Pierre FRANK
THE MILITARY COUP D'ETAT IN ALGERIA AND THE BOUMEDIENNE REGIME
LAt a plenum in July, the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International approved the general line of a declaration issued by the United Secretariat June 23, four days after . Colonel Boumedienne's coup d'état in Algeria. (See World Outlook June 25,) After considerable discussion of the turn in the Algerian situation and its ramifications, the IEC adopted the following resolution on the coup d'état and the regime established by Boumedienne a month later. |
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T.
Meaning of the Military Coup d'Etat in Algeria
Colonel Boumedienne's coup d'état unquestionably constitutes a turn to the right in the development of the Algerian revolution. The main conquests of the revolution are now gravely threatened, particularly the institution of workers self-management in the socialized enterprises.
Following the elimination of representatives of the bourgeois forces like Ferhat Abbas and Mohamed Khider, the government of Ben Bella was characterized by the Fourth International as a "workers and peasants government" of the kind referred to in the first four congresses of the Communist International and in the Transitional Program of the Fourth International, that is, a government of non- Marxist political forces based on the workers and poor peasants, which have broken with the bourgeoisie under the pressure of the masses but which have not yet completed the revolution by shattering the bourgeois state apparatus, ending capitalist property relations and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.
Such a government is by nature highly transitory; that is, it can move either toward the right, paving the way for reestablishment of a bourgeois government (which, in a country with a semi-colonial economy like Algeria, could only be a neocolonialist government), or it can evolve toward the left, paving the way for creation of a work ers state,
Colonel Boumedienne's coup d'état signifies neither the end of the Algerian revolution nor the victory of the neocolonialist counterrevolution. But it has initiated, or more exactly accentuated, a process that can lead to the reestablishment of a bourgeois government by heightening the demobilization and political apathy of the masses,
Condemnation of the military coup d! état does not at all constitute "intervention" in the internal affairs of Algeria, as Colonel
Boumedienne charged in response to the criticisms expressed by Fidel Castro, The fate of the Algerian revolution is of concern to revo-= lutionists throughout the world. Their interest in the Algerian revolution was amply demonstrated by their tenacious defense of its cause and the material aid which they mobilized, often at great risk, during the difficult years of the war, In fact, Algeria could scarcely have won its political freedom without this aid. The truth is that:in: itself Colonel Boumedienne's military coup d'état constituted "intervention" not only in the development of Algeria's revolution, but- in: the development of the revolution on an international scale and in the defense of the socialist achievements in the workers states, above all in the case of Cuba, which has not been the last in line to solidarize with the Algerian revolution in its difficult moments.
The evolution toward the right under Boumedienne has already been clearly shown by the following:
(1) Ben Bella based himself mainly on mobilizing the masses from time to time and on his popularity among them. Boumedienne!s base is mainly the army, which, without having definitively outlived its revolutionary origin, has become increasingly converted into a professional army, a privileged body separated from the Algerian MAaSSeS.
(2) The Boumedienne regime displays pronounced hostility toward all the avowed Marxist tendencies -- both the official Communist parties and the revolutionary Marxist tendencies, and is stressing the "Arab Islamic" character of "Algerian socialism.”
(3) While relations with the workers states, particularly _ with Cuba, have deteriorated, relations with American and French imperialism are improving.
_ (4) Under pretext of improving their "efficiency," the man+ agement committees of the self-managed sector have been threatened with a purge, This could be the prelude to weakening or even suppressing them,
(5) The limited degree of trade-union autonomy, painfully reconquered at the last congress of the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens], is under threat of being suppressed again.
(6) The tentative moves toward establishment of a militia were bitterly opposed by Boumedienne when they were initiated under Ben Bella, The arming of the people would now have to be undertaken in direct opposition to the regime,
(7) Boumedienne has placed a military figure in charge of the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] in contradiction to the need to democratize, strengthen and develop a broadly based vanguard party in Algeria.
: (8) A significant lowering of aid to the revolutionary movements fighting against colonialism in the Portuguese colonies and against the fascist-like dictatorship in South Africa was one of the first measures put into effect by Boumedienne.
