WASHINGTON 'S DILEMMA.
"President Johnson is in a foul mood this Easter Sunday, apparent for all.to see," Douglas: Kiker wrote. in. the April 10 New York Herald Tribune. The report from Texas: is that .Lady Bird, Lynda and Luci’were dressed' in their Easter finest. "As for the head of. the family, he is wearing. a scowl wreathed in- a: fit: of ill temper. '
Johnson went to Texas to soak up a little sunshine ‘but a eold front hit the state about the same time as the president, "clouding the skies: and chilling the: days, and: almost exactly duplicating the gloom of uncertainty and apprehension that is hanging low over the LBJ Ranch." ;
The trouble -- as everyone knows -- is Vietnam. What to do? The April 10 New York Times: boiled it down to a three-word caption under a close-up photograph of Ky and Johnson at hahah last February. The three words were: “KISS: OF DEATH?"
‘From these cryptic words, it is: “not clear whether the Times | means kiss of death for Ky or kiss of death for Johnson. In the long run it will certainly turn out that the famous Honolulu embrace did the political health of neither of them any good.
‘The Pentagon is now growing very impatient with the political situation in Saigon. The military strategists have a very simple, on, more accurately, simple-minded solution; namely, gust move in .and.. run the whole show. "That: is what is being debated: here. behind: the scenes," Times correspondent James Reston reported. in a Washington ... dispatch {April 10]. The trouble with that is -- what becomes of all:
~4o
the propaganda: about being in Vietnam. at the: request of the. Saigon. government and. Just to: "advise ™ and’ “support” ite
Of course, ‘the: ‘American ‘troops could be pulled out as even a sector of the Saigon forces’.are now demanding. But "Washington can-.° not get out without accepting defeat and abandoning every principle. . it fought for in the first place.
On the other. hana "46 cannot use all its power without, risking more opposition from the Buddhists, the North Vietnamese and Communist China," Reston declared.
Another | alternative: is to: dump Ky and try to save the junta.. ‘That is the inspiratieon..of the moment. But "a new coalition govern-.ment.might want .to:end the war by negotiating an arrangement with. ..... the Vietcong. ..' {In the April 10 "Week in Review". section of..the . =: New York Times.] Of all the alternatives, the one most dreaded by... the Johnson administration is being forced to stop the war. What would 1 happen to ‘the stock market! : 7
If, by some “miracle, another puppet. can ‘be - found. by. seraping, ' the barrel, what guarantee is there that he will prove any better than Ky or will last any longer? Ky doomed himself by being a faithful puppet and doing everything his American advisers told him to do. Won't the next puppet tend to be a little: more fearful about adhering to American advice? But then what good will he be as a puppet? Obviously he would be completely undependable.
Finally, if. ‘the Pentagon. ‘Strategists ‘have ‘their way: “and simply take overin order to-step-up the -bombings. still more, what.. guarantee is there that.the American troops will remain uricontaminated by. all the political ferment? Will they remain content indefinitely to play the role of mercenaries in an open, undisguised war of colonial conquest? a oar ;
“In the United ‘States dtself, won't ‘the ‘American people begin to get hot under the collar over the colossal size: of Johnson's _ | blunders and the enormity of his crime in plunging the U.S. into a war of this nature?
In fact; ‘there were : “indications: from many: parts of the country that the demonstrations’: sin Hué, Danang:and Saigon, which have. been... shown on American television screens day after day, were inspiring-a sympathetic response that may lead to a new round of demonstrations in the USA. The feeling was that those kids in-the streets deserved a big? ‘helping. hand. Maybe, after all, the best kind of “foreign aid! isa massive ‘march ' down Fifth Avenue or Main Street! ae
Small wonder that observers in Washington were "particularly impressed last week" by the "fatigue" that showed in-Johnson's face. -And to cap everything, it-could not even be revealed what "religious services" the Johnson's planned. to attend.on Easter. Demonstrators. . from Austin and San Antonio:were waiting for word. in order to.show. up with picket signs at the church door | Protesting: his: Podtcles: in Vietnam.
5 Ky? -- JOHNSON’ ISN'T TALKING |
By George Novack
Since the eruption of the "civil war within a civil war" a month ago, the formerly voluble: léaders of the war cabinet in Washington from: Johnson to McNamara have had little to say in public on developments ‘in Vietnam. The'-few-curt comments by. Secretary of State Rusk have made manifest thei administration's discomfiture and dismay in the face of the turbulence its advisers helped to provoke but have. ‘proved unable to calm or control .
