TROTSKY'S TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM APPLICABLE TO ALGERIA?
By Joseph Hansen |
In 1938 Leon Trotsky drew up a rather brief program, The Death Agony of Capitalism and _ the Tasks of the Fourth International, which was adopted at the founding conference of the organization, It soon came to be called the "transitional program," inasmuch as it dealt with a key problem that has concerned revolutionists since well before Marx and Engels -~ how to make the transition from a small | circle of dedicated, highly political cadres to a mass revolutionary socialist party capable of winning power. Brief and unpretentious — as this program was, it embodied the thinking and experience of the Marxist movement on this problem since the publication of the Communist Manifesto. It is scarcely surprising that it should have become of central influence in the tactics and strategy of the Trotskyist movement, being particularly noticeable in the construction of political platforms, in the selection of slogans, in the choice of areas of work, in the method and manner of proceeding in revolutionary activities,
Among the groupings claiming adherence to Trotskyism, there is only one notable exception to this -- the Socialist Labour League in Britain whose streak of ultraleftism has broadened considerably in recent years. The leaders of this organization are not unaware of the existence of the Transitional Program; in fact it is.on their book list. In their politics, however, they pay little attention to it. This is strikingly evident in their reaction to the current situation in Algeria.
While their influence among revolutionary-minded circles in that country is nil -- so far as is known they do not have a single cothinker in Algeria -- it would be a mistake for revolutionary Marxists not to take their views into consideration. No opinions should be dismissed simply because those holding them happen to be few in number. Truth can begin as a minority of one, as is well known, although it should not be forgotten either that a minority is capable of being colossally wrong.
In considering the views of the SLL leaders on Algeria we are, unfortunately, faced with a complication. They approach the subject indirectly -- by attacking the position of the Fourth International, which they hold to be "revisionist." It is thus.difficult to weigh © their views on Algeria without considering their strictures, all the more so in light of a certain incapacity on their part to present the position of the Fourth International with reasonable accuracy.
"Exposed Again"
Let us begin with the reaction of the SLL to Boumedienne's seizure of power on June 19. The theme is set-by the headline in the June 26 issue of The Newsletter -- the group's official publication -- "Revisionists' role exposed once again," and a similar headline over an article by Cliff Slaughter in the July 3 issue, "Algerian coup -- a final, crushing blow to revisionists! theory."
The emphasis on "revisionist theory" -- which no doubt led to brisk sales among the British workers -- is perfectly logical from the viewpoint of the SLL leaders, since they believe it played a central role in Boumedienne's success. The reasoning goes like this: Both Ben Bella and Boumedienne are political representatives of the "national bourgeoisie in Algeria. To establish its power, the "national bourgeoisie" had a double problem. One was to shake off the foreign imperialist domination. The other was "to push back the forces of the workers and peasants whom they had to mobilise for the first aim." In carrying out this dual task, Boumedienne's army "is the instrument of 'order' on behalf of the native capitalist class in Algeria" while Ben Bella, in "consolidating the centralised state power against the workers and peasants," did not "go far enough and was too prone to give concessions to the masses." Boumedienne "and the right" therefore decided to throw him out.
‘We pause for a brief comment. The view of the SLL leaders that the "native capitalists" in a series of colonial countries are capable of leading a "national-revolutionary struggle, involving years of large-scale armed conflict," as Slaughter puts it, toa successful conclusion against "foreign imperialist domination," is . revisionist to the core. It not only places confidence in the capacity of the "native capitalists" to solve a highly revolutionary task, it leads directly to the theory of state capitalism, To deal with this adequately, however, would require a full article. Let us pass on,
The decisive element in Boumedienne's coup d'état, as seen from the vantage point of London, was a "betrayal," Boumedienne's success was really due to this "betrayal." The "betrayal" was one committed -- the leaders of the SLL are adamant about this -- by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. The "betrayal," still according to the SLL leaders, was “advocating liquidation of the revolutionary party" in Algeria in the belief that the "national bourgeoisie" in Algeria could complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution. A further "betrayal" was the view -- which they allege the United Secretariat promulgated -- that a "workers state" was established in Algeria; i.e., the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, according to the SLL leaders, put the label of a "workers state" on the Algerian capitalist state and this disoriented the Algerian vanguard.
