strike is easily the biggest numerically ever mounted by Ceylon's working class. In relation to the economy, «the strike has. affected about 4 ‘third of the plantation sector, which ‘still ° remains the key sector despite all the attempts at industrialization and diversification of the economy. And in the case of the tea industry , the strike has already meant the loss of 2 29005 000 pounds of tea.
. The workers in government service won Rs. 17. 50 as a cost of living. allowance in a struggle in October 1957. Thereafter numerous categories | of workers in the private sector, including employees | in small mercantile establishments, obtained a similar concession. But as for the plantation workers, nine years of representations to the employers and the government on this issue. brought. no results. .
The cost ‘of | living continued t6° ‘rise during this period consequent to increased prices of imported.consumer goods: and imported foods Cover seventy percent of consumer goods are imported). In this context, the case for a wage increase for all categories of workers became. irresistible.
The strongest case was that of the plantation workers, whose wages have remained frozen for more than twelve years while both tea and rubber production increased considerably | during the same “period.
Nor have the tea manufacturing and trading companies concealed their: satisfaction at their progress in gathering profits. One. of the largest tea companies -- Brooke Bond (Ceylon) Ltd, which purchases between one-third and one-half of Ceylon's total tea crop -- publicly admitted that in 1962-64 their profits increased at tne rate of a million pounds sterling a year. The average monthly wage of a tea estate worker remains at the subhuman level of Rs. 55 a month.
. And if the plantation employers and proprietors refer to _. the so- called ‘fringe benefits these workers receive as compensation for low wages, they only expose the severity of human. misery on © the estates: "Free" housing for these workers consists of half= century-old, one-room tenements with a common’ verandah for the ~ average family of five. "Free" hospital service amounts to. medical attention that has changed little since the worst ‘period of _ colonialism -- mere dispensers of medicine called apothecaries are permitted to perforn | the functions of qualified medical personnel.
_ What makes the oppression.of the estate workers especially severe is that the large majority of them, who are of recent Indian origin, have been deprived since 1949 of citizenship rights. This means that in addition to the loss of a wide range of human rights, these workers ‘remain outside the operation | of government social services...
‘Legally sanctioned discrimination against these ‘workers has gone so far as to virtually deprive them of even the facilities for a bare primary education. The estate superintendent is still the manager of the estate school in which so-called teaching is’ ~ carried on by unqualified teachers -- and even that only to the fifth standard.
- Under the prevailing exploitation, class oppression and discrimination affecting a.wide field of basic human rights, this strike of the estate workers has more content than appears on the > surface. The sustained enthusiasm, militancy and readiness to endure severe hardships manifest in all areas even after thirty days of struggle indicate that for the estate workers this strike over the single issue of a Rs. 17.50 cost-of-living allowance is. in reality the beginning of a liberation movement to end the state of virtual slavery which they have endured now for nearly a hundred years.
At first their. ‘oppressors were the’ ‘British imperialists. Today their oppressors are both the- imperialists and the native planters and the capitalist government.
It was their inability to fathom the real driving forces behind this strike that upset the calculations of the government, the employers and many leaders of the plantation unions. As only the Democratic Workers' Congress led by Aziz called the strike, the government and the employers expected it to soon fizzle out. Apparently this was the reason the government did not seek to use the powers they had under the existing state of emergency to block the strike from being launched.
' As ‘for the leaders Of the other plantation trade unions, most of them preferred to ignore the strike while some of them did not conceal their opposition. The Ceylon Workers' Congress headed by’ ‘Thondaman, ° by arrangement with the employers, entered into so- called” "negotiations" over a wage demand of one rupee aday, which was a common demand of all plantation unions. The
Thondaman leadership categorically stated that they. were opposed to the strike. The Communist party [Moscow] union léader Keuneman called upon Aziz to suspend | the strike, which had already been launched, until his union got a chance to negotiate a settlement with. the employers! The Communist party [Peking], ‘led by Shanmugathasan, resorted to diversionary, tactics. They called for a token general strike. of their unions for a few. hours. As for the Ceylon Federation. of ‘Labour headed by Dr. N.M, “Perera, it dealt a. frofital blow to the striking workers. Perera made the shocking statement a few days after the strike began that it would not be a success Since. Aziz had launched it. Without, any reference to the | other unions. .
In contrast to the virtual strikebreaking tactics of many plantation union leaders, the unions of the United Committee of Ceylon Trade Unions (Bank Clerks Union, Estate Staff Union, Ceylon Mercantile Union and the Democratic Workers' Congress) have from the outset actively supported the strike and continue to play a leading part in the struggle. Of the political parties. only the Lanka Sama. Samaja ‘Party. Revolutionary) came out in support of. the strike. ee
Contrary to the expectations of the employers, the govern-— ment and the leaders of most of the plantation unions, the strike gathered strength from the beginning, winning recruits from the. other plantation unions. The numerous strike meetings addressed by leaders of the Democratic Workers' Congress, the Ceylon Mercantile Union and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary) were ~ attended by thousands of workérs. Often men, women and children a have waited at meeting Draces, and along roads for several hours — ta 11 the arrival of speakers., a
There has been unusual amity between the Tamil-speaking 7 and Sinhala workers. The latter are generally nonresident, coming from the village areas. Furthermore there has been noticeable sympathy and support for the strike among people in the. rural areas and in small towns close to the estates. .
It became impossible. for some of the plantation unions to remain on the sidelines, especially when hundreds of. their-own . members joined in the strike. Thirteen days after the strike. began, the unions:led by the Lanka Sama Samaja .Reformists) and the .two Communist parties. announced their support, saying that: their. members in;the area would participate. — Sok
‘While thirty days is long for a plantation, strike, the . wn support from the other plantation unions, except the Thondaman-led Ceylon Workers' Congress, has not only given considerable: strength to the struggle but has brightened the. hopes; for. victory.
In: addition a 69-day-old bank. strike (National and ‘Gpinlays bank), leading to a general strike. ‘of. all the banks that is’ . a seriously. affecting the entire economy, has helped to generate
considerable pressure on-the government itself to seek a settlement of both the plantation and bank strikes.
Although present’ conditions favor'a successful outcome of the plantation: workers strike, the failure of the unions led by the Lanka’ Sama Samaja (Reformist) and the two Communist parties to do hardly anything more than announce their support unnecessarily delayed fuller mobilization of the estate workers.
Properly coordinated joint campaigning by all the unions involved can raise the. struggle to highér levels of class action and assure suécess. A unitéd front of all the ‘plantation. unions”at. all -levels to- continue the struggle against a’ formidable: section of the class enemy ~- the plantation bourgeoisie (British imperi-'” alists in partnership with Ceylonese plantérs) -~ is unpostponable and: imperative. It would be nothing less than criminal folly and’ irresponsibility if the: ‘plantation union ‘leadership were to-allow ° trade-union rivalry and existing: political differences to interfere with the task of winning a victory.
Ana success: in forming a. united front in -the plantation struggle can well mean the beginning of a new: orientation, pointing: to a wider united front ofall the trade unions and -working-class © political parties against the capitalist class and the ‘capitalist . government. This alone is the road forward for the” workers and . toilers of Ceylon. ~
PERSPEOTIVA MUNDIAL
The first issue of a Spanish edition of World Outlook appeared June 29. It contains nineteen items, including translations: of George Novack's "The Internal Struggle in Peking"; Ernest Mandel's "When | Will They Explain the Tragedy in Indonesia?"; ‘and: the first part of Joseph Hansen's’ "Trotskyism Versus Stalinism in the Cuban’ Revolution." (The second part of the latter article is scheduled for the | second issue.