GENERAL TELLS JOHNSON HOW TO AVOID DISASTER
Some instructive parallels between Japanese experience in the period before the opening of World War II and the current experience of the U.S, in Vietnam have recently been drawn. An outstanding example was the one pointed _ out by the expert in Far Eastern affairs, Professor Owen Lattimore. [See World Outlook April 16.] A similarly thoughtful article, written by Kiyoaki Murata appeared in the April 15 issue of the Japan Times.
He notes a big change in the amount of analysis now devoted in Japan to the Vietnamese situation "in sharp contrast to the remark-~ able indifference that had prevailed here until last autumn."
One of the things distinguishing the "majority Japanese view" from the “official U.S. position" is in the nature of the struggle in south Vietnam.
"The predominant view is that the current conflict in South Vietnam is a civil war -- fought between a nationalist movement and a regime allied with a foreign power,
“From this analysis, it follows that the course of action to be pursued is that the U.S. must pull out of South Vietnam."
This recommendation, says Murata, "seems to carry a certain persuasiveness in the light of the fact that the situation in which the U.S. finds herself is similar to where Japan was at the beginning of the major conflict in which she became involved and which later ended in a devastating disaster."
The "parallel between the Japanese and American experiences was first brought home" when the Japanese read President Johnson's repeated statement: "We seek no.wider war."' The Japanese noted that even while he was saying this, "the war in Vietnam widened,"
"It was highly reminiscent of what happened in the 1930s. In the days and weeks following the first shot fired at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking between the Japanese and Chinese troops. in July 1937, the Japanese Government declared it sought no 'wider war,.! The Japanese expression was 'fuka-kudai hoshin,! the policy of ‘not expanding! the local conflict.
"Despite the 'nonexpansion! proclamation, the fighting spread throughout China, presumably because the military overruled the policy of the Government. It then escalated into a global war,"
- Kiyoaki Murata calls attention to an article written by Lt. Gen. Kenryo Sato in the May issue of the monthly Sunges Shun ju. Lt. Gen, Sato was one of the leading exponents of positive’ mili-+ tary policy against Nationalist China. In his article, this military expert, recalling the somber experience of Japan, *twarns against the U.S.'s falling into the same pitfall Japan had fallen into in the 1930s and 1940s and recommends withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam,"
Japan's object in beginning the "Manchurian Incident" in September 1931 and founding the puppet state of Manchukuo was,"in terms of shibboleths," to “separate Manchuria from China in. order to make it the first Line of defense against the menace of communism in Russia.
The justification offered for this policy was that “the Manchus were not to be dominated by the Chinese and that they deserved independence. In the political language of the 1960s, Japan was trying to preserve the right of the Manchurians 'to be left alone!"
But to “secure Manchukuo, it was necessary to "secure" the adjacent region in China itself.
"It was for this purpose that an incident was created in July 19357, And despite the Tokyo avowal of its adherence to the policy of nonexpansion, the armed conflict spread to other parts of China. By the end of 1938, Japan had occupied Hankow and Canton, not to mention Shanghai and the Nationalist capital of Nanking,"
Now came a severe lesson for the Japanese army. "Contrary to its expectations, the Nationalist regime, seeking asylum in Chungking in the far corner of Szechwan, refused to capitulate."
The ability of the Nationalists to continue resistance was due in part to aid coming through Burma and French Indochina,
To cut off these supply routes, Japan invaded northern French Indochina in the autumn of 1940. Gen. Sato, a principal figure in this operation, says:
"It not only had no effect in settling the Sino-Japanese incident but also, led to the stationing of troops in southern French Indochina and eventually touched off the Pacific War, For all of this I have deep regrets."
Certain strategists in the Imperial General Headquarters proposed early in 1940 that Japan should withdraw from China. Sato vigorously opposed this.
"If we withdrew on our own," he reasoned at the time, "it would mean we have lost the war while winning the battles, It would, therefore, make the Chinese despise us on top of their being hostile to us as they are...To withdraw now without bringing about a conclusion. of this major campaign would mean nothing but defeat,"
Sato proposed an alternative which he thought would bring the Nationalists to their knees. This was to cut off their two supply routes running through Kunming. The proposal was like "the policy being pursued by the United States today in trying to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail." .
The plan was vetoed, but Sato knows today that even if he had had his way, the objective "would have proved elusive. "It is on the basis of this experience," concludes Murata, "that the former general of the Japanese army urges the U.S. to admit the failure of its policy in Vietnam and pull out its troops,"
MAY