The source of these "betrayals," as the SLL leaders see it,
is the position taken by the world Trotskyist movement on the Cuban revolution; i.e., that Cuba became a workers state and that it achieved this without the prior formation of a revolutionary Marxist party in Cuba. In the SLL view, the United Secretariat mechanically repeated in Algeria what it had done in Cuba, assigning to Ben Bella, as it assigned to Castro, the task of completing the revolution,
If this seems out of focus somewhere and even hard to fathom, the confusion lies in the SLL position, They maintain that Castro is a political representative of the Cuban "national bourgeoisie"; thus support to Castro amounts, in their eyes, to supporting Cuban.» capitalism. Consequently, if you look hopefully for "another Castro," you are looking hopefully for another political representative ofa. national bourgeoisie and you are thereby committing a "betrayal,"
~ Perhaps a word should be said here about the Trotskyist attitude toward Castro and Ben Bella. When Castro began organizing the guerrilla struggle in Cuba, the world Trotskyist movement took note. and some of the Cuban Trotskyists even joined his movement at an early stage, but he was regarded nonetheless as a petty-bourgeois, if very courageous, revolutionist until it became completely clear ‘from the actions he initiated and from the program he unfolded that -he was something much more than that, or had developed beyond that stage through revolutionary experience. When he proclaimed his acceptance of the revolutionary Marxist outlook, bringing his avowed beliefs into harmony with his actions, it was quite clear that something new had appeared -- the socialist revolution had opened in.the Western Hemisphere, producing as its first fruits a workers state and a revolutionary leadership uncontaminated by Stalinism.
In the light of this experience, the world Trotskyist movement kept an open mind on Ben Bella. It. offered critical support to his government in its struggle against imperialism and indigenous reaction and in its orientation toward socialism, But it did not consider Ben Bella to be "another Castro." Would he were! Ben Bella's antipathy to the scientific outlook of. Marxism was but one of the indications that he lacked the stature of a Castro. It should be added that French imperialism learned from the mistakes of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Having been defeated in the bloody attempt to put down the revolution by force, French imperialism quite consciously avoided ultimatums that might have set off a chain reaction in Algeria such as ended in Cuba with the country leaving the capitalist orbit. De Gaulle approached Algiers with adroit diplomacy and -- financial aid, His aim was to ward off "another Castro."
With that clarification, let us turn again to the SLL's estimate of the meaning of Boumedienne's coup d'état.
The SLL Formula for Algeria
The SLL theoreticians do not lack in eloquence when it comes to denouncing the United Secretariat of the Fourth International or
the Socialist Workers party in the United States. Perhaps this has a practical aim -- it keeps the subscriptions to their-paper rolling in. As for specific analysis of the political currents in Algeria, or the problems of the Algerian revolution, this is not to be found in their writings. If a simple schema serves, what's the point of trying to probe the complexities of a subject? Thus they do with "two crutches" in the world of colonial politics -- the category of “bourgeois nationalist" and the opposing category of "revolutionary Marxist," . Revolutionary Marxists not yet having appeared in countries like Cuba and Algeria, due to the alleged obstacle of the "revisionist" position of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the most urgent problem, from their point of view, is to break up and remove this obstacle.
The program they offer for the Algerian revolution is marked by similarly elegant simplifications. For instance, a lengthy statement by the "International Committee of the Fourth International" includes only a single sentence referring to programmatic problems in Algeria: "A revolutionary workers! party would gain an enormous following for a programme of workers! control, leading to workers! state power, expropriation of the landlords, confiscation of the vineyards and the formation of peasant soviets, and the expropriation of foreign holdings." (And what about the "vineyards" already expropriated and placed under workers self-management? )
The real program of the SLL for Algeria consists of only one plank. It is formulated by Cliff Slaughter in the July 3 Newsletter as follows:
“what was actually required was a struggle of the workers, leading the poor peasantry, to fight behind a Trotskyist party for their own power in opposition to the existing state."
This formula, it must be granted, is unassailable. There is not a Trotskyist, genuine or. otherwise, who will disagree with it, And not only for Algeria. It is equally applicable to India, Italy, Chile and even Great Britain where the poor peasantry is scarcely a massive force, In fact it applies to any country where a capitalist state exists, Every Trotskyist in the world will hail Slaughter's perspicacity in reaching this conclusion in the case of Algeria,
But this is precisely where the problem begins. How is this
*The majority of the International Committee of the Fourth International united with the International Secretariat of the Fourth International in 1963 at a Reunification Congress that healed a ten-yearold split in the world Trotskyist movement. A small minority of the International Committee, consisting of the SLL and the Frenoh La Verité grouping refused to go along with the majority. For the sake of confusion, this rump group chose to use the name "International Committee of the Fourth International." _
desirable objective to be achieved? Unfortunately, precisely at this point -- where Trotsky's Transitional Program comes in =~ our ultraleft wise man bids us goodbye. Instead of considering the very real problem of party building in Algeria, Slaughter wastes valuable printer's ink trying to prove that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International advocated "liquidation of the revolutionary party" in Algeria.
