CRISIS
FRENCH BOURGFOISTE
The journalists in France who have recently written articles headlined "Political Round-Up of 1976" generally set August 25 as the point of the political break between President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. That was the day the Gaullist Chirac announced his resignation, with the official explanation that the president had not granted him the necessary means through which to govern. (See INPRECOR, No. 57, September 9, 1976.) In reality, the resignation had been planned two months previously and was kept secret during the period of summer vacations. During a "working weekend" back in June the two men had clashed over what political tactic to adopt to counter the electoral gains of the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left, the bloc of the Socialist party, Communist party, and Left Radical politicians). Chirac, who wanted to provoke early elections quickly, was overruled by Giscard. The break was actually consummated at that time. The cantonal elections, which occurred in March (See INPRECOR, No. 49, April 15, 1976), resulted in a clear defeat for the right. The Socialist and Communist parties alone polled 49% of the vote. As the first elections of national scope since the presidential election of spring 1974 (1), the cantonals reflected the failure of the presidential majority, the balance-sheet of which may be summed up in one phrase: an additional 1,000 unemployed each day of its rule. In face of this situation, which was confirmed by the publication of polls indicating a probable victory of the Union de la Gauche if national legislative elections were held and revealing a steady decline in the popularity of the president (2), the French bourgeoisie began publicly discussing how to counteract the existing trend. In general, two positions emerged. Early elections or not? The first called for an immediate policy of blackmail, relying on fear of "collectivism" and the distribution of subsidies to the middle layers traditionally favorable to the majority. This position naturally implied holding early elections. (3) The politicans who upheld this line 14
ОГТНЕ by PIERRE JULIEN thought that it was still possible to whip up the petty bourgeoisie against the rise of the left and to win over the several hundred thousand votes the majority needs to stay in power. They believe that time is on the side of the left; they therefore think it better to advance the electoral schedule. The second position called for relying on "reforms" to win over the new middle layers who have been attracted to the Socialist party and in this way to prepare to turn the electoral trend around before 1978, the date of the next regularly scheduled national legislative elections. This position thus implied continuing the so-called reforming policy that had constituted Giscard's electoral program in 1974.. After first hesitating, Giscard finally decided to continue on the road he had charted. Chirac, aware of the failure of such a policy, chose to abandon ship. It was his view that the "reforms" - which in any case had little credibility in a context of economic crisis - would lead only to further stimulating the demands of new layers, who in any event had already been won over by the left, and would lead to reducing the social base of the majority among the most backward layers of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The consensus broken Both these positions reflected the political disarray of a presidential majority that has now become a minority in the country. The strong state built up after de Gaulle's 1958 coup had created a social consensus around de Gaulle as a Bonapartist figure who assembled all sections of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie as well as a broad section of the proletariat. De Gaulle, it should not be forgotten, took a million votes away from the Communist party in 1958. This consensus was suddenly called into question in May 1968. First, under the effects of a strong accumulation of capital during the 1960s, the social formation was transformed by the growth of the proletariat, the development of new middle layers (managers, technicians, teachers), and the strong reduction of the size of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Second, the new rise of workers struggles, which culminated in the great general strike of 1968, opened a period of rapid disintegration of the consensus. Electorally this was reflected in the advance of the left, especially after
the signing of the Common Program of the Union de la Gauche. Socially it was reflected in a growing polarization around the workers movement of layers entering into struggle on various fields (peasants, autonomists, policemen, judges, etc.). The modification of the relationship of class forces, capitalism's inability to respond to the new demands being raised on questions like working and living conditions, and the absence of any "buffer" structures in a strong state erected around a president-Bonaparte accentuated political polarization and the formation, around the Union de la Gauche, of a social bloc assembling the great majority of wage earners. Giscard's project Under these conditions the bourgeoisie tried for several years to reconstitute a rather dilapidated consensus. Before his death, Pompidou, who had named Pierre Messmer his prime minister, proposed to resolidify a bloc between the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie cemented around the notions of order and security. But when Giscard won the 1974 presidential elections it was a different project that was set in In fact, the new president, conscious of the social transformations under way, sought to construct a lasting alliance between the bourgeoisie and the new middle layers produced by the development of capitalism. Hence his political project, which aims at cutting down the strength of the Communist party, dividing the Union de la Gauche, and, through the establishment of a genuinely presidential structure, creating a system of political alternation between a renovated onservative party and a sobered Socialist party, bott f which would then contend for the favors of these new layers. (4) Apart from the fact that it overestimates the numerical and strategic importance of these layers, this project neglects a decisive factor: the economic, political, and social crisis of the system, which has fueled a new period of rise of the mass movement and has forced the reformist leaderships to respond to the problem of power. The Union de la Gauche precisely constitutes this response, in the particular conditions of France. If it is to remain credible in the eyes of the workers, this project compels the Communist and Socialist parties to remain united, at least until they take over the government. In truth, all the "reforms" attempted by Giscard at the beginning of his seven-year term, which essentially related to the domain of mores (abortion, divorce), did not at all broaden the social and electoral base of the majority. On the contrary, it was the Socialist party, through its demagogy centered on "self-management, "which drew the benefits of the radicalization of the layers in question. Chirac's operation The failure of Giscardism as a political strategy for the bourgeoisie is, up to now, patent. The economic crisis that began in the middle of 1974, the high combativity of the workers, and the strength of the workers movement have been the important factors here. Account must also be taken of the resistance of the Union des Démocrates pour la République (UDR - Union of Democrats for the Republic, former name of the Gaullist party), which had been forced to support Giscard in the presidential elections after its own candidate, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, had been badly defeated by Giscard in the first round of the voting. For two years Prime Minister Chirac thought he could influence Giscardian policy and limit the advances of the Union de la Gauche. After the cantonal elections exposed the real state of affairs, he decided to play out his own hand, basing himself on the Gaullist movement, which is much more solid than the other bourgeois parties, both electorally and organizationally. Despite its 1974 political defeat, the Gaullist movement, built for sixteen years around a state apparatus, offered a sufficiently solid social base to sustain an alternative bourgeois political project to Giscard's. Chirac's rapid reappearance on the political scene after his resignation from the government and the big national demonstration of December 5, 1976, which brought together several dozen thousand people to transform the UDR into the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR - Rally for the Republic), manifested the ex-prime minister's desire to give his operation some credibility quickly.
