STABILITY IS NOT AT HAND
March 11, 1975, had been the first act in the elections of April 25 of that same year. The electoral campaign that officially opened on April 4, 1976, was introduced by November 25, 1975. The Constituent Assembly that resulted from the April 25, 1975, elections, with its majority of workers parties, reflected the rise of struggles that had taken place since December 1974; in a certain sense, it heralded the upsurge of mobilizations that were to attain their peak in November 1975. This time, the bourgeoisie is seeking to place an electoral seal on the advantages if gained through its military operations of November 25, 1975, in order to develop a new lever for depriving the workers movement of its gains. Nevertheless, as of mid-March the bourgeoisie began to realize that even in the event that the rightist parties win a majority in the coming elections, these elections will not represent the conclusion of the process launched on November 25. Stability is not at hand; the procrastination in the bourgeois camp testifies to this, as do the putschist inclinations of various sectors of the military. The working class marks time The period of semi-spontaneous and semi-conscious rise of the mass movement came to an end with November 1975. Confronted by the dilemma "restoration of the authority of the institutions of the bourgeois state or strengthening of the parallel power of the workers, the bourgeoisie drew together and manifested a unity of decision and command that was unprecedented, at least since September 1974.
PORTUGAL & the coming elections by A.UDRY & C. MICHALOUX Materially, the Amadora commandos defeated only the vanguard of soldiers of the Lisbon military region. But the essential point about the demonstration of the bourgeoisie was the sudden and striking appearance of its centralized will. With all the limits of the analogy, November 25 may be compared to the function of de Gaulle's speech of May 31, 1968, rather than to a simply military blow of force. In face of this bourgeois will, the fundamental fragility of the Portuguese working class, engendered by fortyeight years of the corporatist regime, was brought to light: the lack of experience and of independent capacIty for intervention on the political field, even though important progress had been made during the preceding two years. The crisis of the state apparatus - under the combined hammer blows of the colonial revolution, the workers upsurge, and the disintegration of the army -had masked this weakness. Thus, the objective maturity of the situation in autumn - which contained within it political exigencies leading toward the effective centralization of the embryonic organs of proletarian power - only threw an even harsher light on the insufficiency of the subjective factor in a twofold sense: the relatively low level of consciousness of the masses and the lack of existence of a revolufionary party. Thus it was that on the night of November 25 the illusions in the MEA (Armed Forces Movement), fueled by this lack of tradition of political independence of the working class (illusions that in turn contributed to perpetuating that lack of tradition) entailed the heaviest costs. Speaking on television, Carvalho lent his sanc-
PORTUGAL, fion to a Costa Gomes who was imposing a state of emergency that has been prepared in the streets by the troops of Jaimes Neves. Disoriented by this sudden change in the political context and in the framework in which it was able to launch its mobilizations and left without an alternative by the reformist parties, which either called for the intervention of the commandos (the Socialist party) or bowed before the decisions of the officers (the Communist partyl, the working class marked time. In a political field whose contours had been sharply modified, the workers then found themselves compelled to reorganize and strengthen the instruments of struggle (especially the trade unions) with which they had endowed themselves less than two years previously. But they were unable to refer to any long-standing experience of defensive struggle waged by well-structured trade-union organizations unifying broad sectors of the masses and recognized by the masses. A second stage in the post April 25, 1974, history of the Portuguese workers movement had opened. In the course of this stage, the Portuguese proletariat had both to forge the Tron links of trade-union organization and at the same time, in order to defend its conquests, integrate into that organization the forms of organization and demands of the preceding period, which were the fruit of the revolufionary upsurge (planning and workers control, workers commissions, sovereign general assemblies, and so on). This reorientation required time. Moreover, the combination between the elements of the immediate past and the exigencies of the present cannot be automatic. Of course, the terrain is favorable, for a porfion of the experiences have taken root in the memory of the workers movement, but the political weakness of the vanguard, as well as its precarious structure, did not permit these elements to bear fruit. Three months were to elapse before the workers engaged in an initial response, still largely fragmented, to the employers' attacks. The employers and the • «social November 25" The employers hoped that the suspension of labor contracts, decreed on November 25, would permit them to challenge the very nature of the collective contracts that had been won by the workers between September and November 1975. In fact, these contracts covered entire sectors and this unified the most advanced demands. The central axis of the attack of the employers and the government was thus directed toward eliminating a series of clauses of these contracts in order to throw. them back into direct negotiations on the factory level so as to take advantage of the more favorable relationship of forces prevailing there. Thus, after the nationalization of the most important factories, the attempt was made to offer the