mao tsetung & the chinese revolution
The article below is a contribution to the discussion of the historical significance and role of
Mao Tse-tung and Maoism, a discussion which is a necessary part of this rebirth of Chinese rev-
Glutionary Marxism. It is the second and concluding installment of a study by Comrade 5.5. Wu.
(The First installment appeared in the previous issue of INPRECOR, No.59, October 7) It deals with Mao's conception of socialism, the import of the cultural revolution, and the prospects for the post-Mao era. As in the first installment, the quotations from Mao are from the Chinese edifions of Mao's collected works and the 1969 collection Long Live Mao Tsetung Thought. Future issuer of INPRECOR will offer analyses of the meaning of the latest stages in the factional struggle in the Chinese Communist party. by S.S.WU III. MAO'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIALISM After the ebb of the 1919-23 revolutionary upsurge in Europe, the center of gravity of the world revolution shifted to the underdeveloped countries for a relatively long period, This detour of the world revolution led Mao to conclude empirically that revolution could explode more easily in backward countries than in advanced capitalist ones. He mistakenly held this to be a general historical law, which he then extended to the notion that underdeveloped countries could even achieve socialism more easily than the advanced countries. In his Reoding Notes on the Soviet Union's Political Economy he wrote: "Lenin said, 'For the backward countries the transformation from capitalism to socialism will be more difficult. Now it seems that this remark is wrong. The fact is that the more backward the economy, the more easy is the transformation from capitalism to socialism; it is not more difficult. The poorer the people, the more they want revolution." Here Mao obviously confused two separate questions. One was the leading role the colonial revolution may play in certain specific historical periods, while the other related to the socialist transformation of the underdeveloped countries. From the fact that the revolution had broken out in the backward countries earlier than in the advanced ones, Mao deduced that the backward countries would achieve socialism at an earlier date. On the one hand this error reflected Mao's historical empiricism. On the other hand it expressed his polifical thought, which never ossimifated the Marxist concept that the transformation from capitalism to socialism would necessarily be a worldwide and organic process. This was the ideological origin of his theory of socialism in one country, national socialism, and his subjective approach to the building of socialism in China. Mao's notion of socialism in one country is perhaps most graphically expressed in this sentence: "Even if we complete the building of communism, so long as imperialist countries exist, the existence of the state is still necessary." In other words, according to Mao not only so4 cialism but even communism can be achieved before the victory of world revolution. More, a state apparatus can exist in a communist society. This idea of communism in one country is the extreme version of the theory of socialism in one country. Within this general framework, Mao conceived of the construction of a socialist society as a purely national process: "The correct method (of building socialism -5.5. Wu) is that each country should do its best, should rely on itself, and should try to do this independently to the extent possible, but in principle should not depend on the others, only doing what can be done. In particular, they should develop agriculture by all means. To depend on other countries for food is very dangerous." The expression "very dangerous" is a reflection of Mao's own bitter experience of having to depend on the Soviet Union while surrounded by imperialism. And it was precisely this experience that led him to formulate his policy of self-reliance. As a tactical move in a horsh situation this policy may have been conjuncturally correct. But to extend it to a general orientation for the building of socialism implied rejecting the transformation from capitalism to socialism as a worldwide process. This generalization has an extremely reactionary character, of which Peking's foreign policy is the most recent manifestation. Mao understood that the productive forces of the old China were fettered by the prevailing relations of production and by imperialist exploitation. Thus, the Chinese revolution was an attempt to eliminate the obstacles to the liberation of China's forces of production. The new relations of production created by the revolution were more advanced than the actual forces of production, which is a controdiction posed in all underdeveloped countries in which the proletarian revolution achieves victory. For revolutionary Marxists this contradiction can be finally resolved only through the victory of the revolution on a world scale. For Mao, though, it could be resolved within China's own borders. The driving force in this process was seen as the subiective and voluntarist will of the population. Hence: "As soon as the communes have strong economic force, complete
