1975). Nevertheless, the division of the far left and especially its political confusion constituted major obstacles both to undertaking a process of unification and centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power and to breaking down the grip of the reformist parties.

The weakness of the revolutionary Marxists did not permit the elements of political clarification and action proposals capable of responding to these two exigencies to be provided. It even made the revolutionary Marxists susceptible to centrist pressures:

a) The signing on August 25, 1975, of the agreement among the CP, MDP, FSP, LUAR, LCI, MES, and PRPBR reflected this double phenomenon. On the one side, in order to dam up and take advantage of the combativity and initiative capacity of the workers vanguard, the CP signed an accord with these organizations, the content of which conformed to the political conceptions of the CP. On the other side, these organizations were politically incapable of taking advantage of the CP's need to make this maneuver in order to launch an offensive of unity in action around precise objectives corresponding to the needs of the toiling masses, to their aspirations for unity and for developing, unifying, coordinating, and centralizing the independent organs of the workers. On the contrary, whatever their reserves, the organizations that signed the agreement sanctioned a conception denying all autonomy to the workers commissions, moradores commissions, and the popular assemblies, which were placed on the same level as the MFA or the political parties in a front, In addition, the accord called for support to the fifth government of class collaboration, which, in the name of the "battle for production" was calling for an austerity policy and an integration of the independent organs into the state apparatus at the very moment when the objective possibilities for these organs' growing over into organs of dual power were maturing. Finally, at a time when the MFA was splitting at the seams and the autonomous movement of soldiers was surging forward, the accord sanctioned the MFA. In a distorted way, the August 25 accord reflected the new relationship of forces between the broad workers vanguard and the reformist apparatuses, between the revolutionaries and the traditional leaderships; nevertheless, the signing of the accord led to sanctioning an orientation divergent from the dynamic of the mass movement, which had created the conditions for the execution of the accord in the first place. b) After the expulsion-resignation of the CP on August 29, 1975, the question of the relations among the organizations that had signed the August 25 accord was posed in a new way. Insisting on the necessity for unity in action could have contributed to partially overcoming the limits of the intervention of the far left: the scattering of initiatives, the inability to bring the full weight of the broad workers vanguard to bear in strengthening the autonomous organs and the development of the soldiers movement, the weakness of political action proposals that could get a response among the ranks of the reformist workers organizations. Now, the September 10 platform of the FUR did not provide the bases for such unity in action, but instead aimed at the constitution of a front. The grouping togather of organizations that had the allegiance of only a minority of the working class, even within the broad workers vanguard, was identified with "the unification and organization of the class vanguard." This logically led to discarding any united-front orientation directed toward other political currents within the workers vanguard (like the UDP) or toward the reformist parties. And this even though a policy of the broadest possible unity in action, centered on the development of organs of workers democracy and linked to the fight for concrete objectives felt by the masses, would have been able to strengthen the workers vanguard, to permit if to draw more backward layers of the working class into mobilizations, and to respond to the division in the ranks of the workers. This "frontist" conception, which impeded the concretization of an effective policy of united front, was topped off by the characterization the FUR made of the SP. The SP is considered a bourgeois party, the real "advance guard of fascism" that must be defeated before reaction can be crushed! Moreover, the FUR displayed a triumphalist vision of the relationship of forces, which fed a sectarianism and ultimatism toward the CP that was equalled only by the illusion that the CP would fall into line behind the FUR's initiatives, compelled to do so because of the supposed strength of the FUR and its military links. This line was subtended by a total overestimation both of the degree of political consciousness that had been attained by the workers, even those of the most combative sectors, in the course of fragmented experiences and of the level of "development of organs of popular power, " a formulation that in reality encompassed numerous ambiguities about the nature of dual power and the qualitative leap involved in the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus. As time went on, the major components of the FUR abandoned the conscious and systematic search for direct support for the initiatives of the vanguard among the broad masses, the imperative necessity of winning over the majority of workers. In reality, the policy of the FUR led to isolating the vanguard and to consolidating the division of the working class, which in furn strengthened substitutionist and adventurist tendencies. In the last instance, what predominated in the FUR was a spontanéist conception of an automatic transition from the level of consciousness attained by the workers vanguard through the experiences of struggle over eighteen months to the level of consciousness required for the accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution. Finally, the conception of the relations between the independent organs and the parties, as well as the absence of a consistent defense of the principles of workers democracy, raised a supplementary obstacle to the possibility of counterposing the division and bringing about a united-front orientation. By denying organizations in the workers movement the right of expression as such in the organs of proletarian democracy, under the pretext of "nonpartyism, " the FUR retarded the process of political maturation, which is linked to the free confrontation of the ideas of all the currents of the workers movement, and thus prevented the linkup between the more backward layers and the vanguard. By not proclaiming the inalienable right of all tendencies of the workers movement to command adequate means of organization and expression, to have access

PORTUGAL to the mass media, and to be present in the embryos of workers power, the organizations of the FUR did not offer any alternative either to the democratic demagogy of the SP or to the bureaucratic methods of the Stalinists. In this revolutionary upsurge, combining the coming into motion of backward sectors of the working class and an extension of self-organization in the factories and the army, the full tragic scope of the crisis of the subjective factor came to the fore. The nonexistence of a revolutionary party, even a small one, impeded a generalization and centralization of the experiences of struggle and thus also impeded a qualitative leap in the consciousness of the masses. In addition, there was not even any politically credible reference pole that, through its analyses, proposals, and intervention, could have contributed to a political clarification within a vanguard dominated by centrist currents (MES, PRP, etc.) and Maoist ones (UDP). In this sense, the LCI's signing of the September 10 platform and its adaptation to the ideas dominant in the FUR (on the SP and the united front) represented a serious political error that could not fail to retard the construction and consolidation of the Trotskyist organization in Portugal. The events of November 25 were to give a sharp rebuff to this erroneous orientation. III. The desynchronization between the deepened 1(1 crisis of the state apparatus and the lack of centralization of embryonic organs of dual power could not persist for very long. The following alternative is inherent in such a state of affairs:

- Either a centralization of the instruments of proletarian democracy takes place (essentially on the level of the workers commissions) and a situation of generalized dual power results;

- Or the bourgeoisie is able to more or less completely reconstitute tools of repression that offer it the possibility of driving back the advanced points of the proletarian upsurge. This alternative does not mean that a radical change in one direction or the other must take place immediately, but rather that the means commanded by the two opposed camps will modify the terms of the coming test of strength. This desynchronization had many implications:

*In spite of its extreme weakness and crisis of leadership, the bourgeoisie still commanded instruments with which to centralize its political will, which the working class lacked completely. The centrists' confusion of 24

UNIDO ORGANI VENCE the paralysis of the government (the "strike of the sixth government") with the total disintegration of the bourgeois state apparatus expressed their complete lack of comprehension of this phenomenon and accounts for their astonishment at the prepared, rapid, and relatively efFective bourgeois response on November 25 and 26.

