Vol. 4, No. 10 April 8, 1966
JOHNSON TRIES TO SAVE HIS SAIGON PUPPET
While the Pentagon propagandists again make the dubious claim that the military situation has improved for the U.S. in south Vietnam, the regime of puppet General Ky is tottering and can be pushed over at any time. This is the clear political meaning of the mass demonstrations in Hué and Danang and the student rallies in Saigon itself. The precariousness of Ky's grip was underlined by Johnson's order April 1 postponing all congressional junkets to south Vietnam until further notice. The Pentagon and CIA can no longer guarantee the safety of a U.S. congressman in Saigon. And lights were burning late in Washington as Johnson and his crew sought desperately to figure a way out of the morass.
New York, N. Y. 10010. Sc
"From the White House down," said the Washington correspondent of the New York Times April 2, "there is a realization that the ganble made by the Administration at the Honolulu conference early in February in committing the United States to the Ky Government is now being put to the test.
"But the gamble, officials acknowledge, is turning out to be considerably more risky than the Administration expected when President Johnson literally and figuratively put his arms around Premier Ky at the Honolulu conference."
South Vietnam has been seething with unrest since March 10. The political crisis was touched off by a split in the ruling military junta when General Ky ousted General Nguyen Canh Thi, overlord -— of the Hué-Danang area in central Vietnam, from the governing mili-| tary council on charges of "insubordination. aa
At the time, Ky's action was hailed with satisfaction | in : Washington as a "strong" move, and it was indicated that. ‘the puppet premier had acted in accordance with ‘American "advice. :
As the April 3 New York Times put it in "The News of the Week in Review": "When the generals who run South Vietnam voted on March 10 to dismiss Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi as the military commander—governor of the country's. five northernmost provinces, American officials in Saigon privately applauded them. Like the generals, the Americans viewed the development as a step toward. solution of one of South Vietnam's most nagging problems -- the ten-dency toward sectional and religious separatism, which has hampered creation of an effective central government. "
Ky's "advisers" are now inging ‘to shake | off a little of the responsibility for dumping General Thi. They only. advised Ky as to. the "methods"! At least that is the claim made in the April 2 Washington dispatch to the New York Times: "Premier Ky acted with American advice on the methods of the dismissal, although apparently not on the basis of American advice or recommendations in the decision to remove General Thi." Thus it was Ky's. responsibility and not really Johnson's.
Moreover , all the subsequent errors were Ky's handiwork, not Johnson's: "But then, in its political inexperience, the Ky Govern-._ment:.as now seen by United States officials, blundered-in permitting» General Thi to return to the northern: domain rather than arranging” for’ his ‘speedy removal from’ the: ‘Vietnamese scene." - o
“Buddhist and’ student. ‘groups in) ‘the: northern provinces. immedi-~ ately: ‘took advantage of Ky's (or:Johnson's) "blunder" to come out. into:the streets and clamor for an:end to military rule. ‘The: Ky government,. rattled by the scope of the mass protests, compounded the "blunder," by sending General Thi back:to Hué charged with the : mission of calming the turmoil.
Things had already gone too far. As Ky's (or Johnson's) victim, General Thi, had gained instant popularity. The turmoil flared
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higher. In Danang a general strike and student boycott of classes have paralyzed the city since the early days of the outbreak.
On March 27, some 20,000 antigovernment demonstrators marched through Hué in a procession about two miles long. They called for an. end to military rule, the establishment of a constitutional government and the holding of free elections long promised by Ky.
By this time the centers of commotion in the northernmost provinces had slipped from: control by the Saigon government. The March 27 parade involved-1,000 south Vietnamese soldiers along with ‘local public officials. On’ March 29 the student leaders of the movement telegraphed Ky that unless he promptly answered their: demands for a return to civilian government they would set off violent . demonstrations.
Their protests quickly acquired a sharp anti-American edge. The most explosive incident occurred March 30 in Danang, where U.S. marines are based, when a military truck collided with a Vietnamese bus taking part in an antigovernment cavalcade. The student organizers sent President Johnson a 48-hour ultimatum demanding an apology for this interference. They added that they would be forced to take further acts if they got no satisfaction.
They also accused American marines of punching four demonstrators. Within three hours of the: incident a crowd of about 2,000 gathered outside the billets housing the U.S. servicemen and demanded an apology from the marine commandant. They received one from a. resident official.
' The Hué-Danang area was obviously in a state of semi-insurrection. Students temporarily took over radio stations in the northern cities and broadcast antigovernment speeches. On April 1, after 10,000 people had assembled at military headquarters in Hué to hear pacifying speeches from General Thi and General Pham Xuan Chieu,: third ranking member of the military directorate, student and Buddhist leaders gave orders that Chieu be prohibited from leaving the city and returning to Saigon. They threatened reprisals against anyone who tried to provide him with transportation.
The volatility’ of the situation was well illustrated by the attitude of the crowd toward Chieu. Thousands swarmed around the hotel where he was staying, demanding that he come out and speak. The general was apparently fearful of appearing, and not without reason. If he should indicate that his mission was to pacify their boisterousness, he might be torn. apart limb by limb. Thi saved Chieu by addressing the’ crowd and then introducing his fellow general, who made some most diplomatic remarks. The crowd roared its approval and then insisted on wheeling the two generals in pedicabs down the street. Judging from the pictures shown on TV in New York, the pair did not feel that they were. in the safest of hands. General Thi was reported in the April 3 New York Times ‘as telling a. friend, "IT have. been overtaken ‘by events.
