BALANCE SHEET OF THE CHILEAN ELECTION
By José Valdés
Santiago, Chile
‘The outcome of the parliamentary elections held March 7 was as follows:
Votes Senators Deputies
Partido Demécrata Cristiano 989,626 11 82
Partido Radical . 308, 583 3 20
Partido Comunista 286,157 2 18
Partido Socialista 245, 500 Ko) 15
Partido Liberal 175,400 fe) 7
Partido Conservador 129,312 O 3”
Partido Democrdtico Nacional 74,402 1 oe
Other parties 75,000 6) O
Blank ballots 04,500
Void ballots 35, 789 |
Abstentions 20%
From these results we can draw the following conclusions:
(1) The bourgeois and imperialist forces gained a considerable electoral victory, since some 1,700,000 votes were cast for the bourgeois parties and scarcely 600,000 for the FRAP [Frente Revolucionario de Accién Popular, a front backed by the Communi st, Socialist and other parties|.
(2) The Christian Democracy Lop] now constitutes the main party in Chile with 42% of the vote and enough members in parliament to assure an absolute majority. The outstanding fact in.its victory is that a big part of the votes came from workers, peasants and white-collar layers, to which must be added the massive backing of the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the CD gained control of the popular movement, taking it away from the FRAP. In the proletarian and peasant zones, the CH obtained approximately 60% of the popular vote against 40% for the Communist party [cp] and Socialist party [SP], a higher proportion than it received in the 1964 presidential election.
(3) The traditional rightist parties (the Liberals and Conservatives) suffered a considerable decline, losing -- perhaps definitively -- the support of certain layers of the petty bourgeoisie which now prefer to vote for the spare party of the bourgeoisie, the CD. The vote for the Radical party dropped from 21% to 12. 8% but, with some 300,000 votes, it still has-a certain standing among sectors of the urban middle class.
(4) The percentage of votes for the FRAP parties was smaller
than in the previous elections. The CP dropped from the 12.8% which it won in 1963 to 11.87%; while the SP went from 11.47% in the 1963 councilmanic election to 10% despite being favored by compensating deals which it succeeded in getting from the CP. Still worse, the FRAP leaders proved incapable of winning the independent masses who favored the candidacy of Allende for the presidency, the vote dropping from 975,000 in the 1964 contest to 597,000 in the current one. ; ;
(5) An important sector of workers -- although still a very small minority -- repudiated the bourgeois electoral system and the reformist leadership of the FRAP. This was shown by the figure of 20% abstentions (in contrast to 9% in 1964) and the appreciable number of blank and void ballots. In the September 1964 election there were 7,408 blank ballots in contrast to 34,300 six months later in March, The 15,350 void ballots in 1964 contrasts with 35,700 in the current election. A big part of the void ballots came from workers who wrote revolutionary slogans across their ballots. The groups of the revolutionary left who called for blank ballots (Partido Socialista Popular, Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista, Espartaco (pro- Chinese), and MIDI [Movimiento de Independistas Allendistas de Izquierda]) stated in press declarations that "a considerable part of the politically conscious workers responded to the revolutionary appeal." The blank and void ballots were cast primarily in areas where these revolutionary groups have a base as in Coquimbo,. Valparafso, Santiago, O'Higgins, Concepcién, Talca, Cautin, etc. An additional indication was the 4,335. votes cast for the independent — Socialist member of parliament, Rigoberto Cossio, who lacked but few votes to be re-elected from Osorno, Cossio, together with many of his comrades in the province, have applied for membership in the Partido Socialista Popular.
