DEFEATS FOR
THE BANZER REGIME
• by LUIS ROCA C.
BOLIVIA The year 1976 began in a tense political atmosphere. In 1975 the economic and social problems facing the masses had intensified. Although the mosses mode important steps forward in their concrete struggle against the November 9 decrees, which had ordered a wage freeze and the dissolution of the trade unions, they still lacked a leadership to centralize their forces and struggles. The general consciousness of the workers expressed an opposition, a revolt, but without national or even sectoral cohesion. Hence, the explosions of protest that broke out remained fragmented and isolated and were thus unable to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, at the end of 1975 a strong tendency emerged among the masses: to breathe new life into the trade-union bodies that had been dissolved by the government, to defend the purchasing power of the wage-earners, under attack by inflation, and to contain the repression and demand the release of political prisoners and the return of those exiled, Two factors intensified the political tension: the government's contemptuous rejection of the demand for amnesty and Banzer's attitude of copitulation during negotiations with Chile over the opening of a corridor to the Pacific Ocean. Under these conditions, two conflies unfolded that mobilized important sectors of the masses and became transformed into real tests of strength on a national scale: the conflict in the Manaco factory and the conflict in the universities. For the first time, the dictatorship was faced with a real mobilization of the masses which constantly spread and deepened. Shaken by the scope of the confliets, it was compelled to give in, In both cases the test of strength resulted in victory for the masses.
The Manaco conflict
The Manaco factory is a shoe factory, a subsidiary of a
British trust that operates in Latin America under the name Bata. It was sef up in Bolivia thirty-five years aga and since then has constantly expanded its investments, cousing the bankruptcy of small companies (Plus Ultra,
Zamora, Tardio, etc.). During the MR government*
Manaco bought into the nationalized mines, benefiting from a sort of monopoly. Apart from its virtually absolute control of the domestic market, this company has specialized in the manufacture of deluxe shoes for export, especially to Europe, taking advantage of the low prices for raw materials and the cheap labor supply.
Concurrently with the expansion of this company and with the power it acquired within the country, a combative proletariat developed within it. Although not very numerous (slightly more than a thousand workers), this proletariat nevertheless had a clear revolutionary consciousness. The role of these workers within the industrial proletariat as a whole may be compared to that of the Siglo XX-Catavi workers among the miners. When the dictatorship began destroying the workers organiza-
*The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR -
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement), whose best-known leader was Victor Paz Estenssoro, governed the country from 1952 to 1964. 18 tions in August 1971, the Manaco workers became an advanced bastion of defense of the interests and rights of the proletariat. With exemplary tenacity and courage, they opposed the measures of the government and the employers, which were breaking the demands of the industrial workers. The factory management complained that the Manaco workers engaged in seventeen strikes during this period. It was thus that Manaco acquired a vanguard position among the industrial proletariat. While the Manaco workers were winning the sympathy of the toiling masses, they were also attracting the hatred of the fascist officers, the exploiting bourgeoisie, and Imperialism. When a problem came up in one of the departments of the factory, this coalition decided that the time had come to subdue, defeat, and destroy this advanced nucleus of the industrial proletariat. The employers had resolved to introduce "reforms" in the factory aimed of increasing production and thus aggravating working conditions. Resistance to these changes began in the cutters workshop, in Circle 423. Sixty machines were functioning there and the management eliminated ten of them; thus, the work pace was stepped up in consonance with the reduction in the number of machines, an attempt to achieve the same production as before. The workers said: "In this way we do not even have the time to wipe our brows and we are more exhausted than before. " They demanded the return to the previous work system, but management refused. The intention of the employers was clear: increase producfion with the some number of workers and the same wages, but with a reduction in technical facilities.
The workers did not accept these measures of superexploitation, and that is how the conflict began.
On January 13, Circle 423 went on strike. Four days later the whole factory walked out in solidarity. Events then moved of an extraordinary pace. The speed with which the struggle deepened was a product of the policy of repression implemented by the company and the government. A few hours after it began, the labor authorities declared the strike illegal and ordered the workers to go back to work within twenty-four hours. When the deadline ran out, the company laid off 820 workers, denying them all the social compensation provided for by law in cases of indefinite layoff.
