Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Documents: On the Crisis in Algeria -- Speech by Fidel Castro

World Outlook Vol. 3, No. 25, 23 July 1965 · pp 36-442 · 7,948 words

Africa Cuba

ON THE

CRISIS IN ALGERIA

[The following speech was given by Fidel Castro June 26 to the Cuban youth who were chosen to attend the Ninth World Youth Festival, which was scheduled to be held in Algiers July 28 to August 7. The Algerian government information service accused the Prensa Latina office in Algiers of duplicating this speech and distributing copies of it in the "public thoroughfares" of the Algerian capital. The information service said that this was impermissible “interference in the internal affairs of Algeria; and the police ordered Prensa Latina's office to be locked up. The translation provided below is an unofficial one distributed by the Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York. We have made some typographical changes and corrected some obvious minor errors. |] : :

oe 3k

"~ a8

ate

x4 Comrade Delegates to the Ninth Youth and Students Festival:

For many months the selection of the representatives of our youth to the Ninth Festival has occupied an important part of our people's attention.

The enthusiasm with which the preparatory activities and the selection of the Cuban delegation were carried out, would probably compare favorably with what was done in any other country.

We do not know how the delegates are chosen elsewhere, We naturally feel that the organizations do everything possible to select the best everywhere. But we can feel absolutely sure and satisfied that, thanks to a revolutionary mass procedure, Cuba has selected representatives of top quality, that is, real representatives of the best of our people and our Revolution.

And all the people supported this effort. The millions of arrobas Lone arroba equals about 25 pounds] of cane cut, the tens of thousands of acres weeded, the countless and endless projects,. the countless efforts made in honor of the Ninth Festival, speak for themselves of the warmth with which the nation centered its effort on this activity, even in the middle of the sugar harvest. And the efforts were coordinated. Many were enabled to distinguish themselves in the harvest, and the selection and the effort made to choose the representatives of Cuba in turn helped the harvest,

It is said that the effort made was as if the Ninth Festival was to be held in Cuba. The country chosen as the site, our relations with the people of that country and with the revolutionary movement which that country represents, served as a stimulus to our efforts, And an undoubtedly exceptional work was done.

And there was our détegation with their bags practically :

packed, with the ship already on the way here, when suddenly the scene where the Ninth Festival was to be held abruptly changed.

It would no longer be a clear and eloquent slogan to speak of the World Youth and Students Festival for solidarity, peace and friendship, if it were held there where the concepts of peace, solidarity and friendship are now doubtful. Because it can be said that the circumstances in Algeria are now quite different from the circumstances which moved the organizers of the Festival to choose it as the site of the event.

It is not at all agreeable and it is always rather a thorny question to pass judgment on events which have taken place in a country beyond our frontiers. It is even more regrettable and more thorny when these events take place in a country whose heroic people won the sympathy of the whole world, and, as part of that world, our people. When these events take place in the middle of a revolutionary process which awoke the interests of all the nations of the world and especially the interest of those nations which have fought wholeheartedly against colonialism and imperialism, and of the nations which have liberated themselves or are struggling to liberate themselves, and also of the nations which cannot be called underdeveloped, whose progressive sectors. were showing extraordinary interest in the Algerian revolutionary process.

These are the circumstances which, although they make analysis doubly thorny and painful, justify the universal concern at the events which are taking place there and justify not just the right but the duty to express an opinion.

In expressing our opinions we are not seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of any country but we are seeking to exercise the right of analysing events wherever they take place which necessarily influence the rest of the world, because to a certain extent the events in Algeria affect us all.

And that is why what is happening there, in that country, which in its long and extraordinarily heroic years of struggle won sympathy, solidarity and aid from different parts of the world, is something that in one way or another concerns us all.

And that is why tonight, at this meeting with the youths selected to leave for Algeria, facing the unavoidable need to answer the question what we are going to do, we find it necessary to deal with this matter and answer the question. |

We are. not going to speak in diplomatic language, we are going to speak in revolutionary language. Diplomatic and revolutionary language are not always in contradiction. Sometimes they are in contradiction, and other times they are identical. In this case we will forget the diplomatic aspects of the question and confine ourselves to the clearly revolutionary aspect.

