Vol. 4,-No. 20 June 17, 1966
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PENTAGON CONSIDERING 500,000 MORE TROOPS FOR VIETNAM
Returning to the United States after twenty-six months on duty in Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Ben Sternberg, commander of the 10lst Airborne Division, speaking in Nashville June 9 before the Middle Tennessee Federal Executive Council, said that "500,000 more troops would be required" to seal off the borders of south Vietnam to "infiltrators." The general was quoted as saying that a defeat for the U.S. was possible, but he later denied that he had meant this.
He was also reported to have said that Premier Nguyen Cao Ky © would eventually "have to go." He issued a statement saying that this quotation, too, presented an "erroneous picture" of his views.
However, he did not alter his statement about the need for 500,000 more troops. if the U.S. is to win the war Johnson decided to escalate in Vietnam. Given a sufficient number of troops, defeat for the U.S. is not probable "or even conceivable."
In Washington it was revealed June 7 that the administration is continuing to send troops at a heavy rate. By the end of the year about 100,000 more U.S. troops are "now scheduled" to arrive in Vietnam, according to the New York Times. This will bring the total to about 400,000.
Defense Secretary McNamara announced casually June 11 that 18,000 more American troops had been earmarked to go to Vietnam in the next forty-five days, bringing the total to 285,000 by the end of July.
It would seem that the estimate offered by certain Pentagon spokesmen last year concerning the eventual number of U.S. troops to be sent to Vietnam was quite accurate. The projection was 500,000 to 1,000,000.
These figures were received with considerable incredulity at the time. The doubters pointed to the fact that this would signify a major land war in Asia, and that American policy up to then had been to avoid such an adventure.
Johnson, however, continued to escalate the war. Not having met with the kind of rebuff that might have been expected from Moscow or Peking, he seemed convinced that he could get away with his attempt to drown the Vietnamese Revolution in blood and to crush a workers state while its allies responded to the attack with nothing but weak gestures and a minimum of material aid.
One element that Johnson seems to have left out of his coldblooded calculations, however, is the antiwar feelings of the