The company intended to crush the workers, depriving them of any material possibility of survival. It wanted to take advantage of the conflict to carry out an 80 percent turnover in personnel, for the workers were considered too militant. In the history of Bolivian trade unionism, this procedure is comparable to that decreed in 1947 by the Enrique Hertzog government, whose cabinet of "National Unity" authorized the layoff of 5,000 miners of Siglo XX-Catavi. These workers had had the audacity to form their own unions and to confront the power of the Patifo Mining Company. This cabinet of
National Unity was composed of representatives of the oligarchy and of the Stalinist party of the time, the
PIR.* This party, which developed a line of class collaboration and upheld the theory of revolution by stages according to the Stalinist concept, is today cooperating with the gorilla dictatorship of Banzer. But times have changed, and in spite of the presence of the fascist gorillas in power, resistance to partial measures has a snowball effect. Around the Manaco conflict, the causes of which appeared simple and routine, the country began to vibrate and the social forces polarized. The federations of private employers supported the company management and waged a campaign of propaganda and intimidation in the press and on the radio. Then the political police and the Seventh Division of the army mobilized to bring the Manaco workers to reason, But the workers resisted the attack, basing themselves on the solidarity of the peasants, the workers, and the university students. The proletarian response was ropid and decisive. The miners of Siglo XX and Catavi stopped work and asked the Miners Federation to decree a twenty-four-hour strike. This took place on Monday, January 26, and affected 45,000 miners in the nationalized, private, and cooperative mines. Motions of solidarity from the clandestine peasant movement were sent to the Manaco workers. During vigorous and violent demonstrations, the miners of Catavi-Siglo XX decided to sent 10 BolivTan pesos per head to support the Manaco workers. The FSTMB (Federación Sindical de Trabajodores Mineros de Bolivia - Trade Union Federation of Mineworkers of Bolivia) decided to intervene and close all Manaco sales outlets in the mines, declaring a boycott. At the same time, 20,000 students of La Paz and Cochabamba joined the twenty-four-hour strike. It must also be added that the Manaco conflict had an impact on the sectors most tightly controlled by the dictatorship, such as the manufacturing industry of La Paz. The union delegates appointed by the government were ousted and rank-and-file committees arose in factories larger than Manaco, such as Soligno, Said, Fateja, Plasmar, Inmetal, and Plastic. The construction workers and graphic arts workers took the initiative in organizing a work assembly of the three sectors (workers, peasants, students) to analyze the Manaco strike and launch a campaign of solidarity. The workers, peasants, and students understood that the conflict went beyond the limits of Manaco and had become a test of strength between the masses on the one hand and the employers and the government on the other hand. Having understood this, they committed themselves to struggle. Manaco tried to intensify the repression by calling on the army. But the goverment was afraid and hesitated. Then the Manaco employen played their last card, ordering a total lockout. On the night of January 26 the employers made known their intention to close down the factory and transfer it to another location. Rather than intimidating the workers, this maneuver ex*The Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left party) is a petty-bourgeois formation that arose during the 1940s and was dominated by Stalinist elements.
acerbated the conflict and entailed new consequences.