Why beat around the. bush? We cannot discuss. this question: without offending a few people even though there is no intention to offend anyone,

We cannot discuss this question without creating enmity. But in these circumstances what is important is the correct point of view, a correct and objective analysis as far as possible,

In the first place, the military revolt which overthrew the Revolutionary Government of Ben Bella is not and cannot be described by anyone as a revolutionary uprising.

It is true that the crisis arose within the Revolution and among the ranks of the revolutionaries; it is also true that the men that headed that uprising played a prominent role in the struggle . for the independence of Algeria; and it is also true that among those figures there are men that had maintained a good revolutionary line up to this moment, and other figures who although they have played a distinguished role in the revolutionary process did not have a good revolutionary position.

In our relations with Algeria we made contacts with the revo-~ lutionaries, with the representatives of that country, considering them all as part of the same thing. We met many Algerian personalities, many of them visited our country; many of them discussed and held wide exchanges of information with representatives of our country during our visits there or their visits here. Some of them are today in one camp and some in the other; some of them are victims and some victimizers.

But, forgetting names, figures or personalities, the description of a military revolt as revolutionary or not depends essentially on the facts. There can be a revolutionary military revolt and in the case it would be more correct to describe it as a revolutionary movement rather than a revolt. A revolt can also be something that is more crudely described as a putsch, a military seizure of power or a right-wing military coup.

The target against which the revolt is directed is, in the first place, one of the elements that determine how it is described although its description will not depend on the target against which it is directed but also on the ends it. pursues.

Over a decade ago, another North African country, the United Arab Republic, was ruled by a king named Farouk, a representative of a feudal monarchy and of foreign monopoly interests. It was a regime which represented the most crude exploitation of the workers and peasants, and in those circumstances a military movement emerged which led to the overthrow of the king, to the establishment of a republic and to the true independence of the _ country.

That movement was led by a military man and carried out by

military men. That revolt from the very moment it took place could unquestionably be described as a revolutionary military uprising. The mere fact that it was directed against the most anachronistic form of government and against the representatives of the interests that exploited the country, made that movement, from the first moment, a revolutionary movement, or a revolutionary military uprising or, simply, a revolution.

Those circumstances were radically different from those in which the Algerian revolt is taking place. In Egypt, the progressive forces in the army rose against a social system and the government that represented it; revolutionaries rose against supporters of feudalism and against imperialists.

Are these the circumstances in which the Algerian revolt took place? No, it is, in the first place, a painful clash within the revolutionary ranks; a painful conflict within the revolution, in which arms and force are used against revolutionaries and not against a feudal king, not against a representative of imperialist interests, not against a spokesman of the exploiters and reactionaries, not against an enemy of the people, but against the representative of the Algerian Revolution, against a revolutionary and anti-imperialist fighter, against a fighter whose position in the international arena in the struggle of the peoples against imperialism, won in a Tew years great prestige in his country and abroad.

The weapons of the revolution and of the people are turned against one who, unquestionably enjoyed the support of the people; against one who unquestionably represented the will of the majority of the people.

This consideration of what the defeated government represented, the government against which the military revolt was directed, does ‘not have anything to do with passing judgment on the work of that government, does not have anything to do with the achievements or with the errors that men and governments, made up of men, inevitably commit.

There is no attempt in this to make a detailed analysis of a number of years of government, of what was done, good or bad, because this is a question open to argument, a matter of opinion, of judgment.

One could have an opinion on whether more could or could not have been done, on whether they did more or less than they could, But what we are talking about today are facts, not opinions or judgments, but facts accepted by everyone.

Who could deny that Ben Bella was the leader of the Algerian people, who could deny the historic part he played in the indepen- ‘dence of Algeria and in the Algerian Revolution? What government, what party ever said before the treacherous overthrow of President Ben. Bella that Ben Bella was not a revolutionary, that Ben Bella was

not an interpreter of the feelings of Algeria, that Ben Bella was a traitor to the revolution, or that Ben Bella was pro-imperialist, a conservative, a reactionary, a despot?

The Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, as well as the World Youth Festival, was going to be held in Algeria. No one ever proposed to hold it in South Viet Nam, in the capital of the proimperialist puppets; no one proposed to hold it in South Korea or in Formosa or in the Malaysian Federation, or in any of those countries where the governments. represent antisocial and antinational interests. L

By almost unanimous agreement of all progressive and revolutionary movements it was decided that the Conference should be held in Algeria, that the Festival should be held in Algeria. No one, no government, no party, ever said that this man was a turncoat or a traitor or a despot or an enemy of the Algerian people,

I am basing myself on realities, not on opinions but on facts and truths universally accepted.

