SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL SCENE
Frankfurt
The political scene in the German Federal Republic has undergone a change. The victory of the Social-Democratic party in the elections to the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW] constitutes a danger signal for the Erhard government. It was widely. expected that the SPD would gain, but no one foresaw the landslide that gave it 49. 5% of the ballots.
The Christian ‘Democrats, traditionally strong among the Catholic workers and women and therefore always in first place in the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany, got only 42.8% of the votes, while the Free Democratic party Coourgeois- liberal) registered 7.4%.
The Catholic workers deserted their "traditional" party and voted for the only oppositional alternative open to them -- the SPD: -~ mainly because of the crisis in coal and steel which looms large | despite the general prosperity and shortage of labor. |
Like their husbands, the women are angry over continuously rising ‘prices. The yearly inflationary rate, as reflected in prices, » has in fact: topped 4% for the first time. -
“Eni the. mining and steel~producing centers, the. SPD gained from 10% +o 15%. This is quite unusual in the German political scene,
since it. eives the party a 60% majority in many of these towns,
With the SPD holding 99 out of 200 seats in the Landtag, the outcome’ has'a significance extending beyond the most industrialized and densely populated sector of Germany. Erhard, who appeared | a endowed with almost mythical powers as the creator of the German .2 economic "miracle," suffered a heavy blow to his prestige. ane
For a time opinion was divided in ruling circles over what to do. The "Ruhr barons" together with the most reactionary sector of "public opinion," particularly the chain of papers owned by the "press king" Axel Springer, advocated a three-party coalition, including the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Free Demo- = crats. ; ne TR
The July el Die Welt, a. daily controlled by Springer, explained quite unabashedly how this solution would favor the, inter-. ests of German capitalism. "The people of the Ruhr must finally be... told the whole naked truth regarding coal. They must be told in the most direct way that a state depending in a crucial way on the export trade needs cheap energy and that government financial aid in a country that has more than:one million foreign workers does_ not eliminate the factor of rising costs...Only if the three parties in NRW carry out this task in common can they eliminate the fear of competition among themselves...The leading employers are not at all attracted by the .thought that the Social Democrats ANe. -+ NRW could be pushed into an unnecessarily hard opposition... dors
In other words, before opting for a coalition solely between ~ the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, the bourgeoisie argued over ‘advantages and disadvantages of bringing in the Social Demon...’ crats. ren ee
The first consideration of those favoring including the SPD was the political desirability of associating the Social Democrats. with the harsh measures that might well have to be taken in the
Another concern was ‘to ‘avoid a situation in which the SPD, deprived of the fruits of victory, moved into a strong oppositional position, while the workers under the pressure of objective forces turned more and more in a radical direction.
Finally there was the fear that the SPD, capitalizing on its current gains , might. move into position to win a majority in. the parliament in Bonn: in 1969. The best antidote to that. would be to include the SPD in a-coalition, thus making sure that it shared responsibility for projected antiworking-class measures.
The counterarguments finally won the day. The bourgeoisie decided to exclude the SPD from the coalition and to continue ruling. openly for two main reasons. First, they feared that the SPD posi- tion in the Bundesrat (something like a senate) would be strengthened and that this would hamper bourgeois rule on a federal level. Secondly; the situation did not seem dangerous enough for the time .-. being to require resorting to SPD rule; i.e., utilizing the SFPD to... block, the workers from proceeding down the revolutionary road.
oe In addition, they had convinced themselves before the election that a victory for the SPD would mean a "Scandinavian" situation, with a Social Democratic government in office for decades. The German bourgeoisie prefer to avoid that.
The Christian Democrats also hope that they « can recover from the setback, perhaps by sacrificing Erhard.
But there are differences over how to revitalize the party. One wing hopes that it can be done through an adroit foreign policy. They want to imitate and even outdo the SPD which tried to arrange an open discussion with the Communist party officialdom of East Germany. This would fit in well with the current American maneuver of relaxing relations with the USSR in Europe. Although the SPD move failed, it was very popular.
Another wing, © a very a@aingerous - one headed by Franz Joseph Strauss, wants to stir:-up the nationalist brew, projecting a "de Gaullist" Germany adhering to "independent" policies well seasoned with a McCarthyite attitude toward the left.
‘One thing is. clear | —— the most solid ‘position of capitalism in Western Europe, the German Federal Republic, received a rude shock. It is not-at°all certain that the Christian Democrats can succeed in repairing the damage.
The German’ working class has established a new opening. If thoroughly explored and vigorously followed up, it could mean.establishment of a "Labor" government by 1969.
' For the time being the working class has no other .electoral alternative but the SPD. It is significant ‘that the "German,.Peace Union" ‘(DFU], which usually gets the votes of former Communists [the Communist party is banned ‘in West Germany], did not run. sepa- . rate candidates in NRW but called for supporting the SPD.
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