The Federation of Private Enterprise of the city of Santa Cruz asked Manaco to set itself up in that city; it offered the company political guarantees and assurances in addition to economic benefits. Thus, a new regional problem was stirred up going beyond the relations of capital and labor and involving other sectors of the population as well. The response of the workers was not long in coming: "Let the bosses get out of the factory; the installations shall remain; not one screw will be moved!" The nationalization of Manaco and the creation of a cooperative was demanded, with the support of broad popular layers. The management of the factory had gone too far! The bourgeoisie and its dictatorship were afraid. They saw the danger of the situation getting completely out of control. Thus, the anti-worker offensive began to crumble. On January 27 the employers gave in and canceled the massive layoffs. The workers went back to work without any sanctions being taken against them, with the exception of thirteen of them who were accused by the Manaco management of being extremist agitators. A mixed commission (employers, workers, and the government) was named to study the situation. Finally, on January 29 a definifive agreement was reached favorably resolving the case of the thirteen workers, who in reality represented the de facto leadership of the Manaco workers. The company thus failed in its last attempt to destroy this central nucleus. The struggle was tough. The dictatorship used all the weapons at its command: It arrested militants, persecuted the workers, denounced an alleged "subversive plot, ordered the intervention of the Seventh Division of the army. The minister of labor even came to Cochabamba and joined the military-police-employer "task force" that was meeting on a permanent basis, following the development of the conflict, In spite of all these maneuvers, the strike of nearly 70, 000 workers and students was decisive. The threat of even greater mobilizatiors, with the participation of other workers and people's forces, led the dictatorship and the employers to capitulate in order to avoid an even more violent political and social explosion. The workers are holding their position in the Manaco factory. But something has changed both at Manaco and on a national scale. The combative spirit of the masses has advanced; the consciousness that it is possible to win a battle against the dictatorship now exists. Even though the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana - Bolivian Workers Federation) is not functioning as a centralizing national leadership, the mobilizations around Manaco were united. This shows that strength, spirit of struggle, and desire for unity exist among the rank-and-file workers. The will to take hold of the unions and make them function despite the decrees of November 9, 1974, likewise exists. Future struggles will integrate this rich experience.
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BOLIVIA The struggle in the universities The dictatorship has been unable to subdue the universifies of the country, even though the student body and teaching corps had been purged after the triumph of the gorillas in 1971. After being closed for a year, the universities were reopened under a new strucfure. University autonomy was eliminated; the administrative authorities, the teaching corps, and the student leadership were directly appointed by the government. But once the new university system was enacted, it was not long before resistance was expressed and the struggle to recover lost gains was launched. But this process was neither automatic nor general. If began little by little in one department, then in another, then in a single university. The first struggles were isolated; logically, they posed the problem of the right of the students to directly elect their own leadership. These objectives sometimes appeared confused, lacking in orders of priority. It was not until the end of 1975 that the student movement engaged in more important mobilizations, comprehensive actions against the University Law. Nevertheless, there was no national coordination. Political maturity reached its highest point in La Paz and Cochabamba. The Manaco conflict had extraordinary repercussions among the students. They were struck by the strength of the mass movement and they considered themselves an active participant in the struggle. With the triumph of the Manaco proletariat the students gained confidence and launched a frontal battle, coordinated on a nafional scale. The student struggle thus asserted itself as a continuation of the workers struggle. Two days after the definitive accord of the Manaco struggle, 1,700 students of the architecture school of the University of La Paz (UMSA) went on strike. They denounced the arrests and decided to recognize the "Interdepartmental Committee" as a central student leadership for the whole university. They demanded the resignation of professors and assistants who had not passed through the "merit examinafion" and the "test of competence." The university authorifies and the minister of the interior called the student agitation subversive; they claimed that a plot to overthrow the government had begun at Manaco. They seized upon this pretext to imprison six student leaders. Colonel Manuel Ayoroa Montaño was likewise accused of conspiracy. On February 5 all were deported to Paraguay. Finally, the authorities threatened to close the university if the climate of agitation persisted. From this point on, the situation became aggravated. On the night of February 5 the University of La Paz was surrounded and an assembly was dissolved by police commandos. One hundred students were arrested, then released "after careful consideration, "according to the words of the minister of the interior himself. In fact, this meant after having been identified and booked.
The next day there were new clashes; the students opted for staggered strikes by department; the movement developed a cohesion and provided itself with a platform.
