GUERRILLA WAR IN PERU
[The following analysis of the current situation in Peru is by one of the leaders of the FIR (Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario the organization headed by the Trotskyist peasant leader Hugo Blanco). The author is being held without charges in one of Belaunde's prisons. The analysis, smuggled out of jail, was published in the July 26 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly La Verdad (formerly Palabra Obrera), official organ of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores. The translation is by World Outlook.]
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(1) On June 9, a group of guerrilla fighters initiated armed action in the province of. Concepcién in the department of Junin, attacking various objectives. The group is under the political leadership of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria]. Since then heavy repressive forces have been sent to the zone and the guerrillas have been retreating toward a zone of mountain peaks in the general direction of Satipo, a small city buried in the jungle.
(2) For several years the Peruvian revolutionary left has been discussing the best means by which to continue our revolution. A sector in the MIR, dissident sectors of the CP [Communist party] and isolated elements, responding directly to the Cuban line, came out for guerrilla warfare. The FIR, headed by Hugo Blanco, posed the neéd to organize the mass movement of the peasants, resuming ata. higher level the occupation of the land, backed by armed militias; the major role of the revolutionary left in this being in the technical and strategic leadership.
Let us remember that the peasant movement succeeded in organ-=izing in the Cuzco department alone more than 1,000 union locals which occupied more than 100 haciendas and many smaller estates, that it organized mass meetings and mass strikes and that in the process a kind of germinal dual power arose, registering its presence in the setting up of schools, roads and other works on the initiative of the unions and in opposition to the authorities in the peasant zones... (rescue of prisoners, rejection of labor ministers, the courts, etc.), in the complete disappearance of domination by the’ landlords, who even abandoned entire zones, as happened throughout almost the whole Convencién valley.
But this movement was not strong enough to withstand the shock of brutal government repression, This led to the loss of a good part of these conquests and to the jailing of hundreds of militant peasants, including their main leader Hugo Blanco.
(3) Pondering over this experience, the FIR formulated its fundamental programmatic position for this entire stage: the necessity of maintaining and developing the germinal forms of dual power, centralizing them through massive organization of the peasantry, the revolutionary organization acting along with them and as part of the vanguard, A new wave of recuperation of the land must be prepared for, backed by defense organizations, armed militia of the peasantry capable of accompanying and defending the masses in their struggles, preventing new defeats,
(4) The FIR began to apply this line, succeeding in getting the Departmental Peasant Federation of Cuzco, and the federation in Ayacucho to adopt it, spreading it among the rank and file, The big raid of February 1964, in which all our peasant leaders and hundreds of activists in Cuzco were caught up.and thrown into prison for eight months, undid this work. It should be recalled that at the same time there were various massacres with dozens killed in Cuzco and Ayacucho, Almost all the unions became disorganized, the landlords recuperated their losses, the Peasant Federation of Cuzco stopped functioning.
The most important reason for the inability of the FIR to apply its line in time is to be seen in our own weakness and in the fact that the comrades in Cuzco placed too m,ch importance on union activities at the top level and were taken in by the temporary atmosphere of legality. They did not turn all their efforts into creating union locals, party cells and militia all in the same scene; they delayed going personally into the countryside, in preparing for a real underground; and they became easy marks for the repression, None of this invalidates the fact, objectively testified to in Neira'ts book [Cuzco: Land and Death ~- see review in World Outlook January 1, 1965] that our comrades were the best leaders of the peasants at that time.
These are the reasons why the essentials of our program have not yet been realized in Cuzco and why we remain weak organizationally on a national scale.
(5) While the FIR, despite all the difficulties, struggled to rebuild in Cuzco through its contacts with the broad peasant _ masses there, the revolutionary left fell into growing disorganiza= tion and splits. Armed groups proliferated that see immediate armed action as the only hope for materializing the revolution, They undertook various actions in the cities and finally the MIR unleashed guerrilla warfare. It is clear that the weakness of the FIR in applying its. line was a contributing factor in this attitude, otherwise it would have been a powerful pole of attraction for many young revolutionists, In addition the steady pressure of the Cuban position, bol-
stered by a constant stream of comrades imbued with the line of guerrilla warfare as the only viable road for the Peruvian revolution, helped strengthen this mood.