La historical assessment BU • JE AN communal ownership can be realized. Then the system of ownership by the whole people can be achieved. We need probably two five year plans for this. We should not be too hasty. This was precisely what was stated in the Peital Ho resolution. It would take three or four years, five or six years, or even longer. Then it would go through several phases of development, so ofter fifteen years, twenty years, or longer the socialist communes would develop into communist communes." In the same talk Mao continued his presentation of the rosy picture: "It took four yean, 1953-56, to go from mutual aid teams to advanced cooperatives, which went through several different stages. It may take four years or longer to go from the collective ownership of advanced cooperatives to the collective ownership of the communes. Perhaps it will take five years, six years, seven years, during which a hasty approach should be resisted. The point is to promote the level of production of the poor teams to that of the rich teams. We need a process for this. Since the commune is large and has many production teams, we need a longer period for the process of agricultural mechanization, electrification, communal industrialization, national industrialization, the promotion of the socialist and communist consciousness of the people, the promotion of the ethical and moral qualities of the people, the promotion of the cultural, educational, and technical standard of the people. We have calculated that after four years the production of steel can reach the level of 50 million tons. Next year we will supply one million tons of steel, the year after 2 million tons, the third year 3 million tons to the communes. With these six million tons of steel materials and equipment the communes can probably achieve ogricultural mechanization. Therefore, it will be enough for communal industrialization in four, five, six, or seven years. Certainly, this is still the first stage. After that there will be the second and third stages so as to complete socialist construction (which means that it will take fifteen, twenty years or longer)." Mao odvanced this schema in 1959. Seventeen years have passed since then, and even communal ownership has not yet been achieved, let alone communal industrialization and mechanization.
This is not to say that we oppose agricultural collectivization and communalization before the victory of world revolution. In fact, the collectivization of agriculture is a foundation stone of the proletarian dictatorship during the transitional period, for without it there is no starting point for the backward countries' developing toward socialism. Agricultural collectivization has two meanings in a transitional society. First, it lays the basis for the advance of the forces of production within the national borders. Second, it represents a foctical policy without which the national transition to socialist property relations in the means of production cannot sustain itself until the victory of the world revolution. In this sense it extends beyond national borders. Mao left this second consideration out of account and believed that socialist construction would be completed in China provided the process of agricultural collectivization was properly completed. And this in turn depended primarily on the mobilization of the revolutionary will of the population. It was in this sense that the policy was subjectivist at bottom. Mao's conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat was likewise empirically derived. It was not through the experience of the international workers movement, the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, etc., that Mao arrived at his idea of the proletarian dictatorship. Rather, it was through his own experience in the soviet regime in the Chinese countryside during the 1930 and 1940s, combined with his understanding of the so-called proletarian dictatorship that existed in the Soviet Union: under Stalin. As early as 1928 Mao submitted a frank report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party describing his proctical experiences in organizing the regime in the countryside. "Soviets were established on all levels, " he wrote, "but mostly in name only: As for the worker and peasant masses, and even the members of the party, most of them do not understand the meaning of the soviet. In many places the Representative Congress of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers does not exist. On the village and regional level, and even the county level, the executive committees of the
As Mao Tsetung's body lies in state, workers, peasants, soidiers and others wait to pay their last respects.
CHINA soviets are elected by the masses in one way or another. But the mass meetings are poorly organized. That is, there are no real discussions, no political training, and they are easily dominated by intellectuals or opportunists. They cannot understand what a soviet is, that the Representative Congress of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers is the supreme authority and that the executive committee is only an administrative body when the Representative Congress is not in session. This is the biggest mistake regarding the political apparatus in the border areos. In other places there are Representative Congresses, but they are only regarded as ad hoc bodies for the election of executive committees, which after the elections centralize power and no longer talk about congresses. Real soviet organization does exist, but it is very rare. The reason is that we have insufficient propaganda and education on the soviet as a new political system. The bad dictatorial and authoritarian habits inherited from the feudalist era are still rooted in the consciousness of the masses and even the average party member and connot be wiped out immediately. H At that time the soviet system of the October Revolution was still fresh in Mao's mind, and he could thus vividly point out the contradictions involved in building a soviet system in the countryside amid the backwardness of the peasantry. But it was also clear that Mao did not understand