employers of the middle-sized, and especially the small, factories, whose situation was most fragile, the opportunity to 8 deal a very hard blow to the workers, to eliminate the gains codified in the contracts by making widespread use of the tactic of threatening bankruptcy. Once the conquests of the workers were broken in these factories - especially in the northern part of the country - capital and the government counted on transferring their victory to the nationalized sector. In addition, this tactic could create the conditions for a greater fragmentation of the movement for workers demands even on the branch level and could ward off the resurgence of mobilizations by whole sectors, which had been characteristic of the autumn of 1975. This attempt by the employers was concentrated with the greatest determination in the metal industries and in machinery, construction, and transport. Now, since the expiration of the period of suspension of contracts (March 1), the workers have begun to manifest their opposition to the sharp attacks on their previous conquests. General assemblies and work stoppages have occurred in construction and transport; there have been strike threats in entire industries (metals). In addition, this has been combined with the emergence of movements for demands in sectors that had hitherto remained on the fringes of the mobilizations (hospital workers, pharmaceutical aides, public services), and, on the other hand, with advanced struggles against factory shutdowns and the failure to apply contracts (examples: the Fritz Meyer factories, where the workers occupied the plant and demanded a public administrator; Firestone, where there was an occupation with the sequestration of the managers; Timex, where the 2,000 workers planned on an occupation and demonstrated at São Bento). ...the workers have begun to manifest their opposition to the sharp affacks on their previous conquests. Concurrently, the Portuguese toiling masses initiated the second wave in their unionization, a process that has entailed the extension of the number of union members in already organized sectors, trade-union penetration into professions that had remained aside during the first wave of unionization, and, finally, the transformation of the unions into branch-wide organizations ("verticalization, " according to the Portuguese vocabulary). The congress of the textile, wool, and clothing workers symbolizes the various facets of, this process. This congress marked both the strengthening of trade-union organization in a branch that includes 250, 000 workers dispersed in a multitude of small factories and the process of the emergence of a real branch-wide union. Moreover, the composition of the leadership that was elected (SP-CP, far leff) expressed the unitary and democratic aspirations of the working men and women. Finally, the union's platform of demands reflected the
nascent combination between the second wave of unionization and the integration of the experiences of workers control and self-organization. Thus, the document issued by this first congress affirms: "The workers will continue to struggle for the improvement of living and working conditions, while nonetheless realizing that only a socialist reconversion will be able to allow them to bring the sector out of the crisis in which it now finds Itself and to assure a lasting and real improvement in the standard of living and in working conditions. ... Only the construction of socialism con permit the elimination of unemployment and a socialist reconversion of the economy. " To the proposals for self-management under the capitalist system, the workers counterposed "effective workers control by the toilers over the overall functioning of the factories, " In addition, as far as workers control is concerned, they pointed to the necessity of subordinating the struggle on the economic Field to the struggle for the end of exploitation." As for trade-union reorganization, they explained that it is necessary to struggle "for strong and militant trade unions controlled by all the toilers ... organizing themselves around a line of independence of the political parties, the state, and the religious bodies, firmly anticapitalist and anti-imperialist, effectively democratic in their functioning, and intransigently defending unity. " Finally, "the trade unions must participate in, support, and stimulate the discussion among the workers, mobilizing them in the neighborhoods and the countryside, thus contributing to strengthening unity between workers and peasants and to the development of the agrarian reform. " (A Capital, March 22, 1976.) The plan of the CIP Confronted by this revival of activity on the part of the toiling masses, the employers noted that the terrain that was supposed to have been prepared by the government counterattack of November 25 and the subsequent measures had already been undermined. The employers had counted on the absence of a workers' response, assuming that this absence, combined with an electoral victory, would permit not only a prolongation of the suspension of the contracts but also the assembling of the conditions needed for a genuine upturn in private investment. This is what was clearly explained recently by the CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry), indicating what the logical continuation of November 25 ought to be for capital. Vasco de Melo, boss of the CIP and now a declared member of the CDS (Centro Democrático Social - Democratic Social Center, a rightwing bourgeois party), summarized the main lines of the program of the exploiters: wage freeze and then lowering of wages; extension of the work day; restriction of the right to strike and of trade-union freedoms; elimination of legislation allowing public intervention in the factories; accelerated indemnification for stockholders of nationalized enterprises; nomination of former employers to head public enterprises; reprivatization of profitable enterprises in the presently nationalized sector within two or three years.