The day following the inglorious coup a delicate situation arose for all governments and for all parties: what to do? And this question also involved us. What to do and why and what our attitude was to be towards these events.. Do,

A government very friendly to us had been overthrown, a government with which we maintained the best of relations, because. we saw in it the representative of the Algerian Revolution. We are not looking at this problem in the light of friendship as some have tried to insinuate. No. We are looking at it in the light of truth, of our principles, of dignity.

Our relations with President Ben Bella were simply the expression of our relations with and our sympathy for the Algerian Revolution and the Algerian people.

It is true that our people felt a great admiration for President Ben Bella personally, because of course we had not forgotten, it is not something that could be easily forgotten, the gesture of - the revolutionary leader of Algeria, the president of the new state which had won its independence after seven years of heroic struggle, on the eve of those critical days of October 1962,

In an atmosphere. of growing tension he arrived in the United States, invited by the government of that country, the country which maintained such a high degree of hostility towards us, the country which judges men and governments and adopts reprisals against them on the basis of how friendly or unfriendly they are towards Cuba, It must not be forgotten that the representative of Algeria, a country which had been devastated and scorched by war, rejecting all pressure from the imperialist government of the United States, with-

“59 -

out having anything to expect from us, or to receive from us, spontaneously and without any hesitation accepted an invitation to visit our country; to travel from Washington to Havana, thus affronting the imperialists precisely during those critical and tense days,

We recall our contacts with that leader, his decency, his kind and revolutionary character, expressed not in words but in deeds, because a true revolutionary attitude is not expressed in words but in actions.

And it was not a case of mere words but of a deeply revolue. tionary gesture of solidarity, so well understood by our people that they gave our visitor one of the warmest welcomes ever extended in. our country to ‘a foreign visitor.

But we also recall the embarrassing situation in which we found ourselves with our visitor because the (October) crisis was taking form, The U.S. government had put forward its points of view in answer to the concern expressed by the visitor over the hostility of the United States towards Cuba, And they had told him that if. the weapons in Cuba were not offensive weapons there would be no problems, but that if the weapons were offensive then there would be problems, :

This was for us an unacceptable deseription of weapons.: : Because the sovereignty of a country does not involve, and cannot involve in any way, any obligation to give an account of its armaments,

The United States has signed military agreements with Turkey, which borders on the Soviet Union, and is closer geographically to the Soviet Union than Cuba is to the United States, and with Japan and with Italy and with many other countries. Under these military agreements the United States has stationed in those countries the kind of nuclear weapons it saw fit, ranging from strategic missiles with nuclear warheads to bases for atomic submarines or for atomic bombers. Neither the United States nor the governments with which it signed those agreements admitted that any one could ask them to render an account nor did they consider themselves under an obligation to render an account to anyone.

That is why we never accepted these premises and never agreed to them, We are not going to recall the details of those days. To us they were the expression of the most extraordinary heroism and of the greatest dignity that a nation could show,

But we are not going to go into the background of tactical errors in the political field, of public statements that could have played into the hands of our enemy. When one has the right to do something and truth is on one's side, there is no need to resort to a lie. It should never be necessary to lie.

But the fact is that the imperialists had worked out the doctrine of offensive and non-offensive weapons. We perfectly well understood that there could be strategic or nonstrategic weapons 5" nuclear or conventional weapons.

But in the days when President Ben Bella visited us, very close to the October crisis, the whole plan for the military strengthening of our nation was in full swing and the establishment of the nuclear weapons was near completion. What should we do with our guest? Could we accept in silence the explanations he gave us about what he had been told by the imperialists? Could we let him leave our country without saying a word, without explaining to him the storm that was approaching, and without telling him the truth? Could we reveal secrets or facts that should be kept rigorously secret? Could we reveal the extent of the military strengthening of our nation, and the nature of this strengthening?

