‘THE
UPROAR OVER PERON'S PROPOSED RETURN
BUENOS AIRES -- Talk began in Argentina last January about the possible return of Perén, Little by little the rumor gained ground, Certain trade-union leaders who frequently travel to Madrid for conferences with the former president. announced that the return of the Justicialist® leader would be this year. However, everything remained conjectural until recently when top Peronist trade-union and political leaders confirmed the report. The public thereupon began to seriously consider the return of the main and undisputed leader of the Argentine working class as a real possibility.
There is no doubt that Perénts actual return would, for many reasons, constitute the most outstanding event in recent years for Argentina. Although almost a decade has passed since Perén was overthrown by the.Armed Forces. with the support of the oligarchy, most of the industrialists, and the political parties, the hatred and fear in which his government was held still remains. alive, Consequently when the former president himself announced in an open letter to the. Argentine people that he. intended to return this year in order to collaborate in bringing peace to his fellow citizens, the response was most vigorous. It is possible that one of the objectives of the letter was just to send up a trial balloon. If this was Perén's Pnbent tony. it is evident that he succeeded.
Up. “to. the day the letter was "published, opposition. to his proposed ‘peturn did not appear to be extensive. Opponents openly against the return of the “deposed tyrant," as he is customarily labeled by La Prensa -- the paper of. highest prestige: in the country -- could be counted. on onéts fingers... .Only, an occasional political committee. and a grouping of. Small..civic organizations that appeared-in the heat of the so-called “Liberating Revolution". of September 16, 1955, had made the public record. -Not.a single.major party had ventured to offer an opinion. Even more -- the secretary of the Federation of Center Parties. ([Federacién de. los Partidos del Centro] -- a- grouping of completely conservative cut, typically representative of the “oligarchy" -~- had declared’ that it was not worth the bother to say anything, since the. ‘armouncement made by. the Justicialist leaders that Perén intended to’return to Argentina had no other aim but to create a sensation among the Peronist forces and raise their morale,
But the -big .unknown was the. government and the Armed Forces. Before the election that gained him the presidency of the Republic, Dr. Arturo Illia and his party .-- the Unién Civica Radical del Pueblo -- had declared that Perdén's return was a problem that only Perén himself could decide, When the possibility began to be dis-
="Justicialismo,'t the doctrine advanced by Perén, claims to stand between Communism and capitalism, combining idealism and materialism, individualism and collectivism. Banned as "Peronism," the movement gained sanction from President Frondizi to participate in the’ March 1962 elections as the "Justicialist Front." . .
cussed this year, the question.was immediately asked, "What does the Executive Power say?"
By way of the mouths of his highest functionaries, the Execu- | tive ‘Power insisted again that he had nothing to say, since ‘it was not up to him, ‘“Perén," said the Undersecretary of the Interior, “is a private citizen like anyone else. It's up to him to decide and no © one else." , So ne
~ The Wabstention" of the Illia government in regard to a trip home by the president who was toppled in 1955 was taken to mean either of two things:
(1) “Since a case was pending against Perén charging him with statutory rape involving a minor -- a dubious” ‘charge ~- and since he could be accused of other crimes (fraud, etc.),-the benevolent: attitude of the Executive Power could be considered the- prelude: to- possible amnesty to be granted by parliament. A favorable vote on this could be. obtained with relative ease since: the’ present: government holds an absolute majority in. the senate, while in’ the ohamber of ~~ deputies it’ could. count -on the ‘support: of ‘other parties anxious not to get crossed up with Peronist’ voters. oo
(2) The acquiescence ‘of the Executive Power: ‘in Perdnits return could mean that Illia had succeeded in convincing the Armed Porces that the entrance- of the former president would not’ provoke any big disturbances.
Since it was necessary to find sonie political motive’in all... this, the silence of the government; more accurately, its refusal to come out unequivocally against Perdén's return, provoked more and more speculation in political and journalistic circles that the two had reached a political understanding. Since you'can't lift youself by your boot straps, as the popular saying goes, it was not any attach- — ment to electoral promises.that determined the attitude of ‘the authorities. If Illia was not opposed to Perén's return it was purely and — simply:because the Unién Civica Radical: del Pueblo was negotiating ~~ for the support of the Peronist movement .in the next parliamentary” elections scheduled for March 1965.