Since his procedure is quite typical of SLL polemics, we will take it up briefly. Slaughter cites a sentence from a news account in the June 25 World Outlook indicating the reason for the -lack of organized resistance to Boumedienne!s coup d'état. Here is the sentence: "In the absence of a well-organized vanguard party, of unions with an independent leadership, the army stood as the only cohesive — power in the country." From this sentence, Slaughter selects the phrase “well-organized vanguard party." . The use of such a phrase is "deliberate confusion," he claims, because World Outlook, according to his deductions, wants "one set of readers" to understand this as a reference to the’ ‘FLN, the National Liberation Front, while at "the same time" hoping "that those who regard themselves as Trotskyists will understand by a 'vanguard party,! the revolutionary party of Marxism." As revealed in Slaughter's crystal ball, what World Outlook is particularly insistent on is that "the. relation between the two things must not be clarified," Continuing, he argues that this clarification is precisely what has been necessary in the past ‘period, "In this way, the revisionists complete their betrayal..."
' Let us try to. assist Slaughter in reaching the necessary clarification, A few examples will, perhaps, prove of service.
Trotsky and the SWP
In the United States, the Socialist Workers party, which is a revolutionary party of Marxism, has called for the formation of © an independent labor party for the past quarter of a century. It is well known that the suggestion to take this stand came from Trotsky at about the time he wrote the Transitional Program, Was Trotsky unprincipled in making such a suggestion. in view of the faot that an’ independent labor party would almost certainly begin with “the corrupt, bureaucratic, petty-bourgeois, capitalist-minded leadership of. the American trade unions at its head? Trotsky contended that the mere formation of such a party in the American political scene would..constitute an enormous step forward that could well signal the beginning of the socialist revolution in the United States. To argue that it stood in contradiction to organizing the: revolutionary Marxist party was an ultraleft position. Precisely by taking a transitional position, by advocating and helping to organize an independent labor party, no matter what its initial leadership, the revolutionary Marxist party, in this-case the Socialist Workers party, would Pind its chances for growing and prospering much improved.
The issue was debated with special sharpness among the
American Trotskyists because, out of intransigeant opposition to the. conservative trade-union bureaucracy, they had previously opposed formation of a labor party and had recruited on this basis, so that among some of the new recruits advocacy of an independent labor party was considered to be a "betrayal" of principles. However, after a... clarifying discussion, the position was adopted by an overwhelming majority and has constituted part of the platform of the Socialist «: Workers party ever since.
Let us take a more recent example. In Europe, particularly in France, a standing slogan of the Trotskyists has been that the Communist and Socialist parties should strive to take power, The treacherous character of the leaderships of these parties is no secret; to list their betrayals would require a thick book. But | what is actually required, if we apply the thinking of a Slaughter, is a struggle of the workers, leading the poor peasantry, to fight behind a Trotskyist party for their own power in opposition to the existing state. Is it not a gross betrayal, therePore, to call for the treacherous CP and SP leaders to take power? The answer is no. The workers are not prepared.to fight behind ‘a Trotskyist party for their. own power, desirable as that would be. They still stand . behind the CP and SP leaders. The Trotskyists have no choice but to recognize this fact, to proceed from it, and to seek transitional. steps that can help put the working class into movement despite their treacherous leaders. Moreover, the Trotskyists promise to participate in this and to support it with all their energy and ability, while retaining their right to criticize the inadequacy of such steps as are actually taken along this road, Is this unprincipled? No. Any partial step, any slogan that can help the working: class move forward is principled if no halt is made, if the motion toward the socialist goal is kept up with more advanced steps and:-. slogans. In the Transitional Program, Trotsky explained the reasons for calling on petty-bourgeois leaderships of the workers and peasants to take power, citing the experience of the Bolsheviks, Lenin having used it with telling effect in the Russian Revolution,
Let us take a current example. In Argentina, at a recent unification congress, the Trotskyists decided to advocate that the. General Confederation of Labor should engage in independent political action, The CGT leadership is not a revolutionary Marxist leadership. It is under Peronist influence; it does not have a socialist outlook; it is even quite corrupt. But behind these bureaucrats stands the organized Argentine working class -- potentially the greatest force in the country. The question was vigorously discussed at the congress of the Argentine Trotskyists [see World Outlook July 9]. Interestingly enough, those who objected to the slogan and. course of action repeated arguments used among the American Trotsky-. ists before World War II when they discussed Trotsky's suggestion about advocating an independent labor party. And the arguments used. in reply in Argentina were similar to those advanced in the United States. General agreement was finally reached at the Argentine congress on the correctness of pressing for the CGT to engage in inde-
pendent political action. Were the Argentine Trotskyists wrong? It would be instructive, perhaps, to hear the opinion of the SLL. theoreticians on this. ,
Which Page Do You Read?
