DEMOCRACY FELL by I. GUSTAFSSON & G. I. JOHNSSON After forty-four years of Social Democratic rule, Sweden now has an openly bourgeois government. This is a historic moment. September 19, 1976, is now seen by many as the darkest day in the history of the labor movement. But if this is true, it throws a long black shadow over forty-four years of Social Democratic governing. How is it possible that the Social Democrats have not won more people to "democratic socialism" than has been shown to be the case? How is it possible that after forty-four years the bourgeois parties have won so many supporters among the youth, workers, and white-collar workers for an openly bourgeois government? With some exceptions, the Social Democratic commentators are now trying to explain the defeat by several objective phenomena: "The rightist wind defeated us, " it has been said several times. But why this rightist wind and why the change in direction? "The good life in the urban centers is creating individualism and weakening the idea of solidarity. " "The bourgeoisie dominates the mass media." "Accidental events having no connection have been linked together in the public debate in a way that has hurt the Social Democracy. " "The Social Democratic election train didn't arrive in time. One more week and we would have done it.
Such have been the explanations advanced in many Social Democratic editorials during past weeks. Of course, there is an objective base for the defeat, but it must be sought on a much deeper plane than suggested by these "explanations." Furthermore, the objective base can give only a part of the truth. It must be asked what role was played by the subjective factor - Social Democratic policy and its relation to reality. In fact, the subjective factor was decisive. The Social Democracy fell to a large extent because of its own faults. Forty-four years of governing laid the groundwork for the defeat. The "mixed economy" under which a large portion of Swedish voters have grown up (those people under 50 years of age have never known a Sweden governed by bourgeois parties) has failed to satisfy the aspirations of the youth. The Social Democratic education policy has favored children of the upper classes, reducing the possibilities for a strong and united workers movement. The Social Democratic mass media policy has failed to counter the passive consumption of general bourgeois ideology. The authoritarian political system in the work places, schools, and the army has weakened the position of the working-class movement. The Social Democrats have done nothing to counter the increasing commercialization of culture. All this has resulted in a general decline in mass enthusiasm for the Social Democracy, thus enabling the bourgeois parties to successfully take advantage of discontent over a number of more specific issues to gain the small shift in vote they needed to oust the Social Democratic government. Whatever the Social Democratic leaders may say about having "vitalized" the party during the election campaign, the fact is that the working-class movement is in a bad way today. The Social Democratic party apparatus and the Social Democratic led trade-union movement are bureaucratized, led from the top down, procapitalist, and devoted to preserving the present society. That is why the main responsibility for the clection defeat must be laid on the Social Democratic party and Social Democracy in general. Now is the time to intervene in the debate on perspectives that will arise in the party, its youth organization, and the trade unions and to advance a plan to restructure and democratize the workers movement. If such a discussion and plan had begun to be realized a long time ago, the election result would have been different. The passive campaign carried out by the Social Democracy could have been different, and the anti-socialist demagogy of the bourgeois parties could have been met
1970 1973 1976
Conservative party 11.5 14.3 15.6
Center party 19.9 25.1 24.1
Liberal party 16.2 4.4 11.0
Social Democrats 45.4 43.0 42.9
Communist party 4.8 5.3 4.7
Rate of participation 88.1 90.8 90.1
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SWEDEN and exposed, preventing it from influencing many people. Nothing in the comments of the Social Democratic party and trade-union leaders indicates that they have any desire to open the profound and traumatic discussion that is needed. The real question is how this debate will take shape on the rank-and-file level, especially in the trade unions, and what adaptations this debate will compel the leadership to make. In fact there are already some signs that some forces in the Social Democratic trade unions have taken exception to the purely "objectivist" explanations of the defeat. Critical voices The first editorial in Aftonbladet (the trade-union owned evening paper) commenting on the election was headlined "The election defeat leads to rethinking on the part of the Social Democracy. " This remains to be seen. But in any case it is now clear that the party leadership will have to allow a debate on the party's line. From the outset of this debate there will be tensions between state and party functionaries on the one hand and individuals and groups within or connected to the trade-union bureaucracy (who have a more passive relationship to the party) on the other hand. This is what Aftonbladet had to say about the election result: "The power of the bourgeoisie will now increase considerably; the political and economic power is now fusing. The Social Democracy has to fight this power bloc, while at the same time making a necessary reevaluation on its own part. The party must, and here its position in the opposition can help, begin again to fulfill its function of social criticism, as during the an on tea are to coralia, he so co. big equality campaigns. 'Democratic socialism' has been presented more as an ideology of well-being than ers from dependence on the capitalists. The Social Democracy will have a difficult task as an opposition party. It is hardly suited to that task organizationally. It is the government department that has been the source of power far more than the party leadership. Two of Aftonbladet's leading journalists, Olle Svenning and Macke Nilsson, went further in the same direction. "The party has not differentiated itself from other parties and has transformed itself into a party fighting the bourgeois 'center parties' on the basis of being the best reformers of the present society rather than trying to change to another society, " according to Svenning. And Nilsson added: "The election defeat cannot be explained by the 'scandals' this spring. The reason is much deeper - it is the party's adjustment to the established society. There was trouble between the party and the trade unions because the party remained passive on questions concerning economic democracy and democratic socialism. There was irritation among trade unionists against the compromises made necessary by the 50-50 balance in parliament and against the compromises with the bourgeois parties on economic policy, or more correctly there was irritation at the fact that this compromise policy was sometimes elevated to the level of ideology. " 14
There is a lot in these observations, al though they do not raise the basic questions that must be posed if the class collaboration policy and the bureaucracy inside the workers movement are to be broken:
*Is it at alt possible for a workers party to gain a lasting base among the majority of the population through accepting the present political system and parliamentary rules?
