GENERAL HUMBERTO DELGADO -=- REVOLUTIONARY OR ADVENTURER? .
By Julio Cabral
ALGIERS -~ General Humberto Delgado, leader of the Portuguese emigré opposition, left Rio de Janeiro on December 18 for an extended tour of Africa beginning with Algiers where he intends eventually to establish himself, The General plans to visit Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia, Tanganyika, Nyassaland, the Congo, and Senegal.
The avowed purpose of the trip is to seek help from African states in everthrowing Salazar. Ina statement in Rio, General Delgado declared: "T want to discuss with Heads of State in these countries and convince them that I possess the solution to the problem of ending Portuguese ‘colonialism, I want the Africans to help me to assemble the forces necessary to enter Lisbon, where the head and heart of the beast are to be found. If the Africans will help me I can overthrow Salazar towards next July. a Ds
The General added that he favoured total independence of Portuguese African territories, "If I win," he said, "they shall have their independence. We shall be friends with the Africans, Portugal is too poor to maintain a war in several territories."
He said he had thought of holding a summit conference in Dar-Es-Salaam with African nationalists from the.Portuguese colonies,.. In a later state~ ment the General added that he intended to form a Provisional Government,
Does this reappearance in the news of this controversial figure of anti-Salazarism augur a strengthening of revolutionary activity among the Portuguese Opposition? oo.
General Delgado, who was Opposition candidate in the 1958 Portuguese presidential elections and now leads the MNI [Independent National Movement], a component of the FPLN [National Patriotic Liberation Front], has already made two attempts at the forcible overthrow of the Salazar régime since his break with the dictator and his unsuccessful candidature in the 1958 electoral fraud. First was his participation in the DRIL [Revolutionary Directorate for Iberian Liberation], which climaxed its activities with Captain Galvao's sensational seizure of the Santa Maria in January 1961. General Delgado subsequently broke with Galvao. The reasons for the break remain obscure, but among the Generalts accusations are that Galvao disobeyed orders and surrendered the seized Portuguese liner without the General's authority.
A year later on January 1, 1962, the General, who had entered Portugal clandestinely, took part in the abortive Beja uprising when 130 opposition= ists, including a number of communist workers, attempted unsuccessfully to storm the army barracks of this southern Portuguese provincial town.
Like his former associate Galvao, but unlike other anti-Salazarists of his generation -- the General is nearing sixty -- Delgado is a latecomer to the ranks of the Portuguese Opposition, A career officer in Salazarts air force, he was Portugal's NATO representative in Washington
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and later director of Portuguese Civil Aviation. |
Although he is regarded as an honest and intrepid man, for a former fascist general, Delgado nevertheless bears the hallmarks of his class and training. He has never put forward any program of a coherent kind for hisnew Portugal, other than the single point of his electoral campaign: tag President of the Republic I will dismiss Salazar.from premiership." When: asked, during his visit to Britain in 1960 about his economic policy, he admitted he knew nothing of economics, but if he achieved power, he said, "“T can easily take a quick American correspondence course."
His lack of understanding of African politics and the aspirations of colonial freedom-fighters was evidenced in an interview he gave in Rio de .. Janeiro last October 1 when he declared: “African States ought to revise their policy of giving moral and material aid only to the offensive against the dictatorship!s troops in the Portuguese colonies." The opposite, he said, should be done. Africa should concentrate all its efforts on aiding the Portuguese Opposition -- "this would be cheaper, quicker and more ~ efficient." He added that he was willing t> enter into agreements with African nationalists that would guarantee the interests of Portuguese settlers in Angola and those of the Angolan people who aspired to self determination,.-
Delgadots activities have always been regarded with misgivings punctuated by open hostility, by the Portuguese Communist party, which at first campaigned against him for alleged American connections, Today, although the Communist party forms part of the FPLN, it continues to discourage talk. of armed struggle, while paying lip-service to the "need to prepare a preinsurrectionary situation." It bans its members from reading Che Guevara's book. on guerrilla warfare, and concentrates on campaigns around wage issues and amnesty for political prisoners. Desertion from the armed forces is discouraged and soldiers are called on to protest against bad conditions prevailing in barracks.
