BEHIND THE KISSINGER/CALLAGHAN PLAN
EI THEI ORCE THEGIN anni POLITICAL THA MERCENAR TALKING FIGHTING ZIMBABWE The revolutionary upsurge that has gripped southern Africa has already dealt significant blows to imperialist strategy for the region. The attempt to structure and consolidate the economies of the southern African countries around South Africa, linchpin of imperialist interests, has been punctured at two points, Mozambique ical crises have developed in both Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia). Moreover, the humiliating defeat suffered by "invincible" South Africa in its military intervention in Angola has been a crucial factor stimulating a widespread response among the masses, now entering into struggle in southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. The entrance of broad sections of the South African urban masses onto the political arena with the undaunted courage they have demonstrated in face of the brutal repression of the past few months has exacerbated the crisis gripping the states of southern Africa. The question of Zimbabwe as such is to be the first in a series of crucial tests for both imperialist strategy and African "diplomacy." It contains the possibility, in combination with the South African struggles, of becoming a major focal point of the class struggle throughout the
KISSINGER SHUTTLE WE UPPOS! DIEN ZIM FABWE' NO! YESI TANZANIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PROTESTIMO KISSHNGER'S ARRIVAL IN DARES SALAAM by PAT JORDAN & JULIUS KARANJA
The inability of African "diplomacy, " particularly the "front line" states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia), to take effective action against the Vorster and Smith regimes and the consequent decline of their credibility among the masses in their own countries will push these regimes to collaborate in attempting to isolate and even repress the guerrilla fighters. In this way the various national struggles in southern Africa may potentially develop into a wider southern African struggle in which these states will probably play a role not dissimilar to that played by the Arab states in the Palestine question. The aim of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in southern Africa is to deal mortal blows against the most intransigent fighters against imperialism and racism. African "diplomatic leaders, " imperialism, and the racist regime of South Africa agree on the urgent need to "resolve the Rhodesian question. " Moreover, a suitable solution (a compliant neocolonial regime without the stigma of Smith's "illegal" status) would strengthen the hand of imperialism in its attempts to bring the Vorster regime more into line with its own interests. As the September 9 issue of The Economist put it: "... a settlement of the relatively small-scale Rhodesia problem would win time to try to solve the much bigger and harder question of South Africa. " 3
ZIMBABWE The Kissinger/Callaghan project This was the general background to the Kissinger initiative and his shuttle diplomacy in September. Despite the identification of Kissinger with this enterprise, it is important to note that the concept of this kind of operation originated with James Callaghan, now prime minister of Britain. Callaghan himself proudly points to his March 22 speech, in which he said that a solution to the Rhodesian deadlock depended on white acceptance of majority rule within two years or less. But on its own weakened British imperialism has neither the resources nor the influence to bring about such a solution. The involvement of U.S. imperialism was therefore essential. The latter, of course, had its own vested interests in intervening in Rhodesia: since the end of the second world war the proportion of American capital invested in Rhodesia has increased substantially, the main sources being the Anglo-American Corporation, De Beers, Tanganyka concessions, eta., all of which operate from the copper belt of Zambia as far south as Cape Town. Moreover, the recent experience of American imperialism in Angola further motivates Washington to discourage any idea of the guerrilla militants' seeking aid from the Soviet Union or Cuba. British participation, particularly under the aegis of a Labour government, was vital for other reasons. First, there is the question of bourgeois "legality, " which has been used as a central argument against the Smith regime by British imperialism (notably during the pre1970 Wilson government), the United Nations, and the black African regimes. Because of its "stand" on this question the Labour government has been able to pose as having a progressive position against Smith - a posture that has had a substantial response among the Zimbabwe masses. This is precisely why the proposals made by Kaunda, Machel, Nyerere, and company for British involvement actually represent a credible maneuver. Second, British imperialism has carefully cultivated a reputation for having been realistic in its decoloniza-
VORSTER & KISSINGER/ tion policy in Africa. This, together with its nominal opposition to apartheid (once again, particularly under Labour), reinforces its standing in the eyes of the African masses. The Callaghan-Kissinger project required two essential ingredients: a statement from Smith that he would accept majority rule and a scheme of implementation that would have credibility in the eyes of the masses. This is the essential background to Smith's September 24 statement. The package-deal arrived at inciudes the following proposals:
1) that the Smith regime accept majority rule with-' in two years;