This plan indicates the sort of deep modifications in the relationship of social forces that are necessary if there is to be motion toward realization of an effective and realistic project for capitalist restabilization. In the final analysis, the rage that fills the declarations of the CDS or the CIP, the rightward shift of the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático - Popular Democratic party, the largest bourgeois party), like the hesitations and divisions among the employers themselves and within the military hierarchy, all reflect the difficulty the bourgeoisie feels it will face in carrying out this turnabout in the relationship of forces. The simple fact that the theme of the struggle against "capitalist recovery" is found in the majority of the platforms of workers demands also indicates that on the side of the proletariat consciousness of the present stakes is slowly sharpening. Moreover, the development of discussion around the necessity of strikes and mobilizations on a sector-wide basis reveals the initial concretization of this comprehension on the level of the organization of defensive struggles. The discussion around the convocation of a democratic congress of all the unions takes on growing importance in the present phase for the orientation of the consciousness of workers toward the need for unification and centralization of the mobilizations, especially since in view of the structural crisis of Portuguese capitalism, many mobilizations immediately raise the problem of the survival of the factory, the reconversion of the industrial branch, and so on. To this have been added the objective effects of the nationalizations, which result in the Ministry of Labor, the government, becoming the direct interlocutor both for the workers of Timex or Firestone (where the question of nationalization is objectively posed) and for those of the metal and construction industries. Nevertheless, the response still remains fragmented, in face of an offensive of the employers and the government that is tending to sharpen. The grip and policy of the reformists, the division that they maintain, go hand in hand with the inexperience of the movement as a whole: There has never been a general strike in Portugal. Hence, a central outlet for the present struggles is unlikely in the short run (apart from the possibility of a response to a major provocation by the bourgeoisie), and this constitutes a decisive element reducing the impact of the defensive struggles. But if does not follow from this that it is possible for capital to gradually impose all its own solutions, for the organizational strengthening, the defensive capacity (even fragmented), and the combativity of the workers constitute obstacles that cannot be easily overcome but must be violently swept away. In this context, the result of the elections to the Assembly of the Republic (the legislature) not only appears uncertain for the bourgeoisie, but even strongly threatens to fail to become the second wing of the project initiated on November 25. Counting on the voluntary collaboration of the SP, on the CP's policy of being a "respectable party, " on the passivity of the masses up through the elections, and on the possibility of its partial victories" being clearly
PORTUGAL reflected in the electoral results, the bourgeoisie worked out the following plan after November 25: The "pact" between the Council of the Revolution and the political parties was supposed to permit a framework to be traced out by April 25, 1976, within which the electoral results could be rendered operative. On the basis of the restoration of the state institutions, of a consolidation of the repressive apparatus, a president of the republic was supposed to be installed, a candidate of national unity designated by the officers and then approved in a plebiscite thanks to the support of the major workers and bourgeois parties. This presidential system was supposed to rest on the increased political assertion of a petty bourgeoisie that would act as a counterweight to the working class and on a channeling of the workers movement, which would be compelled to limit its field of activity to economic demands. A body of antistrike laws and laws against occupations was supposed to limit the workers' sphere of initiative. At bottom, the essential part of the Spinolist project was being raised once again, in a different context. Economic aid from imperialism, especially from the European bourgeoisies, was supposed to permit the pump of "capitalist recovery! to be primed again. The centerpiece of such a construction was none other than the inaction of the working class and the consequently easier agreement of the reformist parties. But since the middle of March, this centerpiece has crumbled. The unanimity that reigned in the ranks of the bourgeoisie on November 25 once again gave way to divisions, to procrastination. Thus, these divisions reasserted themselves over what could have appeared as the point of agreement of diverse bourgeois currents: the nomination of an officer to the post of president, more precisely, the nomination of Ramalho Eanes, the chief of the general staff. These differences were not solely a product of uncertainty about the results of the elections, about the degree to which there would be a shift in the vote, but above all of the understanding that any bourgeois "solution" to the present crisis implies a confrontation with the working closs, the outcome of which is doubtful, since the wait-and-see attitude of the workers during the first few weeks after November 25 did not turn into deep demoralization or apathy. Paradoxically, it is in the bourgeois ranks that a certain wait-and-see attitude is being manifested today. While the overall project of capital has been maintained, the means acquired on November 25 still seem inadequate when compared with the tasks at hand. The crisis of bourgeois leadership is continuing, especially since the erroneous predictions about the scope of the mass movement's capacity to react had cost the bourgeoisie dearly in September 1974 and March 1975. This can only increase the hesitations. While there are advocates of a coup attempt in the upper circles of the military command, their capacity to close ranks, as they did temporarily on November 25, is undoubtedly more limited. 10