*Militarily, the many fissures in the hierarchical system were not accompanied by sufficient development of soldiers commissions and above all by the coordination and junction of such commissions with the organs of the workers. In addition, the spread of the self-organization of the soldiers was very different in the North and South, which facilitated the maneuvers of the military hierarchy. This was capped off by the gap between

ZADOS

฿ EMOS the crisis of the army and the lack of any political outlet that would have provided for a centralization of the workers commissions, which induced some of the radicalized soldiers and officers to seek a political way out in a military solution. Finally, the disintegration of the army gave rise to the illusion in the mass movement that the outcome of a possible test of strength was assured in advance inasmuch as the mass movement had already won over a large number of soldiers. Hence, the necessity both for the selfdefense of the organs of the toiling masses themselves and for the arming of the proletariat was obscured for the majority of the workers, even the most advanced workers.

*The dispersion of the structures of self-organization did not permit the masses to go through the experiences that would have led to a qualitative rise in the level of class consciousness. By assuring the direct and broadest possible participation of the toiling masses in discussing their problems, in working out measures able to respond to those problems, and in beginning to enact these solutions on a general level, a centralization of the autonomous organs would create propitious conditions for overcoming democratic illusions among the active majority of the working class in order to win these workers over to the side of workers councils against bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Only then can the search for the forms through which to move to the proletarian revolution properly so called be broached. By obscuring the function of a situation of dual power in the development of class consciousness of the majority of the workers and by spreading the myth of a real "popular power" that had only to be extended a bit (when in fact what were involved were still only dispersed embryos of potential organs of workers power that had to be developed), the centrists (PRP-BR, MES) were led to present the insurrection as a precondition for a qualitative leap of the mass movement, which could then be won over to the socialist revolution. The march of the socialist revolution is turned the wrong way around!

The confrontations of November 25 and 26, 1975, must be grasped within this perspective. For the bourgeoisie, it was indispensable to quickly get out of the impasse into which it had been plunged by the failure of its interventions, the disintegration of the army, and the successes won by the metalworkers and the construction workers. The bourgeoisie set itself two priority objectives: put an end to the political turmoil in the army in order to neutralize a series of units and reconstitute a police-military force; and retake control of the mass media, which had been broadening the scope of the mobilizations of the workers, even the sectoral ones, inciting solidarity, and providing the workers with a partial element of coordination. The baurgeoisie thus sought to provoke a test of strength on a very restricted field: the question of the commander of the Lisbon military region. The "strike" of the government created an atmosphere favorable to such an operation by casting responsibility for it onto the military officers alone and by concentrating decision-making power in a circle that commanded dominant positions in the General Staff and the Council of the Revolution. The nomination of Vasco Lourenço acted as a provocation that permitted the preparation of a plan of counterattack against any attempt by any sector of the army to prevent the application of this measure. Instead of relying on the development of a network of soldiers commissions capable of neutralizing the initiative of the majority of the Council of the Revolution in practice, the so-called revolutionary officers and the Gonçalvesist current responded on the terrain chosen by their adversaries. On this level, there was an objec-

PONTUGAL tive confluence of the 'insurrectionist" conceptions of the centrists (MES, PRP) - which interpenetrated with the militarist positions of the "revolutionary officers" - and the desire of Gongalvesist sectors of the army to undertake a coup de force to respond to the advances of the reactionary military hierarchy and to reshuffle the bodies of military power. The CP's campaign for a "return of revolutionary officers" to the Council of the Revolution and for support to Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon military region gave a de facto stamp of approval to these plans and suggested the organization of mass support for their implementation, which in turn strengthened centrist illusions in the options of the Cunhal leadership. The sudden intervention of the Tancos paratroopers precipitated the implementation of elements of an unfinished plan on the part of the "military left. " On the other hand, Costa Gomes's "response" had been carefully prepared and studied for weeks. It unfolded simultaneously on the military, political, and media levels: militarily thanks to the Amadora commandos, politically through the vote of the Constituent Assembly in favor of the state of emergency, in the mass media through the immediate transfer of radio and television to Porto, which guaranteed government control of telecommunicafions. The genuine coup of reaction was not improvised! Within the logic of its campaign for "order and discipline, " the SP openly supported the establishment of the state of siege and the police measures that accompanied it. The SP voted for them in the Constituent Assembly. As for the CP, Its aims fell within the narrow framework of a personnel shakeup within the Council of the Revolution and, later, within the government. At the most, the CP intended to utilize the modifications the Tancos paratroopers could have brought about in the relationship of forces within the reactionary bastion of the air force in order to make it easier to implement its plans. In no case was the Cunhal leodership inclined to commit itself to a "coup d'etat. " The search for a compromise within the framework of a strategy of "democratic revolution" remained constant - before, during, and after November 25. The CP did not even mobilize against the state of siege, in spite of its official position during the debate in the Constituent Assembly. It immediately shifted the axis of its alliances a notch to the right, The essential point remained clinging to its positions in the state apparatus on the chance of altering its points of support. The centrists, more particularly the PRP and the MES, while manifesting complete incompetence on the terrain on which they had chosen to fight, nonetheless declared that "the hour has come to give the bourgeoisie a definitive lesson. " Their separation from the real movement of the masses was sharply brought to light. Their depunciation of the betrayal of the CP was in consonance with their illusions about the strategic orientation of the Stalinists and about the relationship of forces between their organizations and the reformist apparatuses. 26

At no time did the working class participate in this "stillborn coup"; at the most, the workers reacted to defend their gains by mobilizing in the factories. Both the form and the apparent objectives of the "rebellion" of November 25 inevitably made a mobilization of the broad masses almost impossible and gave rise to the greatest uncertainty and confusion among the masses. The soldiers took a wait-and-see attitude, Isolated from the mass movement, they were not prepared to throw themselves into a battle whose protagonists and results eluded them.