It was really a delicate and embarrassing situation. And what did we do? We did not tell him we were going to have nuclear weapons, but we allowed him to understand it. We explained to him the philosophy of our position, the truth about our situation in relation to U.S. imperialism, its constant interference in our affairs, its implacable hostility, its aggressive plans, its crim — inal aims to crush our homeland, the dangers hanging over our country, the danger of a conventional war’ whenever it pleased them, plus the danger of a nuclear war if such a war broke out for any reason in any part of the world,

And we explained to him how we were directing our strategy toward the simplification of this problem, to get out of this alternative and have only one risk over our heads, the risk of a thermo-_ nuclear war that we would have to face anyway, if such a war broke out for any reason anywhere.

And not many words are necessary in the case of one who understands well. And Ben Bella showed himself to be a person of magnificent and intelligent understanding.

Of course, that was not the only reason for the presence of strategic weapons, since we were not thinking only of our purely national interests. Our thinking when the decision was taken, was not on the security of our country alone but was essentially on the security of the whole socialist camp, the security and strengthening of all the enemies of imperialism.

And it must be said that when the decision was taken, the fundamental concern of the Cuban leaders was not the security of our country but the total coincidence of our national policy and our international policy; the full identity, without contradictions of any kind, in our revolutionary policy, because our homeland and the socialist camp would both be strengthened. .

Of course, all this can be the subject of multiple discussions, because everything can be discussed. Whether or not it meant a strategic strengthening of the socialist camp , whether or not missiles were needed here, whether they were "hard" or "soft"; that is, whether they were underground or on the surface. But, without trying to settle the question which history will have to clarify, the unquestionable fact is that the strategic missiles in Cuba had an incomparably shorter distance to travel than the strategic missiles in the Soviet Union.

We believe that this is not the time, that it is up to history to clarify the intentions of each and every one of those who acted on that occasion. Changes in governments take place, new situations arise, men pass, facts remain and history will weigh the actions of men.

But I say simply this, in our concept, and not without a very solid basis, the presence of the missiles in Cuba meant the strengthening of the power of the whole socialist camp.

I say this so as not to leave this delicate question without clarifying one or two points that should not remain obscure. But essentially I was referring, and that is why it comes up today, to the practical problem we faced with Ben Bella's visit at that mom= ent, a few hours after he had talked with the president of the United States. What was our attitude and what was his? What did he understand? He understood quickly and correctly. He told us that things were all right, that he understood our position.

And there is something more. When the Cuban-Algerian communiqué was drafted -- and when these communiqués are drafted,more radical and less radical positions always appear, and the position of the (Algerian) Foreign Ministry was not then the most radical == the clearest and most radical positions in the communiqué were those of Ben Bella, not of the Algerian Foreign Ministry.

I.dontt remember whether Bouteflika was the foreign minister or whether it was his predecessor, but I recall that the checking of the joint communiqué took place very near the time of Ben Bella's departure, The communiqué had to reflect the ideas of both countries, and for our part we did not, and could not, in any way raise issues likely to make the acceptance of the communiqué difficult for our visitor,

I remember that when the final communiqué was read, I will never forget, that in recalling the conversation we had had on offensive and non-offensive weapons -- and I forgot to tell you that as well as that explanation of the alternatives we also explained our position on the description of weapons as offensive and defensive -in recalling that conversation which was undoubtedly the most important question we had dealt with, Ben Bella said to us: “a phrase has to be added to the communiqué, that Cuba has the right to take

any measure it. deems fit to defend its security.”

And that phrase, more or less as I have quoted it, must be there in the records, in that communiqué. It was on his initiative, showing just how well and how clearly he understood our position, and how he roused in us sufficient confidence, sufficient gratitude for his gesture at that time so that, without being either casuistical or concrete, we did not hesitate to explain the philosophy and the base of our position, and everything else he deduced himself, Hence he got to know a lot about an extiaordinarily important secret when he visited our country.

The relations and friendship between the two peoples became greater and greater. Later, circumstances arose, moments of crisis for Algeria, difficult moments for the Algerian nation, when they asked for our help. And men and arms from our country, crossing the Atlantic in record time, arrived in Algeria ready to fight alongside the Algerian revolutionaries. And when our men were there, they were with those who today are divided, Those who today have taken up arms against Ben Bella in a fratricidal struggle, were then at his side.

At that time, distance did not keep us from being the first to arrive, Proletarian internationalism in deeds, in deeds, and not in cheap speech making. We, the small country, constantly threatened by the imperialists, parted with some of our most important weapons and sent them to the Algerian people, And the deeds were strengthening relations and friendship between the two peoples, in their best and most glorious moments,

Perhaps, unfortunately, those weapons that one day left our country for the Revolution and the defense of the Algerian people, in a glorious moment of brotherly solidarity, were employed at an inglorious moment, in a fratricidal act, against the Algerian government and people.