that the soviet system was the highest expression of the autonomous Russian workers movement, that the soviet system was constructed from top to bottom by the workers movement itself. Mao viewed the peasant "soviets" primarily as creations of the party. By 1934 he discussed the question of the soviets from a somewhat different angle: "The democracy of the soviet has been developed, but it should be pointed out that in many places it is still very insufficient. The struggle against bureaucratism should be rigorously launched and the rubbish standing between the soviets and the masses should be thrown away. This rubbish is bureaucratism and commandism. The people working for the soviets should carry out the tasks of the soviets based on mobilizing and convincing the people. They 6 should not use methods of compulsion or command. They should pay attention to every demand and proposition of the people and should not ignore these demands and propositions." Here Mao is no longer stressing the notion that the soviet is the supreme authority expressing the will of the masses. Rather, the soviet is viewed as the vanguard of the masses and his concern is that they play their vanguard role in a non-bureaucratic manner. This conception of the soviet system was reinforced by the strategy followed by the Chinese Communist party in the third Chinese revolution. The workers movement itself played no independent role in the seizure of power, since the cities were surrounded from the countryside. Thus, the CCP entered the cities as the liberators of the workers, who had not themselves created a soviet system as the highest expression of their own independence. Thus, the Communist party was naturally led to establish a sort of "substitutionist" proletarian dictatorship, which was, moreover, in line with the Maoist conception of the "soviets" that already existed in the countryside, It is in this sense that the proletarian dictatorship in China acquired its deformed expression from the very moment of its appearance; it is in this sense that the Chinese workers state was bureaucratically deformed from birth. In this regard, Mao's position in defense of the basis of the Chinese bureaucracy was a theoretical and ideological justification and expression of the deformed proletarian dictatorship in which the party substituted for the working class in ruling the country. The reactionary character of this position was not fully exposed as long as the working class remained docile and did not challenge the rule of the party by demanding the direct application of its own power. When the January 1967 events occurred in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, Mao complained, "If Shanghai and the whole country are transformed into communes, what should the party do? Where will the party be then? Since there are party members and non-party members in the committees, where shall we place the party? Nevertheless, there should be a party! ... There should be a party in the communes. Can the commune replace the party?"
The message is clear. The efforts of the workers and students of Shanghai to build their own soviet-type structures from top to bottom represented a challenge to the very existence of the party; the commune system tends to outflank the party's concentrated power. So long as that concentrated power and the consequent bureaucracy is to be preserved, workers democracy can be allowed to find forms of expression only within the limits set forth by the party. From the sociological standpoint, then, the vision and practice of the proletarian dictatorship under Mao has an affinity with the vision and proctice of the Stalinist system. But the two systems differ in their historical formation. Stalin's was imposed in a reaction against the October Revolution and thus rested on a passive or hostile working class. Moo's arose in the upsurge of the revolution and thus enjoyed fraternal relations with the masses to some extent. IV. MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the most significant political event following the national seizure of power in 1949. Why did Mao initiate it? First we must understand the nature of the tendency headed by Liu Shao-chi. Fundamentally, it represented the rightist current within the CCP during the so-called transitional period of new democracy. We have already outlined the process of permanent revolution followed by the CCP. (See the first installment of this article, INPRECOR, No.59, October 7, 1976.) But did the CCP, which had been educated on the programmatic basis of Mao's theory of new democracy, shift to the policy of permanent revolution as smoothly as did the empirical Mao? Did the old political line of the CCP not clash with the new line, which contradicted the previous one? As early as June 14, 1950, during the second meeting of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Congress, Liu Shao-chi expressed himself as follows: "The policy we adopt to preserve the rich peasant economy is surely not a temporary one, but rather a long-term policy. That is to say, the rich peasant economy will be preserved throughout the whole period of new democracy. The rich peasant economy will cease to be necessary only when machinery can be extensively used in the countryside, collective farms can be organized, and socialist transformation can be Implemented in the countryside. But this will be achieved in the comparatively far future. " (Selected Works of Liu Shao-chi, Chinese edition.) Even in June 1956 he still argued: "Some comrades think that collectivization could be realized in the countryside through mutual aid teams, cooperatives, and substitute cultivation teams. This is impossible.
