FRENCH MINERS WIIT_ STRIKE
Roatan April 5 =~Aithough miners at some pits, demonstrating their militafiéyssrumbled at the settlement, it appears that the majority consider they have won their strike after 34 days on the picket line.
‘So far as the demands raised at the beginning by the miners unions ‘are concerned, the struggle is ending with a quite favorable compromise. A wage boost of 6,55) goes into effect at once, retro-
ective to April 1. Further increases will go into effect until the rise reaches 11%: January 1 and 12.5%) by April-1, 1964. An immediate payment on account is granted, and the government agrees to another week's paid vacation, giving the miners an annual paid vacation of four weeks.
Against the background of general class relations in France, both the objective reality and the prevailing mass sentiment, the struggle terminated in victory for both the working class and the unions: It suffices to cite the facts to show this.
The united take-off of the strike was a surprise for everyone, including the unions. The government, to save face, named a "committee of wise men" who recognized that wages had fallen behind 09%. -In response to this, the government, while making out that it was accepting the report, granted only a derisory increase, hoping thot the miners, at least those in Lorraine, would go back to work and thus break the strike. This was at the end of the second week.
The maneuver failed; new vague promises were made at the end of the third week; the miners rejected them unanimously.
At the end of tie fourth week, another identical maneuver, and this time the representatives of the UNR (de Gaulle's Union ‘pour le Youvelie Republique) elected in the Lorraine area personally appealed for a back-to-work movement. A new failure.
This time the government permitted top management of the Charbonnoges of Trance to engage in genuine negotiations which, after some twenty hours, ended in an agreement.
In almost five weeks ~- not a scab. The niners left and returned to work as one man. The decree signed by de Gaulle, requisitioning the miners was thwarted.
Parallel with the miners, workers in other industries presented their demands. Substantial concessions were either gained or are in process of being gained.
‘Solidarity with the miners was widely demonstrated. Hot only on the port of the working class but also anong wide layers of the petty bourgeoisie, and even toward the end of the strike.
The regime had counted on defeating the miners and the union through weariness, debt. material difficulties (important as finan= cial aid wos, it is self-evident thot solidarity collections could never rise nigh enough to assure minimum subsistence for 200,000 strikers and their families), the irritation of the middle class over a succession of demonstrations upsetting the daily routine (stoppages of electricity, gas, transport, etc.) which accompanied the upsurge of demands during liorch.
All this failed to achieve the results sought by the regime. It became engaged in a test of. strength, Although the unions did
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not exactly reply on this level, the movenent was so powerful that the rovernment was unable to follow through. At no time did it dare engoge the forces of coercion which it brought into the strike-bound areas, At no time did it succeed in dividing the miners whether in vetting a return to work in the coal basin or in pitting the three unions in competition with each other.
Without overestimating the victory of the miners, it must nevertheless be underlined that it involves a serious loss of prestige for de Gaulle and his regime, both nationally and internetionally. YVhis personage who only had to speak to bring the generals to heel, to make the bourgeois political parties bite the dust, to cancel out the American and British projects, this great personace. who already had to change his tone in speaking: with’ the Algerian revolutionists, was checked by the miners in his first great test with the French working class. He sent his ministers to Ciscredit themselves with declarations on radio and aeteecyeens he Heee his mouth shut.
"After such results, does this signify thot the workers organizations followed correct tactics? Understandably in this first confrontation with the regime, the unions wanted to assure unity of action at all costs and did everything possible to avoid incidents. Uowever, it was possible to achieve more in building solidarity for -the miners. We have in mind not so much the financial sige of it as yerkers action.
It could not be a question of a general strike, which pxesupposes & different relation of forces in the country, bus of mass . (PORE LRansons in the streets.
_ Toward the end of the second week of the strike, the ferment had reached such proportion that much greater pressure could have been brought to bear against the government to obtain its ‘eoptpalstion:
The other great wealmess was that the mass organizations, both: parties and unions, while they supported the strike did not utilize the opportunity during the course of it to speak out strongly for a program (for a forty-hour week, against de Gaulle's atomic weapons policy, etc.) which would have placed the combat in proper relétion to a perspective of further battles of greater scope, reaching even to a struggle against the regime itself.
The I'rench working class scored an important victory, especially if one takes into account the atmosphere which has prevailed since de Gaulle came to power. ‘Dut it still has a hard road ahead of-even more difficult battles which may not always end as RawonepTy as this ‘one did.
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