The discussion around the constitution - namely, the right of the legislative assembly to revise the constitution - synthesizes the gap that exists between the hopes and projects explicitly expressed and the bourgeoisie's immediate possibilities of concretizing them. After defending the Constituent Assembly against the "parallel power of the workers commissions," the ruling class placed a question mark over the very activity of that body when it threw down the gauntlet on November 25. The dynamic of the "democratic counterrevolution" is clearly revealed. But the basic relationship of forces inherited from autumn 1975, Its reflection in the relations among the political parties (and within the linchpin, the SP), and its expression in the conflicts that continue to run through the military hierarchy all combined to defeat this last-minute maneuver. The social mobilizations of the past two years, expressed in a certain form in the central articles of the Constitution, have not ebbed to the point that their reflection can already be erased from what should constitute a prop for bourgeois rule during the coming years. In this context, the CDS is taking shape as the advocate of an effective program for the bourgeois class, even if this program cannot become a reality in the present conjuncture. And the design of the CDS is not limited to the programmatic realm. It rests on the formation of a team of political personnel that is linked to imperialism (the CDU-SU in West Germany, the Giscardians in France, the Republican party in the United States) and is capable of embodying imperialism. The CDS bases itself on the organization of social forces whose two pillars are the CAP (Confederation of Farmers of Portugal), the advance guard of the struggle of the landed proprietors against the agrarian reform, and the CIP, genuine organ of political and economic expression of the Portuguese employers. As for the PPD, it remains at the intersection of the contradictions within the bourgeoisie and, moreover, is subject to the centrifugal pressures of the urban petty bourgeoisie, a product of the relative expansion of the 1960s, and of a fraction of the traditional rural petty bourgeoisie. In this sense, whatever may be the pretensions of the PPD's national leader, Francisco Só Carneiro, as a party the PPD reflects the crisis of leadership of the bourgeoisie and is asserting itself less and less as a potential agent for putting the bourgeoisie's house in order again (regardless of its electoral strength), It remains the bourgeois party of social instability and political crisis. The workers parties The current conception within the Socialist party was expressed by party secretary Mario Soares: "November 25 saved the revolution. ... In one blow November 25 wiped out the suicidal inclinations of the far left and cut the ground out from under the far right... Democracy emerged from the test victorious and strengthened. .. - (The suspension of contracts) was the only realistic policy for dealing with the chaos that was threatening.(1) Soares, like his spiritual fathers of the Social Democ-
DA RAIS FONGA vota votaO6 MAIS FORÇA A UBEROADE PCPS racy, believes to have "saved the revolution" and "safeguarded bourgeois democracy, " when in fact he has opened the doors to counterrevolution. The attacks of the CAP, CDS, and PPD against the agrarian reform and against the Socialist minister of agriculture, Lopes Cardoso, as well as the declarations of the CIP and the offensive against the Constitution prove ten times over that for capital "safeguarding democracy" is but a smokescreen for initiating the process of dismantling the forces of the workers movement. The hatred of the employers does not stop at the workers of the Communist party or the far left, it goes on to include the workers of the SP. Thus, the SP leadership, which nurtured the hope of presenting itself in the elections as the natural guarantor of order on the basis of the political and social stability it had helped to construct now finds itself confronting the consistent defenders of the only real capitalist order. And now, in some of his speeches Soares has taken to calling for saving the SPI Concurrently, the reanimation of activity among the workers, poor peasants, and agricultural workers is introducing contradictions into a party that proclaims, "This is the situation: We are facing a certain reality and we have to decide how to divide the national pie. Whatever we do at this moment, we cannot expand this national pie. The Portuguese people must realize this" (report of Soares press conference in Portugal Socialista, weekly of the SP, March 30, 1976). The trade-union militants of the SP, meeting in Aveiro in January 1976, thought it was possible not only to divide this pie in another way, but even to produce it so as to be pleasing to the taste of the workers. More than one SP worker has come to share this sentiment since then.