The victorious military "counteroffensive" gave 12 the bourgeoisie the opportunity to initiate a process of reconsolidation of the state apparatus, a precondition for any possible partial reestablishment of order in the factories and the countryside and for implementation of the economic plan whose general lines were worked out at the beginning of November. Thus, the bourgeoisie primarily emphasized:

-taking control of arms stocks and constituting a repressive apparatus centered on the PSP and the GNR, which were transformed into operational forces (this was an implementation of the original intention of the sixth government, which has not yet taken the risk of sending the soldiers out against the workers);

- making changes in the officer corps in order to guarantee control over the wave of new conscripts and reducing the number of troops in an attempt to professionalize some strategic units;

- gaining control of the radio and television and restructuring the press in order to provide the government with means by which to manipulate public opinion, cut down on the audience of struggles, even partial ones, that had been reached by the press and the radio and put an end to the permanent political debate they had been fostering. Urilizing its fulcrums within the army and the state apparatus in general, the bourgeoisie sought to bring its regained political initiative to bear in the social sphere. The government extended the period of suspension of labor contracts and thus challenged the gains of the mobilizations for workers demands that had occurred during October and November 1975. The CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry) resurfaced. It proposed an austerity plan, a wage freeze, and the reestablishment of the power of the employers in the factories. The right and the far right took advantage of the breach that had been opened to challenge not only land occupations, but also the very principle of agrarian reform; in this they were supported by the mobilization of the landowners. A process of restructuration of the bourgeois forces took shape and its center of gravity shifted clearly to the right: The Spinolists and representatives of simiTar currents took over key posts in the military command; the social bloc of reaction consolidated its positions in entire regions and is seeking to transform them into strongholds to serve as rear areas for a future test of strength; the far right reappeared on the political scene,

its links with the official parties of the bourgeoisie and a sector of the military hierarchy becoming visible. Thus, November 25, 1975, gave confidence to the bourgeoisie once again. The bourgeoisie reorganized its forces, tried to fashion a state apparatus capable of driving back the mass movement and breaking the most advanced struggles in the short term. The first phase of this offensive took place precisely in the sphere in which the bourgeoisie's success was clearest. In the social domain, the bourgeoisie is seeking to maneuver, to postpone the date of a genuine frontal battle, while at the same time establishing the elements of an overall offensive. Since the working class was not a protagonist on November 25, the bourgeoisie is conscious that it still has to settle accounts with the workers. Because the test of November 25 provided no proof of the state of the respective forces, sectors of the bourgeoisie perceive the possibility of a discordance between the initial strengthening of the state apparatus and the capacity to impose anti-worker measures in a lasting manner. This is reflected in the differences within the PPD, the divisions within and among the bourgeois parties on the question of alliances with the reformist parties of the working class, and the cleavages, albeit limited, within the officer corps. Nevertheless, the crisis of the functioning of the capitalist system, like the depth of the recession and the collapse of certain branches of industry, hardly enables the bourgeoisie to postpone application of its attacks on the gains of the toiling masses in order to rigorously restrict them. The government decrees of December 1975 and January 1976 herald this tendency. Here lies the fundamental contradiction between the objective requirements from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie - requirements which determine the nature of the measures that must be taken to slow down the mass movement again and assure an upturn in investments -and the relationship that was not suddenly modified in a qualitative manner by the effects of the military defeat of a sector of the army. Of course, imperialist aid could enable various investments to be made, in public works, for example, and the effects of such investments could provide some respite in unemployment. But this would not eliminate the question of the functioning of the capitalist system, that is, the reestablishment of capitalist and employer order (elimination of workers control, increase in productivity, halt to factory occupations and land seizures, lengthening of the workweek, reduction in real wages to permit an upturn in the rate of profit). On the contrary, the investments depend precisely on these factors being fulfilled; rather rapid confrontations at least in this realm are inevitable. All this indicates that a real stabilization is impossible unless a deep defeat is inFlicted on the proletariat. Even in the rather unlikely event that some delay in sharp measures against the standard of living of the workers (because of imperialist aid and a broad mobilization of internal reserves) is combined with significant hesitation in the camp of the workers, a test of strength in the social and political spheres will not be able to be put off for long.

The transfer of the defeat of a part of the soldiers 13 and "revolutionary offices" to the sphere of the relationship of social forces has not had the effect of qualitatively modifying that relationship of forces. Nevertheless, this defeat did serve to reveal the political and organizational weaknesses of the semi-spontaneous and semi-conscious workers upsurge and exposed the uneven development of combativity and consciousness. This does not imply, a posteriori, that a different judgment of the nature of the relationship of forces before November 25 must be advanced. Over eighteen months if shifted in favor of the working class and against the ruling classes, to such an extent that during autumn 1975 the workers broke the major decisions of a government that wanted "order and discipline" (the occupation of the radios on the order of Pinheiro de Azevedo rebounded against the government's objecfive; the creation of the AMi was challenged almost from the moment the decision was made; defeats were inflicted on the Ministry of Labor). In fact, the very maturity of the objective situation made an overall anticapitalist strategy, an extension and centralization of the organs of the workers themselves, indispensable for any step forward. This maturity underscored the limits of the spontaneous and empirical upsurge of the mass movement. The weakness of the subjective factor was thus to be strikingly revealed and was to affect the evolution of the relationship of forces. After November 25, 1975, the limited ebb in the "revolutionary process" was to express itself, among other ways, in a complex process of recomposition of the organized workers movement. a) The more backward layers of workers who entered into struggle during the mobilizations for workers demands in autumn 1975 went through a rapid and superficial radicalization and politicization that made them vulnerable to the bourgeois counteroffensive. Their dependence on the reformist apparatuses increased, while the government attack was located precisely on the level at which these organizations play a decisive role in the organization of an overall response. Thus, the limited ebb in the workers movement has intensified the differences in the political maturity of the working class among different regions and branches of industry. The fissure between the proletariat of the Lisbon region and the Alentejo on the one hand and the rest of the toiling masses on the other hand threatens to deepen if there is a prolonged delay in the response on the economic level on the part of entire sectors of workers whose contracts have been suspended. The workers' delay in organizing a response could combine with mobilizations and a change in attitude among the petty bourgeoisie and thus generate a modification in the overall relationship of social forces. b) The lack of centralization of the organs of the workers themselves - which, during a period of upsurge,