A final example leaps from the pages of the July 3 Newsletter. This is a reproduction of a leaflet being distributed by the Young Socialists in Britain in opposition to the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. Two slogans stand at the head of the leaflet: "US imperialism Get out of Vietnam!" and "Victory to the Vietcong!" The latter slogan is not without relevance to our discussion. We note, in passing, the jarring use of the term "Vietcong," the epithet applied by the South Vietnam puppet government to the freedom fighters, meaning "Viet Commies." However, those who drew up the leaflet might well argue that unfortunate as this is, the word "Vietcong" has been popularized by the imperialist press in Britain and one must make some concessions...
That is a minor criticism, however. What is decisive is the political content of the slogan. The National Front of Liberation in south Vietnam is not a Trotskyist party. It is a broad front containing heterogeneous class forces. And its program is not a Trotskyist program, If anything it is less radical than the program of the FLN in Algeria. If the line followed by Slaughter on page three of The Newsletter is correct, then The Newsletter is guilty on page one of joining the Young Socialists in a ‘revisionist betrayal,"
How is this glaring contradiction to be explained? One can conclude that either the editorial board of The Newsletter is not much concerned about consistency, feeling perfectly content to follow one line in Algeria and a completely contradictory one in Vietnam; or it could be surmised that there are conflicting views. ‘Perhaps there is an ultraleft sectarian position, represented by Slaughter, and a position that comes closer to Trotskyism, a position more aware of the importance of the colonial revolution, of its particular problems and the pertinence of the Transitional Program in solving them. Each tendency, in accordance with the principles of cricket, is granted a certain expression in the columns of The Newsletter. If this is the case, we of course offer critical support to the tendency inclined in the direction of "revisionist betrayals.'
Healy and Messali Hadj
Considerations analogous to those indicated in the above examples have been applied by the Trotskyists throughout the Algerjan revolution. For instance, Gerry Healy, the national secretary of the SLL, found himself supporting a wing of the revolutionary nationalist movement, the Mouvement National Algérien headed by Messali Hadj. The experiment had an unfortunate ending when Messali Hadj went over to de Gaulle; but it was nonetheless correct to seek
to find an opening or point of entry for Trotskyism in the Algerian revolutionary nationalist movement. If one attempt ended in failure or led into a blind alley, it was necessary to seek another. Healy and his French supporters, however, decided after their dismal venture to follow the much less dangerous and far more comfortable . course of abstention. Such a decision is quite typical of ultraleft sectarianism,
The Trotskyists under the leadership of the International Secretariat did much better by throwing their forces into the FLN. They did this in accordance with the criterion at the heart of the Transitional Program -- revolutionists must always go where the main forces in the struggle are to be found, whether they are organized in the unions, in a front battling for freedom, or in some other formation. In the most difficult days, when the FLN was under _ ferocious persecution from French imperialism, the Trotskyists were of great service in helping to organize material aid. As a result - Trotskyism gained very honorable standing among Algerian revolutionists and a good basis was established to gain a favorable hearing for the program of Trotskyism in the further development of the revolution.
After the victory of the struggle for national independence, the Trotskyists in Algeria continued their work along the same lines, following the pattern laid down in the Transitional Program, Their policy in relation to the FLN was stated in a declaration issued December 9, 1962, by the International Secretariat of the Fourth International when it opposed Ben Bella's banning the Algerian Communist party. Here is a translation of the text of the declaration as published in the March 1963 issue of. Quatriéme Internationale under the title, "On the Banning of the Algerian CP":
For a Reorganized FLN >
"The IS [International Secretariat] of the Fourth International disapproves the decision taken by the Algerian government banning the PCA [Parti Communiste Algérien] and its official newspaper,
"The Fourth International has never spared its criticisms of the PCA, whether this involved the approval given by the PCA to the colonialist repression in the Constantine area in 1945 or its line during the armed struggle for independence. It is still opposed to this party's line.
"On the other hand, the Fourth International is convinced that the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale], reorganized as a genuine party with a mass base and a democratic centralist structure, and struggling to have the Tripoli program carried out in practice, ~ will be able to play a decisive role at the present stage of the Revolution; and the task of the Algerian revolutionists is to work for such a perspective within this organizational frame.
"But in no case will the Fourth International drop its position of principled opposition to any kind of bureaucratic restraint. on free expression for currents, tendencies and organizations that respect the legal framework of the Revolution and which are committed to a consistent struggle against imperialism. The Fourth International is convinced that the only way to select out a genuine leading party and a genuine revolutionary leadership is through an eventual dialogue among forces of this kind, along with practical experience; while any attempt to resolve this problem by administrative. means will prove to be illusory and, in the final analysis, prejudicial to the interests of the Revolution. oe
"The criticism of the decision banning the PCA involves no change in our attitude of critical support to the revolutionary Algerian Government, as already advanced in our resolution of November 4, and does not “hinder our support ing the progressive measures which this government has taken since the adoption of our resolution (for example, the reduction of the high salaries paid to top functionaries, ministers and deputies),."
