provisional government of the second Republic of Portugal, General Spínola fired all his ministers. A plebescite against elections This governmental crisis opened officially on July 3, when Prime Minister Palma Carlos announced his intention to resign. One day later, Palma shed some light on what he was planning. He proposed that the elections scheduled to to held in March 1975 be postponed for two years and that presidential elections -- that is, a plebescite on Spínola -- be arranged in the shortest possible time, preferably within a month. Then, with a "legal" president of the republic in power, going ahead with elections would be more acceptable.
ranean, a position that is now controlled by British imperialism and forms, along with Gibraltar and Malta, a military chain along the old route to the Indies. The American fleet has only one base in the region, in Greece. The political personnel that were allied with the United States are in power, while those supported by Britain are in opposition or in exile in London, the old power that had held Greece in its grip. With the new agreements with Egypt and the reopening of the Suez Canal, Washington needs strategic bridgeheads in addition to Israel to support its political strategy in the region.
From the Turkish side, the aggravation of the latent crisis of relations with the United States could provoke a revision of the various military treaties, with serious consequences for imperialism, particularly after the appearance on the Turkish political scene of young officers sensitive about national independence. The Soviet Union is also standing by and is especially concerned with the course of events in that the ability of the Russian fleet to circulate freely in the eastern Mediterranean and to pass through the Dardanelles may be challenged by future developments in Cyprus. Athens and Washington were working seriously to make that challenge a reality. Hence the pro-Turkish attitude taken by the Kremlin when Turkish troops invaded Cyprus. But it is on the internal Greek situation that the consequences of the Cyprus coup will be the most spectacular and immediate. The failure of the attempt at enosis was an internal defeat for the junta that strongly encouraged the popular masses who had mobilized against the first dictatorship in October and November. After the cease-fire in Cyprus, the European and American regimes were especially concerned to replace the Athens regime with a civilian government as quickly as possible. This had to involve the resignation of the junta. Already during the crisis a new Greek bourgeois leadership was coming to the fore, with many political figures putting out appeals for national unity, for support of the "fatherland in danger, and other such nonsense. It is only nine months since the Athens uprising of November 1973 and the Greek masses are not dormant. Their struggle has only just begun. THE SECOND DROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT The representatives of the Communist and Socialist parties in the provisional government opposed the maneuvers of Spínola and Palma Carlos and refused to resign. Faced with this refusal, Spínola dumped the whole provisional government. He then tried to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Firmino Miguel, the former defense minister with whom he had "worked" in Guinea-Bissau, as head of the new provisional government. The military presence within the government was to be strengthened, for purposes that were well described by the correspondent of the Financial Times of London: "It is expected that among the ministries that the armed forces will take over will be that of labour -- to overcome the growing chaos in industry -- and information, which will mean a harder line against the leftist press. " (July 12.) It is therefore evident that these military men were not supposed to come from the most "demo-
7
PORTUGAL cratic" wing of the Armed Forces Movement. Under Spínola's project, this introduction of officers closest to his views into key posts did not necessarily involve eviction of the representatives of the CP and the SP. Spinola was certainly prepared to satisfy and soothe the SP and CP by offering them governmental posts, which in any case was the only way to assure the coalition government of a certain social base. The July 10 meeting between Costa Gomes, Spínola, and Cunhal was certainly not unrelated to this maneuver by the chief of the junta. The desire to dispense with the "electoral test" is explainable by the fear of big financial capital and the junta that they would be confronted by a CP and SP victory in March 1975. The bourgeoisie has not yet been able to construct a political instrument at all capable of opposing the left parties. Their only chance for success would be a plebescite-type operation for or against Spinola. Postponing the elections -- assuming that they take place at all -- was therefore supposed to gain more time for organizing the Peoples Democratic party of Sá Carneiro and Magalhaes Mota. But that does not seem so easy, especially since the rise of peasant struggles threatens to loosen the grip this formation might hope to maintain over the rural regions. SP and CP opposition mounted against what the Socialist daily República called "Operation Palma Carlos. " On July 11 the SP for the first time demanded the "recognition of GuineaBissau, "because it thought it had the elements of an agreement in hand. But opposition to Spínola's nomination of Firmino Miguel as prime minister and to the rejection of elecfions was manifested also (and especially) within the "coordinating committee" of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM). The effectiveness of this opposition was demonstrated when Firmino Miguel was pushed aside and Vasco Gonçalves, one of the most influential members of this "coordinating committee, " came forward. Vasco Goncalves, who met successively with Cunhal, Soares, and Sá Carneiro, formed a government within which "all the military ministers ... are AFM members, except for the minister of defense, as Brigadier General Carvalho declared." (Corriere della Sera, July 17.) The Socialists lose one post in this government, the minister of information, which had been held by Paul Rego, the minister who passed the law on the press. (See INPRECOR, No.3.) Nevertheless, the ministry of education is held by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, who is known as an SP sympathizer. The CP loses the ministry of labor, which went to an officer, Captain Da Costa Martins. In presenting the government, Vasco Gonçalves declared, according to the July 19 issue of the Italian CP daily l'Unita: "The process of democratization of the country must be such that the people can freely elect their representatives to a constituent assembly with equal opportunities for all currents." It thus appears that Spínola's maneuvers around a plebescite and the nomination of Firmino Miguel, who remains minister of defense, have failed. Opposition to this plan from the
"coordinating committee of the Armed Forces Movement" is at the root of this failure. The deep crisis in the army, the fear of combined operations by the most reactionary sectors of the army and their representatives in Angola and Mozambique, and the various options for "solving the colonial question" sparked the intervention of the "coordinating committee, " which decided to block Operation Palma Carlos.
