Japan's total trade during the period. -
Trade with China amounted to $164,080,000 in exports for Japan, an increase of 45 percent over the previous year, and $156,124,000 in. imports, a rise of 37 percent. .
IMPERIALISTS WELCOMED TO CEYLON
By Edmund Samarakkody
The so-called economic development of Ceylon by capitalist governments in the nineteen years since "independence" in 1947 has ended in manifest failure. The first UNP [United National party]... government's nine-year regime, followed by an eight-year SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom party] regime, and now another year of the UNP have left a picture of economic backwardness and stagnation more alarming than ever.
This is the meaning of Finance Minister Wanninayake's lamentation that his government was "formed in the throes of an economic crisis," and that the gross national product registered a decline of 0.4% while the gross capital formation declined by 5.9% as compared with a fall of 1.7% in 1965. What this regression of the ~ economy means in terms of human misery cannot be adequately revealed through statistics that are admittedly long out of date and based even originally on inaccurate and unreal assumptions.
The crisis in the economy complained of by the finance minister is none other than the crisis of underdevelopment. And the capitalist way of resolving such a ‘crisis is no secret. Whatever may be the consequences to the workers and toilers, the capitalists and their apologists have repeatedly called for drastic cuts in expenditures on essential ‘social services, and more especially the removal of subsidies on food,’ the reduction of consumption below even minimum needs and a still more severe wage-freeze despite the failure of all the capitalist governments to control prices of commodities. As all ‘these measures in their totality will not help to realise a level of capital accumulation necessary for an accelerated pace of overall growth, the capitalist remedy is to obtain doses of foreign aid which must inevitably mean the continued economic dominance and stranglehold of imperialism.
In their second budget, the UNP leaders have taken the bull by the horns. What a Felix Dias Bandaranaike of the SLFP proposed in 1962, Finance Minister Wanninayake of the UNP has commenced to implement in 1966 under conditions of a continuing emergency and in the setting of a reorganised army and police force. If it is still too early to effect a cut in the rice ration, the UNP government has decided to get back into their coffers Rs. 25 million Lone rupee = US$s20] by increasing the price of flour .05 rupees a pound. | They also expect to collect a further Rs. 40 million from the pockets of the workers and toilers through the turn-over tax, which is a tax that the consumer will pay whenever he buys most of his essential nonmanufactured consumer goods.
The drastic curtailment of expenditures on essential social services is revealed by the failure of the government to even mention the serious housing problem of the masses; and by their decision through the education bill, to severely restrict higher educa-
tion for the children of the workers and toilers.
That these measures of the government rarely touch the lives of the rich and well-to-do is proved by the fact that customs duties on a wide range of expensive articles have been reduced by as much as 50%. These include air conditioners, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, floor polishers and electrical goods of the type only the rich can afford to purchase. Bourgeois ladies have been especially remembered by the UNP government through a 90% reduction in duties on imported pedigreed dogs!
In the sphere of economic development, it is now a question. of implementing the blueprint handout of the imperialists and especially the U.S.-controlled World Bank that is shaping the economies of most underdeveloped countries to their own needs of exploitation and world domination. While the way out of economic stagnation in Ceylon lies through speedy development of the manufacturing industries to reduce the huge.volume of imports, the imperialist advisers of the UNP government must have it differently. In the words of the finance minister, "in the new development effort, primary emphasis has been placed on domestic agriculture." And despite the notoriously ineffective private sector, future indus- _ trial development is to be in charge. of private capitalists, while. ” only "the rationalisation of the public sector enterprises will ~_— take place.
While domestic agriculture through co-operative production and collectivised forms of agriculture could effectively mobilise the peasants and agricultural workers for development, the UNP government has handed over this sector of the economy also to private capitalists and big landowners. With thousands of people without land. to cultivate, 35,000 acres of cultivable land have been given to some 100 private capitalist organisations. What is , _. more , while the poor peasant is virtually without credit facilities, to improve his land, big capitalists who have obtained thousands of ~ acres of. crown land will get loans on easy terms, not only for development of domestic agriculture, but to develop tea estates and °. to mocernise their tea factories.
. “As all local plans for economic development remain linked to the overall plans and needs of imperialism, the question of foreign aid and foreign capital loom large in the second budget of the UNP _ government. As much as Rs. 125 million of foreign aid will help to. meet the announced budget deficit. Foreign aid for the current year is expected to reach Rs. 500 million.
And what is significant in this connection is the "quid pro quo" for the inflow of foreign private capital. A further relaxation of the moratorium on remittances for dividends, profits and capital has been allowed. Foreign-owned companies and enterprises will be permitted to export Rs. 29 million as against 6 million in the previous year.
As a further concession to imperialist interests, the govern-
ment has already signed an "investment guarantee programme" with the USA, offering protection for new investments against nationalisation.
To complete the picture of the increasing dominance of impe-— rialism in the Ceylon scene, the finance minister has announced his intention to repeal the restrictions imposed on the foreign banks by the 1961 finance act. In other words, foreign banks will be permitted to operate in Ceylon more or less on the level of the stateowned banks; and private foreign capital will now flow through the channel of the foreign banks and help to realise more effectively the economic stranglehold of imperialism on the country. Imperialism in Ceylon will become a reality more than ever. Political independence can soon become emptied of content.