PORTUGAL did not permit the uneven development of consciousness and of the degree of self-organization to be counterbalanced - sharply reveals the qualitative differences between the workers commissions and the moradores commissions as well as the varying degrees to which the workers commissions are representative. This process facilitates the reformists' operation aimed at coopting the workers commissions and integrating them into the trade-union structures; this is particularly the case since the reformists are the only ones who command coordinating bodies, means of effecting some centralization, and since they have decisive influence in the Intersindical. Concurrently, the weight of the trade-union organizations increases in this period of recuperation of strength of the working class. A new stage is opening in the extension of unionization. It combines three aspects: deeper penetration of the trade-union organizations in sectors that had never been organized in the period before April 25, 1974 (feachers, public services); broadening of professional unions emerging from the old corporatist "trade-union" system; the birth and expansion of branch-based trade unions (metals, civil construction, postal system). After November 25, 1975, some unions led by the SP affiliated to the Intersindical. A new debate is opening both on the type of response to offer to the measures taken by the government and on demperatic functioning in the unions. This process is shaking the bureaucratic control of the CP and tends to aggravate the contradictions in on SP that Finds itself serving as the mainspring of the government. c) The very nature of the workers upsurge, which proceeded through successive stages without encountering any major obstacles, fostered a capacity for initiatives and a real audience for the broad workers vanguard. Nevertheless, the semi-spontanedus and semi-conscious character of the movement reflected itself in a distortion between the level of political organization of this vanguard and its size. Within this some logic, the identiffcation of the victories of the soldieis with those of the workers was a decisive feature of the vanguard's political perception and explains the impact the defeat of a part of the soldiers had on the vanguard. Thus, during a period of retreat, the quantitative weakness of the organized fraction of this workers vanguard is revealed; its political confusion loosens its links with Its periphery and thus facilitates a grip by the organized force of the reformists (especially the CP) over this periphery. The nonexistence of a credible revolutionary organization capable of drawing the lessons of November 25, of helping this broad vanguard assimilate this experience, and of using the educational aspects of the confrontations to increase class independence, heightens the disarray of the vanguard, slows down the pace of its recovery, and limits its ability to take the lead in a determined response to the government's economic offensive.

d) Since the strategy of the CP was essentially determined by a reformist project of "democratic revolution"

28 and by concern to maintain positions in the state apparatus and more particularly in the military apparatus, the conclusions the CP has drawn from November 25 have logically led it to a right turn. Once again, the CP is giving priority to the antifascist struggle, within the perspective of the construction of a democratic regime. Hence, the CP is insisting on an alliance with the SP, while also making overtures to the split from the PPD, in the context of seeking an alliance with the urban petty bourgeoisie and sectors of the middle The weakness and confusion of the "revolutionary left" - which did not manage to take advantage of the tensions within the CP after November 25 - can facilitate this utilization of the autonomous organs by the Stalinist current, It may even permit this current to back down on some conquests of the masses without taking too great a risk. But its links with the working class and the combativity of a good part of its worker militants will force the CP to respond on the economic terrain, trying to channel the movement into the framework of the trade unions in order to prevent a resurgence of the workers commissions as embryonic organs of dual power, Likewise, it will be difficult for the CP to remain silent about government repression without running the risk of stimulating internal tensions and of further limiting its influence among "leftist officers. " Nevertheless, the CP will seek to avoid new clashes at all costs, and its statements opposing the government's economic and social policy will certainly not be followed up by precise indications on the form the response should take. * The SP has taken another step further in its counterrevolutionary course by supporting the repression and the government decrees. Now, the rightist regroupment in the military hierarchy, the offensive against the agrarian reform, and the reactionary proclamations of the PPD and the CDS indicate bath who will benefit from the stabilization of the bourgeois state and the measures needed to set the market economy in order again and who the real artisans of a reestablishment of the capitalist order are. The character of the SP and ih relations with the working class do not make it a functional instrument for assuring application of measures that frontally attack the living standard of the workers. The coming elections and the political situation are forcing the SP to strengthen its organized presence within the workers movement, Concurrently, in order to compete with the PPD among petty-bourgeois voters, the SP has to come forward as a factor supporting order. These two contradictory requirements, like the government's attacks on the gains of the workers, including those workers organized in SP trade-unions or influenced by the SP, may generate internal contradictions that have hitherto been covered over by the struggle against the CP and may enable opposition tendencies to arise. Finally, the confirmed danger of a strengthening of the far right is reactivating aspirations for unity among the workers movement, and this may throw the Soares leadership off balance.

f) The discrepancy berween the real development of the class struggle and the perspectives that had been traced out by the centrist and ultraleftist currents is causing a deep crisis within these organizations. The turnabout in the position of the MES and the PRP has led them to develop an "antifascist line" whose dynamic is laden with opportunist adaptations to the CP and the sectors that follow the lead of the "left of the MFA." As for the UDP, it is intersifying its hypersectarian attitude toward the CP, characterizing it as social-foscist. The UDP calls for the formation of an "antifascist united front" based on the organs of "popular will." The crisis of the centrist organizations of the MES-PRP type, combined with the weakness of the Trotskyist pole, leaves some room for a current like the UDP in the immediate future. The adoption of this antifascist line by all these currents once again, whatever the motivation for it, increases the uncertainty in the working class and the demoralization of its vanguard and contributes to dissolving the slogans needed to respond to the economic attack of the bourgeoisie into a confused perspective of "antifascist struggle.