Under this double pressure, the SP is being led to accentuate its image as a government party, the only government party, in an illusory attempt to escape this contradiction by apparently placing itself above it. Before the workers, the SP puts the emphasis on its independence of the PPD and CDS. Before the bourgeois camp, it stresses its refusal to make a coalition with the CP, which is intended as the proof of its desire to guarantee stability. Not only does this project require a high electoral score, but above all it presents no strategic interest for the bourgeoisie, which pays greater attention to the role played by the trade unions under SP leadership in the recent struggles (banks, public services) than to the statements of Soares. A government with the SP as the backbone is temporarily useful for the bourgeoisie in a certain conjuncture, but the bourgeoisie understands where the real center of gravity of the permanence of the present crisis lies: in the nature of the relationship of social forces. Modifying this relationship in its favor implies, at least during the initial period, an attack on the unions, including those led by the SP, and then a battle against the SP itself. After the operation of the Amadora commandos, the Communist party, shifting its project of alliances a notch to the right, sought to obtain the support of the Melo Antuneses and the Charaises (those they call "democratic officers") by offering to support their troops. The few mobilizations organized by the CP (assemblies of the Intersindical, the trade-union federation, on January 17 and February 27) were aimed exclusively af this, which implied a certain show of force. But the rapid conquest of key posts in the army by the Spinolists and the traditional hierarchy strongly limited the maneuvering room of these "democratic officers." Moreover, what they wanted most of all was to see the weight of the CP added to that of the SP in order to counterbalance the tendency of the "operating troops" to get out of hand in the manner of Jaimes Neves. They were not looking for privileged links with the CP. So the range of the party leadership was a bit too short! With the upturn of the movement for demands in March there was an increase in the blackmailing pressure of the bourgeoisie and the officers who, on the basis of the results of November 25, were forging a weapon for eliminating any CP footholds in the state apparatus. Concurrently, the opening of the Cunhal leadership toward the SP required that the CP make a number of gestures of goodwill. In any event, that has been the direction taken by the CP's electoral propaganda for a "left majority, " that is, in reality, an SP government supported by the CP. Trapped in this vise and worried about winning an electoral score that would not result in its being thrust too far to the sidelines, the CP declared itself in favor of a "social truce" and shelved its professions of faith in the "socialist revolution. " The editorial in Avante, the CP newspaper, does not camouflage the fundamental
11
PORTUGAL line: "To prevent the social and political stabilization of a revolutionary situation (sic!) is thus one of the major objectives of the counterrevolution in its efforts to reconquer power... The Portuguese CP completely agrees on the fact that social conflicts must not be sharpened, for they might then create a elimate of instability and disorder in the country, which would be fovorable only to the designs of reaction... Once again, we must repeat that the just struggle for demands must be subordinated to these basic objectives, as the workers in civil construction have been able to understand." (Avante, April 1, 1976.)