-The second budget of the UNP government proves more than ever that the only alternative beforé the workers and toilers is either | continuation of capitalist class rule through the UNP, the SLFP or coalition of the SLFP and LSSP [Lanka Sama Samaja party], which | would lead inevitably to more and more burdens for the workers and . toilers, the contraction of social services, a continued wagefreeze, "unemployment, hunger and a police-army regime; or economic development of the country, attainable through the overthrow of the capitalist state in Ceylon and the establishment of a workers and peasants government in the perspective of laying the foundations for socialisn.
THE ASSASSINATION OF VERWOERD
The death of Hendrik F.. Verwoerd at the hand of an assassin September 6 met with little mourning. The racist-minded prime minister was one of the world's most hated figures since Hitler. However, among the nonwhites in South Africa, the feeling of satisfaction over Verwoerd's end was tempered by fear that it might be utilized by his followers for widespread reprisals against the blacks and colored people. "Thank God it wasn't one of our people who did it," a black African woman was quoted by the press as saying.
The motives of the assasin, Dimitrio Tsafendas, who had been temporarily employed as a parliamentary messenger, were not clear. However his co-workers said he had complained that Verwoerd was doing too much for nonwhites and not enough for "poor whites.
A scramble immediately broke out among Verwoerd's lieutenants over succession to the mantle of top fascist. Whatever modifications the winner might initiate in the regime, opinion was unanimous among observers that these will not be in the direction of a thaw in Verwoerd's barbarous apartheid policies. As the September 11 New York Times put it succinctly, the successor "will inherit the armed forces and police that Dr. Verwoerd built up, his most solid legacy." Only a revolution can sweep away these murderous guardians of South African racisn.
-2]-
LESSONS: FROM A DEFEAT
By Ps: “Soedarso_
-LOn September 30-4t will be one year since the events -began.. in Indonesia that rapidly led to one of the greatest tragedies of our times, the decimation of the largest Communist party in the capitalist world and a nationwide slaughter in which the estimates of the numberof victims range from 300,000 to more than 500,000. According to the latest reports in the press, the killings are still going on.
[Such a ‘political debacle and mass blood-letting demand the most intensive analysis. The costly experience makes it imperative that the lessons be singled out and learned by the workers movement. In resolutions and articles the Fourth International and parties adhering to its views began this task even before the. defeat by Fe calling attention’ to the class-collaborationist policies followed ..... by the Aidit leadership ofthe Indonesian Communist party with the... approval of Moscow and the special backing of Peking. Up to now, primarily because of the ferocious repression, little has come out of Indonesia: itself.
i. That the Indonesian. Communists are now beginning to review. the bitter experience they have lived through, is well indicated. . by the following article. The author is a young member of the. Indonesian Communist party concerned about assessing the causes and meaning of the tragic defeat suffered by his party. He is now in . exile. As a reflection of the thinking going on in the most advancea. sectors of the ranks of the PKI, the article is of considerable .. interest, in our opinion, and we are pleased to be able to offer Le in World Outlook. ] -
ok ok Ok
"Indonesia's military student action front, KAMI, has appealed for military help in face of what it calls mounting Communist. attacks. in Central Java. A student delegation from Jogjakarta said here today that 325 KAMI students were wounded in clashes with Communists. A. spokesman said a campaign of terror was underway and the KAMI leaders had asked for military help." This item appeared in the New York Herald Tribune [European edition] July 20, 1966.
Similar reports have appeared with increasing “frequency Loe recently, indicating that armed resistance is being mounted by the .. Indonesian revolutionary forces against the brutal suppressive measures of the Indonesian military-fascist regime. The armed struggle is occurring not only in Central Java, an area considered | to be the stronghold of the revolutionary movement, but also in. other islands of the republic.
This armed struggle, ‘however, is still uncoordinated. It is still sporadic and anarchistic in nature. It still lacks leadership,
either political or military, capable of organizing an armed uprising. It seems that the Communist party of Indonesia [PKI, the Partai Kommunis Indonesia] has not recovered from its defeat. Is the leadership still intact? Has there been a new regrouping? Where does the leadership stand in relation to this new situation? Do they still support Sukarno, as in the final statement of October 1965? Do they still maintain the old political line or. have they drastically changed it? ©
‘No answers are to be found in either journals or pamphlets. The masses are acting in accordance with their own judgment and : initiative, seeking to protect themselves from being massacred by the forces of the Indonesian reaction. Out of loyalty, many in the ranks have drawn the conclusion that the leadership has remained silent due to "security reasons" or as” “safety measures."
Most likely we are faced with a vacuum, the leaders having been martyrized during the witch-hunt, or the survivors being unable to assess the new situation. The events in Indonesia constitute a © catastrophe for the PKI in particular and for the revolutionary movement in Indonesia as a whole.
It is true, of course, that the future of the Indonesian revolutionary movement has not been destroyed -- it cannot be. The movement will rise again in a mightier force that will finally end the system of exploitation of man by man in Indonesia.. But it is a fact that it has suffered a serious defeat and. setback.
Nevertheless there are some to be found who still do not regard it as a defeat: but'as a "blessing in disguise"; since now the line between friend and foe is very clear and the people really . know that "it is not we who resort to violence. but the reactionar-: . ies." Such people still maintain that the past policies of the party were quite correct, the recent catastrophe being merely a "routine" incident in the revolutionary struggle. "Sacrifices always occur," they say. Thus these people do not consider it necessary to analyze the previous policies, strategy and tactics of the party; they even argue that it is "premature" to attempt this or "it is very. dangerous because it can lead to a split in our movement." Their advice. is to “just continue the struggle - ‘in line: with the past policy, only with more caution and vigilance.