*Can a party with a reformist policy toward the capitalist state and the capitalist companies ever defend itself against the bourgeoisification that inevitably flows from these tasks of administration?
*What are the relations between the party's policy and its bureaucratic structure? Will radical ideas ever be able to gain ground there?
*How can the party and the trade-union movement change their political course in order to open the road to the classless, non-capitalist society which some Social Democrats talk about at solemn moments? Questions like these have been posed by neither the "right" nor "left" wings of the Social Democracy. But they must be posed - and answered - by all those who want to draw the real conclusions of the election defeat.
OLOF PALME Can the bourgeois parties govern? Comment on the election in the bourgeois press was notably cautious. Dagens Nyheter (the largest daily paper, liberal) wrote: "It's understandable that many people place their hopes in the new government. It is in the nature of such hopes that they are always exaggerated and can easily lead to disappointment if they do not have a realistic base from the outset. The change in government will surely not mean drastic changes, but it can perhaps make a good country better in some important respects. " The cautious optimism is evident.
The optimism results from the fact that the bourgeoisie has been working for an election victory over the labor parties for forty-four years now. It is cautious because it is clear that now the real problems will begin for the bourgeois parties. The optimism is greater among the right wing of the bourgeoisie, but even here some prudent comments have been forthcoming, particularly in regard to the energy policy of the Center party, the largest bourgeois party. (The Center party concentrated its election campaign on environmental questions, especially opposition to nuclear power plants.) This is what the conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet wrote immediately after the election: "The government succeding Palme should not expect a bed of roses. There are many questions that have to be cleared up, not least energy policy." There is no doubt that it will be difficult. This said, however, there is no reason why the three bourgeois parties should not be able to produce a common governmental program eventually. It will be a product of compromises, but it will be enough to support a threeparty government. But this says nothing about how long such a government will last. A maximum of one year, said one German Social Democrat in an interview on Swedish television. This is probably too optimistic, but it may be assumed that the coming government will be weak politically, that from the outset it will consist of three parties not very well united, that the various party interests will prevail over common government interests on some questions, and that it is not at all certain that the government will be able to serve out its term. Important representatives of large and middle-sized companies have already indicated that the new government will face the following problems:
* The bourgeois parties will have greater difficulties than the Social Democrats would in carrying out an anti-worker, pro-employer economic policy. Their margin for maneuver is smaller. They have to take account of the not very rosy economic situation expected in the short and medium term and must also consider both their own relationship to the trade-union bureaucracy and the bureaucracy's relation to the working-class rank and file.
* They have no experience in governing.
* They will be faced with a Social Democratic opposition much more effective than they ever were themselves, an opposition which has already promised to advance "constructive counterproposals" on all fronts.
* The three parties must concoct compromises on all the questions on which they differ, and must simultaneously avoid immediately losing prestige in the eyes of big groups of voters who took their promises seriously.
* They have to count on big pressure from reactionary owners of small companies, who expect big changes in the state departments from a bourgeois government. This will be an especially touchy question. Either the new government will have to sidestep these expectations of new freedom for capital or, if they do not, the bourgeois parties will destroy the image they created for themselves during the election campaign: that of advocates of a broad popular reform policy.
