BACKGROUND | whe GEN. _IRONSI'S TAKE- -OVER"
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“By Dick Roberts
ml “The military: coup | in: Nigeria, January 15, prought to an abrupt close: the first phase of Nigeria's political independence. from Eng-— land. Nigeria, with a total population of nearly 50,000,000, and an organized working class of over 1,000,000, had been the "pilot test" of neocolonial bourgeois democracy in "Africa.
Nigeria's indigenous ‘bourgeoisie, which had been given years: of training ‘in the colonial’administration of the country, was sup-— posed to become the model ruling class for Africa. Nigeria's leaders were heralded by the imperialist world as the "most able," the "most responsible," the "most reliable," African politicians.
Nigeria was. on. the road to becoming a major arena for capital investment and one of the largest markets in Africa for imperialist products. Nigeria was Considered a dependable ally of-the Western World and she had. been granted increasingly larger.loans to maintain financial stability by the International Monetary Fund.
In one fell Swoop, however, these "highly reliable" leaders and their closest associates, even including the trusted financial minister, were struck down. The framework of parliamentary democracy was abolished, and: the army established martial law.
'- In point of face, the Nigerian "experiment" was destined to failure from the beginning. The five-year period of independence, dating to October 1, 1960, far from being a period of stable political development , was one fraught with crises.
The Nigerian bourgeoisie was pidden with internal rivalries, particularly between the leaders of the more developed southern regions and the feudal, even slave-owning -emirs of: the Moslem Northern Region. And the working class delivered heavy blows at the capitalist rulers, particularly in the south, time after time.
Far from proving that bourgeois democracy could work in the "Third World," the Nigerian experience showed the utter incapacity of the indigenous bourgeoisie to’ solve the problems. of economic development within the framework ‘of a parliamentary democracy. Long before this "democracy" crumbled’ in January, it had become little more then a masquerade, barely disguising ‘colossally fraudulent elections throughout the land, and depending upon harsh repressions ” of the militant working-class leadership. oo
Events leading to the January crisis can be traced to June, 1964, when Nigerian workers conducted a general strike for higher ~ wages which paralyzed the country for two. weeks. The strike had loomed since the trade unions formed a Joint Action Committee shortly after the country became a republic, in October 1963.
This committee brought together all- sections of the tradeunion movement, which range from a right wing associated with the ICFTU (International Confederation of Trade Unions), to a left wing led by the long-standing radical labor leader, Michael Imoudu. The _left wing included the. Nigerian Trade Union Congress, a member of “ the WFTU (World: Federation of. Trade Unions), . controlled by an independent Nigerian political party, the Socialist Workers , Artisans: and Farmers party (SWAFP). :
The Joint Action Committee had called. for a federal. minimum’. wage equivalent to $56 a month. Under this pressure, the government: set up a commission to: make recommendations for improving wages and working" conditions. “The commission, however, dallied interminably, © and a strike was prepared May 305 “simply to demand that the commis-~: sion hand dowh a report. | on a oO Ss
The government responded by attempting to break up the May 30 meeting, injuring dozens of people in a fight which ensued, and arresting many of the leaders. Word of: this: action precipitated the general strike. In some places, workers: occupied the factories | and set: up political committees -- ultimately leading to the. form-, ation of the Nigerian Labour. party (NLP), under: Imoudu's leader-:.:ship. The NLP drew into its ranks the more militant workers, including: the left wing. of the SWAFP. an
“Although the strike gained only half the minimum. wage originally, demanded. it. shook the government: to-the:-core, and served warning of mass social ferment, barely beneath the surface. In the following weeks, the government attempted to crack. down on labor militants, arrested many headers and. banned Public: meetings in. the. .large. "eities. :
The deep effect of the general strike on the Nigerian ruling class could be seen in the elections of December 1964,..which were the country.'s first. federal elections following independence. In these elections, the five jarBest. bourgeois. political, parties, formed: two opposing coalitions,
On one side stood the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), a coalition of.more moderate bourgeois politicians whose strength. lay mainly in the Western, Midwest. and Eastern regions. of the: south. Their main and only goal was; to. wrest political control of.the country. out of the hands of the. enirs of. the Northern Region and their cohorts in. the. Western Region. ct UPGA was composed. of three parties. The predominant one. was the National Council of Nigerian. Citizens, (NONC.)’ ‘which traces its history back to the mid-war period, when it was the most militant ~ Nigerian nationalist organization in the struggle for independence, under the leadership of. Nnamdi Azikiwe.Over two decades. later, however, the NCNC had become thoroughly. conservatized , as? ‘could be a seen in Azikiwe's own behavior in, these | ‘elections. ; -
With the NCNC were ‘the ‘Northern Fiements" "Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Action Group (AG). NEPU is the progressive capital-
ist party of the Northern Region -- where even moderate capitalist politicians are subject. to intensive pressure by the emirs, face possible prison sentences, and. often are not allowed to. hold. meetings. os
Action Group is probably the Nigerian capitalist party closest to the demands and pressures of the masses at the present timé. Drawing most.of its support from the Western Region, AG leaders had begun as early as 1955: to;attempt to pressure,Nigerian politics in, a nationalist. direction; but. AG's-leader,: Chief Awolowo, was con- _ victed in August::1962.0n grounds, that he was preparing | to take overth the government ,,. and is still.in prison. ;
UPGA was supported by ‘the pro-ICPTU wing of the trade-union movement, and SWAFP attempted to join the.UPGA front, but was rejected.
In response: to UPGA, the Northern emirs entered into a coalition with a right-wing split- off group. from AG in the Western Region, the Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP) under Chief Samuel | Akintola. The emirate party of the Northern Region. is called the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and was under the leadership of: the premier of the Northern Region, Sir. Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of . Sokoto, and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The coalition with Akintola called: aitsedt the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).