This stand is not correct. We should pay tribute to the fallen heroes of the people; we should salute the martyrs of the revolution; we should prepare retribution for the brutality of the reactionary forces; we should express solidarity with all who have suffered. But can we just continue "spontaneously," merely pursuing the struggle without seeking a _bewter road, more: effective methods?
No! We must recognize that it was a setback, a big setback. We must dare to uncover the mistakes of the past that led to this failure. And we must have the courage to make the necessary correc~ tions so that we won't fall ‘into the same fatal errors again. Criticism and self-criticism are necessities for a healthy revolutionary
movement. |
In my opinion, the following mistakes led to the present defeat.
1.
The Policy of Seeking to Achieve Socialism by Peaceful Means
This was the most fundamental error. The PKI believed that socialism in Indonesia could be achieved by peaceful means. As stated in the constitution of the PKI: "To achieve its goal, the PKI follows peaceful and democratic ways. This is what is sought by the PKI and what will be consistently pursued."(1) And the second — secretary of the Central Committee of the PKI, M H.Iukman, explained this as follows:
"The constitution now mentions the possibility of a transition.to socialism by peaceful means. Theoretically as well as prac-) tically, this has an important meaning...in face of the propaganda of the reactionaries, we feel it necessary to affirm the possibil- © ity of a transition to socialism by peaceful means. By emphasizing that we are going to make this possibility become a reality, we can’? thereby. show the people that if violence does occur, it was not started by the Communists nor was due to them and it is not at all wanted by the Communists. °
"From the theoretical point of view, to affirm the possibil- —“ ity of a transition to socialism by peaceful means, signifies affirming the truth that Marxism-Leninism does not point to absolutely the same road for socialism in all countries in different periods and in different international conditions. This also means that we Marxist-Leninists do not bind ourselves to certain forms; methods and roads of completing the revolution, because everything ~~" depends on the concrete balance of power among the existing classes, . on the quality of the working-class organization and its enemy, on the ability of the working class to attract its allies to its side, especially the peasants, and on taking into account the existence: of democratic institutions in each country."(2) . a
In the same speech, Iukman said further: "In accordance with the. teachings of Marx and Lenin; namely, by taking into account the objective conditions. of the world balance of power between the. ; socialist and democratic forces on the one hand, and the imperialist *: forces on the other, and considering the experiences in the East European countries where the transition to socialism did not occur’
(1) Constitution of the PKI. Central Committee of the Partai Kommunis Indonesia, Djakarta. 1964. p. 16. (2) M.H.Lukman, About the Constitution. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta.~ 1959. pp. 26-27.
24
through a civil war, Comrade Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of. the CPSU stated the conclusion that in the present situation certain countries have a real possibility of reaching socialism in a peaceful way." a
It is therefore understandable why the PKI was unprepared for armed struggle when the crisis came last October 1. The PKI concentrated activity. only on the "legal" or "parliamentary democratic": platform. It completely ignored preparations for armed struggle by the workers and: peasants under the leadership of the working-class party. This was well-known to the reactionary forces; consequently they launched a quick brutal action:to liquidate the revolutionary forces. The only hope for the revolutionary forces was to seek safe retreats, but it was already too late. The toll was very high.
Because of this belief in a peaceful way of achieving socialism, and perhaps especially because of the advice of "Comrade" Stalin and later "Comrade" Khrushchev, the leadership of the PKI willingly, if not even faithfully, followed Sukarno's personal leadership and teachings. Sukarno was considered by the party to be a "pro-people's | element" and even the. "great leader of the revolution." The reactionary forces brutally massacred.members of the. PKI and other revolutionary forces in the name of Sukarno; yet.Second Secretary Njoto still said, "The PKI recognizes only one head of the state, one supreme commander, one great leader of the revolution -- President Sukarno." Furthermore, "It is President Sukarno united with the forces of the people who will decide the destiny and future of Indonesia." In Accordance with the October 10, 1965, instructions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI, Njoto con-. tinued, all party members should. "fully support the directives of President Sukarno and pledge themselves to implement these without reserve." (The October 10 instructions have not been withdrawn to this day.) The party was still seeking to maintain the peaceful road. Njoto said, "Our. party is making every effort in its power to prevent a civil war."(3. .
“As for the. Indonesian Armed Forces, the PKI hela that they | constituted forces of the people, since the ranks were made up of. the sons of workers and peasants. This viewpoint was maintained even after the "October 1 affair," Njoto saying: "We do not consider the Indonesian National Forces to be like the armies of imperialist countries or the army of India. When you appraise an army, you should study and take into account. the history of its formation, its role in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, its composition which is mainly made. up of former poor peasants or workers. It is true that there are still entipeople's elements within the National Forces of Indonesia. This 7 also true concerning the republic as a whole." And he stated that "our party has never had its own army. "(4) so " (3) These statements were made to a Japanese correspondent. See Asahi Shimbun,. Tokyo.:. December 2,.1965.
(4) ibid.
Let us now examine the arguments and viewpoints indicated above. — nn |
It was argued: that it was necessary to follow a policy based. fh on the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in order: ~ to counteract the propaganda of the reactionary forces; i.e.,; the’ propaganda that the Communists are’ "terrorists," "monsters, ete. But what was the result? The repudiation of the use of armed struggle in achieving revolutionary goals only demonstrated the weakness of the revolutionary forces in the eyes of the reactionaries and created a feeling of insecurity among the masses.