These elections can be of decisive importance to the government, inasmuch.as a defeat could mean a strong opposition in parliament for some years. And where did Peronist votes come in? ‘Why not assume that Perénts return could be purchased in return for electoral support for » the government party? -
La Razén, the country's most widely circulated evening paper, published an interesting report with regard to-this, Three military. figures had been sent.to interview Perdén in’ Madrid, the paper said, to discuss the terms of. an agreement.
“Other newspapers ran a report that appeared - in the London Times, claiming that an agreement had been reached along the follow- -
ing lines: . Peré6n would return to Argentina for-a-short stay -- three months more or less ~- his aim being to iron out internal problems of the Peronist:movement and to leave the leadership in the hands of Vandor, the strong man of the CGT [Confederacién General del Trabajo}... Yandor was said to favor a tacit understanding with. the government, “In return for this, the Justicialist movement would support Illia in the parliamentary elections next March. In-order not togive the Armed Forces cause for worry, Perén's arrival and: stay in. Argentina .would be undertaken with every conceivable precaution... oo Fhere- was even talk-of confining him to a distant corner of the country and keeping him practically under lock and key until the time . came to send him abroad once and for all. .
All these rumors about a possible agreement between Perdén and Illia -- with the approval of the Armed Forces -=- were denied at one time or another by both sides. Nevertheless, despite being. urged | more and more to state his opinion ahout the return of the former president, the Executive Power persisted “in dummying. up. Wasn't this the best proof that a deal was actually being worked out?
Perén's letter to the Argentine people changed the situation at once, It was clear that Perdén proposed to return. .And he had set the date -- before the end of 1964, .Those who had been watching things. with a knowing smile, believing that it was alla Peronist "bluff," had to change their minds.
‘The opposition to his return mushroomed. The two most: mpor-_ tant dailies of the Republic, La Prensa, which the Justicialist leader expropriated when he was in power;. “and La Nacién began by recapitulating the chorus of the .small rabidly anti-Peronist organizations that had already come out against his return. Both of them commented editorially on Perdén!s letter:-and declared that he could not and must not return. Political personalities spoke up in the same way... Américo Ghioldi, main figure of the Partido Socialista Democrdtico, a liberal organization that participated actively in the struggle against the Peronist regime, had declared some time ago that the return of Perén would.draw his following away from many parties fighting for the Justictalist votes. At first it seemed that Ghioldi would ret oppose the proposal to let the former president return. However, -he now came out vigorously in opposition and had his party do the same. . .
The Unién Civica Radical ‘del Pueblo, the official wing.of the Unién Civica Radical (both were once united under the leadership of former president Frondizi), had maintained silence up to this point. FPhis is easily explained. Neither of these parties can view the return of Perén with equanimity. In fact-both of them are gambling on the Justicialist movement abstaining in the next electoral contest. Their greatest ambition is to .make a secret ‘deal that would end Justicialist competition. But, as is understandable, such an agreement would be ruled out if they said they were against.Perén's return. A party not facing this problem, UDELPA LUnién del Puebla. Argentino], which was organized by former president Aramburu, who:ran against
Tllia, spoke up against Perdn's return without any hesitation.
Although the attitude of the government and the Armed Forces continued to remain enigmatic, a series of facts proved that here,. too, the ground was not favorable for Perén. Before the publication of his open letter, certain officials in retirement said that. they opposed his return in-any form. With the appearance of the letter, the protests rose. It was well.known that the chief of Campo Mayo -- General Lanusse -- a stubborn anti-Peronist, had filed his veto | with the Executive Power. It was evident, therefore, that the reluctance of the government to take a stand. in the matter would not last. long. .
: The occasion came with the ninth anniversary of September 16, 1955, the so-called "Liberating Revolution." In the previous. eight. anniversaries the festivities were:’almost always limited to ceremon-. les that were rather played down, This time it was different, : Throughout the country, the "democratic" elements staged rallies inwhich inflammatory speeches were made against the “return of the past." The government backed these ceremonies in an ostentatious way. If there were any differences among the Armed Forces, no one could see them, .The secretaries {a post second only to the Minister of War) of the three departments, expressed the views of their =. respective bodies, and they ail agreed that. Perdén must not return...