The principal social force that rallied immediately to the military coup d'état in Algeria was the "bourgeois bureaucracy," a product in large part of the former colonial administration, which -is closely linked with the neocolonialist business circles, From this force <= independently of the wishes of Colonel Boumedienne -emanates the threat of regression in the Algerian revolution, a threat increased by the successful coup d'état,
It.
Origin of the Coup d'Etat
After seizing power at the end of the crisis of the FLN in > July 1962, Ben Bella balanced between two forces: on one hand the army of the frontiers, which had brought him. to power against the resistance of certain Wilayas [districts] of the interior which were struggling for local prerogatives; and, on the other hand, the masses, the mobilization of which reached its high point with the publication of the March 1963 decrees on self-management in the socialized "biens vacants" ["vacant property"], Ben Bellats tour of the country and the celebration of May Day. Ben Bella's great popularity among the masses, coupled with their occasional mobilization, acted as a coun= terweight to the army. In addition, Boumedienne supported the March decrees at the time,
This equilibrium of forces was, however, extremely unstable, It could not endure, and had to give way, either to an increasing role of the masses, or, in the opposite direction, of the army, The first variant called for maintaining a fighting spirit among the. — masses, both urban and rural, and keeping them mobilized. This in turn required a functioning democracy and the autonomy of the mass organizations. In addition, a series of revolutionary measures were needed to improve living conditions for the broad masses in the rural areas; i.e., a deep-going agrarian reform, Particularly important was immediate relief and the opening of a perspective for the unemployed to whom the revolution has not yet brought any improvements.
Even had these conditions been fulfilled, the ultimate victory of the socialist revolution would not have been assured so long as an essentially neocolonialist bureaucracy, hostile to socialism, remained in place, and along with it a state structure inherited from the colonial administration and a professional army capable of enforcing obedience. The completion of the revolution required, besides the economic measures indicated below [see section Iv], the arming of the workers and the poor peasants (people's militia), a.
radical purge of the administration, and particularly the creation of the apparatus of a new kind of state based on committees of workers, soldiers and poor peasants. The realization of these conditions would open the possibility of continuing the revolution in Algeria. toward socialism and establishing a workers state in the relatively near future,
In the absence of measures to maintain the fighting spirit and mobilization of the masses at a high level, the whole fragile equilibrium of power shifted imperceptibly toward the army at the expense of Ben Bella. The longer that measures like the second agrarian reform were delayed, the greater became the demobilization and apathy of the masses, and the more Ben Bella became a mere hostage of the army whom it: could eliminate almost without striking a blow. This is what happened June 19,
. After the elimination of procapitalist forces like Ferhat Abbas, Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Khider, the FLN was dominated by an internal struggle between an unorganized left tendency, which to a considerable degree understood the need to carry out the indispen-~ sable measures to complete the revolution, and.a rightist tendency .. favoring "Arab Islamic socialism" of a Nasserian variety supported by the army and the state apparatus. Although Ben Bella undoubtedly favored measures that could have led to completion of the revolution, particularly the program of the FLN passed at the Algiers congress (the Algiers Charter remains valid as a whole), he rejected organizing a genuine vanguard party based on the masses of workers and poor peasants and maintaining workers democracy and a climate.of continual mobilization in the country. He preferred to play a bonapartist role between the two tendencies, of searching particularly for compromises at the top rather than of continually appealing to the masses, In . this there was a fundamental difference between him and Fidel Castro, which likewise determined the different dynamics of the Algerian revolution as compared with that of the Cuban revolution.
The left-wing vanguard, which included members of the dissolved Algerian Communist party, as well as sectors further to the left (militants, who embodied the best revolutionary tradition of the rank-and-file. of the FLN) and independent revolutionists, fell in with Ben Bellats maneuverist policy of compromises at the top instead of offering a revolutionary Marxist criticism of Ben Bella's course and.seeking to organize their own forces in an effective way. Some of them are continuing to follow the same course in relation to... Boumedienne as if they had learned nothing from the military coup | d'état and were blind to the mounting danger to the revolution. The road they are following points to disaster.