But what is important, what remains, are the deeds that go on forging history in the relations between two countries and two revolutions. It will be the job of the Algerian historians, or some other country -- because everyone has the right to have an opinion: about what happens anywhere -- to assess the work of Ben Bella at the head of the Algerian government.

Many people will be satisfied and many people will not be -satisfied, but some and perhaps many, and among them ourselves, have not the slightest doubt of the extraordinary good faith with which | Ben Bella worked, of the honesty of his intentions and of his posi-~ tion at international meetings where Cuba was present. There we were also exceptional witnesses to the fact that the most revolutionary positions were represented by Ben Bella and not by Bouteflika, the foreign minister whose insubordination marked the culminating moment in the overthrow of Ben Bella. There is no doubt at all that this

intellectual of the military seizure of power is not a revolutionary but a man of the right and known as such by the Algerian. people and the whole world, A man of the right, an enemy of socialism, that is, an enemy of the Algerian Revolution, although in their proclamation as in all such proclamations, a certain revolutionary language is used, not a completely revolutionary language, since there is not a word about the national liberation movements, of help to the national liberation movements, help about which Ben Bella never bargained, solidarity which Ben Bella never refused,

And this gentleman, spokesman and one of the men behind the military seizure of power, is a man of the right, a reactionary, And I believe that these facts serve to define the situation.

And at these international meetings the position of Ben Bella was the most revolutionary. It's not easy to judge and we have to confine ourselves to the facts. Everyone will have his own opinion, everyone has his own style, others perhaps would have done things differently. Perhaps with a little more shrewdness, and less kind-~ ness and nobility, Ben Bella would not have. been a victim and would have foreseen the danger, the danger which we unfortunately did fore= see. Because we saw that around Boumedienne there was a clique gathering, we saw that around Boumedienne there were. officers who liked to discredit Ben Bella, And here, unfortunately, on many occasions when delegations visited us, our comrades saw with sorrow that a militarist caste, obviously influenced by militarist conceptions, was showing disdain for the Algerian president.

Naturally we were not going to spread the gossip because this was also quite a general attitude among the men close to Boumedienne. I am not judging Boumedienne. Let us not judge him for what he has done now, so that history may judge him for what he has done and what he may do. He is a very silent man, of few words. It is diffi- ‘cult to know what he is thinking, but his supporters were neither quiet nor lacking in words.

And unfortunately the military seizure of power took place, If Ben Bella had been shrewder and less ingenuous, there would not have been a military seizure of power, and the masses would have disarmed the men behind the revolt, but the unfortunate events took place. I repeat, we base ourselves not on exaggerations but on what we know for a fact, and it does not involve an analysis of the work of Ben Bella, but an analysis of his intentions, of his characteristics, of his decency, of his nobility, of his goodness, of his passion for the Revolution and for Algeria, demonstrated on many occasions.

And now, in view of the events, were we going to ignore all this history, all the ties which bound us to the Algerian Revolution and its most legitimate representatives, to abuse the fallen hero because he no longer governs in Algeria and to try at all costs to. win the support of those who assumed power at the point of the sword?

No, because we would be engaging in the most repugnant political opportunism.

Could we express our support for the military seizure of power? No, because in the conditions of Algeria, in the middle of the revolutionary process, we find no possible justification for the way in which they acted. We could, at the most, wait and see if the unlikely and almost impossible happened, that after using treacherous and dishonorable methods, they later showed, without any possible doubt, really revolutionary intentions, showed that they are leading and not following the Algerian Revolution.

In that case we could exonerate them or be tolerant of their very serious mistakes of today, because of the way they might be able to remedy them tomorrow, but it is not possible to expect this. It is not probable, it could be possible, but it is not probable.

Let's imagine that these gentlemen were even more revolution= ary, that the Algerian Revolution appeared backward and show that. — they wanted to deepen it, to go further. Let us assume for a moment that the arguments or the motives that inspired their action had a base, at least, in intention. Let us imagine, as a hypothesis, that they were right, When you are right, is it necessary to resort to treason? Is a military revolt the only road open to them? Was their situation that of Nasser in Egypt against King Farouk? Not at all» Many of the cabinet ministers are still there. If it is true that--. the promoters of the coup represented the will of the people and if it was true that they were right, why did they resort to a military seizure of power? Why did they not raise the problem before the masses, before the people? Why did they not take up the problem within the party, within the ranks of the revolutionaries?