On February 7 the Interdepartmental Committee called upon the authorities of the UMSA to discuss the following demands:
*release of all student prisoners;
*return of the exiles;
*guarantees that the student organs would function;
*assurance of an effective professional system
(against favoritism);
*price reductions in the university cafeteria. The students took to the streets around these slogans. On February 9 the students of the medical school declared a twenty-four-hour strike and erected two barricades, blocking Saavedra Avenue, which runs right past the headquarters of the armed forces general staff. The civil engineering department and the sociology department joined the strike. The conflict spread from La Paz to Cochabamba and then to Sucre, where protest strikes took place against repression and in solidarity with La Paz. The Bolivian Catholic University joined the strike. Its leader was arrested on February 10. The CNES (Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior -National Council of Higher Education), whose president is the PIR Stalinist Mario Rolón Anala, tried to maneuver. It declared that it would agree to a dialogue, but claimed the right to select the university representatives. The Interdepartmental Committee rejected this fraud and agreed to "an honest dialogue with its representafives. " In Cochabamba the conflict had interesting consequences. The student center of the law school carried out an inquiry among the students of the school. The results were as follows:
*92,85% of the students rejected the present educational system imposed by the dictatorship through the CNES;
*4.65% agreed with this system;
*2.48% did not respond. The law professors responded to this inquiry with an unlimited strike and demanded trials and disciplinary measures against the student leaders. On February 12 in La Paz, after an assembly, the students took to the streets. On the "Avenue July 16" they were attacked by the police, who used dogs, clubs, and armored cars. A forty-eight-hour strike was called. In face of a situation that was becoming increasingly tense, the authorities declared that they were prepared to engage in a dialogue with the Interdepartmental Committee, but would regard the Committee's members as rank-and-file students and not as the leadership of the struggle. On Tuesday, February 17, violence mounted. There were new confrontations around the University of La Paz; at 12:30 in the afternoon the students built barricades blocking Villazón Avenue; they were violently repressed. The police were not sufficiently numerous, so specialized army troops were called out (dressed in civilian clothes), who attacked the students with chains, clubs, and blackjacks. At 7:00 the students assembled again and even more violent clashes with the police occurred.
On Wednesday, February 18, there were new bloody clashes and mobilizations. The police opened fire, and the students responded with Molotov cocktails. The University of La Paz was closed.
Two hundred thirty students, forty of whom remain in prison as of this writing, were arrested. During this time, a national assembly of student leaderships met in Cochabamba. This assembly tried to unify the struggle on a national scale. It put forward a forty-eight-hour deadline for opening a dialogue with the CNES. The discussions would no longer occur on a regional level, but would henceforth take place with the national authorities. When the forty-eight-hour deadline ran out, the country's nine universities went on unlimited strike. The students asked for the mediation of the church, the press, and the radio. Banzer denounced the existence of a plot led by ex-president J.J. Torres and Major Ruben Sánchez, he asserted that the government would accept no mediation. The closing of the UMSA brought on forty-eight-hour protest strikes in the universities of Oruro, Potost, and Sucre. After an assembly, the BolivTan Catholic University "invited the students of the UMSA to attend classes in its campus while their university is closed. " It then issued a deadline for the reopening of the UMSA; if this was not done, it would decide on other measures to take. In the meantime, the miners federation called for a general strike to support the students and accused the government of being incapable of resolving the problems of the students, since it relied on repressive violence. The miners' resolution concluded as follows: *1. Decree a twenty-four-hour protest strike in all the mining districts of the country beginning at seven o'clock in the morning February 21. 2. Firmly condemn the closing of the UMSA. 3. Support the initiative of the press and the radio aimed at reestablishing talks to resolve the problem. 4. Demand the immediate release of all students arrested." The peasants also supported the students. The peasant Federations of the provinces of Omasuyos, Los Andes, Ingavi, and Camacho condemned the government and proclaimed in a special document: "The living and representative forces of the country must be prepared to give their support to the students, who are struggling for the defense of rights and liberty in the educational system and in professional work. " They denied the authority of the peasant federation controlled by the government, for this body did not include the peasants. Finally, they attacked the single agricultural tax. The National Confederation of Liberal Professions and the Episcopal Conference also condemned the closing of the UMSA. The government responded to all this with increased repression. The University of Potosi was shut down. Several students and military officers opposed to the regime (Colonel Raúl López Leyton and José Patifo Ayoroa, former minister of urban affairs under Banzer) were accused of conspiracy and deported to Chile. The right and the left were accused of conspiring together. but he was publicly threatened with deportation. The conflict had reached its most critical point. Three thouoccupied the cathedral and continued the strike. The students of the Catholic University also started a hunger strike and installed themselves in the headquarters of the archibishop of La Paz. The Manaco factory declared a twenty-four-hour strike. The miners federation brought out a new document and announced new measures of solidarity with the students. That was on February 26. The next day the government began to give in. The CNES took to the airwaves to consult the authorities of the nine universities about a dialogue and was authorized to begin that dialogue. The Ministry of the Interior and the CNES began to give in at the Catholic University and came to an agreement to terminate the strike at the archbishop's headquarters. The proposals were as follows: 1. The students of the Bolivian Catholic University would be released immediately. 2. Rapidly, by March 1, the Ministry of the Interior would examine, case by case, the status of the arrested students and would commit itself to releasing those not involved in incidents of violence. 3. The Ministry of the Interior would hand the dossiers on those students not released over to the regular courts. 4. The CNES would guarantee the opening of a dialogue, which would begin on Monday, March 1.