In accordance with this, the Algerian Trotskyists (1) opposed the banning of the Algerian Communist party or any other political grouping that remained within the legal framework of the revolution; (2) opposed the setting up of a single party; (3) advocated that under the circumstances revolutionists should join the FLN; and (4) that there should be freedom of tendencies within the FLN. The aim was to advance the program of revolutionary socialism under the concrete circumstances in which the Trotskyists constituted but a small minority. To argue against this course, as Slaughter does, is really to argue against the Transitional Program. And to go so far as to call the course taken by the Algerian Trotskyists a "revisionist betrayal" is to call the Transitional Program itself a "revisionist betrayal." This, of course, may be Slaughter's real position,
The Question of the State
So much for the ultraleft strictures of the SLL leaders about party-building tasks in Algeria. We turn now to another issue that will take us to the heart of the situation in Algeria and at the same time place the most glaring light on the ultraleftism of this grouping in the British radical movement.
One of the major arguments which they advance, as indicated above, is that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International called Algeria a “workers state," thereby granting to the national bourgeoisie the possibility of carrying out proletarian tasks, "We insisted against the revisionists," they state, "that Algeria remained a bourgeois state." "In the epoch of imperialism," they affirm, "the bourgeoisie, neither in Algeria nor in Cuba, nor in India, nor any~ where else, can achieve these tasks." We leave to others the task of trying to convince these ultraleft sectarians that Algeria, Cuba and India really belong in quite different categories, and turn to
the "proof" they offer that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International was guilty of calling Algeria a workers state. The "proof" consists of some extracts from a statement issued February 17, 1964, by the United Secretariat [see World Outlook February 21, 1964]. To show the level to which these theoreticians descend, it is necessary to consider the full text of this statement. Everyone can then judge for himself on what basis the extracts were selected, To facilitate this, I have italicized the extracts which were published by The Newsletter, Now watch the SLL brain trust, deep in thought as they study the statement of the United Secretariat and debate among themselves which sentences will best serve to "prove" that the United Secretariat called Algeria a "workers state" and advocated "liquidation of the revolutionary party." You can see them, ball-point pen in hand, carefully underlining the sentences that fit their thesis! Complete Text with Extracts Indicated
"For some time the course of the new regime in Algeria has shown that it is a 'Workers and Peasants Government! of the kind considered by the Communist International in its early days as likely to appear, and referred to in the Transitional program of the Fourth International, as a possible forerunner of a workers state,
"Such a government is characterized by the displacement of the bourgeoisie in political power, the transfer of armed power from the bourgeoisie to the popular masses, and the initiation of far-= reaching measures in property relations. The logical. outcome of such a course is the establishment of a workers state; but, without a revolutionary Marxist party, this is not guaranteed. In the early days of the Communist International it was held to be excluded in the absence of a revolutionary. Marxist party. Experience has shown, however, that this conclusion must be modified in the colonial world due to the extreme decay of capitalism and the effect of the existence of the Soviet Union and a series of workers states in the world today.
"An essentially bourgeois state apparatus was bequeathed to Algeria. A crisis in the leadership of the FLN LFront de Libération National] came to a head July 1, 1962, ending after a few days in the establishment of a de facto coalition government in which Ferhat Abbas and Ben Bella represented the two opposing wings of neocolonialism and popular revolution. The struggle between these two tendencies within the coalition ended _in the reinforcement of the Ben Bella wing, the promulgation of the decrees of March 1965 and the ouster successively* of Khider, Ferhat Abbas and other bourgeois leaders although some rightist elements still remain in the govern~ ment. These changes marked the end of the coalition and the estab-
*The editors of The Newsletter print this as "successful ousting instead of “ouster successively." The bias against accurate reporting appears at all levels in this paper.
=~? T=
lishment of a Workers and Peasants government.
"As is characteristic of a Workers and Peasants Government of this kind, the Algerian government has not followed a consistent course, tts general direction, however, has been in opposition. ‘to imperialism, to the old colonial structure, to neocolohialism and to bureaucratism, It has reacted with firmness to the initiatives of would-be new bourgeois layers, including armed counterrevolution, Its subjective aims have repeatedly been declared to be the construction of socialism, At the same time its consciousness is limited by its lack of Marxist training and background,
"The question that remains to be answered is whether this government can establish a workers state. The movement in this direction is evident and bears many resemblances to the: Cuban pattern. A profound agrarian reform has already been carried out, marked by virtual nationalization of the most important areas of arable land, Deep inroads have been made into the old ownership relations in the industrial sector with the establishment of a public and state-controlled sector. Yet to be undertaken are the expropriation of the key oil and mineral sector, the banks and insurance companies, establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the inauguration of effective counter measures to the monetary, financial and commercial activities of foreign imperialism.