The new stage opened by November 25 is not 14 characterized by a guelitarive modification of the relationship of social forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Nevertheless, the period characterized by a deepened crisis of the state apparatus that was not rounded out by a centralization of organs of dual power is over. The dominant features remain those of a prerevolutionary situation. The bourgeoisie has regained a certain political initiative and has begun to restructure its state apparatus, but without having overcome its own crisis of political leadership. The divisions in the PPD and in the military hierarchy and the debates between the CDS and the PPD reflect this crisis. The CDS wants to appear as the sole consistent defender of the interests of the bourgeoisie and is seeking to put itself forward as an alternative leadership in the bourgeois camp. It is trying to make use of significant layers of the petty bourgeoisie to provide itself with a social base, a petty bourgeoisie that is also furnishing the troops for a rising far right. The industrial and agricultural proletariat, whose combat potential is very significant, for the first time finds Tiself facing a challenge to its maior gains. It commands important levers (trade unions, workers commissions, peasant leagues, parties) and has a rich experience of struggle, which permits it to respond to the bourgeois offensive and to initiate economic struggles in the short term. A new rise of the movement for demands against the attacks on the standard of living would allow new life to be breathed into the autonomous organs of the masses, the backbone of which would be the workers commissions. Once again, their centralization and transformation into organs of dual power would become an immediate objective.

An economic or political provocation by the bourgeoisie or by some sector of the bourgeoisie blinded by excessive confidence might not only accelerate such a response but might also result in a massive and united form of mobilization that could beat back the effects of the consolidation of the state apparatus and once again objectively place the question of power on the agenda for the toiling masses. A delay in the workers counteroffensive would foster consolidation of the instruments of the bourgeoisie for entering into a test of strength that could be postponed a bit but would be no less decisive. The dynamic, rhythm, and crucial dates of the Portuguese political situation will also be determined by the deepening of the succession crisis of Francoism and the entry of the working masses of Spain onto the political scene. Thus, in the relative short term, an element of disequilibrium may be grafted onto the structural factors of instability in Portugal itself. The tasks the Portuguese proletariat will have to conFront in this new stage underline the urgent necessity of the construction of a revolutionary leadership capable of assuring a rise in class consciousness and of leading the proletariat and its allies to the conquest of power. IV. 15 proces, *o decisive test of trength between the Whatever the fluctuations in the "revolutionary two fundamental classes is inevitable. Revolution or counterrevolution, victory of the working class and establishment of a workers state or political crushIng of the struggles of the workers and the establishment of a "strong regime" (military dictatorship, fascist or semifascist dictatorship, etc.) — that is the real alternative facing the Portuguese working masses. The LCI must throw all its efforts into preparing the masses for such a conflict, basing itself on the many and rich experiences undergone by the workers before November 25, attempting to have the lessons of November 25 and 26 assimilated by the broodest possible layers of the working class, and putting forward an overall political program, credible in the eyes of the toiling masses, to transform the initial response to the attacks of the bourgeoisie on the conquests of the masses into a generalized offensive. a) Taking advantage of the reformist policy of the leaderships of the workers movement, the bourgeoisie is now trying to extend the military and political victory it won on November 25 into the social sphere. In this context, the priority task of revolufionary Marxists is to stimulate - through propaganda, agitation, and prac-

PORTUGAL tical initiatives — the most united and radical possible counteratfack against the effects of the government gusterity plan, against the challenging of workers control and all the manifestations of the contesting of the power of the employers in the factories as well as against the attacks on the agrarian reform. The relationship of social forces, the potential of combativity, and the instruments commanded by the working class and the agricultural workers permit them to mount a stinging rebuff to the present offensive of the government and the employers. Any postponement of the response can accentuate the limited disorientation of the workers, strengthen the reformist grip, empty the structures of self-organization (the workers commissions) of their content, and broaden the space available for a regroupment of forces within the bourgeois camp and the consolidation of a leadership within that camp. Under these conditions, the elections in April could concretize, accelerate, and consolidate this process. Revolutionary Marxists must therefore attach great importance to the organization of solidarity with and popularization of the partial and radical struggles that ore now developing, since the policy of the reformist leaderships contributes to isolating these struggles. Demonstrating that victory is possible and permitting the most advanced forms of struggle of the previous phase to be placed on the agenda again can constitute a factor favoring broader mobilizations. In the present conjuncture, the key battle will unfold against the measures suspending the trade-union contracts, that is, the negation of the gains made by the workers mobilizations of autumn 1975. In suspending the contracts the government is testing the reactions of the bulk of the working class. At the same time, it is directing the attack toward an area in which the responses of the workers are heavily determined by the policy of the trade-union organizations and thus of the reformist apparatuses, Given the conjunction between the scope of the attack on the standard of living and the potential of struggle that still exists among the ranks of the workers, it is quite improbable that the government will succeed in implementing the totality of these measures, even by taking advantage of the orientation of the reformist organizations. But a very fragmented response might allow the government to concentrate its efforts on the sectors that are most backward politically and weakest organizationally, even if it is unable to advance all along the line. Thus, the division in the working class among the various sectors and regions could deepen. That is why revolutionary Marxists, on the basis of the mobilizations that will develop in one branch or another, will insist on the necessity of coordinating and generalizing the response in order to deFeat the attacks, which are in reality hitting the entire working class. Nevertheless, a mobilization of broad scope to block the austerity measures acutely poses the question of the overall functioning of a capitalist economy facing a sharp conjunctural and structural crisis. Any overall response and above all any persistence of a high level of struggle requires clear general perspec30 tives and a solution worked out from the standpoint of the working class. Hence, it is imperative for revolutionary Marxists to work out a body of demands and a plan of struggle constituting a concrete response to the social and economic problems of the country and standing as an altemative to reformist solutions of all stripes. Such a project must be the framework of the intervention of the LCI. Agitation for immediate demands in partial struggles must be combined with propaganda for overall solutions in order to increase all the possibilities of translating them into mass initiatives. b) The application of the government austerity plan implies the challenging of the freedom of organization and expression won by the workers in the course of eighteen months of struggle. For the moment, the government is still not in position to unleash a brood repressive offensive. It is limiting itself to selective measures aimed at laying the groundwork for hitting the vanguard harder. These measures come more sharply into political relief given that the soldiers and officers arrested on November 25 are now in prison, while the plotters of March 11, 1975, and the police personnel of the Salazarist regime are free. For the entire workers movement, the organization of a broad campaign for the immediate release of the political prisoners must make the bourgeoisie and its government back down and prevent them from damaging the rights of expression and organization of the workers movement. Concurrently, the purge of the many exagents of the corporatist state who are getting their jobs back must be demanded; initiatives must be taken in this direction wherever this is possible and can receive popular support. The reactivation of the GNR and the PSP, striking forces of the old regime, and the increase in their personnel and resources place on the agenda the necessity of launching intense agitation for the disarming and dissolution of these repressive bodies. In the present conjuncture, the government may try to rely on anti-working-class legislation (law on the press and on the right to strike that has not been applied up to now because of the rise of the mass movement. Thus, the struggle for the abrogation of these decree-laws becomes primordial, along with the struggle for the unconditional defense of the workers right to strike and demonstrate, of the right of expression and organization for all currents and parties of the workers movement and for the structures of the working masses themselves. It is within this perspective that one must situate a campaign against the Pact proposed by the Council of the Revolution, which is trying to consolidate its positions, including through a presidentialist operation, in order to develop an anti-worker policy and to challenge the conquests of the toilers. c) The main instruments for a mass response to the attacks of the employers and the government on the conquests of the workers and people remain the workers com-