2) that representatives of the regime will meet immediately with African leaders to organize an interim government;
3) that this interim government will consist of a Council of State (half of whose members will be black and half white, with a white chairman) and a Council of Ministers (with a majority of Africans and an African premier);
4) that the British Parliament will pass enabling legislation for a transition to majority rule, to be followed by the Rhodesian Parliament doing the same;
5) that upon the establishment of the interim government international sanctions against Rhodesia will be lifted and all "acts of war" will cease. These are the so-called five points. Smith reported one additional agreement: a gigantic trust fund is to be established - sums between $1, 000 million and $2, 000 million have been mentioned, that is, nearly $4, 000$8,000 for every Rhodesian white - to provide economic aid to Rhodesia and to guarantee private investment, property, pensions, and overseas remittances. It is also designed to aid whites wishing to leave, but this will not be encouraged. In their totality, these propusals amount to an attempt to give the appearance of majority rule while actually maintaining white domination. In essence, they differ very little from the British White Paper on Rhodesia and its "five principles" drawn wp by Sir Alec DouglasHome and the Conservative government in 1971 (and vigorously attacked by the Labour party at the time. Furthermore, the proposals contain an important loophole through which the Smith regime is able to escape: if the crisis for either imperialism or Smith heightens at any time during the "two year period" of transition, the entire negotiating machinery can be brought to a halt by claiming that the guerrillas have not ceased the ir activities. Moreover, the same tactic can be used to isolate those militants who will continue the armed struggle, accusing them of preventing the "transition to independence." The latter tactic will certainly be one of the favorite catch-phrases of African diplomacy. Finally, the "majority rule" that is to come about in two years is nowhere defined, and there is no reference to the main demand of the nationalists: "one man, one vote. " It is also noteworthy that when listing their criticisms the "front liners" did not raise this demand, still less make it a condition for accepting any solution.
GRANSMA Smith regime's military-economic position When talking of Smith's "realism" in agreeing to the Callaghan-Kissinger plan, imperialist leaders may have had in mind the fact that according to U.S. intelligence reports, Rhodesia's military position is untenable. Referring to three separate reports (from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency) which Kissinger is reputed to have shown Smith during their talks, The Observer of September 26 commented: "All three were broadly agreed: the only difference was over their estimate of the time before Rhodesia's military and economic position finally collapsed. " Whatever one's assessment of these predictions, it is quite clear that the position of the Smith regime is perilous indeed. It has not been getting massive military aid from the West, and the South African regime has been disengaging from support for Smith. The arrogant June statement of then Rhodesian Defense Minister van der Byl that he "wouldn't give a kopek" for the guerrilla forces was classical whistling in the dark. Under the most favorable conditions for the Rhodesian forces - in the mid-year months when the hills are scorched bare - it required 20,000 men to combat the 1,200 or so guerrillas. Even so, Alan Savoury, vice-president of the Rhodesia party and an anti-guerrilla expert, explained: "By summer most of the army were aware that they were getting nowhere. The sheer increase of guerrilla incidents in the past few months and
NAN the army's inability to follow them up turned talk of a guerrilla 'operational area' into a joke. They used to be confined to a pocket up north, but now its the whole country." (Quoted in the Sunday Times, September 26, 1976.) Even van der Byl, speaking of the rainy season due in November, had to admit, "You get an enormous canopy of trees, the grass is high and the whole vegetation is extremely dense. You get a situation like the Americans experienced in Vietnam. " (Sunday Times, Sepiember 26, 1976.) On the economic front, David Smith, the regime's finance minister, reported to the recent conference of the ruling Rhodesian Front that Rhodesia. was bankrupt and had almost no foreign exchange. Without infusion of soft loans and grant aid, Rhodesia could not pay for more arms nor cope with increasing inflation nor keep industry supplied with spare parts and replacement material. The closure of the border by Mozambique and the consequent need to re-route all goods (usually passing through Beira and Maputo) over the Beita Bridge has added further strains on the economy. The strategic attacks by the guerrilla forces along this route have also taken their toil. Probably the most demoralizing aspect of the situation for the Smith regime is the accelerating emigration of whites, many of them young men escaping military ser-
The Observer has estimated that the exodus is running at the rate of 15,000 a year. Be that as it may, official government figures issued September 27 re-
5
