BECOMES ALGERIAN
By Pierre I'rank
PARIS -- A short stay in Algiers, a city scarcely typical of the rest of Algeria, and a brief visit in the Mitidja, a fertile area of vineyards, citrus orchards and grain fields some fifty kilometers from the capital of the newly independent country, are not sufficient to form definitive conclusions. What you see and hear is filled with the contradictions of a situation where everything is in flux and everything is evolving.
Before the revolution, the center of Algiers was not Algerian.
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It resembled the business district of a big French city. The "Algerianisation" of this European sector is s ,, and surely irreversible. In these streets which the Algerians could once use only as common laborers, in these stores and cafes where they were hardly permitted to enter, they now feel at home. °
This is seen most vividly at the university. Once dominated by the worst of the "pieds noirs" (French colonials), the nage Sop is now alive with 3,500 Algerian students. The notorious cafe which the fascist lawyer Lagaillarde used for his headquarters has been taken over by them. ‘
In the former European town, more and more signs appear in Arabic characters. From the ghetto where they were once confined, the Algerians are moving into areas where less than a year ago the OAS (Organisation de l‘Armee Secrete), facing imminent defeat, filled the gutters with blood.
Little by little the crowded Casbah is thinning out. There is plenty of room for Algerians in the Bab el Oued district, deserted by the pieds noirs. More than fifty percent of the stores there have been posted as "biens vacants" (vacated property). Many restaurants and hotels, formerly the property of Europeans, are now in the hands of Algerians.
One of the curious sights in this period of transition is the strolling soldiers. Men in French uniform (including German-speaking Foreign Legionnaires) mingle with members of the ANP (Armee Nationale Populaire) whom a' short time ago they would shoot on sight. I saw oP ia of awkwardness, of stiffness, of hostility between the two sides.
A further word on the surface aspect of the city. During the first years of the Algerian people's struggle for independence, French imperialism sought to impress certain layers by granting them concessions. During the final years of the war, however, when the Europeans recognized that defeat was inevitable, they let everything go to rack and ruin. Aside from the destruction carried out by the OAS, dilapidation became quite general. Nothing was kept up. Repairs are now under way. Bricklayers and painters are busy. Everybody believes that the stagnation of past months is over. A little movement is felt.
There is no doubt that independent Algeria is removing the colonial make-up and that this development is absolutely irreversible. Algeria's social evolution, however, is another matter. Here it is wiser to observe prudence in making forecasts. To a certain degree one can perceive the forces at work, but to measure them is not easy.
A number of pieds noirs remain -- and it is not difficult to see that they have learned nothing. But if as individuals they can
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still commit crimes against the Algerians, they no longer constitute a social force. French imperialism does not seriously count on them to assure its positions in Algeria. The real danger for the Algerian masses today is neocolonialism; that is, the development and strenthening of an Algerian bourgeoisie which would have the support of world capitalism. And this danger is by no means insignificant.
During the years of war, "native" capital grew considerably. According to one reliable source, Algerian capital expanded from 200 to 600 billion 01d francs (from $400 million to $1,200 million). For many reasons, this consists mainly of commercial capital engaged in foreign trade, in commerce, the services, etc. In Algiers this is seen in the transfer of exclusive stores, restaurants, hotels and cafes from European to Algerian hands. As in every period of social overturn, some people have profited personally. Cases of corruption have come to public notice.
In the future this Algerian bourgeoisie can find sources of profits in two main areas, given the present economic structure of Algeria. One is the surplus product of agriculture and livestock (through profits in either foreign or domestic trade); the other, government orders of all kinds. This Algerian bourgeoisie, no mgtter how strict and vigilant the attitude of the government may be, cannot fail to take on flesh in the coming period.
The new Algeria begins with a heavy heritage of misery and ruins. Grave destruction occurred in the countryside ~- even orchards and woods were destroyed. At the moment people are moving toward the towns and cities. The fate of the children is one of the most. painful problems.
Perhaps the heaviest handicap in this opening period is the lack, if not complete absence, of competent personnel in all spheres. lTIverywhere evident is extraordinary energy and extraordinary determination to bring the country out of the situation in which it was left by colonialism. But it is quite apparent that. this determination and energy lack the fulcrum of cadres, of knowhowe
_.I interviewed doctors who told me that in the hospitals medical departments have had to be entrusted to men who have not yet gained their degrees. Medicine was one of the fields in which there was a relatively high proportion of Algerians.
Europeans are now returning to Algeria after fleeing last summer at the time of the OAS terror. Unfortunately they are not the most qualified technically (probably because those with skills can easily find employment in France).
The Algerian government will most certainly find itself faced with the necessity of promoting "accelerated formation of skills
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in all fields from trades to college instruction, including elementary schooling where the difficulties are multiplied by the absence of teachers and textbooks, both French and Arabic. Even with the ~ greatest effort, the bottleneck here will exist a few years until Algeria can train the men and women needed for a genuine take-off,
Another handicap is credits. It is true that French, and American imperialism as well, appear adroit. No doubt they have drawn lessons from the Cuban experience and will avoid threatening the Algerian government too flagrantly -- at least for a time. What they will do is favor the bourgeois forces in the country while aaa developments for the moment that do not exactly please em.