missions and the trade unions. The orientation upheld by revolutionary Marxists in the workeis commissions and trade unions must avoid any counterposition of these bodies and must stress their complementary character. Against the reformist project of integrating the workers commissions into the trade-union structures, of negating their autonomy and their specific function, it is necessary to emphasize the preservation of this autonomy and the mass representativeness of the commissions. This can be done only through the workers commissions demonstrating that they con take on tasks that fall within the general framework of workers control, conceived as a genuine means of defending the interests of the class, and can begin to realize the aspirations of the class. The decisions of the government and the process of recomposifion of the workers movement lend the trade unions an increased role and underline the importance of developing systematic work within the unions to construct a revolutionary tendency. This trade-union activity must enable a series of transitional demands and a discussion around themes linked to workers control to penetrate into the most backward sectors. In addition, the presence of revolutionary militants in the trode unions on a national scale and their active work within the unions can prevent the isolation of the workers commissions in certain branches. On the trade-union level, the strategic objective remains that of constructing a united, independent, central trade union organized by branches of industry and functioning according to the norms of the greatest workers democracy. The battle for this democratic functioning and for the liquidation of the corporatist structures can be combined with the development and strengthening of the workers commissions and can even facilitate branch-level centralization of these commissions. In face of the economic crisis and the government decrees, the definition of overall options to consolidate the trade-union counterattack requires the freest discussion of the various orientations and highlights the importance of a democratic trade-union congress. The expression of needs, the formulation of demands, and the definition of a strategy of struggle require the right to form tendencies, that is, the possibility of an unhindered debate in which each current of the workers movement can put forward its solutions before all the workers. This confrontation of ideas constitutes a real precondition for the respect for and implementation of the decisions taken by the majority. This concept must be constantly presented as an alternative to the manipulative practice of the reformist leaderships in the trade unions and particularly of the CP in the national apparatus of the Intersindical. d) Revolutionary Marxists reaffirm the decisive role of the workers commissions in the future of the Portuguese revolution; these commissions are the fruit of the movement of the masses themselves and have permitted the overcoming of the trade-union division by profession, the assumption of permanent tasks of workers control and embryonically of self-defense, the guaranteeing of the linkup with the popular masses, and the taking of radically anticapitalist initiatives (beginning of reconversions, links between industrial and agricultural workers, etc.). The central place of the workers commissions is a necessity because of:

- the deeply felt need in the factories for the required unity in struggle;

- the need to generalize workers control, especially in the nationalized sector;

- the need, already expressed in the platforms of demands in certain branches, for an overall plan of struggle against unemployment, for the reconversion of entire branches, for the establishment of direct links between the various sectors of industrial production and between these sectors and agriculture, for the definition of production priorities in the nationalized sector. The strategic objective thus remains the development, coordination, and centralization of the workers commissions as the central axis of the development of organs of dual power. In this perspective, branch-level coordination can constitute an intermediary step leading to a national congress of workers commissions and the emergence of a situation of dual power. Propaganda and agitation for centralization takes roof in the concrete struggles and needs of the workers; its revolutionary dynamic lies in attributing to the workers commissions functions that are those of workers. councils and that lead the commissions into direct conflict with the coalition government and the bourgeois state machine. A national congress of the workers commissions must be presented as the most adequate organizational framework for the bringing together of widespread experiences and the gathering of the information needed to elaborate a workers plan for the reorganization of the Portuguese economy and to guarantee the preconditions for carrying out the decisions made. The elaboration of this plan must go hand in hand with the development of workers control. In fact, this plan rests on the balancesheet of the productive capacities of the agricultural and industrial enterprises, on the state of the means of communication and transport, and on a verification of the workers' needs in the realm of private and social consumption as well as the need for producer goods. Hence, a national congress of the workers commissions emerges as a central element in an autonomous response of the working class to the social, economic, and political crisis and can permit the workers' allies among the urban and rural masses to be cemented around the proletariat. The defense by revolutionary Marxists of the full exercise of workers democracy in the constitution and functioning of the workers commissions becomes a decisive

PORTUGAL task in attaining these objectives, which requires a unification of the working class and a growing over of the organs of the workers themselves into genuine unitedFront bodies at the highest level. The following points flow from this:

- the free and democratic election of the workers commission delegates and their revocability by the ranks and not their designation by parties according to arbitrary and fixed proportions;