All these capitulations have nonetheless not prevented the bourgeoisie, still shaken by the events of autumn
1975, from placing elimination of the CP from the state apparatus in the center of its electoral objectives. On the other hand, these capitulations are beginning to run into hostility from sectors of the working class. Although on the whole the CP (through the Intersindical) has been able to keep control over the mobilizations of the most important branches (metals, construction), local instances of the CP's being outflanked have already occurred. In addition, the agricultural workers of the Alentejo are not prepared to tailor their method of struggle in the material defense of the land they have occupied to these declarations of appeasement.
CALC APC! DORI ACPiRIA Thus, what we are seeing is the structural difficulty of the strategy of the CP, which is aimed of stabilizing instability and hence puts the brakes on any dynamic toward the unification and centralization of the defensive struggle. "Against the fascist threat» If only because of the opportunities (radio, television, the press) it presents to the organizations of the so-called revolutionary left, the present electoral compaign(2) could be an exceptional occasion for stimulating the assimilation of the many experiences that have 12 been undergone by the masses over the past two years, of generating responses permitting the broadening of defensive struggles and of indicating a central political outlet. But the formations of the far left, like the MES (Mavimento de Esquerda Socialista - Left Socialist Movement) and the PCP-R (Partido Comunista Portugués -Reconstruido - Portuguese Communist party-Reconstructed), on the basis of an analysis centering all characterization of the period on the threat of fascism, logically develop a campaign the backbone of which is formed by the themes of the "antifascist struggle, " even though there are still important political differences among these organizations. Thus, the MES writes in an editorial in its newspaper, Poder Popular: "The basic combat front against fascism is the front of the masses, the organization and unity of the people for the resistance that makes possible a new rise in popular initiative... The fascist threat is not holding backy it is fighting! Against the maneuvers of the fascists and the imperialists - unity, action, and struggle! Unity of the people against fascism, for people's power." (April 5, 1976.) In addition, the MES does not put forward any concrete perspective capable of acting as a mediation toward an initial centralizafion of the response to the offensive of the employers. It maintains silence about the necessity of a democratic congress of the trade unions. It is opposed to tendency rights in the trade unions, with all the implications. this entails both for the unification of the ranks of the workers and for breaking the bureaucratic policy of the CP within the Intersindical. This "hostility" to the right of tendency may be linked to its conception of the relationship between the political parties and the "organs of popular power. * Finally, the MES avoids the question of a government slogan that takes account of the attachment of the masses to the reformist parties, the relationship of forces between the workers parties and the bourgeoisie, the necessity of unifying the ranks of the proletariat, and the demands and needs of the toilers. Thus, the MES gives no clear answer to a question that is being debated constantly during the electoral campaign. The PCP-R, which has gained strength organizationally during the latest period, and its front, the UDP (União Democrática Popular - Popular Democratic Union), attributes the following role to the electoral campaign: "The electoral campaign must be transformed into a high point in the struggle of the Portuguese people for Freedom, Bread, Land, and National Independence, against the two superpowers and European imperialism. . . It is essential to center the electoral campaign against the fascist threat and against poverty." (Resolution of the PCP-R Central Committee, Bandeira Vermelha, April 1, 1976.) For the PCP-R, the essential thing seems to be the development of its front, the UDP; thus, the second wave of unionization and all the related problems cannot be taken into consideration as central concerns. In the rather long Central Committee resolution, there is not even any mention of the trade-union question.
Nevertheless, the PCP-R, in the heat of its electoral campaign "against the fascist threat, " does put forward a governmental slogan: "An antifascist and patriotic government that guarantees the people's conquests, that firmly opposes fascism and respects the liberty of the people, a government of national independence that breaks the imperialist alliances and transforms Portugal into a country independent of the superpowers, nonaligned, with close relations with the third world."