BOLIVIA The government was beginning to capitulate; it did so before the church and not the students, but it amounted to the same thing. The official front dissolved. On the night of February 27 fifty-three students were released. There remained only seven, accused of "extremism, " who would be handed over to the regular courts. But although the dialogue began on March 1, the final accord was not yet reached. The government resisted, opposing the accord. The student representatives and the members of the CNES held extremely heated discussions. The critical point related to the release of the students. On March 4 the negotiations were broken off and the conflict began again. A large group of students from the University of La Paz came to the archbishop's headquarters and began a hunger strike again, The miners of Catavi-Siglo XX went on strike for three days and the miners federation reaffirmed its unconditional support for the students. It threatened to launch a national mobilization. The firm attitude of the mineworkers swept away the last resistance of the government. The dialogue began again the following day and finally, on March 6, the university conflict came to an end, The agreement that was reached was as follows: 14 The CNES committed itself to undertaking initiatives to obtain the release of the students within two weeks. It also promised to negotiate with the minister of the inferior about the return of the exiled students. 2. The process of democratization of the student leaderships in all the universities of the country would begin with the election and renewal of the Professional and Departmental Student Centers beginning in June of this year. This included reopening of their officers, restitution of their property, and release of the funds of the student organizations without imposing retroactive taxes on them. 3. The authorities (the Ministry Uf Education and the
CNES) would guarantee the functioning of the representative bodies of the students. 4. The prolongation of the second semester of 1975-76 at the Universities of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Potosi would last until April 19.
5. The beginning of the first semester of 1976 was set
For May 3 in these universities.
6. All the instructors provisionally appointed must submit to the "merit examination" and "test of competence";
the participation of the students in verifying the holding of these tests was granted, The reform of the educational system would be formulated by a commission composed of instructors, students, and the CNES; the reforms will have to be approved by the CONUB (National Congress of Bolivian Universities).
7. The maintenance of the polytechnical schools and the departments of humanities and education in the Bolivian university structure was guaranteed; the number of technical institutes will be increased.
8. Student participation in the student welfare departments of universities was agreed to.
9. The decision made by the CNES and the Conference of Deans in December 1975 to allot 2 percent of the university budget to the Catholic University will have to be ratified by the students.
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This agreement was signed by twenty-one student delegates, as well as by the president of the CNES and six of its voting members. The seven arrested students came before the regular courts and were released soon after by the judge. The question of the exiled students has not yet been answered. The struggle for their return continues and will probably be launched again, on the basis of the experiences recently accumulated, when the new school year starts in the fall. Government counteroffensive Although these conflicts ended with the defeat of the state, the dictatorship is now reorganizing its forces. If is intensifying repression against the revolutionary organizations, especially the POR-Combate (Partido Obero Revolucionario - Revolutionary Workers party, Bolivian section of the Fourth International), the ELN (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional - National Liberation Army) and the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario - Revolutionary Left Movement). Several militants of these parties have been arrested, their houses and apartments have been ransacked and turned into police centers of repression, Warnings have been published in the press banning the renting of houses to leftist opponents of the regime under pain of prosecution. The campaign against the revolutionary leaders being waged on the radio, in the press, and through posters has been intensified. Rewards have been offered to informers. The dictatorship has to put its own ranks in order, for the conflicts at Manaco and with the students have had a big impact, During these confrontations the "institutionalist" sector of the army and some high officers were imprisoned, In order to cut down on the influence of this sector, a "Command Assembly" of the large and small military units throughout the country was convoked. On this occasion, the High Command, Banzer, and his ministers tried to explain their projects and political orientation. After three days of secret deliberations, they obtained the support of the armed forces for the government. Nevertheless, signs of disagreement are already being manifested on the question of access to the Pacific Ocean. The military chiefs recognize that a definitive agreement with Chile will not be reached without popular consultation. It is obvious that there are contradictions within the armed forces and that oppositions are arising constantly. The mobilization of the masses and the defeat of the government have undoubtedly exacerbated these tensions. Finally, in order to try to limit the expression of its social isolation, the dictatorship has organized "spontaneous popular concentrations. " They began in the regime's bastion, Santa Cruz; later they were held in
Ucureña (Cochabamba), the peasant center where the agrarian reform was signed in 1953, and then in La Paz.