- the right of delegates to group themselves together into political tendencies and the strictest right of discussion on all problems according to the ideology of the delegates. Only the scope and results of such a campaign of explanation can expunge from the minds of the workers the false polarization provoked by the SP leaders and fostered by the orientation and bureaucratic methods of the CP between a "democratic" state in Fact located within the framework of the capitalist system and a "Communist dictatorship" destroying democratic rights. The massive experience with workers democracy within the workers commissions at the level of a branch or national congress is the only thing that can pave the way For the recomposition of the unity of the proletarian front and can convince the workers that a workers state based on councils will guarantee democratic liberties qualitatively superior to those conceded by traditional bourgeois democracy. Finally, an expansion of the activity of the workers commissions in this direction can provide a reference point that would facilitate a reemergence of the moradores commissions as organs of the working masses themselves in the neighborhoods and localtties and could break down the reformist-inspired tendency to make these commissions appendages of the state apparatus (the municipal governments). The bourgeoisie's attempts to recover the occupied housing during the post-March 11 period and the atlacks on the living conditions of the masses offered, at the time, an opportunity to revivify and extend the moradores commissions. One of the centers of gravity of their intervention must be to take initiatives to control prices, to forge links with the agricultural cooperatives for the sale of products and for the struggle against the capitalist distribution networks and against stockpiling speculation in consumer goods. d) After organizing support for the attempted coup of September 28, 1974, the large landed proprietors met the progress of the agrarian reform with dispersed resistance without being capable of organizing a mass mobilization. The preferred weapons of the latifundia proprietors remained refusal to apply the agrarian reform law, hijacking of livestock and agricultural materiél, failing to repair machinery, burning harvests, and carrying out individual attacks. In face of the exacerbation of the 32 class struggle in the countryside (land occupations under the fifth and sixth governments, linkup between the metalworkers in the South, the agricultural wage-earners, and the small poor peasants), the second "assembly of farmers" of Rio Maior, held in November 1975, marked an important advance for capitalist reaction. Apart from land occupations, it was the agrarian reform itself that came under violent attack. On this occasion, the expropriated latifundistas succeeded in reuniting the small and middle-sized merchants (whose speculation operations are threatened by the rationalization of the trade circuits linked to the agrarian reform), the rich peasants, and the small and middle peasants of the North and the West. Reaction's attempt to crystallize a social bloc, especially in the North and the Center, represents a weighty threat to the Portuguese revolution, The workers movement can envisage a victorious outcome of a test of strength with the bourgeoisie only if this bloc is disintegrated at least partially and if the social base of support for the workers is expanded. For this, stress must be placed on all the measures the trade unions and the workers commissions in the industrial and banking sectors can take to provide a response to the immediate needs of the agricultural workers and smallholding peasants (fertilizer, credits, machinery, etc.). Further, proof must be offered of the community of interests that links them together to the progress of the revolution, by demonstrating as concretely as possible that only central planning, under workers control, of fertilizer production and production of machinery and agricultural implements, as well as central utilization of credit and a planned reconversion of cultivation and agricultural production can permit aid to the cooperatives and to the expropriated land that has become collective state property. A modification of the relationship of forces in the contryside requires a strengthening of the agricultural trade unions, the leagues of poor peasants, and the commissions of agricultural workers and a growth of the weight of the poor peasants, as well as of the tenant farmers and sharecroppers, in the village councils throughout the areas where small property predominates. This consolidation of the organization of the land workers themselves must strengthen the linkup between these organs and those of the workers in industry, banking, and trade in order to assure the application and deepening of the agrarian reform, independent of the structures of the bourgeois state. Finally, the instruments of self-defense must be strengthened in order to counter the operations of re-seizure of land and of intimidation now being mounted by the latifundistas and their armed militias. 16 a) Revolutionary Marxists will take advantage of the main lessons of November 25 and 26 to combat adventurist and minority conceptions and to develop propaganda for mass self-defense in the

extension of the embryonic organs of proletarian power and for the protection of all the political and trade-union organizations of the workers movement. This is the only way to prepare broad sectors of workers to respond to any reactionary attempts. In the immediate future, the campaigns of the for right, like the utilization of the GNR-PSP or the possible utilization of specialized military units, lends particular importance to the organization of self-defense pickets. Moreover, in light of the importance the hierarchy itself attaches to regaining control of the arsenals, the experiences of the pre-November 25 period in controlling arms stocks and all the initiotives taken in the realm of arms manufacture must be exploited to develop concrete propaganda around the theme of control of arms stocks and use of weapons by the workers and by committees of soldiers. b The counteroffensive of the military hierarchy, while it has profoundly modified the conditions under which the soldiers can mobilize, has nonetheless not eliminated all possibilities of struggle in the barracks, possibilities that are bolstered by the experiences through which many soldiers have lived. The audience of the past movements among the new conscripts can favor resistance to military discipline. The objective of the activity of revolutionary militants in the army is the defense of democratic rights, the right of organization, and the right of expression of the soldiers. The structures of the soldiers themselves which can lead to the resurgence of an autonomous movement can take shape around this axis. Such a movement remains the greatest guarantee that the government will not be able to use the soldiers against the workers. Revolutionaries must do everything possible for the perpetuation of what constituted one of the most important gains of the movement of soldiers: their massive refusal to ever be turned against the workers. On this basis, revolutionaries can insist on the necessary linkup between the organs of the soldiers and those of the working class as well as on the prior discussion of orders, which can further facilitate agitation in favor of the election of officers by the soldiers themselves. Antimilitarist propaganda must be integrated with the various aspects of mass work (in the unions, the workers commissions, the moradores commissions). The antimilitarism of revolutionary Marxists must differ radically from the pacifism of the reformists and must seek to free the workers of any hope that clemency will be forthcoming from the "democratic" bourgeoisie once that bourgeoisie opts for moving from political maneuvers to a determined attack on the working class and its allies. The principle of the disarming of the bourgeoisie and the arming of the proletariat must be the thread that runs through all our antimilitarist work, both inside and outside the barracks.