From March to November 1975 the maturation of the political situation confronted these organizations with a multitude of complex political problems. The political origin of these organizations is recent and they have taken root in a workers movement with limited
Marxist and communist traditions, one rarely affected by strategic debates (apart from those related to the
"Sino-Soviet conflict). Thus, a process of maturation on various questions, which was forcefully posed by reality (workers control, self-organization), was combined with ultraleftist competition traced out by the effects of the rapid revolutionary upsurge on organizations with short political histories. This latter aspect was revealed above all in the orientation toward the reformists (characterization of the SP, united front), but also in their understanding of the nature of the revolutionary upsurge, dual power, etc. The retreat provoked by November 25 intervened in the political development of these organizations, If is now pushing them onto the reassuring" terrain of "antifascism" and is slowing down the critical assimilation of the previous experiences, even though an interesting discussion (too often suddenly halted by the leadership) has marginally arisen in their ranks. A latent crisis Although November 25 will certainly find expression in the electoral results, its reflection threatens to be quite hazy. A shift to the right (after the 58.7 percent of the vote won by the reformist workers parties and the far-left organizations in the elections a year ago) would have to be massive for the electoral results to become a direct lever in the accentuation of the attack of the employers and the government aimed at allotting new political territory to the bourgeoisie. Not only is a very clear shift in the vote (reducing the share of the workers parties to less than 45 percenf) far from assured, but also and above all, even an important shift could lead to an electoral relationship of forces relatively divorced from the relationship of social forces, as is indicated by the initial new rise in the workers response. To then form a PPD-CDS government and throw the SP and CP jointly into the opposition would Imply opting for a short-term test of social and political strength. This possibility is certainly not regarded with equal serenity by all the currents of the ruling class. Even if it was arithmetically possible, the risk that would be entailed in such a choice is obvious, especially given the country's proximity to Spain, where the workers have already defeated the reformist projects of Franco-
These elections will also test the balance of forces within the bourgeois camp, with the function of disengaging an alternative for a subsequent phase. In this sense, an electoral boost in the strength of the CDS compared with last year (a strengthening fied to the modification of the attitude of sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and to their organization) would suggest the party of Freito do
Amaral as the political axis of the counterrevolution, with consequent ramifications in the military camp. ENCONTRO
NACIONAL
Freito do Amaral addressing a conference of the CDS. Behind the reassuring electoral declarations, the feeling that these elections "will settle nothing" is predominant in the Portuguese bourgeois press today. This crisis of leadership will certainly be manifested in the discussion that will take place around the choice of one or several presidential candidates. An SP government, in consonance with the wishes of Soares but contrary to his illusions, would be only a government of crisis. Likewise, after a period of a vacuum of power, there could be a restoration of the governmental status quo (an SP-PPD coalition government, presented as a "government of national salvation") in order to get the rank and file of the parties to accept it more easily. A "nafional salvation" that certain officers would like to be different. April 8, 1976 FOOTNOTES:
1. Mario Soares, Portugal, quelle révolution? (interviews with D. Pouchin-Calmann Levy).
2. For the positions of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI - Internationalist Communist League), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, see INPRECOR, No. 47/48, April 1, 1976, In our next issue we will publish an extract from the LCI's electoral platform,
13
ON THE COORDINACION
On March 26 a new organization, the Coordinación Democrática (Democratic Coordination) was founded in Madrid. The new body assembles two opposition bodies that have existed in Spain for several years: The Junta Democrática (Democratic Council) and the Plataforma de Convergencia
Democrática (Platform of Democratic Convergence). These two organizations have been joined by the Christian Democracy of Ruy Giménez, who signed for the Democratic Left pending ratification
The Junta Democrática had been founded on July 30, 1974, in Paris. Initiated by the Communist party, it included the Carlist party and the Popular Socialist party. It called for the utilization of peaceful means to wage "national democratic action" "at the opportune polifical fime."
The Plataforma was created a year later, in the summer of 1975, Initiated by the PSOE (Spanish
Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy), it included the Basque Nationalist party, the
Democratic Left, the MCE (Communist Movement of Spain), the ORT (Revolutionary Workers Organization), the Carlist party, and the Spanish Social Democratic Union. It called for the "open-
Below we are publishing the text of the founding declaration of the Coordinación Democrática.
In addition, we are publishing a communiqué on the Coordinación issued March 31 by the Liga
Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi to Askatasuna-VI (LCR/ETA-VI - Revolutionary Communist
League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress), sympathizing organization of the Fourth
Coordinación Democrática