Ben Bellats maneuverist orientation was bound to end in weakening the revolution. Ben Bella felt this after a time, and early this year, particularly under the pressure of the strike wave that shook the country last winter, he made concessions to the masses and to the left which held promise of giving new life to the revolution,
At the UGTA congress, the former leadership imposed by the bureau-. cratic apparatus. of Mohamed Khider against the will of the immense majority of the trade-union militants was ousted and replaced by a leadership that could be considered as being partially representative of the rank and file, Nationalization of the major part of industry was promised. On the eve of the coup d'état, the central committee of the FLN, under the pressure of Ben Bella, decided to move ahead in a more serious way with construction of a people's militia. A few days later, Ben Bella wanted the political bureau to organize the party inside the army and to eliminate several rightwing ministers. These measures would have radically altered the relation of forces. To block this, the army seized power. But it is significant that in face of the growing resistance of the army, particularly to his attempt to push the army!s political represen=tative out of the government (Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the minister of foreign affairs), Ben Bella, far from appealing to the masses, once again was content with maneuvers and secret conferences at the top. He thereby provided history with a fresh example of how much more costly it is to conceive of carrying on a revolution by commands or maneuvers "from above" than by mobilizing the giant power of the masses and proceeding with the revolution "from below." The latter method, it is proved once again, is much less disorderly, costly, painful, and dangerous.
Boumedienne's coup d'état also places a harsh light on the role of Khrushchevism, After isolating itself from the mainstream of the Algerian revolution until it was victorious, the Algerian Communist party, upon being banned by Ben Bella, accepted the decree, making a face-saving protest, and the leaders actually went so far in applying the Kremlin's line as to formally dissolve the party, It was through the FLN under Ben Bella's leadership, according to the CP leaders, that the main goals of the Algerian revolution were to be achieved. Algeria was described as a kind of "netional democratic state," one of the great new innovations of Khrushchevist. "theory" adopted at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.
This line suffered the usual fate of illusions. The FLN proved incapable of preventing Boumedienne!s “action” or of mobilizing resistance against it. The need for an organized revolutionary Marxist vanguard was proved to be more imperative than ever in Algeria. And it was shown that to guarantee and complete the con=quests of the revolution, it is necessary to build a workers state and achieve the socialist revolution, without halting at any nonex~ istent stage of "national democracy."
Itt.
The Immediate Perspectives of the Algerian Revolution
Colonel Boumedienne's regime is itself of unstable and transitory character. It is based mainly on the army, the only cohesive ruling apparatus in Algeria. But this army is not homogeneous; it tends, in its own way, to reflect all the contradictions of Algerian society and a state still enmeshed in a revolution that has not been crushed nor become exhausted, and which is far from having disappeared from the minds of the toiling masses, aan oo
Colonel Boumedienne, it is evident, has gathered into his own. hands all the reins of power; he directs the army, the administra- tion, the Council of the Revolution. He seeks to reconstruct theparty from above, The model he has in mind is undoubtedly a "socialist" regime like Nasser's, But Algerian realities are quite different from those in Egypt.