ZIMBABWE vealed that 1, 520 whites left during August alone, resulting in a net loss of 910. These figures are truly huge: on a pro rata basis it would be equivalent to some 2,800, 000 to 3,000, 000 leaving Britain in a year. Moreover, the net loss figures would be even higher but for the fact that former settlers from Angola and Mozambique had made their way to Rhodesia. One must be cautious about predictions, because whatever similarity there might be between the vegetation in Zimbabwe and Vietnam (and this is only limited), one essential ingredient for full success is missing at the present stage: a political formation with social policies like those of the NLF, that is, an instrument for combining the national liberation struggle with the social revolution. But in any case, what is clear is that the white settler regime is facing complete collapse in the next period. The interim government One can almost admire Smith for the audacity of his proposals. The Council of State was to draw up the constitution through which majority rule would be legalized, yet whites were to have equal representation on it. The Council of Ministers, despite its black majority, would be unable to challenge white interests either, for all decisions would have to be passed by a two-thirds majority (some reports stated that this also applied to the Council of Statel. Moreover, the key posts of minister of defense and minister of law and order were to remain in white hands. Yet on the establishment of this interim government all acts of war were to cease. In a nutshell, the proposals amounted to the black nationalists' giving up the struggle in exchange for vague undefined promises of majority rule - and this at a time when the white Rhodesian regime was facing a rapidly deteriorating situation. No wonder the front-line presidents felt obliged to distance themselves from these conditions. But in their rejection the stress was on the "illegality" of the Smith regime. The five presidents wish to overcome this illegal situation by getting "the colonial authority, the British Government, to convene at once a conference outside Zimbabwe with the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people. " (From the communiqué issued after the Lusaka conference of the five frontline presidents, held September 26.) The proposed conference would:
"(A)... discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government.
"(B)... establish the transitional government.
"(C)... discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution.
"(D)... establish the basis upon which peace and normalcy can be restored in the territory. " (From the
September 26 communiqué.)
The outstanding feature of the statement of the five presidents is its vagueness on who the "authentic and legitimate representatives of the people" are to be. Obviously, these same "representatives would constitute any transitional government emerging from the conference. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, however, seers to have made up his mind. Nkomo, aptly described as a Kenyatta-type figure, * has been flying from capital to capital in a Zambian government aircraft. He is being groomed for the position of prime minister of the transitional government, and as a longstanding "moderate" and one of the few Zimbabwe nationalists willing to discuss with Smith in the recent period, he is considered "acceptable" by wide circles of whites. The key to Nkomo's project is to arrive at an agreement with Mugabe, described as the effective leader of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and reputed to have strong political influence with the guerrillas in the field. On September 27 Mugabe stated that Sithole was no longer the president of ZANU and that the African National Council (ANC) was toothless because it had no army. Historically, Nkomo and Sithole have been rivals heading Z APU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and ZANU respectively. Sithole fiercely denounced the terms of the proposals immediately after the Smith broadcast, but elements in Muzorewa's ANC joined Nkomo in saying that the terms contained certain positive proposals. Mugabe is said to be the favorite nominee of the five presidents to head the guerrillas in the field. Much of the dispute that will take place in the coming period will of course center on the claims and aspirations of these leaders to become state functionaries in the transitional and later "independent" government of Zimbabwe. It will be quite difficult to bring about an agreement between Nkomo and Mugabe. Despite their mutual hostility to Sithole and Muzorewa, they have widely differing interests and are subject to varying pressures. *This term, much-used by the capitalist press, requires some explanation. Jomo Kenyatta was closely associated with the guerrilla struggles of the "Mau-Mau" in Kenya and during the 1950s was detained by the colonial government. In the early 1960s, when a black leader was needed who could maintain widespread support among the masses against the interests of the white settlers but who would nevertheless remain compliant with the interests of imperialism, Kenyatta was released and became the first black member of parliament, and later prime minister and eventually president. Because of his blatantly collaborationist role in the talks with
Smith and Vorster at Victoria Falls, Nkomo can fulfill this sort of role only if someone like Mugabe is included in the plan. On being released from prison, Kenyatta made the famous speech in which he stated: "The government of an independent Kenya will not be a gangster government. Those who have been panicking about their property - whether land or building or houses - can now rest assured that the future African Government... will not deprive them of their property or rights of ownership. " Interestingly enough, a compensation plan was also initiated for white settlers, as in Rhodesia today.
