Palestinian Resistance Faces Critical Choices
_ by SELIM ACCAWI. After sixteen months of bitter battles, the situation in Lebanon is now ripe for the realization of a reactionary peace. The Arab regimes are stepping up their diplomatic initiatives and political pressure in order to be able to reap the fruit of the military plot they have been perpetrating against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left for eight months now. None of the objectives of the first civil war (April 1975January 1976) had been achieved. The resistance had emerged from the test more powerful than before; it held absolute control not only of the Palestinian camps but also of a good number of Lebanese neighborhoods. Besides, the military regime the Christian right had sought to establish did not exist; in fact, the Lebanese army itself crumbled under the weight of confessional dissensions and the Lebanese state wos disintegrating.
The failure of this war, the major objective of which was to militarily (and hence politically) cut the Palestinian resistance down to size in order to facilitate the realization of a number of partial accords between Israel and the Arab regimes, had opened the way for a different war, one waged by the Arab regimes to bring the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to heel. The disagreements between the Palestinian leaderships and the Syrian regime, which had hitherto appeared secondary, suddenly came to the fore. Syria, which is seeking to work out an overall agreement to end the Arab-Israeli crisis, proposed the establishment of a SyroJordanian-Palestinian confederation as a solution to the "Palestinian problem" and demanded the acceptance, or rather the total obedience, of the PLO leodership. The past four months of the civil war may be characterized os a period of bitter military and political struggle by the resistance to preserve its independence of the Arab regimes. In the course of past weeks the vise has been tightened considerably. In the eyes of the PLO leadership, the only possible way to avoid extinction is to accept compromise. Since the fall of the Palestinian camp Tal elZaatar last August 12, the military fighting and political wrangling have revolved around the scope and weight of this compromise. The turn in the situation Following the series of military successes won by the Palestinian-progressive camp during the offensive of March 1976, the tide turned after the last quadripartite Arab summit, which was held last June 23 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, attended by Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Before this summit what had somewhat reassured the Palestinian leaders was the relative isolation of the Syrian regime, both internally and especially in the Arab world, for Damascus was waging its reactionary offensive alone and the Arab bourgeoisies had hitherto odopted a position of "neutrality" in the conFlict. But the relationship of forces turned around completely after this summit. After June 23 isolation was the lot of the Palestinian resistance and its Lebanese allies. It is probable that Saudi reaction had already decided to support the Syrian crusade politically and financially even before that date, but it was on June 23 that the facts became absolutely clear. In their majority, the Arab regimes would support with all necessary means the effort at pacification undertaken in Lebanon by the dedicated Syrian regime. While Syrian President Hafez el-Assad left Riyadh reassured, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left made the sad discovery that even the relationship of military forces in the field no longer counted for much. Completely isolated politically and dependent primarily on the active support of the Arab regimes, these forces were not at all able to turn the situation around by winning new military victories, especially since it was becoming increasingly difficult to make new breakthroughs because of the striking force thrown against the anti-reactionary forces by the Syrian regime. The tactic adopted by the leadership of the resistance after June 23 was to resist in the field without occupying any new sectors and to intensify political initiatives and public appeals aimed at "convincing" Saudi Arabia and the other Arab regimes to adopt a less "negative" attitude. During the last month of resistance in Tal elZaatar, while the fighters of the camp were waging a determined struggle, no offensive of any real scope was launched by the resistance or the left to reduce military pressure on the camp. Yassir Arafat, leader of the PLO, refused to take any measure that would definitively burn his bridges to the bourgeoisies of the region. He preferred to address appeals to the "various Arab kings and governments" asking them to intervene to stop Palestinian blood from being shed in Lebanon. The effect of this policy was exactly the opposite of what was hoped for by the Palestinian leaderships. The Arab regimes intervened in a manner that was clearly contrary to Palestinian interests, while the military pressure of the Syrian froops and the Lebanese reactionary forces mounted ceaselessly. The military situation today is extremely unfavorable to the resistance