They have been held in all the provincial capitals. The employees of the public sector, the merchants of the
marketplaces, and the whole civilian bureaucracy of the armed forces have been compelled to mobilize. The "masses" are transported to one place or another by train, truck, and bus. These demonstrations of "spontaneous support" have cost very dearly. But the government needs to hold these demonstrations in order to maintain its image abroad. To calm the impatience of discontented elements in the army, the government has to make a demonstration of its "strength. " But these demonstrations are so artificial and fragile that they cannot even stand up under a light rain! In La Paz, for example, Banzer had to make his speeches to an audience composed of his own bodyguards because the "people" he had assembled did not want to get wet! This does not mean that the dictatorship is on the point of collapse; it still commands rather broad room to maneuver. It receives much money from imperialism and its institutions in the form of loans and gifts, which enable it to finance many public investments, particularly in roads and construction of housing. But above all, it can maintain its enormous repressive apparatus. The weakness of the revolutionary leadership, which needs time to recover from the blows it has suffered, is another factor prolonging the life of the dictatorship. Balance-sheet and perspectives The conflicts of Manaco and the universities express a new stage in the political maturity of the Bolivian masses. The defeat of the dictatorship during these mobilizations builds the confidence of the masses in their own strength. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go. The level of political maturity is very uneven; some sectors are in the vanguard, while others have not yet broken with the control of the government. The former must address themselves to the latter in order to stimulate their combativity. A struggle has already been launched to assure the functioning of a trade-union movement, with democratically elected leaderships, in order to breathe new life into the COB and the other national trade-union federations, This mobilization to force the dictatorship to respect the democratic rights of the masses constitutes the primordial task. Nevertheless, this struggle is linked to the fight for other social and economic gains, especially the elimination of the wage freeze and the defense of the living standard of the masses, In reality, these two demands are part of the struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship. The weakest point, apart from the unevenness of political maturity, remains the problem of the unity of the workers movement, the left parties and organizations. Only this would be able to avert the development of fragmentary struggles having varying objectives. The reanimation of the movement of mineworkers, which has recently overcome the obstacles of lack of national coordination, must be seized upon as the point of departure for overcoming these weaknesses. It is in this direction that revolutionary Marxists must work. The next miners congress, which will be held in Corocoro at the beginning of May, must attempt to go beyond the limits of the mining sector itself and pose the totality of the problems of the masses of the country. If it does this it can offer an outlet, a perspective, and arm all the people politically in such a way as to unify their forces to overthrow the dictatorship and lead them on the road to socialism. It is for this reason that it must be a "little national congress" of the Bolivian masses. Throughout the two mobilizations, that of Manaco and that of the students, victory appeared possible because the conflicts were broadened and new forces were drawn into struggle. It is necessary to assimilate the methods used to extend a conflict that is initially local and to popularize it in order to win the support of other sectors of workers and students. Likewise, the primary objective of the students must be to make their university problems known so that they may be discussed by the worker masses in order to obtain their support, That is the current stage of the struggle. Further stages will produce a more centralized mass movement with a single leadership and a common program that assembles all the partial conflicts and offers them a perspective of political power. Revolutionary Marxists must prepare themselves for this by integrating themselves into the mass movement and by acting as its vanguard. March 31, 1976