“are: ‘present. ‘difficulties go back to the Honolulu conference’ in veprusey where Johnson sought to buttress the Saigon military .
regine ‘by giving his blessings to Premier Ky. The president's aan exuberant embrace of the tin-pot genéral, whose hero is Hitler, displeased - ‘some. of his” ‘own ‘supporters and disgusted his critics in the United States. .
Still worse for Washington, this unconditional commitment weakened rather than strengthened Ky's position by further exposing him as a tool of U.S. imperialism. This gave his political opponents headed by the Buddhist monks and-.all ‘the elements dissatisfied with: the. junta an opportunity to stir up anti-American feelings as a : means of replacing the detested military rule with a constitutional government.
The five northernmost provinces where ‘Hué and Danang are — located is the hotbed of opposition to the Saigon dictatorship. This was reflected ‘within the ten-man military directorate by the unruly attitude of its most powerful member, the northern commander General Thi, who had built a base of his own in the military district under his command.
Ky and most of his colleagues plotted to tighten their power by ousting Thi from the~ junta. According to an account in the April 6 New. York Times, independently confirmed by CBS correspondent Charles Collingwood on his return from Saigon, when this proposal was brought to U.S.Ambassador Lodge, he "summoned his mission: council, which included the heads of military and civilian organizations, to consult on.the plan. One or two members were uneasy about the possible repercussions’ but the consensus was that | the move. would reinforce the. government's authority,
"Ambassador Lodge reviewed with Premier Ky the details of his plan and impressed on him the need for presenting a good case for his. action. The Ambassador aid not attempt to dissuade - him."
Ky went ahead. with the dismissal” but ‘was outmaneuvered by = General Thi and the faction led by the Buddhist monk Thich Tri. Quang who had played a major role in bringing’ down three governments, » beginning with Diem's regime in November’ 1963. Thi's supporters and: Tri's organization, spear-headed by student committees, coalesced on a program calling for the elimination of the military junta and
the immediate election of an assembly that would draft a constitu- ‘tion and, in the interim, exercise legislative powers. They set off the anti-Ky and anti-American demonstrations which have exhibited such remarkable militancy and stamina in the past weeks.
Since Ky's first move against the northern stronghold of discantent backfired, Lodge and his superiors back home .have not had much luck in subduing the forces they inadvertently set into motion.. As the struggle against Ky has intensified, they have had to change © tactics in their: improvised efforts. to cap the volcano.
‘Their initial reaction was to back Johnson's puppet to the hilt, urge him to stop temporizing with the opposition, and crack down on the rebellion. As late as May 4 New York Times reporter Richard Eder wrote that U.S. officials had made it clear that "Washington will give unreserved support to efforts by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky to reassert the Military Council's authority in the dissident city of Danang." While the. American representatives discreetly pretended to keep hands off the internal conflict, they kept prodding Ky behind the scenes. ae ‘The premier was reluctant to act for fear that he could not get. away. with the repression... "Despite the urgings of American officials," said the April 6. New York | Timés, "Marshall Ky did not move to put the anti-government movements down with armed force as they began to spread. 'I.-do not want to create any martyrs,' he said."
Actually Ky was worried about his own neck. Nevertheless he was prevailed.upon to make the attempt. The thin veil of U.S. neutrality was ripped aside when Ambassador Lodge put eight planes at Ky's disposal to transport his marines to crush the rebels in cen- © tral Vietnam. This intervention in the civil conflict was justified on the ground-that "we are committed to the support) of the South Vietnam government."
This move, too, resulted in a fiasco. .Faced with unyielding resistance and the prospect of.a bloody encounter whose outcome was uncertain, the sawdust Caesar backed down from his threats to smash the insurgents and their leaders in Danang and Hué and apologized for calling them Communists.
.. His. conciliatory statements and failure to go through with the. use of foree cut down Ky's prestige so much that his fellow generals in the junta and their U.S. subsidizers now treat him as an expendable liability. What had begun with the dismissal of Thi now promises to end with the dumping of Ky.
This: development caused the Johnson administration to. concentrate on insuring the survival of the military junta, with or without Ky at its head. Washington correspondent Max Frankel wrote in the April 7 New York Times that, although officials there. "did not suggest any desire to push Premier Ky from the leadership," they felt he. would.not be able to weather the storm and he could be sacrificed in order to save the junta. That was "Washington's principal objective."