c) The attack on the living standard of the workers and the bolstering of the reactionary measures, along with the dangers they entail for the working class, not only create objective conditions that demand the solid unity of the proletarian front, but also sharpen the aspiration for unity. Unifying slogans corresponding to the most pressing needs of the proletariot must serve os instruments for the realization in struggle of a united front against economic and political reaction. The tactic of the workers united front is the keystone of any real attempt to initiate mass actions and thus to start down the road to winning over the majority of the working class. This does not mean that any initiative must be subordinated to the prior agreement of the reformist leaderships of the workers movement. Indeed, unity in action must be sought with all political forces prepared to engage in struggle, without delay, both in defense of the conquests of the masses against repression by the government and the employers and in favor of the development and coordination of the workers commissions and, in some cases, of the moradores commissions. Concurrently, unifying demands must be emphasized in the trade unions; the formation of groupings (for common trade-union lists, for example) can become an important lever in bringing forward alternative solutions to those advanced by the reformists who lead the unions. Such a step - which can reinvigorate the activity of the broad workers vanguard and find a response in the reformist ranks (especially in the CP) - must be constantly articulated along with unitary propaganda directed toward the reformist leaderships and the multiplication of proposals aimed at involving the workers influenced by the SP and the CP in action. This permanent propaganda and agitation for the united front, the assertion of a will for unity, even at cross current with the immediate sensibility of certain layers of the vanguard influenced by ultraleftism, can pave the way for a united response to any political, military, or economic provocation by reaction. By creating actual unity in action, such a response could in turn result in a new step forward in the construction of organs of proletarian democracy. Concrete successes in this area are preconditions for a perspective of dual power opening up once again.

The dominant features of the social and political 17 situation remain those of deep instability. In this context, the test of the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes of Portuguese society is yet to come; it will probably take place around the suspension of trade-union contracts, the major questions of the economy (inflation and unemployment), workers control, and the agrarian reform. Hence, in their propaganda for a workers and peasants government, revolutionary Marxists will emphasize the program that this government should apply to defend the conquests of the working class and meet the needs and aspirations of the toiling masses. In addition, they

FUNGUGAL will indicate that it is only through the mobilization and self-organization of the proletariat that this government will find the strength to resist the sabotage of the bourgeoisie and to carry out its own decisions in practice. The translation of the government formula into agitation depends essentially on the degree of mobilization and unity in action of the masses and the dynamic of development of a movement around initially defensive objectives. During this transitional phase, the aim of a govemment slogan remains to politically counterpose the working class as such to all other classes, that is, to all government combinations emanating from the bourgeois political system. *In the event that the capitalist and reactionary offensive intensifies and the credibility of an SP-CP rapprochement gains ground among the masses, the government formula would Immediately incorporate these facts and would express itself in the demand for an SP-CP government applying a program of defense and extension of the workers' conquests. In the present context, united front initiatives toward the SP and the CP must be articulated with the demand on the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaderships that they "break with the bourgeoisie," that is, that they break collaboration with the bourgeois parties and the bodies that preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie, particularly the Council of the Revolution. *If a new upsurge of the movement and of self-organization of the masses expresses itself in the possibility or realization of a democratic congress of trade unions (going beyond the pure trade-union level) and of a national congress of workers commissions, then conditions would be present for the organization and expression of the working class itself against the projects of capital and the government. These facts would then have to be integrated into the government slogan in order to effectively allow the objectives of the masses to be translated into terms of power. The general propaganda formula "workers and peasants government responsible to the mass organizations of the workers" corresponds to this orientation. This formula will have to be concretized at each precise stage in light of the evolution of the relationship of forces, the turns in the political situation, and the resulting recomposition of the workers movement. 18 During the autumn of 1975 the desynchronization between the state of mind of the masses and the fact that they could not see any clear political outcome, in addition to their low level of political organization, reflected the tragic lack of a revolutionary leadership. The post-November 25 situation puts on the agenda a recomposition of the workers movement and of its political forces. Revolutionary Marxists can play an important role in this process if they are capable of creating a political reference pole basing themselves 34 on the limited forces they already command and carrying out a genuine process of political correction. This necessitates systematic public intervention demonstrating the ability of Trotskyist militants to provide an analysis and perspectives for the development of struggles. Then they will be able to take part in and even stimulate debate and unity in action within the far left and wage a political offensive toward the workers of the SP and CP who are disoriented by the policy of their leadership. This central political activity will be able to assert its full political impact only if it is based on a permanent and patient effort toward gaining an implantation in the brood workers vanguard by winning to the Trotskyist organization the advanced workers who command a capacity for initiative and audacity and are able to strengthen their influence and authority among the ranks of the workers. In addition, the expansion of the striking force of the revolutionary Marxists requires the regroupment of all the Trotskyist forces into a single organization, Portuguese section of the Fourth International. This implies the attempt by the LCI to establish priority unity in action with the PRT with a view toward fusion. 19 the head of mobilizations in solidarity with the The Portuguese Trotskyist militants will stand at

Angolan masses, who are fighting to defend the independence won through fifteen years of determined struggle. They chose the camp of the People's Republic of Angola against the holy alliance of imperialists, racists, and local reactionaries. Likewise, they will support the struggle of the FRETILIN against the invasion of East Timor by Indonesian troops. The links between the struggles of the workers of Spain and Portugal confer special importance on a campaign of solidarity with the battles of the proletariat of the Spanish state against the Juan Carlos regime, given their objective repercussions on the development of the situation in Portugal. Moreover, this campaign provides precious support to the militants of the Spanish revolution. The close relations that must be established among the militants of the Iberian peninsula constitute stable support for this internationalist activity. Whatever the limited ebb resulting from the events of November 25, for hundreds of thousands of workers the Portuguese revolution still incarnates the hope of socialist revolution in capitalist Europe. In light of the decisive dates now looming in the course of the Portuguese revolution, the militant international solidarity of the workers of Europe with their Portuguese brothers and sisters must exert its full weight in determining the outcome of the coming battles. The Fourth International will fully participate in the construction of this movement of solidarity, one of the central objectives of which is the release of all militants and soldiers hit by the repression that followed November 25. Bl

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