This is fantastic agricultural socialism and it is wrong." (Materials of the Cultural Revolution in Communist China, Ming Pao publishers, Vol.1, p.284, Hong Kong, 1971) Concerning the question of nationalization of industry, as late as 1957 Liu still approved the development of spontaneous capitalism: "The existence of a part of capItalist industry, commerce, and underground factories should be permitted so as to let them "fill the holes' (of the socialist economy). (Same source as above.) In essence, Liu persisted in continuing to follow the old line of "new democracy" and was willing to make concessions both to the rich peasants and to spontaneous capitalist development. This tendency, whose rightist political nature is clear, differed with Mao's line. When the Great Leap Forward wos initiated in 1958 the Liu tendency did not wage an open fight against Mao's left turn (probably because of a combination of factors: Mao's high personal prestige, the relatively positive outcome of agricultural collectivization, which contrasted with the gloomy tableau of collectivization in the Soviet Union, and the promising future of the socialist transformation of industry and commerce). But Liu did acknowledge the existence of such political differences: "There were debates between different opinions within our party over the questions of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes... - Over the question of the socialist transformation in the field of industry and commerce a debate inside our party reflecting different viewpoints did occur." ("The Triumph of Marxism-Leninism in China, " 1959.)
RED GUARD ACTIVISTS MOURNING MAO IN PEKING'S GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE But the differences between the two tendencies went beyond economic policies. Mao stressed a special connection between the masses and the bureaucracy, his idea being that the party's policies should be implemented in the form of mass movements without especially relying on a social caste made up of experts and technocrats as the mediating mechanism through which the party accomplished its policies. Conflicts between the two tendencies thus surfaced and evolved in virtually all fields: education, ideology, philosophy, arts and literature. In some cases these conflicts had political implications.
CHINA up their organization and self-awareness and thus become de facto factions in the course of the cultural revolution itself. Mao was forced to initiate the cultural revolution the way he did because of the combination of his weakened position in the party leadership and his reliance on the mass movement. His attempt was to liberate the creative energy of the masses and direct it against the opposing faction. At first, the development of the cultural revolution seemed to coincide with the schema laid out by Mao. The masses, filled with new vision, confidence, hope, courage, and militancy, stormed the party and even the army apparatus, dealing heavy blows to the Liu Shao-chi faction. But the mass movement did much more than Mao had expected, The locus of the struggle was largely determined by the masses' deep-seated hostility toward the bureaucracy, their desire for revenge, and their willingness to resist openly. The more mass initiatives developed, the more the masses went through struggles, the clearer the antibureaucratic character of the moss movement became. It is true that in the end even the most left wing current of the Red Guards continued to uphold the banner of Mao Tsetung Thought, but the essence of the movement was nevertheless a negation of Mao in particular and the bureaucracy in general. When the workers and students attempted to establish their own rule in Shanghai in January 1967, Mao's confidence in and patience with the mass movement ran out. For Mao the masses had gone beyond the prescribed limits. With no hesitation whatsoever, he chose the side of the bureaucracy, the first time he openly betrayed the revolution in front of the revolutionary masses. This betrayal itself decided the future of Mao: with the rise of revolutionary consciousness among the masses, the legendary image of Mao the revolutionary would gradually be emptied of content. The cultural revolufion, initiated by Mao, offered the Chinese people a political renaissance. But even as the new infant was born, it cried, even if unconsciously, for an end to the Moo era. V. THE END OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG ERA From what historical perspective can it be judged that the era of Mao Tse-tung is approaching its end? The first point that must be clarified is what is meant by the expression "Mao Tse-tung era. " This era did not appear as merely a period of revolutionary transformation on the one hand or bureaucratic degeneration on the other. It represented a historical process in China in which 8
the Three Great Revolutions unfolded in a specific way under the Mao leadership, a leadership that constantly vacillated between the two counterposed axes of Stalinism and revolutionary Marxism. Moreover, the era represented a historical conjunction in which, given the lack of political maturity of the Chinese working class and the stagnation of world revolution during that period, the Chinese Communist party nonetheless created a bureaucratic structure and constructed a workers state with a distinctively deformed character. Finally, this era saw the sociological growth of the bureaucracy toward a self-conscious existence as well as Mao's resistance to this particular trend of development of the bureaucracy. Ir thus saw conflicts between Mao Tse-tung and the natural sociological trend of evolution of this bureducracy. Here Mao's subjectivist approach to the building of socialism is the most clear-cut Feature of the era. The culmination of the era came with the cultural revolution, in the sense that during this period Macism genuinely gripped the minds of the people and was seen as the only possible road to socialism. Ironically, however, it was precisely the same cultural revolution that prepared the disintegration of the Mao era, The essential significance of the end of the Mao era thus lies in this: Given the failure and futility of Mao's subjectivist approach to the building of socialism and given his final choice of defending the very basis of the bureaucratic system, now, for the first time, in a broad historical sense Maoism no longer coincides with the progressive and revolutionary tendency among the masses of China. The Chinese masses are now seeking their road to liberation outside the platform of Maoism and objectively oppose the framework of Maoism. The demonstration in Tien An Men Square on April 5, 1976, vividly illustrated this historical trend. (See INPRECOR, No.50, April 29, 1976.) In this context the death of Mao will enable the masses to break with Maoism more easily. What, however, will be the immediate impact of the death of Mao in the present Chinese political situation? Obviously, the inner-party factional struggle will be affected most sharply. The repeated professions of unity issued on the occasion of Mao's death were surely only an expression of a temporary truce between the two factions. But the deep differences between the Maoist and rightist factions will not and cannot disappear with the death of Mao. On the contrary, the struggles will sharpen. This is especially the case since the Mooist faction was able to take initiatives and launch offensives because of the fact that Mao himself was both head of their faction and the highest arbiter of the party's factional struggle. The rightist faction was thus forced to retreat and defend itself. With the death of Mao the Maoist faction can no longer use the same tactics, and the rightist faction will no longer be permanently on the defensive.