“Among the most heartening signs in Algeria are (1) in foreign policy the establishment of friendly relations with Cuba, Yugoslavia, China, the Soviet Union and other workers states with the possibility this opens up for substantial aid from these sources; (2) the active attitude of the government toward developing the colonial revolution in such areas as Angola and South Africa; (3) within Algeria the establishment of the institution of 'self-management.! 'Self-management! with its already demonstrated importance for the development of workers and peasants democracy offers the brightest opening for the establishment of the institutions of a workers state.
"As a whole, Algeria, as we have noted many times, has entered a process of permanent revolution of highly transitional character in which all the basic economic, social and political structures are being shaken up and given new forms, This process is certain to continue. It will be greatly facilitated and strengthened if one of the main problems now on the agenda -- the organization of a mass party on a revolutionary Marxist program -- is successfully solved.
"The appearance of a Workers and Peasants Government in Algeria is concrete evidence of the depth of the revolutionary process occurring there, It is of historic importance not only for Algeria and North Africa but for the whole African continent and the rest of the world.*
Was Trotsky Right?
What theory Slaughter or his collaborators followed in making their judicious selection of quotations remains obscure; but it must he admitted that it certainly facilitated their polemical work. On the other hand, it constitutes convincing proof of what a mistake it would be to take them seriously on the level of theory. For they leave unanswered a series of questions of the utmost importance and timeliness in the international class struggle of today, all of which are implied, if not directly referred to in the very statement on which they performed their surgery. Were the Bolsheviks correct in suggesting that Workers and Peasants governments might arise as transitional formations while the capitalist.state still remained in existence? Was Trotsky correct in referring to this possibility in the Transitional Program? Has this possibility, foreseen by the masters of revolutionary socialism who were our teachers, been realized anywhere-in life? If so, what should be the attitude of the Trotskyist movement toward such transitional formations? What kind of program should they propose for them? How should they participate in such developments? , .
Not only is there the deepest silence on these questions in The-- Newsletter, the evidence would seem irrefutable that the leaders of the SLL deliberately exclude these topics, particularly if they stand in the way of falsifying the position of opponents with whom they insist on carrying on a dead-end factional struggle. Such. —~ methods spell doom for the Socialist Labour League. In the case of Algeria, for instance, the "theory" of Slaughter and his collaborators signifies never advancing beyond the barest of abstractions and either monstrously mistaking the reality or missing it completely.
We are told about the need for a Trotskyist party in Algeria.
*Here is what Trotsky said: "Is the creation of such a government by the traditional workers! organizations possible? Past experience shows, as has already been stated,. that this-is.to say the least highly improbable. However, one cannot categorically deny in advance the theoretical possibility that, under the influence of completely exceptional circumstances (war, defeat, financial crash, mass revolutionary pressure, etc.), the petty-bourgeois parties ineluding the Stalinists may go further than they wish along the road to a break with the bourgeoisie. In any casé one thing is not to be doubted: even if this highly improbable variant somewhere at some time becomes a reality and the 'workers'--and farmers! governmentt in the abovementioned sense is established in fact, it would represent merely a short episode on the road to the actual dictatorship of the prole= — tariat." We call the attention of the ultraleft-SLL leaders to the fact that Trotsky specifically referred to "petty-bourgeois" parties. (Transitional Program, page 35 of the SLL edition.)