The propaganda of the reactionaries can be ‘counteracted by explanations and by action. Through explanation it is possible to completely expose the real character of the reactionaries. The facts of history constitute the best source to show the people the cruelty’ and brutality of the reactionaries. For example, the- massacre com «— mitted by the reactionary Hatta government in 1948; the brutal "August Razzia" committed by the reactionary Sukiman government in 1951; the brutal armed: suppression carried out by the reactionary generals against the peasantry in Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi and other islands; the bombings carried out with planes furnished by the imperialist U.S. and the massacre committed by the reactionary rebels’ in 1958, etc., etc. Past experience provides the best lessons for teaching the people about the brutality of the reaction-aries and the necessity to° resist such | brutality through armed struggle.
And the’ propaganda of action is still more important. The people will trust the Communists and have real confidence in the party if the Communists genuinely defend their interests and show themselves prepared through sacrifice and armed struggle to safeguard the people from oppression and suppression by the exploiting classes. The Communists must demonstrate that they are really cadres‘: of the working class and:-really on the side of the exploited masses; -" and are not merely pleaders with the "haves" nor collaborators with the "good people." Socialism cannot be achieved by pleading but only through armed struggle by exploited masses under correct leadership” — provided by the working class! Aidit once said, "The development of: the party, besides depending greatly on the united front, also greatly depends on armed struggle. The advance or: decline of armed struggle greatly influences the advance or decline of the united front and the party. "C5) But why did this” remain only words which © were not carried out in practice?
let us consider the "experiences in the East European countries." Wasn't the’ revolution there led ‘by the Soviet Red Army?
‘The Cuban Granma was quite correct when it. said editorially: "We are not denying that in a given country, under certain very
(5) D.N.Aidit, Forty. Years, of the PKI. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1960. p. 61. mee
_26- .
special conditions, an exception could occur in the future; nevertheless, not one case can be cited of a victorious revolution which has been able to avoid the use of violence, insurrection or armed struggle as fundamental methods. This is a universal experience and the political position of the Communist parties must. be developed ; by taking into account what has been learned in the ractical experi = ence of revolution and by probing deeply into it. "ey we
In the ‘development of the Indonesian. revolution, many oppor- . tunities arose for the PKI to mobilize the workers: and peasants into: . revolutionary armed forces and to counteract and liquidate the reac- ... tionary elements in the "National Armed Forces of Indonesia." These opportunities were ignored, a
For example , during the campaign for the liberation of West Irian from Dutch colonialism, the people were mobilized.into volun- . tary units in anticipation of a clash with the Dutch imperialist forces. This should-have been utilized by the party to mobilize the _ workers and peasants. and-to set.up bases for armed struggle. The party did engage in this, but not with the objective of carrying. out a socialist revolution. The movement was limited to liberating _ West Irian and it was disarmed after this aim was achieved. nh
Again during the ‘campaign. to crush ‘the neocolonialist regime . of "Malaysia," the party contributed greatly in mobilizing the masses, but without bringing in the idea of armed struggle for the. socialist revolution. Thus the chance slipped by to set up bases for armed revolutionary struggle. Even worse, the party left the leadership of -the voluntary units in the hands of reactionary generals... oa.
Another excellent opportunity came during-the campaign for . unilateral action to take over the land belonging to the big landowners.. This action was led by the PKI, Day by day hundreds of. thousands of peasants took part in the action. They faced armed suppression by the feudal forces backed by the reactionary generals. But the party did not organize armed units of the peasants to | counterattack. It left it up to the peasants to organize their own defense on the basis of their own courage and initiative. When this developed into a near revolutionary crisis, with many clashes between the peasants and the reactionary forces, the campaign was stopped. The "great leader of the revolution" Sukarno had given the order or "revolutionary command" to stop "any unilateral action." He gave the "command" that "every conflict or difference . should be solved by consultation and agreement.'
In accordance with the appeal from Sukarno in this situation, :. Aidit proposed the so-called "NASAKOM Code of Ethics." Among other things this-laid down the following: "Among all NASAKOM or MANI- POLIST groups there must be no confrontation. Only consultation to.
(6) Granma, Havana, Cuba. May 15, 1966. (English edition. )
reach agreement. "(7) And he specified: "In the present situation, if conflicts arise between .the government and the people, the only. .correct way: to: Solve them is to reach agreement through consultation. "(8)
Blood had been shed by the people, but the. action was .stopped. As the slogan put it, "We should have revolutionary patience."
The. PKI's: repudiation of the use of armed struggle can.. be. traced back to the beginning of the “August. 1945 Revolution. ™Q).
During: the struggle: against ‘the Japanese. military occupation, the PKI was instructed or. ;"advised,." under.-Stalin's guidance, to cooperate with the Dutch imperialist government ,. to carry out "joint . actions" against: Japanese imperialism. (This. also. applied to all the other Communist parties, who were told to cooperate with their respective bourgeois -governments in.fighting against the Axis. ) Through such cooperation, the PKI hoped to. "earn" independence for Indonesia at the end of the war. The program of the PKI as well as the CPN [Communist party of. the Netherlands] called for an "independent Indonesia within the Commonwealth:-of the Dutch Empire" as a. ...: step toward full independence. This remained a utopian dream.. At the. end of the war, the Dutch with the backing of the British and U.S. ~~” imperialists sent their armed divisions to reoccupy Indonesia. What attitude did the PKI take toward this? 1.