The day after detaining Chieu, militant paaahicte ica 'a
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general strike that closed down everything but the essential services. No move was made by soldiers or national policemen to stop the strike.
. Beginning March 26 the anti-Ky and anti-American protests had spread ‘south. On the same day that antiwar demonstrations were held . throughout the United States and other countries, teen-agers and | children marched into the central market of Saigon chanting "Down _. with Ky" and "We Want Democracy. "
Denunciations of the war, demands for civilian government, and thrusts at U.S. domination’ continued through the week. At a rally in the same market: square in downtown Saigon:March 31 student. orators condemned “an anti-Communisnm...that demands the rejection of our sovereignty in the economic, political and military fields." One declared: "The government intentionally mistook a friendly country _ for a master and thereby transformed Vietnam into a submissive country" and "a’ testing place ‘for: international forces. to Jtry. out their new weapons.
Other students nailed crayon: caricatures of Ky and two other junta, leaders to the stakes along one side of the square used for
public executions of traitors and profiteers. This grim portent of the Ky regime's future was shown on U.S. television screens.
‘South Vietnam's most powerful Catholic leader, Rev. Hoang Quynh, charged March 26 that the country's military dictatorship was "worse than the dictatorial “government : of. Ngo” Dinh Diem!" which wa overthrown in.1963.
Thus the junta of generals headed by Ky finds itself openly opposed by Buddhist and Catholic leaders and students in the principal cities who have been. joined by its own public officials andsoldiers: in the five northernmost: provinces. The regime lacks any popular support and hangs on solely through the Packing of its foreign paymaster.
In. this taut situation, Ky! s “American "advisers" were appar- . ently itching for a display of "force" to stop the demonstrations forthwith. In an informative article in the April 1 New York Times, Tom Wicker indicated that the Johnson administration was weighing dumping General Ky because of his weakness. Among the faults now found in Johnson's favorite puppet is an apparent inability to crackdown on his critics:
"Nor does Washington understand why the Ky Government has tolerated such events as the temporary take-over of radio stations in northern cities by student demonstrators, who then broadcast — anti-Government propaganda.
"Marshal Ky has threatened to take very, very strong. mea—. sures' if the unrest continues, but has not yet done so. This also. puzzles the: Administration, although it is remembered here that . when the Diem regime responded with violence to Buddhist opposition in 1963, the effect was only to create even stronger sentiment against the Government. _ ;
Ky finally responded to this. pressure emanating from the political genius in the White House. . 7
On April 1 Ky ‘ordered authorities throughout the country. to forbid antigovernment agitation and if necessary to prevent it forcibly. He said it was."time to protect the people, time to stop the trouble and demonstrations. " Then he added: “I either stop “it or. resign. 7
‘The sound of ‘clubs on the bodies of students » was heard in Saigon April 43 as combat policemen charged 300 youths staging a sitdown protest outside the Saigon radio station. Tear--gas grenades helped break up the demonstration. "By sending the combat: police into action today," said Charles Mohr in a report to the New York Times, "the government was gambling that it was better to use force and risk public. indignation than to let.the protests go unchecked in the cap- ital." It remains to be seen how well the Ky-—Johnson ‘strategy works.
Meanwhile in Hué, 3,000 troops of the Saigon regime marched April 2 in a demonstration against Ky's dictatorship. Some Saigon "officials" (probably American) described this action as "virtual mutiny." ”
And in Danang the same day, 10,000 demonstrators marched against. Ky's ‘governmént, some:of them shouting anti-American slogans. "The Government," said Mohr, “which has apparently lost its authority in the northern aréa ‘of South Vietnam, proved.powerless to prevent the marches.
The extreme shakiness of the Saigon puppet regime has placed the White. House in-an. excruciating. dilemma, as Washington correspondent Tom Wicker explained in his previously cited article. Can the Johnson administration "afford to:let the present military government fall or should it move openly to keep it in power if that becomes necessary?"
Kennedy confronted a Similar problem in 1963 when hatred of Diem's dictatorship reached its peak. Then the CIA encouraged compliant generals to do away with its used-up servitor.
However, circumstances have changed since then. First, there has been a succession of short-lived military regimes in the. three years Since Diem's assassination. Second, large sections of the American peopie and many allies of the U.S. have become increasingly disturbed by Washington's manipulation of its Vietnamese puppets which belie the last pretentions of Saigon's independence.
Finally, the U.S. president, writes Wicker, "publicly embraced the Ky government at the Honolulu conference in February, proclaimed its leadérs as partners in winning the war and rebuilding south Vietnam, and gave strong endorsement to its plans for pacification and other reform programs."
If Ky is now overthrown by popular pressure ,..or even by a military coup, that could only be considered. as a repudiation of the
United States. Moreover, "that could have strong repercussions on public opinion in this country, in Congress, and among other govern-' ments," says Wicker. It would deal a damaging blow to Johnson’ rs prestige and credibility.
Finally, writes the New York Times. reporter, if Ky goes,. there looms "the possibility that a new government would seek to end the war. And no one here pretends that the downfall of the present regime would be less than a serious setback to the United States in the larger world. ‘picture.
_ For these reasons it appears that. Johnson will. do all he can to preserve his present puppet and save him from going the way of — his predecessors. His fall would remove the last trace of political stability in south Vietnam and leave the United States nakedly | exposed as an imperialist invader and occupier of the. country -- the only force insisting on continuing the dirty war.