(6) The objective situation is highly favorable to the revolutionary process, (a) There are constant squabbles between the government, the oligarchy and the traditional parties. (b) The cost of living is rising. (c) There is an explosive situation in the countryside, with an inoperative Agrarian Reform; sporadic, isolated occupations of the land, and the existence of elements of germinal dual power,
The subjective factors lag far behind: manual and white~ collar workers divided, without a joint organization to handle common problems; bankruptcy of the Aprista [APRA -- Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana] and Communist party leaderships; a peasant movement struggling to reorganize itself; a divided revolutionary left. -
(7) These were the conditions under which guerrilla warfare broke out. We will indicate its characteristics insofar as they are known:
(a) They began their action in a mountainous zone of cattle ranches in the Junfn department, with a rearguard located in a jungle zone where there is some tropical production (coffee, etc.)3; but it is also an area of virgin forest,
(bo) The group was small, approximately twenty men, who separated into two teams which attacked a mine and two haciendas, a police post and several small stores,
(c) After dividing up the expropriations with a group of peasants, they invited them to participate in seizing the Hacienda Runatullo. About twenty peasants agreed. After burning the buildings in this hacienda and dividing up some of the things that were seized, they then sent the peasants back to their community and left.
(ad). In their march, they retreated in the direction of the jungle zone, near which they are at the moment. Some peasants have joined the guerrilla band.
(e) The guerrilla fighters gained a complete strategic and tactical surprise, They ran into no resistance for five days. On June 14 there was an exchange of gunfire in which some peasants were killed. Possibly the majority of the group have undergone complete guerrilla training. After fifteen days of successive actions, the repressive forces began an intensive search for them with the aim of encircling and annihilating them. About 1,000 troops are being used in this.
(8) It is evident that the guerrilla fighters are mechani-~
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cally following the Cuban experience: a small action group, a favorable zone, surprise, mobility, etc. They have left aside the most important weapon which we revolutionists have in Peru -- a peasantry anxious to recover its land, which has already begun to do so through actions of tremendous force,
We mention this because the guerrilla fighters have not sought to develop the union work already begun, or to follow a policy of wide occupation of the land, or massive arming of the peasantry.
Because of this, when the repression began they fell back,. losing personal contact with the zones where the most peasants are concentrated, who are needed to back their actions with food, information, places of refuge, etc. They are thus losing possible regional points of support. They are going over into an essentially military struggle for survival under very difficult conditions, against an alerted enemy, altering the relative weight of forces. In a phase like this, if they do not gain the active support of the population, they run the grave danger of being annihilated.
(9) The outbreak of guerrilla warfare is a fait accompli. Correct or not, guerrilla warfare exists. While they have been. fighting for their lives, retreating toward the jungle, battling the repressive forces, what have been the first consequences?
(a) .First of all, a current of sympathy throughout the left _ and broad layers of the students, with the resulting attraction of groups and isolated revolutionists,
(b) Wide repression, especially in the center of the country and elsewhere according to the expressions of support that can be given to the armed struggle and its evolution. This will create new difficulties for the legal organization of the peasantry and the task of constructing the revolutionary organizations in the countryside, and, to a lesser degree, in the cities.
(10) What must our attitude be?
(a) Our forces are not large; we cannot waste them. Most of them must concentrate in developing our line in the countryside, appealing to all the revolutionists to help us. A powerful movement in Cuzco, with thousands of peasants recuperating their land, backed by militia based among the peasants themselves and helped by teams of revolutionists, would completely change the situation. It would revive the urban struggles, fortify revolutionary unionism, strengthen the efforts for unity in the revolutionary left and widen its influence to the most distant corners of the country. And it would con-~ stitute the only serious aid that could be proffered to the comrades in the guerrilla ranks in Andamarca, This action would find natural allies and have immediate repercussions among the peasant masses of Ayacucho, Apurimac and Puno.
(b) In the preparation of these actions, the inclusion of
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cadres with political and technical experience is a fundamental necessity to speed things up. Isolated revolutionists and the existing armed groups should understand that the FIR offers integration into a revolutionary apparatus in which their capacities will be utilized from the first moment in order to carry out the preliminary tasks that are indispensable in building a vast movement like the one we propose, The sooner we can move along this road, the sooner we will catch up on the delayed march of our revolution.
(c) To the comrades in Andamarca, who are fighting in accordance with the method which they believe to be correct in order to carry forward the revolutionary process and which merits our complete respect, we would suggest the need to get into the closest possible contact with the peasantry of the zone, orienting and supporting their struggles. In this task all the revolutionary militants of the central part of the country must contribute their efforts, helping and promoting the organization of the peasantry, the setting up of militia and the massive recuperation of the land. Resume at a higher level the heroic struggles of the communities of Pasco that shook the center of the country in 1962. -