The internal tensions among the three pariies will be exacerbated by the even more onerous problem of the relations between the new government and the labor movement. The Social Democracy in opposition The Social Democratic party has exhibited a rather remarkable capacity to roll with the election defeat. Palme set the tone in his very first television interview on the night of the elections: "We stood and we stand united on our program. We are going to represent those groups we are based on. We are going to carry out an offensive policy in opposition. " The leadership has rapidly taken some initiatives to reorganize its apparatus in accordance with the new situation; there have been proposals for new work groups, new methods of recruitment of members, and there is even talk of initiating a new "struggle fund. " The party leadership has surely not shown any interest in drawing the real political conclusions of the defeat, but has instead relied on resolute organizational actions to block the shock effect of the defeat within the party itself. The Social Democracy has already begun to reorganize for the 1979 election! One element in the coming Social Democratic policy will be to have the Social Democratic trade-union bureaucracy play a much more active role. "LO (Landsorganisationen - trade-union federation) is an organization for struggle and we have first of all to take care of the interests of our members, " declared Lars Westerberg, LO vice-chairman, the day after the election. This is the same Westerberg who said six months ago that LO would have to be very cautious in national wage negotiations. In addition, several leaders of branch unions have already stated that the coming wage negotiations may be tough, with big wage demands. It is not accidental when many leaders of the Social Democracy and the unions say the same things at the same time. But what does it mean? One reason for acting so rapidly and offensively is to rally the shocked movement and give it courage, to, show that Social Democracy has not given in. But there is more than mere hot air in these declarations. In the new situation the trade-union leaders especially will be compelled to be more aggressive and show less willingness to hold back. There are two reasons for this. First, the LO leadership will no longer be able to use the excuse of moderating demands in exchange for direct links with a "government of the wage earners" implementing a policy that benefits the workers in the long run. This will create greater pressure from the rank and file. Second, the union bureaucrats are aiming at creating difficulties for the bourgeois government in order to show its incapacity to govern. This will be the task of the trade-union movement in a division of labor within which the Social Democratic parliamentary group will bombard the government with "constructive counterproposals" aimed at breaking up the bourgeois bloc by setting the Liberal People's party
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SWEDEN in conflict with the Conservative party. Tax policy, general economic policy, and family policy will be in the center of this tactic. The overall goal here is clearly limited. A more active attitude on the part of the LO does not mean that class collaboration will be jettisoned. Rather, the aim is to show that a responsible policy of class collaboration is not possible without a Social Democratic government. The union bureaucrats will try to cast the new government as the force which, through its resistance to working class demands, makes a responsible class collaborationist policy impossible. The Social Democratic defeat and the fact that the Social Democratic party is no longer directly responsible for the administration of capitalist society open several new possibilities for revolutionary politics. The new atmosphere which will inevitably develop within the trade unions must be used to anchor a credible class-struggle policy. A dialogue must be opened with left Social Democrats and trade-union militants who are searching for the real reasons for the defeat and a policy for the future. For revolutionary Marxists, seizing these new opportunities means concentrating on three central questions in the coming period:
* National wage negotiations, in which the change of government offers increased possibilities for a militant struggle, regardless of the reality that lies behind the more or less radical statements of the trade-union bureaucrats.
*The struggle against nuclear power plants, both as a specific question and as an issue that offers opportunities for more developed propaganda against capitalist waste of resources and for the need for a change in the goals of production, for a planned economy under working-class direction.
*Questions of international solidarity, as one of the fields in which the Social Democracy is weakest and which at the same time has mobilized the greatest number ef people and will continue to do so, now more in relation to the sharpened class struggle in southern Europe. The CP setback The clection was also a setback for the Communist party. It declined in absolute and relative terms (from 5.3 percent to 4.6 percent). There will surely be a debate inside the CP, a debate which will probably mean a lot for the party's future development. The tensions and contradictions within the party are already too great to allow the leadership to simply ignore the election result. These contradictions will now come to the fore once again. Various explanations, internally contradictory, will undoubtedly be offered to explain the setback. One thing is certain: if this debate is to do anything more than scratch the surface, it will have to deal with more fundamental problems in the party's policy:
*The CP tries to play two roles, appearing both as a respectable parliamentary party and as an exponent 16 of non-parliamentary struggle. The truth is that is succeeds in neither. Its role in parliament is now more marginal than ever. The bourgeoisie does not regard it as sufficiently trustworthy and the Social Democrats do not see it as a necessary partner. But at the same time the CP does not function as a tribune for the mass struggle, as an organized expression of the anticapitalist struggle in society.
* The CP is largely basing its strategy on increased parliamentary representation and hopes for a stronger "socialist front" with a radicalizing Social Democracy. But this perspective is mere nonsense. The CP has never been able to clarify how to attain socialism through the parliamentary road. Neither has it ever explained how those who support Social Democracy today can be won over to a "socialist strategy."
* The CP tries to differentiate itself from the bureaucracies in East Europe and to defend a "Swedish road to socialism. " But in fact it has succeeded in neither. Some of these questions will be raised within the CP in a direct or indirect way. This is a debate in which we revolutionary Marxists must be prepared to participate. The election campaign of the KAF It was with the aim of giving answers to questions on how to fight in the coming wage negotiations, nuclear power policy, international solidarity mobilizations, and many other questions that the Kommunistiska Arbetarförbundet (Communist Workers League), Swedish section of the Fourth International, participated in the election. Our resources are not great when compared with the parties of promises. The KAF received a total of 2,769 votes. While not large, the vote was more than was expected. It should be said that each of these votes really reflects a conscious choice for a revolutionary Marxist policy. Because of the 4 percent minimum vote required to gain any seats in parliament, those voting for the small parties did so knowing that their vote would not count in that sense. That's why the result of the campaign is not completely reflected in the electoral score, for the most important achievement was the new contact we made with thousands of workers and students throughout the country. This contact has only just begun. It must be developed and transformed into practical politics. We take our own analysis seriously: it predicts a mounting bourgeois offensive against the workers movement. Even if the present political situation does not permit any immediate and drastic political change against the working class, the bourgeois election victory does show how badly armed the Swedish workers movement is in face of the coming bourgeois attacks. Thus, the KAF's main slogan during the election campaign remains equally necessary in the coming work: For a fighting and democratic workers movement! September 30, 1976