A reptiblic had been proclaimed under the leadership of the ~~ bourgeois Sukarno. The masses as a whole were completely ‘ready to — defend their newly proclaimed republic. But the -PKI. still .clung to | the old program of establishing Indonesia "within the Commonwealth © of the Dutch Empire." Thus they followed. the. line. of compromise in _ face of Dutch aggression. They supported the “policy of the. reaction- | ary Sjahrir government in signing the Linggadjati Agreement, com- ~~ promising with Dutch. imperialism in 1947..Then, still.worse, the following government under Amir. Sjarifuddin . (a PKI leader at the |. time) signéd the so-called "Renville Agreement." Under this cata- — strophic agreement, all pockets of the guerrilla forces were to = © withdraw from Dutch-occupied - territory. The reactionary forces used this opportunity to send in reactionary armed units. Cander the com- ~ mand of Nasution; the present co-dictator) to dominate the liberated areas. Realizing his mistake, Amir Sfarifuddin voluntarily surrendered his government back to Sukarno. This was followed by . the formation of the most reactionary government ; i.e., the Hatta
(7) D.N.Aidit, The. Indonesian Revolution Its Historical Back round and. its Future» Jajasan Penbaruan vjakarta, L . P. 03: 7 (8) ibid. p. 8l.
(9) The armed struggle against the Japanese occupation and later ~ the British and Dutch aggressors is called the "August. 1945. Revolution." It began with the proclamation of’ ‘the Republic. of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.
regime.. Under instructions from the U.S. and Dutch imperialists, . this government introduced ‘a program of "rationalizing" the Indonesian armed forces, which’ meant liquidating the people's’ armed units. The Hatta government wanted only "one type of ormy” that is, the: so-called’ “Indonesian National Armed Forces.
In 1948, Musso, who was one of the PKI leaders of the twenties and thirties, returned from abroad and called for a “new Road" for the PKI. Among’ other things this demanded renunciation of the old policy of compromise. The correction was accepted by the majority of the PKI leaders. But it was too late.:-Before the PKI could consolidate itself under the new progran, ‘the reactionary Hatta government launched a “white terror" in the so-called "Madiun Affair." 7 Thousands of party. members and most. of the leaders were killed.
This affair should: have been | a salutary lesson for the PKI: not to abandon the method of armed” ‘Struggle. Yet it: was" not.
‘When a federal republic was.established under the so- called "Round Table Conference" agreement, the PKI held it: best to. con-. tinue the struggle py “peaceful democratic" means. -.
Aidit explained this as follows: "Against this RTC agree~ . ment which was signed on November 2, 1949, by Hatta's government under instructions from U.S. imperialism, there were two opposing viewpoints in the party...the first group wanted to continue armed struggle against the federal republic of the RTC...while the second, who based their position on revolutionary theory. ..wanted to. main-: tain the party's legality"; that is, continue the struggle by» "parliamentary democratic" means.(10) Thus was a beginning provided. for the repetition of the” old errors.
On the question of ‘the "Indonesian National Armed Forces, it is not correct to say that they are not "like the armies of © imperialist countries or the army of India." At the beginning of the August 1945 Revolution there were no regular armed forces. Throughout the islands, the people formed their own armed units for defense against the imperialist aggression. There were many kinds of units. "The PKI built a Red Army, and had big influence on the Lasjkar Buruh [Workers Army], Lasjkar Pesindo [Army of the Socialist Youth], Lasjkar Rakjat [People" s Army] and Tentara Ba Peladjar [Students Corps]."(€11) In the process ‘of struggle, then, a regular army was built. Following the program of "rationalization" under Hatta, most of the irregular armies were liquidated. The most. reactionary forces remained. After the RTC Agreement a new "National Armed Forces" was formed. This was an arithmetic combination of the previous Indonesian "National Armed Forces" plus the "Dutch East Indies Troops." These Dutch Troops (of Indonesian © nationality) were much better trained. The remnants of the progres-
(10) D.N.Aidit, Forty Years of the PKI. p. ,59.
(11) ibid., p. 47.
sive units within the Indonesian National Armed Forces were subsequently liquidated. Of course, there were still some “BepTpecple: gs" elements within the Indonesian National: Armed:Forces.. But'as awhole they belong to the same classification as the "armies of imperialist countries or the army of India." It is a great error not to treat reactionary forces.as reactionary forces.
2.
uestion of the United Front.
“The. ‘PKI ‘followed ‘the theory:, of two. stages tothe ‘ pevelubion: <. namely, a national ‘democratic stage followed by a socialist Stage ns
"To confuse ‘the “two stages of the Indonesian ‘revolution and to say that we are already building socialism is demagogic., subjective.and reactionary. The national democratic stage constitutes... preparation for the socialist stage. The socialist: stage cannot be. achieved without first completing the national democratic: stage. "(12) This was the stand of the PKI. It was said that this national democratic stage constituted in essence a bourgeois: democratic Stage, but of a new types namely, one led by the. working’ class. (13)
According to the. party" s analysis, Indonesia at. [present:. still has a semicolonial and semifeudal system.. And there are =~... --) "three forces within Indonesian society; namely, first the. diehards,. i.e., the feudalists and compradors who collaborate with the imperialists. This is still a big force, but it is declining.-Second, the progressive forces, ise., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals. This force.is-rather large and is: .. increasing. Third, the middle-of-the-road forces, i.e., the national. . bourgeoisie and: all other patriotic.and: other. anticolonial forces, .... including the left group of landowners. This force is rather large. It stands between the reactionary and the progressive forces. "(14)
“The: PKI 's| political line in. ‘aealing. with these three forces is: with all its power. to tirelessly develop. the progressive forces, unite with the middle-~of-the-road forces.and isolate the diehard forces. The implementation of this line is very ; important | in changing. the balance’ of forces in society. "(15) a
‘Mhus, striving to- achieve socialism ‘along. the peaceful. road,
(12) D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its- Future. p. 77. erie oo
(13) The Constitution of the PKI. p. 7. (14) D.N. Aidit, Forty Years of the- PKI. p- 83.