and the left. All the coastal Muslim or Palestinian enclaves in the Christian region have now fallen, The city of Tripoli in the northern part of the country is completely surrounded, while a maritime blockade has been imposed on it by the Syrian fleet. A similar blockade has been clamped on the ports of Sidon and Tyre in the south by the Israeli fleet, which leaves no possibility for the anti-reactionary forces to communicate with the outside. The only sectors in the Christian zone still occupied by Palestinian-progressive fighters amount to a few villages of Mount Lebanon. Military and political pressures have been brought to bear to have these regions evacuated as quickly as possible. But the most serious aspect of the situation is the behavior of the inhabitants of the Muslim neighborhoods of the capital. Thousands of families have fled Beirut during the past two months. The popular neighborhood of Shiyah, where 100,000 people lived before the outbreak of the civil war, is now virtually empty of civilian population. This massive exodus is of course due in part to unemployment and the general state of insecurity that reigns in Beirut, but it is also a reflection of the growing depoliticization of the population, a result of the militarist view of the civil war held by the Palestinian and Lebanese leoderships. With this exodus, the antireactionary forces not only lose direct support which they most urgently need; in addition, the inhabitants who flee the combat zones generally completely abandon the cause they had supported up to then and aspire only for the return of peace at any price. This state of affairs is aggravated by the incredible state of privation that prevails in these sectors, whereas the Christian regions, which are in contact with the outside, are now receiving all the products of basic necessity at relatively accessible prices.
LEBANON
Is an agreement possible?
After first hoping for a pure and simple withdrawal of
Syrian troops in Lebanon and after then trying to gain time in the hope that there would be a turn in the Arab world, the Palestinian leaderships were finally driven to accept the principle of making a basic compromise with the Syrian regime. What the latter is demanding is no more or less than recognition by the resistance of the legitimacy of the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, as well as acceptance of a relative demilitarization of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the right of the Lebanese state (and through it the Syrian state) to exercise control over the Palestinians in Lebanon, and the permanent non-interference of the Palestinians in the affairs of the Lebanese state. All these points are mentioned in the agreement signed by the Syrian regime and the ledership of the PLO in Damascus last July 29. This accord also includes clauses concerning the application of a cease-fire in Lebanon, which has not yet been applied in reality. Assad issued an ultimatum to the resistance calling upon it to accept an agreement with the Christian right before September 5 or the Syrian troops would launch a new offensive, more severe than the previous ones, and would impose peace (sic) throughout Lebanon. This ultimatum has since been repeated in various forms. Beyond the bluster, the threat is clear. The Syrian guns will not be lowered so long as the Palestinian leaderships have not completely submitted to Syrian will. In the wake of the fall of Tal el-Zaatar, bilateral negofiations were opened between the Fateh leadership and the Phalangist party. The PLO also approved the call for an Arab summit to "examine the situation in Lebanon. "According to the latest information, the Palesfinians would be prepared to withdraw from the zones they occupy in the Lebanese mountains "if this step guarantees peace in Lebanon. Why is it taking so long for an agreement fo be applied? The Christian right, strengthened by its recent successes, is obviously seeking to bolster its advantage. But the greatest obstacles come from the Palestino-progressive camp itself. The Palestinian lederships have still not tuled out the possibility of the Syrians' softening the ir conditions and they are herefore trying to stall for time. But above all, these leaderships have to face strong opposition from the rank and file, regardless of the character of the Palestinian organizations. The rank and file of these organizations have nothing to gain from such accords and they are correct to wonder what was the point of so many months of fierce resistance and privation. The July 29 accord with Damascus has run into very strong criticism even from the rank and file of Fateh. There are rumors of disagreements within the leadership of Fateh. In fact, however, a division of labor has recently been established within this leadership, the aim being to muddle things up and delude the Palestinian Fighters about the leadership's real intentions. Thus, at the moment when two members of the Fateh Central Committee were meeting with the Phalangists, one of the other leaders of the organization, Abu 20 lyad, issued a stinging declaration attacking not only
Syria, but all the Arab regimes without exception. But the time when such maneuvers could succeed has past.