Wonderful! We are told that the national bourgeoisie cannot carry out the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Superb! But then this promising beginning trails off in gibberish. Algeria is equated with India and Cuba. And the gibberish continues: "Where the state takes a bonapartist form on behalf of a weak bourgeoisie, as in Algeria or Cuba Pry ], then the type of ‘revolt! occurring on June 19-20 is on the agenda, The role of the Fourth International is not to take sides Ct] and cam aign for mass support for one or another wing of the bourgeoisie Ey, but to build independent parties of the working class which ae "utilise such crises for the
- overthrow of the capitalist state."* We thus end up precisely where we began -=- without having advanced a single step in solving the problem of how to build an “independent” party of the working class capable of utilizing a crisis like the one on June 19-20 to overthrow the capitalist state. A Crucial Contradiction
: In contrast to this barren ultraleft approach, consider the concrete analysis reached by the Fourth International, as indicated | in the documents cited above. At the heart of the political struggle in Algeria stands a glaring contradiction. A deep-going revolutionary upheaval thrust into power a government capable of taking farreaching measures, such as expropriating the land held by the French colons, instituting workers "self-management" on the expropriated properties and projecting a socialist "option" for the country. This government nevertheless.rests on a capitalist state structure inherited from the French colonial period. The government points in the direction of socialism; the capitalist state structure in precisely the opposite direction, A contradiction of such intolerable character can signify only a highly unstable situation. The nature of the alternative has never been in doubt. Either the Workers and Peasants government must initiate further radical measures, eventu~ ally transcending the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution. or the counter pressures, backed by the imperialist world (primarily France and the United States), will overwhelm this government in
*In a préss interview at Chantilly (near Paris) June 24, Messali Hadj denounced both Ben Bella and Boumedienne with fine impartiality. "A civilian dictatorship has been ousted," he said; "to be replaced by a military dictatorship. It's really not worth bothering about... That's why the PPA [Parti du Peuple Algérien] refuses to choose between the regime of a single party and dictatorship, and a military coup d'état," While certain leaders of the SLL might respond sympathetically to this, caution is still advisable in any projected approaches to Messali Hadj. He ended his interview, according to the June 26 Le Monde, by paying "homage" to the "constitutional monarchy of Morocco™; Calling for the creation of an "Islamic Algerian state"; and declaring that while there had been "trouble" under French rule in Algeria, nevertheless “a certain freedom of expres= sion existed that has disappeared today."
~SO— -
one way or another and lead to the stabilization of a neocolonialist regime, All the political forces (if we leave out the abstentionist ultraleft wiseacres who find it the height of wisdom "not to take sides") lined up in accordance with this alternative and have sought with the means at their disposal to affect its final outcome.
Theoretical insight as to the nature of the contradiction was provided by the Transitional Program and certain discussions and documents of the first four congresses of the Communist Interna-~ tional. The same sources also provided basic orientation in finding ways of promoting the program of revolutionary socialism in the Algerian class struggle. The real situation in Algeria, of course, determined what could be most effectively advanced. Thus the idea of a popular militia to strengthen the defense of the Algerian revolution made rapid headway during the Moroccan attack and the armed counterrevolution centered in Kabylie. (The idea of a popular militia was opposed, naturally, by the reactionary forces, especially the military clique forming around Boumedienne.) A more dramatic example was the development of workers self-management. A much more advanced slogan (or phase in the revolutionary process) than workers control, it became of outstanding importance due to unique features in the Algerian revolution,
The example of Cuba has appeared like a banner over the struggle. In fact, bearing in mind all the obvious differences between the two countries and their problems, the key question can’ be aptly formulated: Will Algeria follow the road blazed by Cuba?
To utilize the example of Cuba in the Algerian political scene constitutes a “revisionist betrayal" in the eyes of the SLL leaders, of course. In their opinion Cuba is a capitalist state, not a workers state, and Castro -- as they view him -- is trying, if rather unsuccessfully, to sell out to American imperialism. (Yes, that's their position!) However, outside those holding this freak view, few would deny that the establishment of a workérs state as dynamic as Cuba on the strategic southern | shore of the Mediter~~
tory. From the beginning, those with any capacity for objective appreciation of the possibilities understood how high the stakes. are in Algeria. The Coup d!Etat
The meaning of Boumedienne's coup d'état must be weighed in this context. In Algeria itself the revolutionary. vanguard has displayed hesitation. The first reaction was fear that all the revo-= lutionary conquests might be under threat of immediate liquidation. Spontaneous demonstrations broke out. These were met with sharp repression, a number of deaths being reported in some areas. But there were also reports that soldiers in the army expressed bewilderment. In at least one town, they began fraternizing with the demonstrators. However, a regime resting solely on the barracks
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and offering the masses nothing but a diet of tear gas and bullets could not last long in Algeria. Boumedienne soon sought to reassure -the advanced sectors of the workers and peasants; and the demonstrations died down. In making up his government, Boumedienne gave con-= cessions to the left. El Moudjahia [formerly Le Peuple] kept in step and recent issues have played up “self management™ and the need to carry out the Algiers Charter. It is not excluded that Boumedienne will make some dramatic moves in an effort to popularize and consolidate his regime. That he is capable of such a turn is shown by the fact that he was one of the most emphatic in denouncing the Evian agreement as a "sell out."
Castro, in denouncing Bouwmedienne's coup d'état, did not reject the possibility that its authors were motivated by revolutionary aims, But Castro was completely correct in pointing out that even if this was true, the coup d'état injured and endangered the Algerian revolution, In Castro's opinion, the differences with Ben Bella should have been fought out on a political level in the FLN and before the masses. That would have strengthened the revolution.