. Correctly, the Communist party warns against the tendency towards putscbism and terrorist adventures, declaring that a successful insurrec~ tion can only be achieved by mobilizing the people. However, in practice it does nothing towards that mobilization and fails to put forward the necessary class slogans that could rally the Portuguese peasants and workers around the party for.a socialist revolution. Instead the party pro- . claims the need for unity -- not unity of the people's forces, but unity of the antifascist forces, among whom it includes colonialists and the liberal bourgeoisie who are vehemently opposed both to effective colonial iiberatton and to armed struggle of the Portuguese masses,
This revisionist policy, together with whole-hearted support. for the Khrushchev line in the Sino-Soviet conflict (though without any accompanying democratization of the party's inner life), has aroused bitter discontent among the rank and file, This encourages the very putschist tendencies that the party criticizes, and many younger oppositionists are fired by - Delgadots action slogans.
This situation is especially apparent in the exile groups where politi-« cal activity is easier. The number of exiled Portuguese grows daily, due to the influx of deserters and those fleeing from military service which
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would take them to Angola. These young people are naturally eager to see. a rapid change of régime in Portugal which will enable them to return home and take up their normal lives. Most of these deserters are from the middle class, the officer category. Lower ranks have neither the economic ‘possibilities ‘nor the facility for leaving Portugal. What these young emigrés want most is to be able to get home to continue their interrupted studies, Few of them have any political education and practically nothing is done within the organized opposition to provide any. Political educa-_ tion means. political discussion, and political discussion is dangerous because it threatens "unity,"
Inside the country the mass unrest that showed itself in the first year..of the. Angolan war, in the student demonstrations of spring 1962, huge street demonstrations of May Day 1962 and lesser demonstrations in May 1963 has dwindled to a point of no response in recent months. In May 1962 thousands filled the streets in answer to demonstration calls, for the rumor had been spread that arms would be distributed. No arms were forthcoming. Again the same rumors spread in May this year, Far. fewer people believed them, But although there were widespread ealls for mass demonstrations on October 5 (traditional Opposition festival to commemorate the 1910 Republic) nothing happened. Radio broadcasts by the FPLN had called on the Portuguese people for weeks preceding October 5 to demonstrate in the streets and not to worry about being unarmed, The people's brothers in uniform, the army and the gendarmerie -~ these broadcasts repeated —=— would not fire on their own. kind! These assurances were not believed, and in view of the wounded and killed in previous unarmed demonstrations this is. not surprising. - a
The Juntas de Acgao Patriotica or JAPs, the basic organizations of | the FPLN, which experienced a flurry of activity in 1961 and 62 are now practically defunct inside Portugal, reduced to a handful of middle-class people and intellectuals who are periodically imprisoned,
In this atmosphere of a total vacuum in coherent political “leadership, bitter division in the opposition over the colonial question, and a subsidence in mass revolutionary enthusiasm, it is not: surprising that an activist tendency has developed which places all its hopes in a: rapid military putsch, -
In these circumstances, while it is unlikely that African leaders will listen sympathetically to suggestions that Delgado is an appropriate spokesman of Angolan interests, and while it is difficult to see howa | general, presumably versed in military science, can envisage armed invasion of Port igal whose coast bristles with defences "and whose capital, Lisbon, is NATO's naval headquarters -- nevertheless, it is possible that Delgado's renewed spurt of activity will encourage dissident Salazarists to head preparations for a quick military overthrow of the 35-year-old régime.
Some of Salazarts closest supporters, influential men in the fascist state structure, have become more and more vocal lately at the disastrous effect on the Portuguese economy of the Angolan war, shortly to enter. its fourth year, This war, accompanied by guerrilla activity in Portuguese . Guinea and the potential threat of nationalism in Mozambique, means that Portugal at present maintains nearly 100,000 soldiers overseas, This is a
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colossal burden for -a nation of nine million which has per capita the lowest national income in Europe, Moreover, the Addis Ababa decisions, the recognition by several African states, including Algeria, of Holden Robertots Angolan government in exile, and-mounting international discredit, are beginning to convince more far-sighted Portuguese colonialists that all this expense might not result in victory, The growing efficacy of the “ Angolan nationalists is now becoming evident, and when even a New York Times L[Deceimber 16] correspondent states that 2,500 fully armed soldiers are being turned out every eight weeks at the Angolan nationalist base -in the Congo, even the most recalcitrant Salazarists begin to have second thoughts.
