BEHIND THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS IN THE SOVIET UNION
In his report at the recent Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev tried to excuse his policies and to explain away the current agricultural crisis in the USSR by referring to the situation in 1953 when, as he admitted long ago, there were less agricultural produets for consumers per capita than in Czarist times, -
In contrast to this hemming and hewing, Voprossi Ekonomiki [Economic Questions], No. 4, 1963, has ‘published an interesting article by M. Vassiliev, entitled "State of Development and Specialization of Agricultural Production," which offers background material of genuine relevancy to a rational explanation of the agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union.
Figures made public in the article completely confirm some of the © basic criticisms lodged by the Fourth International against Khrushchev'!s agricultural policy during the past ten years. Here are key items Lour emphasis throughout]:
“Compared to 1913, gross output of industry has risen 44 times; in 1961, gross output of agriculture had risen only 2.35° times. In all major economic regions of the country, the increase in industrial output is rather regular and high, whereas the increase in agricultural output is very irregular from one year to another, and presents great variations from one region to another, oe -
"In numerous regions, the gap between the- development of industry and the development of agriculture not only is not reduced, but is growing wider and wider. In 1961, in four great economic regions: of the country, gross output of agriculture was from 3% to 6% lower than in 1959 and 1960. In two other great regions, it stagnated at the 1960 level. In five other economic regions, tt grew only by 1% to 3% compared with 1959 and 1960. Only in eight economic regions did gross agricultural output grow by more than 4%,
"From 1957 to 1959, grain output actually fell by 0.6% to 1. 16 in three Soviet republics and in the great economic region of the Northwest, as compared with the annual average of the 1954-57 period, In five economic regions (Central Asia, Ural, Central Siberia, East Siberia, and Transcauscasia:) the increase in agricultural output was very Low (between 0.2% and 2% annually ) during that period, During the same period, the potato crop fell in four important economic regions and the vegetahle crop in two major economic regions, From - 1960 to 1962, the grain. output likewise fell in several economic’ regions. . . .
"During the period 1959=61, among 26 economic regions and Republics of the USSR, the plan for per capita output of agricultural _pro-= ducts was realized in 3 regions for wheat, in 7 for. potatoes, in 2 for milk, in 5 for sunflowers, in 6 for sugar beets and in 4 for wool, Not a single economic region fulfilled its plan figures for meat, FenSbables and eggs per capite. ..."
"Between. 1925.and 1961, productive fixed funds [i. Ce, productive investments] rose 41,2 times in industry and construction, 9.7 times in transportation end telecommunication, and only 2,9 times in agriculture (including cattle raising).. Investments in agriculture between 1928 and 1961 amounted to: only 14. 5% of total investments made by the state and co-operative societies in the Soviet Union during that period. « « e In 1960, only 3. 4% of all electrical energy produced in the country wes ati lized by agriculture, whereas industry, building construction and transportation utilized 86.1%; t.e.,.25 times more then agriculture. Per person employed, agriculture in 1960 used 1/18 the amount of electricity of other sectors of the economy, © and 1/15 the amount of coal, oil and gas used by industry, building construction, transportation and telecommunications,
"the relatively small amount of fixed funds received by agriculture explains to a great extent the lower level and the lower rate of growth of labor productivity in that sector of the economy as compared with industry. From 1913 to 1961, productivity of lebor rose 11.9 times in industry and only 4 times in agriculture (sovkhozes and kolkhozes combined). As a result of this, agriculture, which occupies ‘ 38.8% of the active population of the "USSR, produces only 16. 1% of the. national income, .-..-According-to the: program of the CPSU, the increase in productivity of labor from now to 1980 must be higher in agriculture than in industry; it must rise 5 to 6 times in agriculture, against 4 to 4.5 times in industry. .. In order to realize the ‘objectives which. the Twenty-second Congress put before the Party, visualiging an abundance of agricultural ‘products, industry will have to deliver 7 to 8 times more chemical fertilizers to agriculture. .. But in 1960, five out of 19 major: economic regions produced no chemi~ cal fertilizers, and in 6 regions the consumption of these fertilizers was 2 to 4 times higher than the local output. .. In only 8 major > economic regions was the output of chemical fertilizers greater than local consumption. "
"At present, the effective use of mineral fertilizers per 100 ha [hectares] of cultivated land still varies greatly from region to region: from 7.6 mq. [metric quintals].in East Siberia to 37.6 meq. in Central Asia. For nitrogenous fertilizers the veriation is between 5e8 mq. in Kazakhstan and 90.7 mq. in Transcaucasia; for phosphates, between 2.5 in,g. in Bast Siberia and 158 mq. in Central Asia; for’ potash fertilizers, between 0.27 mq. in Kazakhstan and 75.9 mq. in tne West,
"Our country is far behind many advanced capitalist. countries in the use of mineral fertilizers. The USA uses 4 times more chemical: fertilizers than the USSR (in kilogram units), Britain 14 times more and the Federel Republic of Germany 20 times More. - As a result, during the last five years y average ‘yield. (per hectare of cultivated land) of grain and beets is twice as high in the USA, and three times as high in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany; wheat yields were 5 to 35,5 times higher in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, corn yields were nearly twice as high in the USA; oats, twice as high in the USA and 3 to 4 times higher in Western Germany and Belgium, Potato yields are 2 to 2,5 times higher in the USA, Britain and the
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German Federal Republic, flax yields 5 times higher in Belgium, soya beans 5,5 to 4 times higher in the USA and Canada, etc., etc. ....”
"On 100 ha. of agricultural land, there. are 3,5 more cattle in Britein than in the USSR, and 4,5 times more in the German Democratic Republic, This implies in turn a much lower input in the USSR in natural fertilizers. .." .
‘“YAt present, the equipment of our agriculture in tractors, agri-~ cultural machinery and other labor instruments is much worse than in: many advanced capitalist countries. For 100 ha. of cultivated land, © the USA has 7 times more tractors in physical units, and, converted | into 15 horsepower tractors, nearly 4 times more; the number of. com= | bines for wheat is 5 times more in the USA (per physical units) or 3 times. more (converted into 15 horsepower units), and the number of corn harvesters is 5 times greater in the USA. American agriculture . has 3.7 more trucks..." = .
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These figures clearly show that the main reason for the backward~. ness of Soviet agriculture is chronic underinvestment in equipment, ~ sheds, buildings, spare parts, fertilizer, etc. So long as this underinvestment is not radically overcome, agriculture will remain the Achille'ts heel of the Soviet economy. ,
‘It is characteristic of Khrushchev that while he invites experts to sit in at decision-making meetings (of the Plenum of the Central. © Committee, the Supreme Soviet, ect.), he is nevertheless little inter=ested in their opinion. Criticisms voiced in the Academy of Agronomy over his "virgin lands" experiment was ruthlessly suppressed at the time, although it later’ proved to be accurate,
Recently, just before the Plenum of the Central Committee, he again invited the Academy of Agronomy to voice "frank criticism" of the current agricultural policies of the government.
‘Wheh this criticism proved to be very sharp indeed, he avenged himself by banning the Academy from Moscow to the provincial tow of Kursk, /