From the Trotskyist viewpoint, the key question is: How does the coup d'état affect the main contradiction in Algerian poli- ‘tics, the contradiction between the government and the state? There cannot be the least doubt that the acuteness of the contradiction has been. reduced -- in an unfavorable direction. The bureaucratic elements lifted their heads and breathed easier, as did all the anti- Marxist forces. On the other hand, a government that came into power on the shoulders of the masses was greatly weakened in its popular basis.
Since Boumedienne tock no immediate sweeping measures against the conquests of the revolution, and may even offer headline-catching concessions to consolidate his regime, it may appear that his seizure of power represents no fundamental change. And that is undoubtedly how it is being read by many leftists in Algeria after the first shock, The sag in the revolution, Ben Bella's disregard of the warning signs pointed out by the revolutionary Marxists, his policy of substituting maneuvers and compromises for development of the class struggle, his concentration of power in his own hands -= all helped contribute to the impression among Algerian leftists that the shift in power occurred without much alteration in the political scene, -
From a distance, of course, it is not easy to weigh the validity of this view. However, the coup d'état itself is a most palpable fact. It has its own logic, And this logic can run much stronger than the intentions of its organizers, even if their intentions were of the best. The coup d'état at once heartened and encouraged the reactionary social forces in Algeria; it dismayed and obviously weakened those who favor socialism, who want Algeria to follow the Cuban example. The true significance of the coup d'état must be judged at the beginning from the direction it points to,
The arrow has swung around to the opposite of the overturn in 1962 that ended the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic which the French sought to sustain, The fact is that the Algerian revolu- -tion is now facing its most dangerous crisis.
Is a New Upsurge Possible?
After subsiding for some time, the Algerian revolution recently began to show signs of revival. Whether this would con-= tinue, whether it would end in a new upsurge, what changes this might lead to on the political level, and particularly in the government's course, remained to be seen. It has been reported that Ben Bella was preparing to move against the growing army power, that the agrarian reform was to be resumed, that the long promised purge of bureaucratic elements would begin, and so on. . Whatever the truth to these reports, and there was probably some truth to them, the Boumedienne clique apparently decided they could no longer delay their project to seize power, which, the evidence tends to show, had been plotted for some time. .
Does Boumedienne's victory then close off the possibility of a new upsurge in the Algerian revolution? There is little likeli- ‘hood of that. Among the revolutions of our day, this one has displayed most remarkable recuperative powers. How many times the punadits declared it dead during the dark years of the dirty war! And each time, this heroic people refused to pay attention to the obitu- - aries, suddenly dealing French imperialism a new stunning blow.
However, even without a new mass upsurge in the immediate future, the struggle to defend and advance the revolution will continue. As was the case under Ben Bella, innumerable issues, often of seemingly narrow scope, will press insistently forward; for _.example, the tug of war over workers self-management, the question of ties with the workers states, the problem of imperialist pressures, the handling of foreign trade, the development of the agrarian reform, the fight against unemployment, the right to free trade unions, _the struggle for emancipation of the women ~-- all the multitudinous problems for which the opposing social forces in Algeria offer mutually exclusive solutions,
The crucial problem of constructing a revolutionary socialist leadership will gain fresh urgency in the thinking of the vanguard of the workers and poor peasants as the dangerous forces encouraged by the coup d'état move more boldly into the open. The potential cadres for constructing that leadership are to be found primarily in the left wing of the FLN, where the key slogan continues to be the need to build a genuinely independent mass party representing the interests of the workers and poor peasants. There are many militants in the left wing of the FLN imbued with the idea that Algeria's only hope is to really exercize its socialist "option" and join the noncapitalist camp where Cuba already stands. Their receptivity to "Trotskyist" ideas, particularly of a transitional
nature, is bound to rise.
To work in a field like that- of the left wing of the FLN, to find the specific partial issues that will best advance the work there, holds little attraction for ultraleft masterminds preoccupied with broader things, like meeting the demand of the British market for articles “exposing the Fourth International, For them Trotsky's Transitional Program is a document to be praised, not to be under- ‘stood and applied. The Trotskyists in Algeria, who seek to participate in even the most limited battles and experiences of the. vanguard, take a different attitude.
In the complex and contradictory reality of Algeria, the Spans tttonas -noeram provides a method for finding avenues and points of entry for the ideas of revolutionary socialism, for — struggling most effectively against the reaction and for stimulating the revolution. While this by itself is no guarantee of victory, it at least indicates the only road on which victory can be achieved, Not the least of its virtues is the assistance it offers in avoiding the deadly trap of ultraleftism.
IT WAS A