The Frei Government
The Christian Democracy is the spare bourgeois party which imperialism had to wheel out in order to maintain the capitalist system and to channelize mass discontent through a reformist, demagogic program. The Frei government represents the general interests of the bourgeoisie and the new plans of Yankee imperialism expressed in the "Alliance for Progress." It would, however, be grossly mechanical to affirm that it is an unconditional or puppet government of the oligarchy and imperialism. Frei represents the interests of a bourgeoisie in a semicolonial country that is incapable of freeing itself from the foreign monopolists but which wishes to play the role of junior partner in an active way, seeking better prices for raw materials, a guaranteed market, ample credits and foreign investments, aspiring to negotiate the division of the national income with imperialism under better conditions. Frei's measures with regard to copper and the electric and telephone com= panies prove that the CD is not an anti-imperialist movement; but they show at the same time that it is not an unconditional servant of Wall Street. Do,
The rise of the CD to power testifies to the displacement of the old landholding oligarchy which shared power with the indus= trial bourgeoisie up until recent decades. However, a sector of modern agriculturists (in the south) support the government, since the projected Agrarian Reform will not affect holdings that are in full production, The industrial bourgeoisie support Frei because in the final analysis he guarantees continuation of the policy followed by the best exponent of this class sector -- Jorge Alcs-~ sandri, the former president. The most favored sector will be export industries (paper and cellulose products, steel from Huachipato, fish meal, etc.). It is not by accident that Frei is giving | special backing to the Asociacién Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio LALALC],-as a means of boosting the Chilean export industries. Light industry, which is concerned about the internal market, likewise supports the government's agrarian plans in the illusion that these will widen the market and increase the buying power of the small landholders envisioned by the projected Agrarian Reform,
The CD enjoys the backing of imperialism and the bourgeoisie, but this is not sufficient to characterize the Frei government with precision, To gain power, the CD was obliged to stand on a dema~ gogic platform voicing popular aspirations. This succeeded in winning the support of the majority of workers, peasants and whitecollar layers, in this way committing the government to certain promises,:. Frei'ts popular support introduces a social element that suggests the following question: Can Frei establish a “sui generis bonapartist" government? That is, a government representing the general interests of the bourgeoisie, but playing the role of arbiter between the classes, which, basing itself on the support of the popular sectors, could blackmail and pressure the old oligarchy in order to advance its own plans? This question, along with a precise characterization of the Frei government, is of decisive importance for the policy that a revolutionary Marxist party must formulate for the mass movement which in its majority supports the government.
It can be argued that this government cannot be characterized as "sui generis bonapartist" because, unlike the governments of _. Perén, Vargas, etc., it is not based on the organized trade-union’ — movement. The objection, in my opinion, is a formal one. What is to be noted is the content -- Frei's popular support whatever its_ form.
In addition, it is possible that with a new trade-union project which Frei has placed before congress, he will gain the support of big union sectors following a possible split in the trade-union movement. If the CD does not win the next congress of the CUT Central Unica de Trabajadores], it will surely provoke a split and create a dual trade-union center which the government will recognize as the legal one. The yellow unions will be inclined to favor this new Central supported by the government, In that case, Frei will succeed in adding an important part of the trade-union movement ° to his present base among the unorganized sectors of the population.
-29.
Frei'ts popular support is a victory for the political dema~ gogy of the CD and a demonstration of the incapacity of the bureaucratic leaders of the FRAP, but it brings in a contradiction that will begin to stand out in coming months when the masses demand fulfillment of the program. Thus the contradiction will sharpen between the militant base of the CD, which is popular in character, and the bourgeois leadership. This will be shown in the formation of ten= dencies and wings within the government party.
Government plans are projected along the following lines:
(1) In economics: To increase agricultural production by means of credits and a mild agrarian reform that will not substantially change land ownership; to foster the export industries as indicated above; to overcome the crisis and deficit in foreign exchange, increasing copper exports through new contracts or projected combinations with the Yankee companies. Our prognosis on the economic perspectives of the country is that the government will not be able to overcome the stagnation of the productive forces, that it will not be able to halt the inflationary process or to increase the standard of living for the masses, The national return on foreign invest-~ ments, promised by Yankee and German imperialism, could increase . somewhat, but in the long run this, like the projected increase in copper production, does not depend on Freits "good" intentions, but on the world market and prices, which continue to be controlled by imperialism, Agricultural and industrial production, with the , exception perhaps of the export industries, will continue to stag» nate, because the inflationary process -- at a higher rate than the 25% envisaged by the government -- will reduce the buying power of the masses,
(2) In the social field: The government will try to widen its basis of support by creating some thousands of small landhold-= ers, but its success will prove to be limited, since the moderate agrarian reform will not affect the producing latifundios [big estates] but only uncultivated lands. This is insufficient to satisfy the aspirations of the peasants who voted for Frei.