(15) D.N.Aidit, Indonesian Society and Indonesian Revolution.,. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1957. p. 50. -. rs
the PKI sought to form:‘a "United National Front," consisting of the working class, the peasants, petty bourgeoisie: and the national bourgeoisie, -"pased upon an alliance of the workers and peasants © under the ‘leadership of the working class. "(16)-
About the alleged necessity to build a@ united front with the national bourgeoisie, Aidit said: "...I would like to emphasize once more that although an alliance with the national bourgeoisie is not as important as an alliance with the peasants, the success and completeness of the leadership of the working class in the revolution will be determined by the success of the alliance between the workers and the “national bourgeoisie. Therefore the Communists must strive -with dll their power to preserve and further develop the alliance with the national bourgeoisie. " (Emphasis added. IO?)
"Anyone in “the party who opposed: the alliance with ‘the national | bourgeoisie was brandéd' a "left deviationist." In criticizing the: 7 "left deviationist" tendency of the previous period, it was Stated: that "the party was still - completely unaware of the need: for ‘uniting. with the national: bourgeoisie, :the party's slogan being ‘socialism now,' ‘Indonesian ‘Soviets,' and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat! This 'left' deviation of the party was criticized precisely =« by J.V.Stalin in his speech to the students at the University of the Peoples of the East on May.18, 1925, in which he said that this left deviation contained within it: the ‘danger of isolating the partys: from the masses and” converting it. into - a sect.” Sp =:
‘What: happened in: reality? In reality, following the policy of an alliance between the. working class and the national: bour- ~geoisie, the party undermined the alliance between the working . bin class‘and the peasants. The leadership of the "United National cae Front" was: never in the hands of the working » Class or its: party, but always in the hands of the: national © Or: comprador bourgeoisie.
In reality this line led to multiclass collaboration under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, degenerating: into. com— promises in ideology and in action under cover of the’ so- called | "mus jawarah for mufakat" (consulting to reach agreement).
Full acceptance of the so-called. "Pantja-Sila philosophy "(18) (a product of the "genius-like thinking" of Sukarno) is an example of the open ideological compromise reflecting the "success" of multiclass collaboration. According to Aidit, "Pantja-Sila is a philos-
(16) D.N.Aidit, The Birth and Growth of the PKI. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1955. p. 9. (17) D.N.Aidit, Be a Good and a Better Communist. Jajasan Penbaruan, Djakarta. 1964. p. 57. oo (18) "Pentja-Sila" is "Five Prihciples":. belief in a single god, national unity, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice.
ophy for unity....In Indonesia one finds Catholic philosophy, Islamic philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, Protestant philosophy, Black “Magic philosophy, llystic philosophy. ie cand Fantja-Sila unites what can be united."(19) |
In the same speech:he said further: "The philosophy of Pantja- Sila cannot be separated from the philosophy of Empu Tantular 'Bhinneka Tuggal Ika' or ‘Unity in Diversity.’ This is very dialectical. 'Unity in Diversity" .-~- differences, but.-in unity...I do not agree with liquidation of not only these various ‘kinds of. philosophy:.but:. also political parties. In the second stage of the revolution and. the next stages...because so long as differences remain among us,:: . ‘Unity in Diversity' and also Pantja-Sila will still be applicable. And in my opinion these differences will.exist forever...thus in-.my-: opinion Pantja-Sila is also everlasting." CEmphasis added.)
It is very clear that the philosophy of Pantja-Sila is an idealist philosophy. Perhaps it was. considered to be only a means of uniting "the revolutionary. groups.:" But it was not that..Aidit said that “Fantja-sile is...everlasting"; "...these differences will exist forever..." Does he believe that class differences will exist forever? Does “not our Glass struggle. aim at abolishing class society? Li fo ae ae Pow ee
Is such a- statement. ‘from ‘Aiait Marxist?. Yet “Aidit said, oT accept Pantja-Sila - also from the Marxist-Leninist. ‘viewpoint. " ¢In the same speech. ) oF mt ee .
Similar conclusions hold for the PKI! s acceptance of the "genuine concept" of NASAKOM(20) proposed by the demagogic bourgeois Sukarno. Aidit: said, "Besides uniting various kinds of classes and groups, the National BFront also unites various kinds of revolu-. tionary ideas...namely; Islam, Nationalism and Communism."(21) "In the traditional struggle for national independence in.Indonesia,. ‘we can find three political-streams which were against Dutch colonialism; namely, nationalist, religious and Communist political. thought. Thus. it is natural to say that. there will be national unity in Indonesia if these three political currents unite within the NASAKOM cooperation. "(22) .