For example, the French government has accepted -- in general -<the take-overs that have occurred under the "biens vacants" measures in agriculture and industry, while grumbling over specific instances which it would like to reverse. But not to strangle someone may not mean that you permit him to breathe normally. On the other hand, the credits allocated by the French government are derisory in com parison with the advantages which it draws in the financial field from certain clauses in the Evian agreement. Thus while Algerian . oil brought to the French and other forei oil companies something | like 300 billion old francs ($600 million) in 1962, the Algerian, ..government received only about 22 billion ($44 million). The lack of banking controls, the absence of a customs wall between France and Algeria, open the possibility of a dangerous drain of capital.
We should mention that aid from the workers states up to now ‘has been trifling and is not likely to increase much.
Altogether, the Algerian revolution on the morrow of gaining ‘independence, after eight years of bitter fighting, faces a complex situation. tn the absence of unforeseeable events such as occurred in Cuba, this signifies that for some years to come, politics will be equally complex.
If the government is composed of variegated social and political elements, one must say nevertheless that the central nucleus, the decisive nucleus found at present in the Political Bureau of the FLN (National Liberation Front) is based on the poorest masses of the cities and above all the countryside. This is its main strength. But it cannot automatically head toward extensive nationalization of the economic structure without running the risk of catastrophic consequences. For some years, it will have to permit a development of bourgeois forces, to compromise in certain spheres with foreign capital and to create bastions in the countryside and the towns in order to pass later to the construction of a socialist society. This will not be done without crises or without international and domestic developments that will run counter to this difficult orientation. ;
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I talked with many militants in various fields. The most devoted and far-seeing agreed pretty much that the following is the probable perspective: several years of great difficulties before Algeria can come out of it with more numerous and more qualified forces. This is a tremendous battle in which revolutionists throughout the world must participate to the best of their ability.
The Political Bureau, we said, is based on the poorest levels of the Algerian masses. What is its present policy? It is difficult to determine preciselgx. The government undertakes things in various fields without setting the priorities which are indispensable in view of the limited resources which must be allocated. Why is this so? Perhaps becouse it is difficult to decide where to start from in face of the low level to which everything has fallen and in face of the almost complete lack of statistical and accounting data. This is understandable because the government has been in existence since only last October. But obviously this situation is not without grave risk should it last too long.
The danger indicated by René Dumont, the well-known French agricultural expert, for black Africa; Lies, the danger of seeking to ape the economically developed countries, does not seem great in Algeria. I noted among most militants a tendency toward austerity, indispensable under present conditions. Simplicity is the rule in the highest levels. Of course there are cases of local abuse of Sabon but the central power has not hesitated to handle these snarply.
The rroblem of religion in Algeria is a difficult one for some European revolutionists. It is best to be cautious about this, A very legitimate need exists among the Algerian people to assert their own personality after so many years of colonial rule. As a matter of fact, Arabism and Islamism are entangled in the consciousness of the masses; and, in the field of customs and habits, time is indis-— pensable to reach clarification and an ultimate balance.
On one especially important question, the government is very firm. This is aid to the African revolution and to the revolutionary movements in other colonial countries. It understands that its own existence, the overcoming of neocolonialism, cannot be guaranteed unless the colonial revolution is carried through to the end. Algeria will certainly tend to become the center gf the revolutionary currents of Africa as Cuba has for Latin America.
What seems to be the weakest link is the party. The FLN has no lack of militants. One must add that there is no spirit of "Beni-oui-oui." (The Algerian equivalent of "yes-men.") They are overloaded with tasks. But the party as such, as an organizetion, appeared to me not to be in the center of things. In other words, while the government is the product of the struggle of the Algerian people, one does not see the transmission belt in operation between it and the people.
To conclude: Everything is in movement. It is an experiment, _a@ struggle that must be supported throughout the world, but which demands constant determination of bearings so that the development of the. various forces operating on the terrain can be gauged. In this way we can contribute to this new revolutionary experience with its altogether specific traits, its difficulties and its potentialities, and help it move toward the socialist outcome.
February 10, 1963.
lone expression “biens vacants" was invented more than a century ago by General Bugeaud to justify the theft of Algerian land and its conversion into the. private holdings of the French conquerors. A case of poetic justice!
2y attended the meeting which celebrated the opening of an official office of the MPLA (Mouvement Populaire de Liberation Angolaise) in Algiers at which Ben Bella presided. His speech, which was widely reported, left no possible doubt as to his political views concerning the Angolan freedom movement. The meeting was quite. impressive.. No protocol. A very simple, very sober affair. The platform was on the same level as the audience. Those who sat at the platform, including the head of the government, had the same hard. chairs as ie eae hi One hopes that this kind of atmosphere will be maintained. ,
§ & § Supplément du 12 février 1963 au No. 17 de "Quatrieme Internationale."
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