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FRANCE Simplistic analyses It would nevertheless be erroneous to believe that two antagonistic bourgeois projects are squarely counterposed. Some people have claimed, without the slightest serious demonstration, that these projects really represent a conflict of interests between a national bourgeoisie and a bourgeoisie linked to the internationalization of capital. Others, out of obvious tactical concerns, stress the right-wing and pre-fascist character of the Chirac initiative in order better to hail the apparent realism and liberalism of Giscardian aims. These are the people who, behind the majority of the Socialist party, would like to prepare public opinion for cohabitation between President Giscard and a government of the left. On the other side, the Communist party flatly qualifies the two policies as "one and the same. " This summary thesis responds to the party leadership's electoral concern to win a few grouplets of recalcitrant left Gaullists away from Chirac's project. Georges Marchais, main leader of the Communist party, for example, has publicly proposed that these bourgeois politicians become the fourth component of the Union de la Gauche. All these analyses err in being simplistic. A proverb is now making the rounds in French political circles: "Giscard can't do anything without Chirac, but Chirac can't do anything without Giscard. " It is certain that the president cannot trifle with the electoral and parliamentary strength of the RPR, which remains the principal component of the presidential majority. At the same time, any too manifestly anti-Giscardian initiative on Chirac's part would have the effect of further accelerating the political crisis of this majority. Conflict-ridden cohabitation is thus obligatory. And it is not certain that the presentation of several rightist lists or candidates on the first round of the municipal or legislative elections would be unfavorable to the majority as a whole. A recent poll confirms this. Long-term projects of the bourgeoisie But behind this cohabitation, it would be suicidal for the bourgeoisie not to hash out an overall project. The only question posed today is this: How to stay in power? From this point of view, Chirac's objective is to reconstitute a popular social bloc, built around corporatist that, to prepare for the post-defeat period and organize a counteroffensive. To do this Chirac is trying to eat into the traditional petty-bourgeois layers and the backward section of the working-class electorate, but he is also aiming at the new middle layers whose material situation depends on the existence of a centralized and powerful state. In the end, the goal is to stimulate a movement potentially capable of drawing in broad masses who will have lost their illusions in face of the hesitations of the 16 workers parties in the government. For this reason, although what is involved is not yet a movement of a fascist type, the authoritarian ideology of the RPR and the more or less avowed adherence to it of a series of undercover agents and former Nazi collaborators implicated in all the scandals of the Fifth Republic could, in the event of strong social tensions following the accession of the left to the government, make it the crucible of a violent counteroffensive as the last card of the French bourgeoisie. For the immediate future, this bourgeoisie hardly has any room to maneuver. The Giscard project is bound to fail between now and 1978. Only a highly improbable success for the Barre anti-inflation plan (5) could give some layers new confidence in a discredited government. In the event of a defeat for the right in the elections - which is not certain, for according to all evidence the vote will be very close - Giscard would wage an institutional guerrilla war with the left government that would emerge from the elections, while Chirac would find himself consigned the role of mobilizer of the panicked. Given the present state of affairs, then, the crisis of bourgeois political leadership is deep. Even the Chirac operation does not yet seem to have drawn in the social and political forces it counted on at the outset. The employers, who scarcely have any faith in the Barre plan, are holding to their wait-and-see positions. The lack of initiative from the workers leaderships, riveted as they are on the electoral calendar, is the major factor propping up a right wing in crisis. The right may cleverly try to save the day by provoking early elections in the spring, at a time when the first effects of a slowdown of inflation and a timid economic upturn may make themselves felt. January 6, 1977 FOOTNOTES: 1. On the second round of the presidential elections, Giscard won 50.8% of the vote; SP leader François Mitterrand won 49.2%. 2. In December Giscard's popularity rating reached the lowest point of any president since the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958. 3. Legislative elections are scheduled to be held in March 1978. 4. It is from this standpoint that one must analyze the rumors that Giscard will soon announce a modification of the system of majority vote in favor of a "corrected" method of proportional representation. All the parties favor this, except the Gaullists. 5. Raymond Barre replaced Chirac as prime minister after the latter's resignation. The "anti-inflation plan" that bears his name was decided on by the government last September 27. It aims at lowering the purchasing power of the workers in order to achieve an upswing of economic growth through greater investment. (See INPRECOR, No. 60, October 21, 1976.)