And Aidit said, "This united national front has: found its organization; namely, the ‘National Front. '"(23) At the top it is (19) D.N.Aidit, In Defense of Pant ja-Sila. Jajasan Pombaruan. 1964. pp. 27-28. ee a (20) NASAKOM is an abbreviation for Nationalism-Religion-Communisn.
(21). D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its Future. p. 65. (22) ibid. 4 “Pp. 92. (23) ibid. , Dp. 67.
"headed by. President Sukarno himself, who with his vice-presidents reflects the cooperation:.of NASAKOM...showing us how deeply rooted is the idea of the national united front among the masses. Now it is our duty to work hard to foster and consolidate it."(24)
a During. the struggle against the Dutch colonial power, it is true; there were many political: groupings all of which were against: the foreign imperialist rulers. But we could also see which were truly revolutionary , which were ‘quasi-revolutionary, and which were opportunist. For example, the PNI [the Indonesian Nationalist party founded by Sukarno] was clearly bourgeois. In the beginning it. reflected the national bourgeoisie but then it degenerated into a vehicle of the national bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, compradors and . bribers. Thus during the struggle, it always swung opportunisti- . cally. And in times of revolutionary crisis, it was always on the Side of the reactionary forces. A clear example was provided during the "Madiun Affair" in 1948 when it served as the "vanguard" of the reactionary forces that murdered thousands of Communist cadres and =’ revolutionary rank and filers. Sukarno himself at the time issued. the challenge: "Join Sukarno or Musso. "(25) i ad
Again in the recent period (1964), during the campaign for ; unilateral action in taking over the land belonging to the big landowners, the members of this nationalist party joined in suppressing the peasant movement; and the "most progressive" leader of this party issued an order to. "stop any unilateral action." Yet the PNI was considered by the PKI to be its true partner in the NASAKOM cooperation as the representative of the nationalist political stream. ;
Similarly with the Nadhatul - Utama, an Islamic scholars party.
The NU was very clearly the party of the feudalists and landowners. They used Islam as’ a cover for. their reactionary. activities in pre- . serving their landownership’ and exploitation of the peasants. By using Islam as protective coloration, the party played a big role and had great influence among the masses that are still strongly under the sway of Islamic teachings...There is no instance in Indo-.. nesian history’ where this party has’ played a progressive or revolu- — tionary role. It has always stood on the side of the reactionary forces. Yet the PKI sought to preserve unity with the NU within the so-called NASAKOM cooperation.
Besides the nationalist and religious parties in the so~ called "National Front" léd by Sukarno, there were other reactionary elements, including the generals.
Thus the so-called "National Front" was not a revolutionary
(24) D.N.Aidit;, The Indonesian Revolution; Its Historical Back round and Its Future. p. 72. x (25) Musso, a leader of the PKI in the twenties and thirties, managed to escape abroad when the Dutch suppressed the movement, returning in 1948.
front led by the working class. It was. not even the united front depicted theoretically in the documents. of the PKI; namely, a united. front of the working class,,peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national. bourgeoisie led by the working class. It was clearly collaboration of all classes under the leadership.of the demagogic bourgeois . Sukarno.
Of course, the PKI cannot and must not struggle alone; the. working class: must. not struggle alone. It. needs: allies. It should ..... not isolate itself from the masses; but the. masses are not the | national bourgeoisie! Jt should be clear who is. really an ally and. who is really an enemy. In. a country like Indonesia, in which poor peasants.constitute more- than sixty percent of the population, | peasants are the real-.ally of the working-class. The peasants should _ become: the army of the revolutionary movement led by the working class. Poor city dwellers or the petty bourgeoisie are reserves to be drawn upon. Towards the national: bourgeoisie. there should be a cautious and vigilant attitude. The. revolutionary movement could . | and should support the progressive attitudes or actions of the. national bourgeoisie,: but there- should be no class collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, since this can undermine the alliance between the working class and the peasants. The Communist party .. Should have. its. own policy. based on the. demands and experience of the most revolutionary class. -
There is, naturally, the influence of Islamic ‘teachings and _ nationalist thinking among the masses. This should be considered in propaganda work and in enlightening the masses. But it: should never mask the class character of the struggle. The masses should be clear that this struggle is a class..struggle and not a religious or racial struggle. The struggle is to. overthrow the exploiters, to crush and abolish the system of exploitation of man by man. And the masses should even have. a very concrete picture in their minds of the true character of ‘the ruling class -- the compradors, the bribers, the usurers, the feudalists, the ruling-class apparatus, the reactionary government apparatus, etc. They must.be shown how Dg and trained to overthrow these reactionary agencies. Only by such ~ means can the united front among all the. oppressed classes be tempered, . strengthened. and made militant. Not through pleading | with ... the “national ‘bourgeoisie. " : = ey be
Pe, 2 Be:
On the Question of Building the Party
‘The PKI's program calls for making the party "both a ‘mass party and a cadre party." Aidit said, "The PKI is a mass party but at the same time a cadre party; it has many members and close con-.~ tacts with the masses. "(26)
In 1952 the membership \ was , only: 10, 000. In the national con *
(26) D.N.Aidit, Be a Good and a Better Communist. p. 49.
~ 34
ference held that year, it was decided "to expand the membershi from 10,000 to 100,000 within six months." (Emphasis added. )(27) And after ‘the: implementation of the first "Three Year Plan" [1956-59], the membership increased to 1,500,000.(28) At the mid year 1965 it was reported in the press to have reached 3,000,000.