. "The military leaders of South Vietnam," Frankel went on to say, "though pledged to:yield eventually to civilian authority, are looked on here as the only cohesive national force capable of prose-cuting the war. Though Premier Ky's troubles are viewed as injurious, the fall of the _dunta, the officials- noted, could be. disastrous. "
However, the Americans have to ‘reckon with the most ‘decisive forces in the shaping of events in south Vietnam -- the insurgent masses and their. leaders. The main demand of the demonstrators continues to be the overthrow of the U.S.+-dominated military regime . and the establishment. of an elected government. The more radical: among them want no more American interference in.their internal affairs; they want the withdrawal (of U.S. troops, and an end to the war. So, ;
A ‘typical: expression of these anti-American sentiments. was contained inthe. message addressed to. President Johnson by some °5,000° students, teachers and other citizens: who marched to the U. s. consulate in Hué April 5. The message blamed "the United States' policy of interference with the domestic affairs of Vietnam as the cause of all the crisis." This charge: was followed with the declaration that the educators of Vietnam had* decided:-"not to recognize any. de. facto government, either military or civilian, that is influenced. by the United States’ to implement a policy that goes against the aspirations of the Vietnamese people."
The application of this test would rule out any government Washington would: find tolerable. The U.S; officials now hope to alleviate the political: crisis. through. a. deal ‘between, the junta and. the Buddhist leaders followed. by the’ antigovernment. forces. This. is no easy assignment owing to the conflicts between the rival factions and the temper of the rebellious masses who have shown in Danang and elsewhere ‘that they are not disposed ‘to. compromise but insist on _the abolition of military rule. . ae
- In the April 8. New York Times. James Reston outlined the. central- political: issues: in. dispute between the Saigon government:.and the Buddhist ‘activists as. follows. They concern "(1) what south.. Vietnamese will form:a: committee to make arrangements for a national. assembly to draft a new constitution; (2) who will be represented at that constitutional assembly and when it will be held; (3) how the delegates will be chosen, by election or appointment, and who will do the electing and the appointing and the supervising of all these things."
-Reston reported that Thich Thi Quang, head of the Buddhist Institute of Religious Affairs, had sent. a message to Johnson, -: promising to call off the. demonstrations in central Vietnam and... wee Saigon if the president would support Buddhist-supervised elections’. within three months. "He also apparently suggested that. the new-:constitution should have a single-chamber parliament and that there-: .: after there should be a vote on whether to invite the United States to remain in. Vietnam. " Reston ironically. comments that “Thi , Quang is not a timid man. a ss
. -His bold proposals should have caused a few shudders in the White House, State Department and Pentagon. They would, if carried. into effect, transfer-the government power in south Vietnam from:. the ‘ puppet generals to elements far less compliant with American: demands and commands. Under pressure from the people, these might declare their neutrality and even seek a compromise with the National Liberation Front and invite the Americans to leave.
Such | a measure of: democracy would not be to Washington's taste. At the moment the U.S. imperialists have no alternative but to prop up, if they can, the military directorate, whether Ky: remains or not That has its handicaps. a
Here is how Reston sees the administration's dilemma. ‘It is not likely to get a government in Saigon which has the allegiance of the people "by supporting the ‘present government , which presumably will not want to ‘arrange its own defeat, and it cannot very well allow the present revolution to go on without hurting the war effort."
‘The pumbles and fumbles of Ambassador Lodge over the past. month have not enhanced the administration's confidence in its chances to find a favorable solution in the deepening crisis. This. did not deter Secretary of State Rusk froma reckless prediction in. a television interview April. 4 that the ruling military council would still be in power by the time elections were held for the constitutional assembly.
This does not. look like a good - bet while Americans are being beat up and angry young demonstrators are distributing leaflets in > the heart of Saigon demanding” Ky" Ss resignation. and - the withdrawal of American troops. 7
In a dispatch ‘from ‘Saigon in the April. 8 New York Post, Keyes Beech controverts Rusk's official optimism in. these words: "South Vietnam is up for political grabs and there is little the U.S. can do about its investment here except. stand worriedly on the sidelines and hope for the best. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's 10-month-old government is. so seriously weakened by continued Buddhist demonstra-— tions that it is| doubtful it can survive for long." |