Strength will now become the most decisive factor:
Broadly speaking, there are three possible roads the coming factional struggle could take:
1. It may mainly express itself as an inner-party power struggle, the victorious faction purging its opponents by resorting to the bureaucratic machine.
2. It may totally or partially involve the mobilization of the army and the militios and take the form of a violent struggle.
3. It may extend to the mobilization of the mass movement itself. If the struggle is limited to the inner structures of the party, the Maoist faction will be at a disadvantage. On the other hand, with the experience of the cultural revolution behind them, the Maoists have good reason to be hesitant about trying to resolve the conflict through resorting to a mass movement. There has already been evidence of such hesitation. Thus, the Maoist faction will not opt for the third possibility unless no other choice is open to it. Given the fact that the Maoist faction has been building the strength and social prestige of the militias for the past several years, it is most likely that the Moists will try for the second possibility. Moreover, should the struggle extend to the mass level, the militias will constitute a useful social vehicle through which the Maoist faction can try to mobilize and arm its supporters among the masses. For the rightist faction, the best choice is certainly to contain the struggle within the party apparatus itself. For one thing, the rightists are powerful in the apparatus. For another, society at large will not be deeply shaken by such a struggle. In spite of the fact that a not negligible portion of the population has illusions in the righfist faction, this faction will be more than reluctant to utilize this support actively, for to allow the struggle to take the form of the third possibility listed above would be to risk the party's social control. Provisionally, then, one may conclude that the following tactics will be stressed by the opposing factions, according to the manner in which they calculate the relationship of forces within the party, the army, and the militias: The Maoist faction will try to strengthen the militias under its control, to divide and neutralize the army, and to capture as many of the important positions in the state and party as possible. The rightist facfion will try to divide and weaken the militias, dominate the army, and retain and extend the posts they hold in the party and state apparatus. The immediate period ahead will be marked by a hidden struggle within the party, army, state, and militias. But this evolution will unfold within a much broader framework in which the development of the mass movement will be important. The situation will be radically altered if an anti-bureaucratic mobilization develops. At the same time, the longer the factional struggle drags on and the more acute its forms become, the lesser overall bureaucratic control will be and the more favorable the objective conditions will be for the development of a genuinely anti-bureaucratic mass movement. Ultimately, history will confirm that the death of Mao Tsetung coincided with the opening stages of the political revolution in China. September 15, 1976
POLISH WORKERS!
The explosion of workers strikes and demonstrations in Poland last June in response to government-ordered price increases was the most massive outbreak of workers struggles to occur in
East Europe since the rebellion of the Polish workers in the Baltic ports in December 1970.
Even more important, however, the regime's subsequent repression against the workers has led to a widespread response, both nationally and internationally. For the first time in decades, a public committee has been formed in a workers state to defend victimized workers. International solidarity with the Polish workers has also begun to develop. The dossier below presents some of the materials of this national and international campaign, In addition to the explanatory article that follows, the dossier includes the text of a petition being circulated in France, the founding statement of the committee to defend the workers in