There is no doubt that the content of the future accord on the crisis in Lebanon will be kept completely secret from the Lebanese and Palestinian masses. Only a few general or secondary points will be published. Nevertheless, the Palestinion leaderships must also deal with strong pressure from their Lebanese allies, who have everything to lose from an agreement reached under the present circumstances. The Syrian regime, the other Arab regimes, and the Lebanese Christian right have refused to negotiate with the Lebanese left and consider that the only valid representatives of the regions not controlled by the reactionary Christian forces are the traditional leaders of the Sunni and Shiite bourgeoisie. Not only will the left not be included when the accords are reached, but there is a strong risk that it will be directly repressed, for there has been no guarantee, nor will there be, that left militants will not be repressed or even that they will be allowed to express themselves in the future. The Syrian peace now looming on the horizon will inc lude no place for freedom of expression or political action in opposition to the new regime. The left today feels that it is being "cut loose" by the leadership of the PLO. Militarily it can do nothing alone, for if is very much dependent on the resistance for all heavy arms and ammunition. When the Palestinian leaderships decide the time has come to make an agreement and stop the fighting and shelling, the left will have no choice but to go along. In any event, if is to be feared that the arguments of the left will not count for much when the PLO leadership decides to make peace with Syria. And the military and political weakening of the left will only isolate the Palestinion resistance still further and make it more vulnerable to the attacks and pressures of the Arab bourgeoisies. The Syrian regime will not back down so long as it has not achieved its reactionary objectives in Lebanon. And in view of the present relationship of forces in the Arab world, it now seems close to doing just that.
What future for the Palestinian resistance? Does the PLO leadership have any alternative to capitulation? At the beginning of the siege of Tal el-Zaatar, when the Arabo-Syrian entente became clear, Abu lyod made a public statement threatening the Arab regimes with a Palestinian response on an Arab-wide scale. Among other things, Abu lyod predicted that mass movements would arise and isolate the regimes that were attocking the interests of the Palestinians in one way or another. In fact, given the state of the civil war in Lebanon, the only way the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left could avoid suffocation would be to develop a popular movement of struggle in all the Arab countries. The great difficulty in carrying out this task today lies in the virtual impossibility of any brood movements of solidarity coming into existence spontaneously and without any preparation in countries in which the slightest manifestation of opposition is fiercely repressed. Unfortunately, the Palestinian resistance is now paying the price, and a very high price it is, for its erroneous conception of the liberation of Palestine. Palestinocentrism, refusal to pose the problem of national liberation in class terms, the complex of "non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab regimes, " and the constant concern of the various Palestinian organizations to develop "fraternal" and financially well greased relations with the Arab bourgeoisies instead of solidarizing with the movements and organizations struggling against these bourgeoisies have led to the gradual isolation of the resistance to the point that it must now stand alone against all its united enemies. The class nature of the Palestinian organizations and their leaderships, the existence of a powerful bureaucracy within these organizations, and the policy adopted by the Palestinian leaderships from the very beginning make a radical turn of the helm very difficult in the present circumstances. In the past, every time the resistance movement came under constraint from some Arab regime, the Palestinian leaders played on the contradictions among the various regimes and thus managed to extract themselves from the impasse. In fact, they walked the tightrope between these contradictions and postponed the crucial choice between the armed struggle and its implications on the one hand and the consequences of special relations with the Arab bourgeoisies on the other hand. When the Arab regimes, overcoming their contradictions and conflicts, organize the great coalition to subdue the Palestinian resistance, the Palestinian leaderships (because of their class nature, direct interests, and political line) are much more prepared to accept the implications of the new situation than they are to unleash a struggle against the Arab regimes, a struggle they have always refused to prepare and which would directly challenge not only their previous political line but also the very structures of the Palestinian organizations.