(3) Among the trade unions: The CD will foment a split in the labor movement if it does not succeed in capturing a majority at the next congress of the CUT which is scheduled later this year. The government has already sent a project to the congress aiming at dividing the unions along the lines practiced by the CD in Italy, Belgium, etc. The CD will seek to penetrate the popular movement not only in the unions but in the villages where the majority of the workers are unorganized. But its housing plan, supplying of sewing machines, food handouts, etc., will not succeed in satisfying the aspirations of the workers. These superficial reforms do not touch the foundation of the present system and do not signify a real improvement in the standard of living.
In the next period, we will witness the failure of the so-
called "Revolution in Freedom" ["Revolucién en Libertad] and see the bourgeois democratic revolution frustrated once more, since, as in other semicolonial countries, the bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying out its own historic tasks. Contemporary history has demonstrated that these can only be accomplished by the proletariat at the head of the peasantry and the impoverished middle class. The Frei government, in which imperialism is placing such hopes, will fail to meet the challenge issued by Fidel Castro as to which will prove superior -- the reform in Chile or the revolution in Cuba? The Latin- American peoples will soon see the difference in rate of progress between socialist Cuba, with its planned economy based on a workerpeasant alliance, and Christian-Democrat Chile, which seeks to patch up and reform a decadent capitalist system.
The Present Stage and Immediate Tasks
The fundamental lines characterizing the present stage are: (1) the strengthening of capitalism through assumption of a new mask -- the Christian Democracy -- which succeeded in gaining the support of big sectors of the population through a demagogic and reformist program; (2) the crisis of the Communist and Socialist parties; and (3) the tendency toward regroupment and unification of the revolutionary Marxist forces.
The fact that the FRAP was defeated has led to speculations about having entered a stage of retrogression. This is due to a formal and mechanistic criterion which identifies the FRAP with the working class as a whole. We believe that the masses who voted for Frei did so because of the program of changes and reforms which the GD promised. Big sectors of the population made a mistake in placing confidence in bourgeois reformism, but they do not feel defeated; instead they expect the promises to be carried out. These layers did not vote for Frei for rightist and pro-imperialist or anti- Communist reasons, but in hope of a "Revolution in Freedom," as the CD called it. The victory of the CD did not signify a social defeat for the working class as a whole. The trade-union and political organizations of the working class are intact, able to initiate a counteroffensive, as was shown by the mobilization of the trade unions at the end of the year for wage adjustments.
We are not in a period of liquidation of the conquests already won by the proletariat, nor in a period of repression and persecution of the workers't movement. We are not living in a stage of retrogression nor of bourgeois counterreform compelling the workers to fall back and stand on the defensive. On the contrary, we believe that the reformist and demagogic plan of the CD and the state of mind of the Freista and Allendista workers favors mobilizing the workers for strikes in behalf of immediate demands, occupations of the land and blocks of houses under construction, etc. These struggles will be spurred by the deterioration of the economic situation, since the government will be unable to counter the inflationary process. The rise of the world revolution, the victories of
the colonial and backward countries, and any noticeable advance of the revolution in any Latin-American country, will likewise encourage the Chilean workers to engage in struggle.
In the stage now opening, the political front will shift to the level of the unions and the villages. The process of politicalization will not automatically be wiped out among the masses who were preoccupied with the political-electoral problem during 1964; it. will be displaced toward their class organizations which can battle for immediate demands, The key to the situation is to accelerate the experience of the popular sectors with the Frei government through a common struggle of the workers, peasants and white-collar layers for wage increases, the unity of the CUT and the unions, the occupation of the land in the villages. This should be waged through a united front of the ranks with the Freista workers, joint action in occupying the land with Freista peasants who still believe in the agrarian reform and in the land promised by the CD, and any kind of action that tends to unmask the Frei government.