But this process has been underway for over a year, Former Minister of Colonies Adriano Moreira, industrialist Manuel Vinhas, ex-president of the republic Craveiro Lopes, deputy Homem dé Mello; all these have been vocal for some time in calling for a reconversion of Portuguese colonialism, They want an ending of the war, softening of repression, limited civil rights for Afrieans and a number of costly reforms to provide education for building an “African 6lite," The only reconversionist to explain clearly how such reforms could be paid for is the anti-Salazar economist Cunha Leal, In his book, A Patria em Perigo, Cunha Leal pointed out that Portugal could not afford to live without colonies (a ferocious anti~ Communist, the author means a capitalist Portugal) nor could she afford a colonial war, The answer therefore was to open both the metropolis and colonies to unlimited foreign, especially American, investment. Cunha Leal declares with admirable accuracy that only such a policy could enable > , Portugal to operate modern: colonialism. The only real differences between Cunha Leal and the dissident fascists are his lack of hypocrisy and his openly voiced hostility to Salazar. : So
-It-is possible that Delgado might well provide a suitable cover for all these interests in the Portuguese ruling class, The mass popularity his "pistol-packing" bluntness aroused in 1958, and his flamboyant courage could. provide the "popular" image that the Portuguese capitalists and compromised fascists require if they are to preserve their rule after the old dictator's downfall, What is more, Delgado has another asset for the Portuguese ruling class, He is extremely popular in the Portuguese. colonies -- among the colons, Despite fraud and trickery at the polls by the fascist authorities in 1958, Delgado won a legal majority in some areas of Angola and Mozambique, where, of course, whites only (and then only certain categories) have the vote, These whites are very much in favor of self — determination and of Cunha Lealts views on dropping Lisbon-imposed barriers on wider American investment, But the self-determination they want is of the Rhodesia-South Africa variety, and they are even moré ferocious than Lisbon on the question of. “keeping the native in-his place," o
One more of-Delgado's assets to the Portuguese colonialist bourgeoisie is his friendly relationship with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], now discredited in Africa since its leader Agostinho Neto allied himself with pro-Portuguese Angolan groups. Only a month ago © Salazarts Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, declared in New York that he could envisage negotiations with Mario de Andrade (former president of the MPLA) "but with Holden never!" |
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It seems therefore that Delgado is unlikely to prove to be a Portuguese Castro, The Portuguese masses, after years of fascist censorship and bans” on workerst organizations, are almost totally unpoliticized. A mounting — atmosphere of social-chauvinism and reformist illusions permeates the petty bourgeoisie, The Communist party's abdication of revolutionary leadership added to all these factors make it unlikely that Delgado can lead anything other than a putschist adventure.
The political changes that would result could scarcely satisfy either ‘the Portuguese people or the African masses. The Angolan National Liberation Front is fully aware of these dangers which have been pointed out in .recent statements by Hoden Roberto and other FNLA spokesman in discussing the Portuguese opposition.
All progressive Africans, throughout the continent, have every reason - to be wary of General Delgado's plans. As Algeria's president Ben Bella put it at Addis Ababa, African unity is to be reached through the path of full liberation of the continent from colonialism, Indeed, the only point on which Africa is united is the need to liberate the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South Africa.
Portuguese pseudo-reforms and the installation of an African puppet ‘régime in Angola under colon guidance could well provide a temporary ' deviation from the revolutionary path, not only for the Portuguese colonies and Portugal itself, but for other territories, Any delay in full libera- ‘tion of Angola will delay the revolution in South Africa, whose logistic — bases lie naturally in this territory. A “respectable” régime in Portugal would provide a welcome respite from the united African struggle against colonialism and an excuse to backslide from Addis Ababa that many neocolon -ialist African leaders are looking for.
In the final analysis there is only one solution to the Portuguese colonial problem: genuine liberation for the African peoples of its colonies.. There is only one solution to the problem of neocolonialism in ‘Africas extension of the revolution to-Africa's soutnern, industrial | ' heartland of Rhodesia. and South Africa. And, finally, there is only one solution to the social and economic problems of the Portuguese masses: the effective overthrow of the Portuguese ruling class whose continued existence depends on its colonial profits as entrepreneur for international financecapital, This class, despite its feeble industrial and financial resources, | has shown a remarkable talent for survival. When the Portuguese monarchy no longer suited it, it installed a bourgeois republic; when the latter provided insufficient stability, it installed a military dictatorship, wnich gradually developed into fascism, Today, when Salazar has nearly. served his turn, the Portuguese bourgeoisie seeks a less repugnant figurehead to face the world stage. ,
MEMO FOR THE NEW YRAR