VENEZUELAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS GIRD FOR LONG STRUGGLE AE,
Venezuelats freedom fighters, organized in the Fuerzas Armadas... de Liberacién Nacional [FALN -~ Armed Forces' of National Liberation]. are discussing the difficult problems they face in their struggle ageinst U.S, imperialism and its national agents, These problems have. become more intense and complex with the mounting aid received by the Betancourt government from many sources and with the capacity it has demonstrated to learn. from the guerrilla struggle itself,
... Observing this, the FALN ranks have come to realize that their. struggle will most. likely be a long one. As part of their preparation for this perspective they are studying the past period to better: um-« derstand the lessons to be drawn from it. An interesting example of what. they are doing in this respect. is provided by a long article which appeared in the February 18 issue of the underground publication Pueblo y Revolucién [People and Revolution]. The section which we have translated below is entitled "Nuestros Errores" [Our Errors]:
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The advances and the skill achieved by the repressive bodies in the cities must be given careful and objective study. To begin with, we must coldly recognize that many of. the successes gained by the government in this field are-due. fundamentally to two causes which. we must energetioally combat with stubborn persistence,’ The first is infantile subjectivism, of petty-bourgeois origin -- the swollen enthusiasm due to a long chain of successes which we gained for a. time and which made us appear each day, in Venezuela as well as abroad, like an almost mythological force of immeasurable power, and which gave the impression that at any moment we would be able.to throw - Rémulo Betancourt out of the Palacio de Miraflores, |
These circumstances led us to underestimate the capacity of the enemy, to consider the enemy incapable, weak, lacking in ability, ete., and to lower cur vigilance, leaving us with an unfortunate balance sheet of indiscretions and mistakes. which were translated into hard blows suffered by our organization,
The second cause, which on many. occasions has facilitated the blows delivered by the repressive apparatus, is the open liberalism, profoundly rooted in our organization and in almost all our cadres and militants, which has led us to abandon revolutionary vigilance, This liberalism has been displayed in various ways, the most important being the following:
® Exhibitionism, which constantly leads us to show off or to indicate before friends, comrades and strangers, the tasks which we are undertaking, the seorets we know, all this with the aim of dis-_ playing before others how important one is-in the organization,
@ The criticisms and observations voiced in familiar circles in
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front of people not belonging to the organizations. involved, Through these circles, the enemy has become acquainted with our faults, deficiencies and errors, taking action, consequently, on the basis” od reports provided indirectly.
@ Covering each other's mistakes [Yamiguismo"]. We will leave aside the faults and mistakes of our "friends" so they will not con= sider us to be tattletales or disloyal, This phenomenon has caused us damage. It is especially strong in bodies and units composed of fighters originating from the same organization, profession, or circle of friends, It is displayed in the hiding of errors, in fear _ of criticizing in order to avoid being criticized and in not criticizing so as not to injure the feelings of comrades,
-® Deviations of a military character which have been committed by the FALN on some occasions have likewise facilitated the repres-= sive plans of the government, A deviation of this kind. occurs. when units are inspired to discuss or draw a balance sheet on their actions, their successes and errors. When they do not accept observations. When they try to resolve administrative problems, When it is thought that the faults and errors should be corrected through punishment, obviously underestimating: persuasion and overlooking educational work among the fighters. When we substitute personal leadership for collective leadership, When we seek to demonstrate that. we are right by raising our voice or by constantly insisting on our position as "chiefs"; and, finally,- when we reject political leadership, trampling on the wise teaching that "the Party guides the rifle." Along with the. political causes indicated above, and which, in our opinion, played the major role in the blows that have been re ceived, there are others to which we must. likewise call attention as important, although they are of another kind -- military, organiza~ tional and technical which-we will try to summarize below.
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For quite a long time the FALN -and the revolutionary parties | have been operating. in accordance with a more or less fixed schema, with procedures that have become almost clichés, This has permitted the government, once an attack has been opened, to foresee the nex ones and to prepare to meet them. In this way,. actions have lost their factor of surprise, an indispensable condition to defeat anenemy as powerful as. the one we are fighting. We can state, without fear of being wrong, that the government has learned to fight us on the basis of the political and military blows which we have” delivered in the last two years,
In the magnificent battles, surrounded by popular support. and enthusiasm, which the FALN fought in the barrios Terowded povertystricken areas] and hills of Caracas, the repressive forces, as time passed, became more and more cagey and effective in fighting us, operating in the following manner:
®@ They isolated us in the area occupied by our forces without trying to take our positions,
e® They waited patiently until we ran out of ammunition, until we became tired, or simply until the commotion died down.
@ Then they proceeded to capture our effectives when they came down from the hill or tried to-leave the barrio. On some occasions they waited up to three days after the end of the battles in the hills to begin the’ mass round up and the detention at the entrarices and exits of the barrios of every youth or person who seemed the laast suspicious to them.
Another evidence of the way the repressive bodies of the government. of Ré6émulo Betancourt caught on to our methods of armed struggle in the city was to be noted in the tactical moves carried out by the FAN and the police apparatus in the days just before and after the elections, restricting the effectiveness of our operations. All of Caracas was divided into zones with their respective Commands, Ccependent on a Central Command which operated in the “Simén Bolfvar" Con-ter, With this distribution, they mobilized thousands of soldiers, police, traffic cops and secret agents of the Digepol, PTJ, and SIPA, who worked in a synchronized way in the capital, All the hills were taken militarily 72 hours before the elections, military and police effectives boing placed in strategic positions with machine guns and observation posts guarded by tanks, Likewise all the sites outside the hills were taken so that any commotion could be observed and the information flashed by radio to the posts on each hill, Where they could not do this, they undertook-encircling maneuvers, with extreme caution and slowness, against the focal points hostile to the government. In other cases they combed the "ranchos," the shanties and tenements of the .crowded barrios with light artillery, ,
This way of deploying Rémulo Betancourt's repressive forces revealed that they have carried. out a detailed study. based on reports and information, which must not be underestimated for one moment. They complement our deficiencies in this respect, the routine planning, lack of accurate information, ill conceived militarily and even -worse politically, “the popularization" of operations to be‘under-~ taken, our low striking capacity (lack of arms and explosives), our technical limitations and other deficiencies which it is not neoes~ sary to mention, all of which gravely endanger our effectives, since they are trying to overcome this weakness through courage alone. All this fits in negatively with the errors that occupy us.
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