How could we, Marxist-Leninists, accept, in the specific conditions of Algeria, a military seizure of power carried out treacher-~ ously at night, which reminds us so much of March 10 (the military coup by dictator Batista in 1952), both by the hour and the way in> which it took place and by the forms of repression already being used against the people, soldiers, fire trucks, shooting, beating and police cars with howling sirens,

With deep sorrow it reminds us of the days following the tenth of March. It would not be correct to say that the Algerian .. military seizure of power is similar to that of March 10 in the compositicn of its forces. No. But in the methods used it is as similar ‘as one drop of water to another. And it has to be similar, because whenever soldiers move against the will of the people, repression arises; and repression against the people, against the masses is very similar anywhere, at any time.

If they thought they were right and were the interpreters of the will of the majority, why did they not go to the masses, why did. they not go to the party? If in addition to force and the military

oe rere EM commands, they were right and had the support of the people, why didthey resort to force?

Why did they not explain the problem to the masses and to the political organization of the revolutionary masses? And I think that anyone who is really convinced that he is right and that he represents the will of the people would not lack the courage to take the problem to the people and to their representative institutions.

Those who are not sure of being right or of interpreting the will of the people resort to the only means open to them at a given moment, to force, And we, as Marxist-Leninists, cannot justify this military procedure against the masses and against the party.

Aside from what they may do afterwards, even if they were more revolutionary than Karl Marx himself, we would not refrain from telling them, while recognizing their virtues, of their errors and the. wrong they have done, of the damage to the Algerian Revolution that. may arise from their conduct, of the damage to the revolutionary movement in Africa and other parts of the world; of the mistrust that they may arouse in other liberated countries of Africa and how unfortunate it is to establish on that continent the procedure of military seizure of power in the middle of a revolutionary process,

“ana if they really would like to be more revolutionary” how could they accomplish these more revolutionary intentions? Could . they do, with a divided people, what Ben Bella, full of good intentions, could not do with a united people? Could they with a divided people face the imperialist danger? Could they wage the hard battles, the hard battles that a process of radicalization of a revolution inevitably involves? How could we have waged those hard battles with a Givided people? Battles that we have won as a united people, with all the forces of a united people?

How are they going to arouse energies without the masses? Will they arouse them in the barracks? No. The energy that emanates from the barracks, divorced from the people will never be sufficient to resist the power of the imperialists which can only be met by the tremendous revolutionary energy and strength of the people, of a united people.

To make the revolution more radical in those conditions would be extraordinarily difficult; of course, it» would not be impossible, But to face those very difficult. battles and those very difficult situations would require on the! part of those who have replaced Ben Bella a political talent and a revolutionary audacity which Bouteflika and Company do not seem. to have ;:-would require support not of the conservatives but of the revolutionary people, the support of the workers, the farmers, the students. And I don't see how anyone can win the support of. those masses by using their rifle butts and firing at them; I doubt that the support of the masses can be won by. those who do not believe in the masses, who are contemptuous of the ~

strength of the masses and try to replace it. with the power of military garrisons, behind the backs of the people.

I was not telling in vain that those responsible for the coup did everything possible to prevent the Algerian army from becoming a ‘people's army, to prevent the armed forces, the working class and the peasantry from becoming closely associated, as has happened in our country. Because in order to foment a militarist spirit the armed forces cannot be truly popular and revolutionary and have roots in the people and their revolutionary and progressive classes, By repressing the students, the youth, the workers, I don't see how anyone, however well intentioned, however imbued with revolutionary ideas and aims, can get anywhere,

And as we see the news, and the cables about the repression that is taking place, we believe that the facts will show more and more each day how unjustifiable the procedure was and what painful consequences it may bring to Algeria. But there is something more. The Algerian army was formed, to a considerable extent, of revolutionary fighters,

It is very difficult, in so few years and in the middle of a revolutionary process, for any clique to have been able to inculcate a caste spirit, to wipe out the patriotic and revolutionary feelings of the men, of the fighters who make up the army. Armies of this kind are no good for repression, armies of this kind cannot be led against the people for long.