The official leadership of the resistance had already taken a decisive step in accepting the principle of a peaceful solution with the Zionist state (which had the effect of creating a Palestinian "Rejection Front"); now a new capitulation is being demanded by the Arab bourgeoisies: total fealty of the policy of the PLO to the direct interests of the bourgeois regimes of the region. If a Syrian peace is imposed in Lebanon, the cleavage between the official leodership of the PLO and the Rejection Front will no longer have any real implication in substance. The control demanded by the Syrian regime includes all the resistance organizations. Precautions will be taken to avoid any inclination to throw any monkey wrenches into the machinery. Throughout the civil war the Rejection Front has been materially Incapable of setting itself off from the official leaderships of the resistance, either through its political position or its initiatives. The basic structure of all the Palestinian organizations, their degree of politicization, and their composition are in general the same. An open offensive against the Syrian regime or the reactionary peace on the part of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine for example (the major organization of the Rejection Front) would entail a violent repression and a consequent move to underground conditions for which this organization, like all the others, is not at all prepared. It is highly unlikely that a peace will be established under the present conditions without strong opposition being manifested within the Palestinian organizations. Some leaderships (the Rejection Front) will probably criticize the terms of the accord, but the real opposifion will come from the rank and file of the organizations. This opposition, unstructured, fragmented, and proposing no real alternative of any scope, will have to confront well-structured leaderships possessing not inconsiderable means of "persuasion. " The strong point of this opposition will be its will to continue the struggle in spite of all difficulties. This opposition has already been manifested and will be manifested even more in the future through planting bombs and carrying out other acts of reprisal against the Arab regimes. But since this road can in no way offer a way out of the impasse, the question of drawing a balance-sheet of the past experience and of continuing the struggle on new bases will be posed in a more acute fashion. A Syrian victory in Lebanon will mean a retreat not only for the existing opportunist organizations but also for the mass movement as a whole. Nevertheless, the crisis of the Arab regimes is now such that more than a war is needed to assure the tranquility of the bourgeoisies and imperialism. The outcome of the war in Lebanon, no matter how unfavorable it may be, will not at all be catastrophic for the future of the Arab revolution. The struggle of the Palestinian people will remain on the agenda. Before too long the Arab revolution will be able to emerge from the defensive situation in which it has been confined for the past six years. O
01
The Destaurian regime, which came to power twenty years ago and rests essentially on the role of Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisinn Bonaparte, is now increasingly facing an impetuous new rise of the Tunisian working class. As the Paris daily Le Monde remarked last June, "strikes are now a feature of everyday life. " Last July, under the pressure of the workers mobilizations of May and the "agitation" going on in the secondary schools and universities, the Central Committee of the ruling party declared: "The right to strike is guaranteed by the constitution, when the strikes are legal" (sic). But on July 25, taking advantage of the summer lull, the bourgeoisie tried to intimidate the workers, sentencing twelve strikers of the Jerissa iron mine, where 700 workers had gone on strike June 16 and 17, to prison terms ranging from three months to three years. The bourgeoisie believed that this was the way to prevent a hot autumn and to make sure that the Tunisian workers would not fight for satisfaction of their demands. But neither this repression nor Prime
Minister Nouira's declaration to two French journalists that "the single party is a historical necessity" hos been able to prevent the workers movement from providing Itself with organizations capable of waging a broad battle against the regime, which, taking advantage of the effects of the civil war in Lebanon, is now trying to turn the country into one of the financial centers of the Arab world while continuing to superexploit the Tunisian workers. The article below, which deals with the current upsurge of workers struggles and the background to them, was written by
*Destour is the Arabic word for constitution. The origins of the Destourian, or constitutionalist, movement in Tunisia go back to the early twentieth century. The neo-Destour, which called for independence from France, was founded in the 1930s. In 1964 the neo-Destourian party, which had been the ruling party since independence in 1956, changed its name to the Destourian So-