The crisis of the Communist and Socialist parties, which is part of the world-wide breakup of revisionism and reformism, has deepened in Chile since the defeat of Allende on September 4, 1964,
The ideological clarification around the Sino-Soviet conflict and, fundamentally, the revolutionary methods of struggle generated by the Cuban Revolution, precipitated a crisis in the old political superstructures of the popular movement. in Latin America. The pro# grammatic revisionism of the Communist and Socialist parties no longer holds sway, because the Cuban Revolution posed with razor sharpness the immediate perspective of the workers and peasants tak~ ing power through insurrectional struggle in contrast to the impracticality of the peaceful and parliamentary road, There has been a sharpening of the contradiction between the ranks who want to take the revolutionary road and the bureaucratic leaderships that hold them back. Hence the innumerable splits in the traditional workers parties in Latin America in the past five years which have given birth to new class and revolutionary formations.
The Chilean Communist and Socialist parties have also been affected by this general crisis. -For some time sizeable sectors have been shifting away from the SP in the provinces of Coquimbo,,. Santiago, Valparafso, Talca, Concepcién, Llanquihue, Osorno, etc., leaving the SP practically without any youth in these areas. In the Communist party, an important split occurred with the departure of Senator Barros, the writer Portnoy and many militants in Valparafso. As yet a mass desertion has not occurred in the ranks of the . CP, but a molecular process has begun of criticism of the leader= ship and open disagreement with the peaceful and electoral road, The crisis in the two parties deepened after the disastrous Allendista presidential campaign, since the September 4 defeat meant the defeat of the line advocating the peaceful road. Many militants of the CP and SP, who believed in this line, or at least accepted it
“2 32Q-
temporarily, were disillusioned and have begun intensive criticism of the line imposed by the leaderships.-~
The task of the revolutionary Marxist groups is to appeal, tactfully but firmly, to the rank-and-file Communists and Socialists, ‘redoubling the ideological propaganda, the publication of books, pamphlets and journals, directing pages, handbills and circulars: especially to them, organizing courses and meetings, and in particu-~ lar carrying out joint actions among the worker and student sectors. Unity of the Revolutionary Forces
The new Marxist-Leninist groups, born in the crisis of the ‘traditional parties and the advance of class forces inspired by the Cuban Revolution, show a marked tendency toward regroupment in all the countries of Latin America. They pose unity in order to end the period of atomization, because they understand that only the fusion of the revolutionary forces can accelerate the overthrow of the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie. In the process of unification many prejudices have already been overcome with regard to older revolutionary formations such as Trotskyism, and old cadres have been impelled to break with sectarianism and to end squabbles and secondary differences. The regroupment has led to the formation of - strong parties of the extreme left in various Latin-American countries, around which the best of the vanguard have-begun to gather, The working-class and student youth are beginning to see through the traditional workers' parties and to look with sympathy at the formation of the new revolutionary parties.
In Chile the revolutionary regroupment coincided, as in other countries, with the rise of the Cuban Revolution. The efforts of the Movimiento de Fuerzas Revolucionarios, organized by Clotario Blest in 1961, have been followed by other unifying steps fostered by the Trotskyists such as gave rise to the Partido Socialista Popular in 1964, This process toward unification of the revolutionary left has registered fresh successes in recent months. The following groups are close to unification on the basis of a Leninist- Marxist program: Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista, Partido Socialista Popular, MIDI, revolutionary trade unionists like Clotario Blest, and dissident Socialist sectors that have recently left the SP,
The national congresses of these groups, scheduled for April, project ratifying the proposal to unite, enabling a relatively strong revolutionary Marxist party to be created, since the forces already assembled in these groups would make possible a party of national scale, well based in the main provinces of the country and the tradeunion and student movements. The fundamental task faced by the Marxist-Leninist groups at present is to rapidly go ahead with the formation of the united party of the Chilean Socialist Revolution, to overcome the crisis in leadership of the workers! movement and guide the workers to power: along the road of the proletarian revolution,
March 20, 1965
AMERICAN SOCIALIST