As might be imagined, the Executive Power had already decided before these ceremonies to exercize a definitive veto. In a statement made to Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune, President Illia, forgetting all hisprevious affirmations, said: "There is no desire for him to return because the Argentine people want peace and tranquility. The government. has not taken any measures. . . because I dontt believe they are necessary. - The ceremonies commemorating the sixteenth of September demonstrate | that public opinion is opposed to his return,"
The Peronist reaction to the veto by the Executive Power and the Armed Forces has been cautious up to now, Apparently they are: a little disconcerted, The repeated assertions that Perén would return without fail in 1964 indicate: that they had come to believe -at least some of them -- in the possibility of a deal with the government forces. Otherwise their optimism is inexplicable. Perédn, according to the declarations of his followers and then his own asser-= tion would return as the "peacemaker." This ruled out beforehand that it would occur as the culmination of powerful popular demonstrations. And the facts corroborated this conclusion. The Peronistoriented "62 organizations" -- the strongest nucleus of the Confederacién General del Trabajo -- although, they had mobilized in favor of -his return, did so in an absolutely peaceful way, with a series of ~ actions that created no stir whatsoever,
Will they continue the same kind. of course after. ‘the veto? - Everything indicates that the answer is yes. It is clear that the_ Peronists will continue to issue threats. They. were. issuing them. ;
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before they knew that the Armed Forces were against Perdédn's return. “If the government does not permit Perén to return, it will bear the responsibility for whatever happens." This is the repeated refrain. But it is difficult to say what the hienarchy proposes to do. It is not that they cannot count on mass support for genuine acts of resis~tance. If they have not resorted to a militant course to promote the return of Perén, it is simply because they didn't want to. The pretext of the leaders is that a militant attitude would prejudice the cause for which they are struggling. There is no reason to believe that they will change in this, The "struggle" for the return will no doubt take shape in.a.series..of acts of some scope, but not sufficient in any case to gain the proclaimed objective.
It would be a mistake to conclude that Peronism suffered a big defeat. It is certain that Perdén's aspiration to return to Argentina received a setback, But is this what he actually sought? It is difficult to imagine a politician as skillful as the former president of Argentina seriously believing for a single moment that he could return with the "benevolent" ‘permission of the Armed Forces.
This is not to ‘deny that dealings were carried on with ‘the. government as rumored, but Perén undoubtedly knew that in a problem as grave as his return, the ultimate decision would be made not by the authorities but by the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. And in view of ‘their: rabid anti- Peronism, permission would not be forthcoming.
The fact that officers apparently in agreement with the return (among them appears to be Ongania, commander in chief of the army and the man who at one time broke the. uprising of the “colorado faction, the "gorillas" [reactionary officers] of the army) were not permitted to say anything, indicates that the Armed Forces still view Peronism as a formidable enemy, Perdén is undoubtedly aware of this. Thus it seems difficult to believe that he really thought he could get. permission to return, -
What' is most probable is that the entire campaign had no other objective than to give Peronism fresh impetus. The division between followers of Framini and Vandor, the “Fraministas" and the "“vandoristas," constituted a potential threat which the former president had: to meet. In the March 1965 elections, the Peronists will, without the least doubt, make an attempt to win a goodly number of deputies and senators and perhaps governors of important provinces. The division could be healed with realization of this hope.
But how to unite the dissidents in the meantime? The “struggle for the return of the undisputed chief could do it. And that's what happened. When-he returned from Madrid, where he had seen Perén, Framini said that the battle with Vandor was something secondary, since after all, "We are Peronists."
The opposition of the government and the Armed Forces now offers Peronism still more reason for closing ranks. In a record-
~Pinw
ing made in Madrid and brought back by Framini, Perén, foreseeing the veto in store, addresses the Peronist workers, telling them that he is. ready to return to Argentina, but that it is up to them to prepare the conditions for it, -It would not be remarkable if from now until the elections next March, the entire Peronist campaign to mobilize the workers. were to center around this slogan.
GUERRILLA