BOUMEDIENNE'S GOVERNMENT
By, Plerre Frank
_ In the month or so since the coup d'état that deposed Ben Bella, the new regime has in one form or another been granted recognition by the various powers, the big ones like. the United States, .the USSR and China, and the medium and small ones. The act of violence has thus been ratified on an international scale.
Within the. country, the “demonstrations that broke out immediately after Boumedienne seized power have come to an end. The "National Council of the Revolution," the membership of which was not announced until after two weeks, turned out to consist almost wholly of military figures for whom Boumedienne had just set an example they are bound to ponder over, A week later the composition of.the government was announced. This, along with declarations made by spokesmen. of the new regime, have given rise to some speculation.
It has been noted quite generally that the new regime has not turned the tiller sharply to the right, that it has expressed its intention. to pursue Algeria's socialist “option,” that it has come out for maintaining self-management, etc. The pro~Islamic declarations are said to be-no surprise, Finally, the composition of the new government, in which Rabah Bitat made his reappearance, has been declared of interest. Particularly, the elimination of a Mohammedi Said has been stressed, and above all one of the more dramatic modifications, the replacement of Boudissa, who had a reputation of being reactionary and dishonest, by Zerdani as minister of labor, zerdani has the reputation of being a man of the left who was one of Mohamed Harbi's collaborators when the latter was editor of Révolution Africaine.
Did the coup d'état then signify only a shift in personnel and not in political orientation? ; Upon the announcement of the coup d'état, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International held that the operation of June 19 did not signify the immediate liquidation of the conquests of the revolution and the establishment ipso facto of a neocolonialist regime. [See World Outlook June 25,.] .It could even be “expected, the Fourth International held, that while seeking to consolidate a regime to the right of Ben Bella's, Boumedienne might undertake certain radical measures, for example in the direction of agrarian reform,
Up to now this is the tendency that appears to be in the ‘forefront. At the same time, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International stressed that an operation like the one carried out by Boumedienne has a logic that does not necessarily coincide with his possible intentions. This question has been quite correctly explained by Fidel Castro. Castro said that he would judge Boumedienne by. his
acts; hut, he added, a pronunciamento cannot advance a revolution,
This is the root of the question, It could be objected that Ben Bella himself came to power in July 1962 under "nondemocratic" conditions. But the assertion is false, First of all the GPRA [Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne] was an assem- -blage whose relations with the Algerian masses were questionable; and it was on the spirit, the enthusiasm of the masses, that the Tlemcen team was brought to power. Following that, in the course of the successive elimination from the government of Khider, Ferhat Abbas, etc., the support of the masses was concretely shown through street demonstrations., This time there was the typical pronunciamento, and the new power showed that it did not dare appeal to the masses, that it was very careful not to call on them to demonstrate in the streets.
Boumedienne's bonapartist game, which is not much different from Ben Bella'ts, is not what is decisive. In politics, it is not only the what that counts. The who and the how can have very considerable consequences. For quite a time Ben Bella addressed the masses above all, and the Algerian revolution made progress. Then he turned particularly to combinations at the top, and thus he opened the way to a coup d'état. Despite recognition from the big powers, Boumedienne's regime is unstable; it rests on an armed force that cannot help but feel the social tensions existing in the country. He does not have the capital of sympathy, of personal authority enjoyed by Ben Bella. In proceeding to a coup d'état, he created a new situation in which the first conclusion is that the Algerian _ revolution is weaker than before. The masses have been disoriented, and the partisans of the coup d'état encouraged.
A disquieting new element is the position taken by figures
like Zerdani who are considered to be in the left. If it were the act of an individual it would have little importance. But unfortunately leftist figures in Algeria have had a tendency for more than a year to line up with combinations at the top in hope of advancing their ideas rather than trying to organize themselves and to organize the vanguard of tested, militant and clear-sighted middle cadres -to be found in the ranks of the Algerian revolution. The only "posi-~ tive" result which the June 19 coup d'état could have would be to stimulate the organization of such a vanguard in the light of the lessons of three years of independence. But if an important part of the left continues to use its talents in combinations at the top, this will prove disastrous for the future of the revolution. No revolution has ever advanced by such means. A revolution can advance only by the broad participation of the masses in political life. Corridor deals are incomprehensible to the masses, it wearies them -and demobilizes them.
The policy of the new regime following the June 19 coup d'état is not in itself the sole determinant. Social forces have been set loose. Some of them, the neocolonialist forces, operate only in the dark, The revolutionary forces, in contrast, can advance only by organizing a political vanguard.
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"RECESSION," "DEPRESSION," OR