It is an amazing growth. A mass production of Communist cadres! Perhaps no precedent exists for this in the history of Conmunist parties. But is it guaranteed that all of these three million members were good revolutionists? Perhaps the CIA agents knew the answer to this better than the members themselves, so that the reactionary forces dared to launch a brutal and massive suppression of the PKI. Of course, the rapid recruitment by the PKI frightened the reactionary forces, but apparently they recognized the fatal weakness of the organization better than did the members of the PKI.
Obviously it is not easy to turn out good revolutionists with mass production methods. Aidit himself recognized the inherent weakness in this rapid growth and mass production of members. For example, he said, "In the beginning they become party members» because they seek protection from the rising revolutionary tide of the peasants. But their cultural level is higher than that of the agricultural workers and poor peasants, therefore within a short time they occupy the chair of leadership in the party and for the time being the peasants grant them their trust. Besides there are cadres who’ joined the party during the armed struggle in 1945 or even before then, thus in the days before the party had an agrarian program. At the time they were good cadres; they implemented the party's policy ‘with high spirits against imperialism. and took an active part in the campaign to crush the reactionary rebellion. But they are not agrarian cadres. "(29)
Aidit recognized that in the local leadership of the party, in the villages, many were "under the thumb of rich peasants and this is not in line with the membership of the peasant movement which | is mainly poor peasant. "(30) ae
Yet the slogan still remained, "Both mass party and cadre party." The fact is that the real cadres of the party stood at a distance from the mass members of the party. Thus the structure of the party was more or less like a mass organization. The cadres did not completely trust the mass members and tended to form many tight, secret rings within the party. The Lheaaeiehat daha ale character of the (27) D.N.Aidit, Forty tears of the PKI, p. 72.
(28). ibid..,°p. 89. . .
(29) D.N. Aidit, The Peasants Crush the Village Devils. Jajasan Pembaruan,, Djakarta. 1964. p. 55.”
(40) ibid., D. 55.
party: was thus intensified. And in a time of: crisis like last October, the party could do nothing. Instead of issuing instructions on what: to do to counteract the brutal massacre initiated by the reactionary forces, the top leadership scurried for safe spots (some of them going to: President: Sukarno's palace) which they knew about in advance, leaving the: mass.members in the lurch. Even two months after the | disaster: there!:were still many in the rank and file who.did not really know what was going on until they were massacred.: Some fought back, but only in personal defense. They still did not know whether the leadership was intact or not, what policy was to be followed, etc. The rank-and-file member was not privileged to know the real policy of the party. an ,
This state. of affairs proved to be very dangerous. Experience. shows that it is necessary to build a party of real cadres who have. _ a correct political line, who are actively engaged in political work |. among the workers and peasants, and who dare to conduct an armed struggle to achieve the: goals of the revolution. The party must have a program "which reflects the thought and experience of an authentic revolutionary movement, aims at really aiding the highest possible .revolutionary activity of the: working class, while. starting out from its most elementary demands." There can be no secrecy among the members, since all are cadres, while democratic centralism must rule. Everything is discussed by all members, but all act. in unity!
“Too Much Stress at the Top-
Because: of its.’policy of seeking to achieve socialism by: means of a "parliamentary democratic" struggle and.-building a false . "united national front," the party concentrated. its.struggle at the top instead of the bottom. Collaboration at the top was considered to be the best way to inch towards socialism. Activities centered -. around the "coalition cabinet" beginning in 1955, then around the "cooperation cabinet" in 1959, the last one being the "NASAKOM cabinet" in 1963.
The party sought to gain power through "working together" with its enemies.
Considerable progress was registered throughout this period. The masses were moving toward a revolutionary crisis. But they were not armed -~ not armed with a correct political line and not armed with real weapons to crush the reactionary ruling class. The peasants were set in motion to take over the land, to smash the domination of the feudalists. But there was no clear political line. And even the land take-overs were stopped because of the "impending probable" formation of a "NASAKOM cabinet."
The party did not protest the banning of strikes in industry because industry was considered to belong to the government, which was almost "a government of NASAKOM."
The party did not issue instructions to counteract the
o
military-fascist. suppression through armed struggle because "Sukarno is still at the top,” the: _'Pro- people | elements are still in the government. '
This line snould have ‘been reversed! All forms of struggle must be employed but the stress must be on building a genuine revolutionary working-class party, activating the masses in the revolutionary movement and preparing for. armed struggle!
In Conclusion -
The above criticism is not intended to undermine the role of. the PKI nor to arouse distrust in Indonesian Communism. But the revolutionary movement in Indonesia will be successful only if it learns from past experience, if it learns not to repeat the same mistakes.
Only true revolutionists have the courage to correct errors. Criticism and self-criticism constitute the best method of reaching: a more correct. line. Mistakes are bad, but not to understand the mistakes is worse; and the worst | is not to correct a mistake, having | recognized it.
The situation is now quite favorable for a new line. People in arms are to be found everywhere. The line between friend and foe is very clear. The brutal character of the reactionary forces is very obvious. The opportunistic character of a bourgeois leader like Sukarno is very clear. Whether the leadership of the party likes it or not, the masses cannot wait out the increasing massacre against them ‘any longer.: What is needed now is a politically correct, class-conscious and militant: leadership, which will lead an armed struggle to abolish the whole system of exploitation of man by man in Indonesia and establish a workers state!