To count on the unconditional support of armies of a revolutionary origin, in the middle of a revolutionary process, against the revolutionary people, is mad, mad and suicidal.

And for that reason we see the picture of Algeria today with sorrow, From the bottom of our hearts we hope that brother country can escape the enormous abyss which has been opened before it, that it can overcome its difficulties without bloodshed. For this, it would be necessary for those who undertook the adventure, to understand in time the extent of their actions and the consequences they could bring for their country. Almost a miracle would be necessary. In their situation they would have to march forward firmly and decisively, showing in deeds the intentions they claim to have, in which case, if they were audacious, if they had the capacity, if they understood that such a battle cannot be won without the support of the people, they would have a difficult but not impossible road ahead, with great but not unsurmountable obstacles,

The road of counterrevolution cannot be taken in Algeria, Military despotism, political reaction and repression cannot prevail in a country whose people won-independence and freedom only a few years ago at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives; a people who learned how to handle their weapons and to fight against a larger’ and better equipped army than that of Boumedienne. Repres-

sion, political reaction and counterrevolution have no possible place in Algeria,

Our attitude will be determined by facts and based on principles. Our hope is that they may be capable of understanding the blunder they have committed. And if they are not capable of this, our hope is that they have the courage to-show in deeds that they are more revolutionary than the men they have overthrown, that they can justify in deeds what is completely unjustifiable as far as the. method used is concerned. And our position will be determined by what. they do, regardless of what they are doing now. If they should break relations with us, they would not be the first military regime to do so, We are not thinking of today, we are thinking of the | future, and we do not act as opportunists but as Marxist-Leninists.

If those who staged the coup show by their deeds that they are against imperialism, if they show in deeds that they are wholeheart«~. edly with the Algerian Revolution, that they are. body and soul with the revolution of the oppressed peoples of Africa and of the whole world, we would not deny them our support , we will not deny them our backing.

And if because they are revolutionaries the imperialists one day turned against them and threatened Algeria, we would not deny Algeria our moral support, and we would not deny our blood to help them, to help the Algerian Revolution, to-help the Algerian people.

But what side are we on, and what side will we be on? We are and we will be with the Algerian people and with those who interpret their revolutionary will, And the Algerian people will be with the revolutionaries, And our support will be, therefore, for the Revolution. And it is the people who will decide tomorrow. just as they are deciding today, -

For these reasons we consider that our delegation should not go to the Festival in Algeria, because the circumstances which justified our presence there no longer exist, because our presence, the presence of our exemplary delegation cannot be allowed to justify what can in no way be considered exemplary but is rather, a very bad example,

This means that we will not go to ‘Algeria.

And where will we go? We can't ourselves decide if it will be held in another country or in what country. If it is in Algeria under the present conditions, we will not go, If it is held in any other country where conditions exist to justify the presence of this delegation and, the presence of youth delegations from other countries, we will cooperate with the same enthusiasm, and our whole delegation to this Festival will take part. But this will be decided, and it will surely be decided soon, by those who organized the Festival..

-. If the Festival, because of the unfortunate events in Algeria, cannot be held with the participation of all, then we will wait for better times,

We would be in favor of choosing another date and another place, and we will attend if conditions permit the attendance of representatives of the youth of the whole world, and if there are, as there always have been, the requirements and conditions which justify our attendance.

I know very well that this is not bad news for you. Inter-' preting your feelings, I am sure that on the contrary, from a moral point of view it is the most satisfying news and in the eyes -of all the people the trip and the Congress or Festival in itself, was only a part. Because a part, a very important part, has been the methods and the system followed in the selection of our young delegates, the title of exemplary delegation was not something they were going to receive outside Cuba. No, they received’ it in Cuba, from our people.

And if there should be no Festival this year, and there is one next year or the year after, this delegation of young people who almost all, or probably all will continue conducting themselves as they did when they were chosen, will represent Cuba, because you are not going to get old in one year nor in two years, and you are not going to change and you will continue to be our exemplary delegation if there should be no Festival this year.

So what should we do in the meantime? Where do we go? We could do something even better than picking coffee while we wait for the problem of the Festival to be solved. And if there is no Festival, I want to suggest this idea to you: that the time that was to be spent in the trip and the Festival should be used to go to an area of Oriente (Province) and through your effort start what could become one of the most useful, appropriate and promising activities of our youth today: to begin in a revolutionary way the reforestation of our country.