“his alliance showed, of . ‘course, that in the final analysis the traditionalist Northern rulers could be found to be more. interested ina ‘stable federal government than their own regional con-._ trol. NNA.and UPGA, each in a different. | way, cut across the regional and tribal divisions of the -land.
‘Imoudu's National Labour party did not attempt to join the popular front in UPGA.,- cand instead ran its own. candidates for the first: time. oo oo
As the 1964 elections neared, Nigeria. became the scene of an intense factional struggle. In the Northern Region, NEPU was almost completely: repressed, and NPA announced that it. would run “unopposed” in most of. the districts. yo ba
“Tn: ‘the Western Region, ‘Akintola' Ss goons harassed and beat ‘ap AG candidates. Only in the Eastern:Region, where NCNC. candidate Dr. Michael..Okpara ran relatively unopposed by the NNA coalition was _ politics anything like normal. Talk of a secession by the Eastern Region in objection to the heavy-handed dealings of the Balewa- © Akintola:coalition, however, was so much political ballyhoo, only designed to fire up tribal jealousies. .
On the day before elections, the UPGA. leadership in the Western Region announced that it would: boycott the ballots. The. result, naturally enough, was that it confused the masses even more than they had been by the preceding weeks of the campaign. SWAFP, although it wasn't in UPGA, announced that it would support the boycott also.. -
NNA was returned to power, literally unopposed in most of: the country. Okpara was elected in the East, in spite of the Day cott, but the total votes cast, about 4,000 "000 , was only half the votes cast in the 1959 elections preceding independence , and re- : flected general apathy on the part of the populace to the electoral debacle.
- Had UPGA refused to accept: the election . results, at would have likely precipitated civil chaos. Instead, Azikiwe read the danger signals, and entered into a compromise with ‘Balewa, whereby the election results would stand in all ‘aréas: except those, particularly in the Western Region, where UPGA candidates would have been elected if they hadn't followed the boycott. The new elections were held in March 1965 and ‘were relatively without incident by previous agreement of the ruling parties.
Azikiwe' Scompromise was strongly condemned by the militant rank and file of UPGA. The Zikest youth group attacked its founder “for his "gross betrayal of thosé nationalists whose sacrifices had made ‘independence possible." Thus, in the end, the compromise only deepened the hostility of the militants towards the electoral machines, and set the stage for an even bitterer electoral struggle in the Wéstern regional elections of October 1965.
These elections were a straight two-party contest between Akintola's ruling NNDP and the Action Group , which was highly popular after Akintola's previous behavior .in the 1964 elections and the heavy’ police repressions which had followed. In an "impartial" vote, theré is no question AG would have come out the victor, particularly in Lagos, which would have seen large- scale workingclass support for Chief Awolowo's party.
But Akintola had nothing of this kind in mind: The elections were completely rigged, with most of the pro-AG electoral officials thrown in jail on the day of voting. Besides wide arrests, AG candidates were often prevented from Speaking. The official result was a 3- 1 victory, in favor of NNDP.
* The: October election fraud ‘lea to ‘the severest political . crisis in Nigeria's history. Far from accepting the results, crowds all over the Western Region took to the streets, day after day, for over a month,-overturning cars, burning homes, and:fighting the police. By’ November 7, the New York Times reported 50 deaths,. hundreds of arrésts, and fire and arson damage estimated at. ($960, 000 in Lagos , alone.”
By ‘mid-November, Akintola was able to establish. police rule in Lagos. Top AG leaders were imprisoned, the AG newspapers were banned and their editors arrested, and it was established a crime to listen to the anti-Akintola Eastern Region radio. At least, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson could attend the January. 10 meeting of the Commonwealth nations in Lagos to discuss the. . Rhodesian crisis without the annoyance of local rioting.
In the Lagos suburb of Mushin, however, violence broke out
on the eve of the conference and policemen opened fire on the crowd with automatic rifles.
The military seizure occurred six days later.
It is now clear that the entire military take over was carefully planned, and that the so-called division between the young officers who slew the Sultan of Sokoto and Sir Abubakar, and General Aguiyi-Ironsi. who emerged in.control, was simply a front to take . blame off Ironsi's shoulders for assassinating the "cherished". leaders. Major Nzeogwu, who killed the Sardauna, has since been "reconciled" with Ironsi.
It is also evident that ‘the UPGA leadership “had no qualms about accepting a military take-over. Besides -the two leaders of NPC, Akintola was murdered, along with. the Finance Minister, Chief Festus Okitie-Eboh, a former member of. UPGA who had gone over. to the NNA after the 1964. elections. ;
Azikiwe and Okpara have not been touched.
. This is. not to say. that Ironsi's coup represents an UPGA military front. Ironsi, himself, was.always closér to the NNA. In.1962, he had been sent into the Congo as the head of the. Nigérian: contribution to the UN "peace-keeping" force; he became commander of the UN forces in 1964; and he had been appointed major ‘General by Balewa in 1965. .
It is “not clear at this time’ what the attitude is of the two labor parties to the -new government. That they. will be the first targets of further repressions to follow, goes without saying. “Most | likely they will give tacit support to the military regime “while attempting to gain time to regroup and form a viable opposition.
While promising to reform the "corruptions" of government, and build new housing for the poor, etc., Ironsi has also promised not to nationalize.property, and so far, has not raised any eyebrows in London or Washington. no
The Nigerian coup is-a further ‘setback to the African. revolution. It proves --. if proof were needed -- that there is ‘no real alternative between capitalist dictatorship and evolutionary socialism for the underdeveloped countries of the continent. In Nigeria, it will open a new period of instability; but one which will sharpen the pressure against the working class and the forces of the left.
‘MIR