The intensified grip of the AFM on the government cannot be interpreted as a take-over by a section of the army opting for a new military dictatorship or as a turn to the right. In the short term, it is rather the expression of the failure of the right-wing operation attempted by Sprnola and of an at-
8 tempt to apply the "democratic" program of the AFM. The measures taken in both Angola and Mozambique against various circles pressing for a solution completely opposed to independence and the adoption of the constitutional law of July 19 confirm this. (The July 19 law affirms the "recognition of the principle of self-determination with all its consequences, including acceptance of the independence of the overseas territories" and entails the "annulment" of article 1 Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau as "overseas provinces. ") of the constitution of 1933, the article that defined Angola, Nevertheless, it would be blindness not to consider the contradictory elements of the situation. First of all, illusions in the real nature and function of the army -- and the AFM -can only be bolstered, all the more so in that the CP and SP are sanctioning and supporting the military more firmly than ever. Secondly, the increased weight of the representatives of the AFM -- especially of ex-Captain Carvalho, who led the military operation of April 25 -- must be looked at through the perspective of future crises. While the AFM has quietly suggested that Cavalho's take-over of the leadership of the Lisbon military region is part of the process of weakening the positions of the most reactionary currents in the army (who had held a strong position in the capital), it is no less true that the task of the now-brigadier-general is none other than "intervening to guarantee respect for order and to maintain it. " While the press law was utilized to slap a 150,000 escudo fine on the right-wing newspaper Economy and Finance (the first censorship measure taken by the second provisional government), it is no less the case that this law will be used essentially to intervene against any far-left agitation and propaganda in the workers, anticolonial, and antimilitarist struggles. This is all the more clear in that it is certain that the present government will be racked by instability in the medium term. The contradiction between the "democratic" promises of the program of the AFM and the social and economic situation can only generate new crises. Once again the policy of the SP and CP in this context emerges as a factor bolstering the worst illusions. The crisis of the army in Angola and Mozambique can only intensify. Military units have been signing communiqués affirming that they recognize FRELIMO "as the only organization representing the people of Mozambique. " Various demonstrations have taken place in Mozambique. More than 2, 500 soldiers have refused to continue fighting. Instances of fraternization are more and more common. This crisis of the army -especially in Mozambique -- can only make Lisbon's negotiation tactics increasingly difficult. And an agreement with
Guinea-Bissau will intensify all these contradictions. Hence, it seems that the "process of decolonization" will have to be speeded up and will have to go further than Spinola predicted it would only a little more than a month ago.
As for the economic situation, it is anything but brilliant.
Unemployment is growing more and more rapidly. The unemployment figure given by the press is 150,000. The crisis of the construction industry, the decline in tourism (which has fallen 40 percent), and the closings of small- and medium- sized factories are accentuating the rise of unemployment.
Struggles against layoffs are breaking out again. The same is true of certain strikes that have been limited in breadth but high in political level, such as the strike in the Efacec electrical motor factory, where demands were raised not only on wages but on the work pace as well.
Given the inflation, which will not be halted so easily, and the unemployment, the response of the workers could well be an element that will be added in September to the crisis of the army. The road to elections may be less direct than Vasco
Gonçalves declared.