From the beginning of the Revolution we have been making an effort in this direction. When we visit many places in Cuba, we see mountains and entire regions under the destructive effect of erosion, completely devoid of forests, wasting the soil, affecting the climatic conditions. We see these regions devastated by an iniquitous, cruel and improvident exploitation, that levelled the forest of this country. We see that these areas include hundreds and hundreds of thousands of acres which could form the basis of incalculable riches, that could produce thousands of millions to help our economy, in a not too distant future of which all our youth will be the beneficiaries, I think that by a revolutionary and mass effort, well organized with the forestry organization, by mobilizing our youth in the summer, in areas that are really very pleasant, healthy and capable of attracting any young person, by preparing the necessary food supplies and making plans in good time, by assembling the resources

REPT needed, we could, starting this year, with an effort which would be relatively modest, plant for example one million pine trees, starting with a vast and extremely beautiful plateau near the zone of Mayarf, in the pinewood of Mayarf. Starting in an almost symbolic way, the experience will serve to inspire our youth in the coming years to a massive mobilization, since the coffee can be looked after by some twenty thousand young people and there are, this year, more than forty thousand available, There is ahead a task which could become one of the most positive, most beautiful, and useful objectives for our youth: the commitment to reconstruct what was destroyed by exploitation; the commitment to recreate with all the wealth and beauty entailed, the new forests of our country.

And in the course of a few years, these hundreds of thousands of acres could be reforested, could be cared for by groups of work= ers devoted to the maintenance and care of forests, with every — modern technique to protect them and to fight against fire. Our young people with their strength and enthusiasm, with a minimum of investment, could create fabulous wealth that no one will have a better right to enjoy than themselves, ,

To invite our old people to plant trees that are going to be cut in ten or fifteen years would seem absurd. But I am also sure that many men, for the pleasure of creating -- following that beautiful sentiment of Marti; that to be a man, to feel a complete man, requires three things: to write a book, to have a child and to plant a tree =~ I am sure that many would plant a tree for the sake of planting a tree, even though they expected nothing from that tree, But if it is not very logical to invite our young people to undertake this task, who, if not our young people should we invite to do those things, which they, more than anyone else, are going to enjoy?

We are taking advantage of this occasion, and these circum= stances to begin with you, the exemplary young people, this task to which I am sure you will give such a moral impulse, and in which you will put such effort that later when our young Communists take this task into their hands they will bring it to sure success and it will enter in the wide stream of the Revolution and into the history of the Revolution as one more positive achievement, a new creation,

We are taking advantage of the circumstances and this opportunity to put before our young people this beautiful task and to invite you to be the first to plant trees in this great effort.

I don't think we lack saplings to plant a million pines. On a recent visit to the area where they have already planted some millions, they told us that this year they would plant three million, six hundred thousand. They must have enough little pine trees so that none of you will be left without some to plant.

Furthermore, we have already been discussing a plan with the comrades responsible for reforestation, to plant all that plateau

next year, And in the coming year it should be possible to make a much greater effort, mobilizing several thousands and planting some tens of millions, if we gather all the seeds. The comrades are now collecting all the pine seeds on the island and if they collect all the seeds it will be possible to completely finish the plan by the coming year; to plant some fifty to sixty thousand acres, and so on until not a.single mountain remains bare, sterile, and eroded.

I believe that youth is not only a state of life, but a right of all those who do not allow themselves to be conquered by years and never lose their youthful spirit. us

I believe that in this we have a concrete task with which we can occupy ourselves while we await developments, while we wait for the Festival, or in which we can spend the time that we would have spent at the Festival,

We have a concrete task and we also know our line and our position, and there is no better place, no more suitable auditorium in which to explain the international political line of our country and this concrete plan of work for our young people.

And it is almost unnecessary to say that we are sure that you will take this line and this task into your hands and make it your own.

Homeland or death!

We will win!

Directeur-Gérant: Pierre FRANK. : l'éditeur).

← It Was A Great Day for Wilson · PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE - Hebdomadaire Abonnement, 26 numéros: 37,50 F, à Pierre FRANK, 21, rue d'Aboukir, Paris (2°) →

Something wrong on this page?