Nkomo wishes to build his credibility as the sole candidate for first black prime minister, while Mugabe wishes to unify the guerrillas in the field (the ZAPU guerrillas who support Nkomo left ZIP A bases during the summer). The main guerrilla force (ZIPA) has also strongly denounced the terms outlined by Smith and made demands including the trying of Rhodesian war criminals. ZIPA also insists that Africans fill the posts of ministers of defense and of law and order. Mugabe, probably anxious to maintain his influence with the guerrillas, has echoed these demands. The guerrillas, however, are dependent on front-line states, Mozambique in particular. Moreover, the poprestige of the regimes in Angola and Mozambique is very high among the guerrillas because of their long struggle against Portuguese imperialism. The Neto regime in Angola appears to have adopted a friendly attitude toward Nkomo in the past period (for example, allowing his movement to open an office in Angola), and despite its alleged Marxist character, Mozambique is extremely dependent economically on the West, particularly South Africa. It is by no means precluded that a combination of further "concessions" from the Smith regime (even Smith himself could be sacrificed), pressure from the front liners (particularly the "militants"), the aura of legality and fairness provided by the British Labour government, a feasible formula for an interim government, and the promise of massive economic aid from U.S. imperialism could at least split the guerrillas and militants of the towns. Perspectives
All the wheeling and dealing, shoving and pushing, and accusation and counteraccusation now going on is part of this process. It would be impossible for even the "militant" front-line states to get the guerrillas to accept the terms as outlined by Smith, but if a
"left" critique is made of them, this, together with the intervention of the British Labour government, paves the way for division and confusion. This is why the line of the pro-Moscow Communist parties (as typified by the British CP, whose paper, the Morning Star, blazoned forth its support of the front-liners in its September 27 issue) is so criminal. This line will give a cover for the activities of the front liners and corresponds to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. On September 27, following the statements issued by the front-line states, Tass had announced in its headlines "Africa says No. " Clearly, the Soviet bureaucracy has no intention of providing the Zimbabwe guerrillas with the sort of aid granted the MPLA in Angola. On the contrary, Moscow's policy of détente is strictly relationship of class forces in southern Africa and to- oriented toward essentially maintaining the present ward providing the required left cover for the plans of African diplomacy. The proposed visit of Neto to Moscow, where he will receive a hero's welcome, is aimed at furthering such a policy. In the present situation, the ability of the leaders of the front-line states and imperialism to pull off this reformist maneuver at least in order to buy some time through the divisions in the guerrilla camp must not be underestimated. The plan to hold the "constitutional conference" in Maputo so as to have easy access to the guerrilla camps in Mozambique will mean that these militants will shortly be exposed to an ideological barrage from the presidents of the front-line states. But unless they are able to carry out this maneuver rapidly, the plans are likely to come unstuck in the dynamics of the struggle unfolding in the rest of southern Africa. Any intransigence on the part of the guerrilla forces in Zimbabwe will severely test the credibility of the front-line regimes in dealing with the question of racism in southern Africa - not only in the eyes of the Zimbabwean masses themselves, but also in the eyes of the masses in their respective countries. The ability of Machel and Neto in particular to maintain their left face before the masses will become drastically reduced, as will their ability to continue to exercise their ideological hold on the young vanguard in Africa. Against the neocolonialist plans of imperialism and African diplomacy for Zimbabwe revolutionary Marxists must fight for policies that will advance the interests of the Zimbabwe masses. No to the neocolonialist plans for Zimbabwe! No deal with the racist state! Immediate majority rule! Immediate election of a constituent assembly! One person — one vote! No compensation for white racists! Britain and U.S.
must compensate the Africans for the ravages of imperialism! Disarm the Smith regime - arm the African masses! September 29, 1976
7
what is at stake?
Since his inauguration as Portuguese prime minister after having assured the election of Ramalho Eanes as president, Mário Soares has clearly announced his intentions: wage freeze, increase in the productivity of labor, priming of the private sector, financial pruning of the nationalized sector, restriction of the agrarian reform. It is in the latter sphere that the secretary of the Socialist party has initiated his attack on the toilfects one of the major gains of the mass movement after the overthrow of the Salazarist regime on April 24, 1974: the agrarian