On the one hand, Boumedienne and the army find support in heterogeneous anti-Benbellist and “antileftist" forces corresponding to quite different social interests and aims, These include the big Algerian landholders anxious to indefinitely postpone the second agrarian reform; technocrats and top functionaries eager to consolidate exorbitant privileges and, under cover of "efficiency," to eliminate self-management and some other much too bothersome forms of control from below; the bureaucratic layers, shot through with neocolonialist memories, nostalgia and interests; the merchant bourgeoisie and various direct representatives of imperialism. The Algerian economy remains profoundly integrated in the international imperialist economy; its government budget even depends strictly on subsidies granted by France. (The latter relationship, it should be noted, scarcely represents a gamble for the French government, since up to now the profits from the exploitation of Algerian oil reserves have largely compensated for the subsidies.) Under these conditions, the combination that supports Boumedienne will rapidly come to pieces, part of them seeking to accelerate the course toward the right, others seeking to continue the revolution "from above,"
On the other hand, the main conquests of the Algerian revolution were the product of a mobilization of the masses, Any retreat with regard to these measures, particularly anything putting self-. management in question, any resort to repression against a new wave of strikes, any attempt to install a regime of austerity at the expense of wages, etc., would be bitterly resented by the masses, who retain their capacity to react. A fresh initiative on the part of the masses would have a dialectic of its own. The numerical and social weakness of the neocolonialist forces, moreover, favors vigorous actions by the masses. In short, after ten years of popular struggle and a tumultuous rise af the revolution, the Boumedienne regime will reveal itself to the masses as a dangerous setback, with
a perspective of bitter consequences,
In addition, the Algerian economy has growing contradictions resulting from the coexistence of a nonintegrated "socialized" sector and a still predominant capitalist sector in industry (oil), as well as in the field of foreign trade, credit and banking. These contradictions will likewise block stabilization of Boumedienne!s power at the present level.
Hither the Algerian revolution will take a new leap forward, experiencing a fresh upsurge, thanks to another rise in the mass struggle ~- as has occurred so many times since November 1954 ~- or the Algerian government will shift increasingly toward the right, in the direction of reestablishment of a bourgeois government, and the road will be opened to imitators of Boumedienne in the art of coups d'état, This is the alternative that faces Algeria following the. June 19 military coup d'état.
IV.
The.Tasks of the Revolutionary Marxists in Algeria
From this analysis, revolutionary Marxists must conclude that. the Algerian. revolution is still alive, that it has suffered a seri-~ ous but not a definitive defeat. A new upsurge of revolution is possible. The revolutionary Marxists in Algeria must concentrate their efforts on preparing for and facilitating the resurgence of the revo-= lution. This work involves in particular:
(1) Defense of self-management and all the conquests of the revolution.
(2) Defense of the democratic rights of the workers movement, including the right to organize workers parties loyal to the Algerian revolution and completely hostile to imperialism and neocolonialism, In the same spirit it is necessary to demand either a fair public trial or the immediate release of Ben Bella and all the revolution~ists who have been made victims of political repression,
(3) Defense of the Algiers Charter and a struggle to apply it.
(4) Defense of Marxism as a revolutionary theory that must be taken as the only valid guide to action in Algeria as everywhere else in moving toward a classless society.
(5) Struggle for the consolidation of the socialized sector to block its becoming an adjunct to the private sector and disintegrating. This struggle must be linked to the slogan of extending the self-managed socialized sector to include all the key industries,
and of nationalizing the credit system, transportation and foreign trade, and initiating genuine socialist planning.
(6) Struggle for a genuine second agrarian reform, capable of considerably increasing the income of the poor peasants and establishing a broad cooperative sector alongside the self-managed sector,
(7) Arming of the workers and poor peasants in a genuine popular militia democratically constituted and electing its own com=manders.
(8) Special attention must be paid to the struggle for equal-~ ity of women, This is of. great political importance in the current situation in Algeria as a counter to the "Arab Islamic" tendency, one of the aims of which is to keep the women from breaking out of the inferior status alloted to them in this retrograde outlook, The revolution in Algeria cannot develop and progress without the active and massive participation of the women.
(9) A radical cleaning out of all the neocolonialist elements in the state apparatus; and the organization of councils and committees in all the factories, neighborhoods, douars [villages], and: : farms, as the basis of a workers state,
(10) Continuation and extension of active solidarity with regard to all the movements struggling against colonialism and neo= colonialism, particularly in Africa, .
(11) Continuation of the struggle to build a mass party with a revolutionary socialist program, based on the vanguard of the masses of workers and poor peasants in Algeria, with a genuinely » democratic structure, and aiming at carrying out the Algiers Charter and completing the revolution in Algeria, by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, with power in the hands of the workers and poor peasants,
(12) In order to struggle more effectively for these objectives, the revolutionary Marxists should seek to construct a section of the Fourth International in Algeria.
JUST "HUNTING GUNS" FOR SOUTH